

Austro-Marxism: The Ideology of Unity

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Austro-Marxism: The Ideology of Unity

Austro-Marxist Theory and Strategy

VOLUME 1

Edited by

Mark E. Blum
William Smaldone



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Preface

The present volume is part of a two-volume set that aims to bring a wide-ranging and representative selection of the works of Austro-Marxism's leading thinkers, including such figures as Otto Bauer, Karl Renner, Rudolf Hilferding, Max Adler, Friedrich Adler, and Otto Neurath, to an English speaking audience. Such a project is long overdue. Often referred to as members of the 'Austro-Marxist school', these activists and thinkers played a decisive role in shaping the political and intellectual history of Central Europe during the first half of the twentieth century.¹ While their theoretical contributions and political praxis addressed the full gamut of socio-economic, political and cultural problems facing Europe during that tumultuous era, many of their experiences and ideas also remain pertinent today. Coalescing as a group within the multiethnic and multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Austro-Marxists worked to construct a unified social-democratic movement grounded on mutual trust and co-operation. In a polity wracked by class strife and ethno-nationalist divisions, their efforts ultimately failed to hold the empire together as Austria-Hungary, like Germany, collapsed in the fall of 1918. Taking the reins of power in their defeated and truncated homeland, leaders such as Bauer and Renner grappled with Austria's political and economic isolation in a region now populated by an array of small, independent, and often hostile states, while Hilferding became a major political figure in much weakened Germany. In the new Austrian and German Republics of the interwar era, the Austro-Marxists worked to realise the aims of democratic socialism through the promotion of democratic social, economic, and political reforms at home and greater co-operation and integration abroad. Operating in a contradictory context of intensifying global economic and political rivalries, growing international interdependence and, after 1929, deepening economic crisis, as well as facing the growing threat of fascist counterrevolution at home, the Austro-Marxists were engaged in struggles not unlike many facing the contemporary world. Their defeat does not diminish the richness of their thought or the value of their experience for understanding the issues of our own time. As Richard Saage has recently noted:

Occupying oneself with the Austro-Marxists ... is quite apart from but one more nostalgic flight from the real problems of globalized capitalism and its neo-Liberal hegemony at the beginning of the 21st century.

1 See Bottomore's introduction in Bottomore and Goode 1978, pp. 1–2.

If one loses a memorial awareness of what Social Democracy addressed in its own history, our contemporary identity suffers, particularly towards the humanity to which we would contribute. In the light of the Austro-Marxist experience in its rise and fall, in its innovations and failures, a relevance for our own time is to be found.²

The cultural milieu of the Austro-Marxists, the arguably supranational society into which they were born, contributed to their aim of achieving what Austrian cultural historians have called ‘unity in diversity’.³ Examples of earlier political efforts to achieve this ‘unity in diversity’ can be found in the attempt of the Kremsier Constitution of 1849, and in that guided by Count Belcredi in 1867, who counseled Franz Joseph to conceive of his role as that of Emperor of a supranational state. Franz Joseph’s installation of the Hohenwart ministry which sought greater participation and authority for the Slavic peoples of the Empire, and the subsequent government under the leadership of Count Eduard von Taaffe – who also made concessions to the Czechs and other non-German nationalities – reflected his effort to greater federalise the national ethnic demands of Cisleithania.⁴ Balance was never fully achieved before World War I because of the countervailing demands of the Magyars who wanted a dual, rather than a federal, political structure.⁵ The Austrian Social Democratic Party followed a similar vision of federalism with their Brünn Program of 1899.⁶

Grassl and Smith argue that just as the politicians of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were compelled to develop policies that could address the centrifugal tendencies of a growing national and ethnic striving for autonomy with outreach towards these differences which could somehow generate and maintain interdependent co-operation, thinkers and artists were intuitively drawn to such frameworks of thought in their own disciplines. New ‘unities in diversity’ might be achieved to better accommodate interpersonal realities. Causation here might be seen as the role of community in the shaping of thought, akin to Aristotle’s understanding of the human as a *zoon politikon* whose frame of reality is the *polis* in its structuring of interdependent realities. The significance of how communal wholes between person and person were formed could vary; indeed, understanding this possibility of changing structures became a new metacognitive ground for the pioneering thought of Austrian minds. For

2 Saage 2009, p. 63.

3 See Grassl and Smith 1986, pp. 11–30. See also Blum 2003, pp. 131–42.

4 See Beller 2006, pp. 143–5.

5 Beller 2006, pp. 145–7.

6 See Kulemann 1979, pp. 120–6.

example, Gestalt therapy originated with Christian von Ehrenfels, who saw every form of a whole as the integration of parts that could very well be constructed into other totalising forms; the therapy was to comprehend how and why a person developed the *Weltbild* that they had, and to help them deconstruct and reconstruct a more effective totality to guide them in an interdependent world.⁷ Sigmund Freud's vision of a patient and a therapist meeting each other with the respective 'transference' and 'counter-transference' of their *Weltbilder* ('visions of the everyday world'), and realising a common, co-operative ground of dialogue to engender a new healing totality of understanding in the patient was another instance of this working within centrifugal forces of mind.⁸

These are among the movements of innovative thought among Austrians in all disciplines between the 1870s and World War I. The Austro-Marxists took up their political and social challenges with such a vision of achieving 'unity in diversity'. The nationality theory of both Karl Renner and Otto Bauer stressed a comprehension of the differing political-economic and cultural realities and consequent perspectives of the multi-national state of Austria-Hungary, enabling them to develop theory and strategies that could generate a federalist structure in their own land, but that could also serve as a guide for integrating diverse national-economic realities among other groups of nations. Bauer's theory, in particular, was a social-scientific method for comprehending the factors that shape a national ethnic group's experience over time, and how that people's normative mode of thought turned that 'community of destiny' into a 'community of character'. Socialisation of such groups required this finely attuned understanding of their past and present. As we will see in the initial issue of the Austrian Social Democratic journal *Der Kampf*, the Second International looked to the Austrians for such guidance. Max Adler, Friedrich Adler and Otto Neurath each took up the issue of 'unity in diversity' by focusing on how individual cognition was articulated to others, each stressing the interdependent bases of communication for community. As a neo-Kantian, Max Adler asked each person to examine how his or her ideation in its conceptual articulation might derail a socialisation that could achieve democratic equality. Friedrich Adler and Otto Neurath contributed to the Austrian movement of phenomenological exactitude in what transpired within the events of a life, particularly between persons. Adler was a Machian, whose philosophy of language and science demanded a phenomenal exactitude of the moment, and Neurath was a father of logical positivism, where all language was con-

7 Smith 1988; Smith and Mulligan 1988, pp. 124–57.

8 See Freud 1959a and 1959b.

sidered 'intersubjective', and had to be clarified for mutual understanding and consequently the co-operative socialisation of society. Karl Renner was also a theorist of law, and his careful attention to the concepts of law as political-economic expressions participated in this linguistically oriented methodology, which augmented Karl Marx's more generally stated insights into language, *Weltbild*, and praxis. Rudolf Hilferding, beyond his groundbreaking study of finance capitalism, could be considered a social psychologist in his address of the effects of political-economic conceptions of reality upon the populace. His methodological contribution to Austro-Marxism included this careful focus on the generation of meaning as the norm was established by hegemonic authority.

The continuing relevance of Austro-Marxist thought as social science derives not only from its methodologies – which will be presented in the translations of each Austro-Marxist in their careful procedural focus – but also from the very social problems each addressed. Among the structural problems of the capitalist society addressed by the Austro-Marxists are those of unemployment and its consequences in the dislocation of nationalities, which created the inter- and intra-national problem of 'irredentas' that gave rise to mutual hatreds and persecutions. Étienne Balibar's present studies of the global movement of populations in search of livelihood brings into question the organisation of national societies with a conceptual clarity that owes its formulations to the nationality theories of Otto Bauer.⁹ The effects of industry upon environment, now widely recognised as a global threat, was an aspect of the agrarian programme of Austrian Social Democracy. Moreover, this international vision of economic-environmental policy was also articulated with a vision of a market in-common, free from the tariff barriers that favoured capitalist practices in particular nations – a concern that is as marked in the present efforts of the European Union.¹⁰

The first editorial of the Austrian Social Democratic theoretical monthly journal *Der Kampf* in October 1907 reviews the critical issues it must address in its struggle within capitalist society, augmenting the above appreciations that have been made in our time. Each of the issues editorially introduced in the 1907 *Der Kampf* resonates with present concerns that are now on a global scale:

Fate has given the Austrian body of the International particular tasks, peculiar to its special circumstances, which are so individual, intricate,

9 Balibar 2004.

10 See Krätke 1997, pp. 23–4.

indeed so uncommon, that we have all that we can do here. Yet in consequence, the solution to our special problems can become highly meaningful, even in a good way prejudicial for the entire International ... We must and will limit ourselves fundamentally to the Austrian problems.

Every Proletariat develops its own special virtues according to the nature of its tasks. Just as the Germans are children of a people who are poets and thinkers, the master teachers of theory, the English models of union organisation, the Belgians masters of co-operative organisation, the French the path-finders in revolutionary and parliamentary tactics, the Russian finally in formidable models of personal struggle and sacrificial courage ... for the Austrian is reserved its own particular individuality. We have had and still have the difficult task of translating the *idea of internationality* into living reality.¹¹

This task of translating the *idea of internationality* into living reality is that of the Austro-Marxists and Austrian Social Democracy by dint of their existence in a multinational and multi-ethnic state where the need for co-operative integration was a daily concern – in politics, social issues, and in the very address of culture. Even after the rupture of this Austro-Hungarian state in the wake of the Treaty of St. Germain (1919), now truncated Austria had to address its own irredenta as well as the economic and geographical realities that tied it to the diverse nations that had broken away. If the Austro-Marxists could successfully address this need in their respective theoretical, strategic, and tactical activity, this could then be a model for the Second International and the Second and a Half International that arose after World War I. Moreover, as we examine the ideation towards this end by the Austro-Marxists over the decades of their praxis, their theories and strategies, in particular, will be seen as a path towards the global integration of multinational and multi-ethnic diversities. To consider Austrian Social Democracy as the ‘party of unity’, always their watchword, is to consider their multinational and multi-ethnic task of integrating diverse proletariats into a common body in a common struggle. The introductory editorial of *Der Kampf* continues by stressing this required unity among its several coexistent organisations of the proletarian struggle:

The political party, which engages significantly in our internal politics, our union movement that has become an economic power in production,

11 *Der Kampf*, Sozialdemokratische Monatsschrift, Vol. 1(1)(1907), p. 3.

our co-operative movement, that unifies the proletariat as consumers and thereby organises the political economy of our consumption, in short, all three factors of our movement, all three battalions of our fighting corps require a unifying scientific organ. In no country does there exist, as was laudably recognised at the Stuttgart Congress, such an integral co-operation of unions, co-operatives, and politics in one movement as in Austria – and this in spite of the marked economic and cultural differences of the country.¹²

The Editorial details the problematic nature of the pre-World War I Austrian state that gives rise necessarily to innovative theory in seeking this ‘integral co-operation’, a habit-of-mind that will continue after World War I:

Every other proletariat – also the Russian – sees itself with a typical form of state. We Austrians have to deal with a national chaos, with state laws that resist death, and with state institutions which cannot live, with a state union (between Austria and Hungary) which cannot live together, yet cannot find a way to sunder, with middle-age-feudal autonomous crown lands, which nations wish to dissolve, as well as unorganised, legally not constituted nations that the crown lands wish to tear apart. State communities, government, crown land, nation – none of them fully constituted or finally dissolved, all together a mixed creation of birth and death, ghosts, which we must encounter in full daylight, everyday, because our opponents are possessed by them! ... This quandary demands that we enter into the tiresome questions of state constitutions and state administration, necessitating judicial fine points and tactical finesse, compelling us against our will or taste to become *a constitutional lawyer for the International*.¹³

The thought of Karl Renner, in particular, takes up the ideation of the organisation of administrative procedures and of integrating differing cultural ‘nations’ into one co-operating society – certainly an issue that contemporary socialism must think through in the light of the European Union and the general movement to larger, co-operating political-economic spheres among nations. The current plight of Eastern European societies that were once of the Soviet Union, as well as the extant problems among the Balkan nations and their irre-

12 *Der Kampf, Sozialdemokratische Monatsschrift*, Vol. 1(1)(1907), p. 5.

13 *Der Kampf, Sozialdemokratische Monatsschrift*, Vol. 1(1)(1907), pp. 3–4.

denta, are constant reminders of the continuing pertinence of the problems *Der Kampf* had to face.

The Austro-Marxists became aware perforce of the coexistent differences of proletarian backgrounds and their corresponding differentiated levels of economic-political maturity. They were quite sensitive to the differing 'rhythms' of milieu development required for a peaceful evolution towards a classless society. The theories of Otto Bauer will address what he will term the 'community of character' of differing proletarian sections of Austria itself – a focus that methodologically has continuing pertinence for social scientists today in their study of any heterogeneous society. The 'community of character' is where the accidents of historical development ('the community of destiny') for that group are taken up by the cultural practices that enable them to cope with existence. The 'character' of a people must be considered in any policies that seek to enlist them in a mutual effort:

The multiplicity of nations and the state institutions correspond, half as cause and half as effect, to a colourful mix of economic and cultural developmental stages of the population. Every great nation of the West includes in spite of its provincial differences a similar way of thinking, a similar economic array of persons and thus is economically and culturally a unity. It is otherwise with us: German Bohemia stands at the same economic stage as Saxony, Upper Austria with that of Old Bavaria; East Galicia, on the other hand, has agricultural conditions similar to the Wallachian boyars or many other areas of Russia ... We have Social Democrats whose activity reflects the strength of mature capitalist development, as in Bohemia, and those whose activity is directed to the backwardness of their economy, as in East Galicia. We have in the International a coexistent temporal flux, in every proletarian milieu there is a rhythm of change: the socialism of craftsmen, journeymen, factory workers, mill workers, and agricultural workers is driven now by the purely political, now the purely social, now the intellectual side of the movement. Because of this, we, especially, in the Austrian movement have great economic-political diversity ... If we wish to make these differences useful, then we must investigate them fully and theoretically master them.¹⁴

From this imperative of integrative co-operation, accompanied by a clear vision of the scale of differences in economic practices, came the praxis of the

14 *Der Kampf*, Sozialdemokratische Monatsschrift, Vol. 1(1)(1907), p. 4.

'third way', 'Der Dritten Weg', associated with Austro-Marxist thought and the strategies which they encouraged as leaders of Austrian Social Democracy. The 'third way' was to emphasise democratic choice within and among constituencies towards increasing socialisation – whenever possible – of the political, economic, as well as cultural vision of the society. The Austrian Social Democrats eschewed the Russian Bolshevik emphasis upon force to change the political-social order, as well as the Revisionist satisfaction with incremental reforms that remained within the *de facto* and *de jure* capitalist horizon of society. The 'third way' was a strategy that cultivated the Marxist vision of the inevitability of the socialisation of the labour process and, consequently, the restructuring of the political system to accommodate the increasing interdependence and equality among all spheres of the population. Education was key to providing workers with this vision. Until the socialist horizon of understanding became axiomatic in the thought and actions of the common person, a socialist, classless society could not emerge. Thus, in contrast to the Bolsheviks' understanding of Marx's concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', the Austro-Marxists' view stressed democratic choice.

Yet there is a certain unintended self-contradiction in the Austro-Marxists orientation toward their own responsibilities. Their vision of a fully democratic, societal interdependence eschewed the grassroots level of decision-making. The freely chosen self-direction of individuals and groups was obviated by the strategic policies and tactical choices made by the Austro-Marxists, as the party's hierarchy of leaders were drawn from a small group, more or less deeded to this right by those who were in authority before. Viktor Adler, the father of Austrian Social Democracy, had kept a strong hand on power and authority within the Party. The party chain of command emanated from the Executive Committee, a body permanently located in Vienna that ranged from twelve to twenty members over the period of 1892 to 1918. All daily political action was controlled by the Executive Committee, which thereby effectively determined the interpretation of the party programme. The Executive Committee was elected at the annual or biannual meeting of the representatives from the various nations of Austria [*Gesamtparteitag*], but this election, which was purportedly to permit the masses to pick their own leaders and choose their own policy, was only nominally democratic. Of the approximately three hundred party members who were entitled to attend the party conference, only about 170 were elected delegates, and all came from the higher levels of the organisation. The remaining 130 places at the party conference were assigned on an oligarchic basis.¹⁵

15 See Blum 1985, pp. 11–13.

This top-down organisation of authority instilled in the Austro-Marxists a sense of duty and justified leadership that did not brook accommodation to voices from below. Often, the ideas and actions of Friedrich Adler and Max Adler were likened to papal articulations. The Austro-Marxists, as a whole, were not keen on the workers' councils. In the year or so immediately after World War I, these spontaneously emerging councils at times threatened to take up a Bolshevik style of violence in actualising a 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. Indeed, the Austro-Marxist 'top-down' practice of leadership made such grassroots authority impossible. Only in the writings of Max Adler did one read in detail of self-directed persons and groups, of the Utopian socialism to come, where even written law was unnecessary, as the socialised norms of interdependent equality enabled self-governance, indeed, anarchism in its most positive sense. Otherwise, the strategies of the Austro-Marxists relied upon their efforts to maintain a 'responsible and responsive' authority towards the membership of Austrian Social Democracy in its unions, co-operatives, and other cultural-educational associations. This self-justified authority was arguably of its age. Leon Trotsky had called the Austro-Marxists 'academic Marxists', and mocked their use of titles, such as 'Herr Doktor' in speaking with each other, pointing out that the norms of Austrian workers in speaking of or to them included the appellation 'Genosse Herr Doktor'.¹⁶ Georges Sorel, in the pre-World War I years, had attacked such leadership by what he considered professional intellectuals with his own syndicalist vision of grassroots proletarian socialisation.¹⁷ Nonetheless, the Austro-Marxists sought in their methodological contributions a redress for this hegemonic use of authority. Otto Bauer, for example, called for a study of the 'Mittelglieder' 'the forms of interpersonal organisation' by which a society performed its work and decision-making. This social-scientific attention to the distribution of authority inevitably would correct how even Austrian Social Democracy functioned. His ideas of such a study are still undeveloped in our contemporary world.

We have divided our translations into two volumes, the first being the ideas and derivative strategies of the Austro-Marxists. The second volume focuses more upon the day-to-day tactics of moving toward a socialist society, engendered by the augmentations to Marxist social-scientific thought in the ideation of the Austro-Marxists. The ideas that enabled new social-scientific lines of inquiry and new methodologies generated long-term strategies of socialisation. As Otto Bauer stated in his rejoinder in 1913 to those in the Party who

16 Trotsky 1930, p. 209.

17 See, for example, Georges Sorel 1976, pp. 78–9.

saw the need for the tactics of immediacy, uninformed by long-term trends in the productive activity of his society, and its corresponding political-economic structures: 'In the study of political questions, the methods of historical materialism [are] to be used. That is our greatest pride; that is what lifts us above the petit-bourgeois political rantings'.¹⁸ Rudolf Hilferding put this emphasis upon strategy generated by theory most pregnantly for the Austro-Marxist as political agents: 'The socialist outcome is a result of tendencies which operate in the commodity producing society. But acceptance of the validity of Marxism, which includes the recognition of the necessity of socialism, is neither a matter of value judgement, nor a guide to practical action. For it is one thing to acknowledge a necessity, and quite another thing to work for that necessity'.¹⁹ Working for that necessity requires tactical decisions, yet a tactics that has the strategic vision of Marxism always in focus. Strategy brooks the two volumes throughout. Karl Renner, Otto Bauer, Max Adler, and Friedrich Adler, as well as Hilferding, voice strategy in both their more theoretical and tactical writings. Otto Neurath's strategic understanding reaches to our own present. He was concerned more than his fellow Austro-Marxists on the multicultural world beyond Europe. His logical-positivist contribution to Marxism was a foundation for the empirical co-operation of humankind regardless of the myriad differences in cultural values.

In our treatment of tactical decisions of the Austro-Marxists, we have selected writings that take the reader from the emergence of these thinkers at the beginning of the twentieth century until its historic defeat in 1933–4. The conflict among the Austro-Marxists over tactics sheds profound light on their strategic differences, and their shared belief in a 'unity in diversity'. The years after World War I especially, as the new republic of Austria was formed, were characterised by strategic agreement, yet tactical differences emerged concerning 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' in Russia and its 'ripple' effects in Austria, and the contiguous new nations, such as Hungary. The socialisation efforts of the 1920s led to the new party programme at Linz in 1926, which occasioned a new round of tactical disputes among the Austro-Marxists. The growing fascist actions and tendencies of Chancellor Seipel and the Heimwehr led to constitutional changes in Austria in 1929, which helped prepare the ground for the Christian Social fascist state of 1934. Tactical discussions over these years are revealing in their questioning of the normative strategy of 'unity in

18 Bauer 1913, 'Die Grundfrage unserer Taktik', *Der Kampf, Sozialdemokratische Monatsschrift*, 7(2): 49.

19 Hilferding 1968, p. 21.

diversity' that had been the Austrian Social Democratic and Austro-Marxist foundation for decades. Finally, while there is a spectrum of tactical understandings among the Austro-Marxists, it is always informed by the strategy of unity among socialists and the assumption of the necessity of democratic choice among peoples. The extent to which the Austro-Marxist vision of democratic socialisation is one in which 'unity in diversity' stands as a central goal, achievable even through tragic disjunctions, makes the reading of their thought highly instructive for the present.

We wish to thank the Verein für Geschichte der Arbeiterinnenbewegung Wien for their cooperation.

PART 1

Introduction



Introduction

Every life is, more or less, a ruin among whose debris we have to discover what the person ought to have been. This obliges us to construct for ourselves – as the physicist constructs his ‘models’ – an imaginary life of the individual, the graph of his successful life, upon which we can then distribute the jags (they are sometimes enormous) which external destiny inflicted. We all feel our real life to be a deformation – sometimes greater, sometimes less – of our possible life ...

The matter of the greatest interest is not the man's struggle with the world, with his external destiny, but his struggle with his vocation. How does he behave when faced with his inexorable vocation? Does he subscribe to it basically; or, on the contrary, is he a deserter from it, does he fill his existence with substitutes for what would have been his authentic life?¹

ORTEGA Y GASSET (1932)

• • •

There is no *tabula rasa*. We are like sailors who have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being able to dismantle it in dry-dock and reconstruct it from the best components.²

OTTO NEURATH (1932)

• •
•

The Austro-Marxists chosen for this theoretical overview and anthology of their writings were all of the same generation, born in the 1870s and 1880s. These men not only contributed to the political, social, economic, and ideological history of their time, they were also affected by the world they were born into, ‘thrown into a certain history’, as Martin Heidegger would say. And, as Ortega y Gasset and Otto Neurath recognised in their own emphases, one inherits cultural norms which condition, even warp, one's praxis and personality. The cultural norms of Austria, norms developed over centuries of Habsburg rule, influenced

¹ Ortega y Gasset 1956, pp. 132–3.

² Neurath 1983, p. 92.

their intellectual perspectives. As one of the Austro-Marxists, Otto Bauer, convincingly argues, every nation has cultural norms that have emerged over its history that slant thought within its inherited perspectives. The Austro-Marxist generation was one that was born into the hope and efforts towards a democratic society, knowing not only the powerful vision of equality that emerged politically throughout the Western world in the political-social changes of the late 1860s into the early 1870s, but also the technological revolution which gave all classes access to a new everyday life of light, communication, and hygienic improvements. The ideas in the arts and sciences changed dramatically as well, giving a more complex understanding of persons, regardless of class, in their depth of thought, judgement, emotions, and cognitive abilities. The value of Austro-Marxist thought remains pregnant today, engendered as it was from the new horizons of modernism into which these men were born. The period from the birth of the Austro-Marxists until their young maturity in the pre-World War I years, and the refinements of these ideas in the 1920s and 1930s, was a chrysalis for thought that is still relevant for our global political-social world.

Austro-Marxist social theory shares, as we will see, a strong emphasis on the potential, as well as actual, unity among humankind, trusting in the rational leaven of reason to guide an understanding of why and how all persons are equal and capable of self-direction and self-governance. While each Austro-Marxist treated in this volume based their ideation upon the legacy of Marx and Engels, each was nonetheless individual in his philosophical base of thought. The mind-set of each man differed. Karl Renner (1870–1950) was more of an English pragmatic thinker, inclined to Locke and John Stuart Mill; his socialist thought was closer to the incremental day-by-day affairs of state and culture than any of the other Austro-Marxists. Otto Bauer (1881–1938) was essentially dialectical in thought, closer to the Hegelian tendencies in Marx than any other Austro-Marxist; Bauer's sense of historical flux was glacially slow, yet it enabled his cohorts and his *Nachwuchs* – those of us today who seek to learn from his socialist experience – to appreciate what Marx and Engels understood as the changing equilibriums of political-social reality. Max Adler (1873–1937) was distinctly Kantian, and a thinker whose categorical syntheses recall Schelling – who was often accused of submerging the particular in the totality – yet Adler's categories were fresh coinages, which like those of Schelling created avenues of thought remarkably new in their promise. Friedrich Adler (1879–1960) was consciously an adherent of what could be called the scientific existentialism of Ernst Mach. The delimiting of judgement to the phenomenological exactitude of immediate knowing was a movement in Austrian thought since Franz Brentano, a contemporary of Mach, and subsequently Edmund Husserl. Friedrich Adler brought a careful analysis of the contemporary events

of his life to his praxis, and was, along with Karl Renner, the most empirically-based Austro-Marxist thinker, albeit from this radical phenomenological position. The last two Austro-Marxist thinkers treated in this volume were theoretically similar in their philosophical underpinnings, one tacitly, the other explicitly. Rudolf Hilferding (1877–1941) can be considered a nominalist, in the sense of his careful analysis of economic and social categories, and the concepts employed by Marx, Engels, and other socialists. While attentive to empirical factuality, the stress of his contribution is on conceptual formulations that offered new insight into political-social-economic realities. Finally, Otto Neurath (1882–1945), a father of logical positivism – the significant nominalist empiricism of the Vienna Circle of philosophers [*Wienerkreis*], concerned himself with conceptual definitions and the ordinary meanings by which contemporary humankind communicated. While the Vienna Circle was aligned in its approach with Ernst Mach in its descriptive exactitude in observation, where concepts were as operational as possible, its efforts were more encyclopaedic in the redefinition of the sciences and the methodological guidelines for the sciences. Neurath also showed developmental phases of ideas, not in the dialectical vision that Bauer offered, but in a morphological advance of human conceptions over time, as they moved more and more towards an appreciation of the commonalities of being human – and thus, towards a democratic socialist society informed and structured by a more effective social science. Neurath's socialism embraced a greater swath of humankind than the largely Western orientation of his fellow Austro-Marxists.

Karl Marx provides the cogent overview of the issues with which all Austro-Marxist minds were engaged:

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.³

We will see that the Austro-Marxist thinkers – whose lives of mind co-existed with the revolution in personal agency brought about by depth psychology, secular existentialism, and other philosophical, psychological, social scientific, as

3 Marx 1970, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, p. 20.

well as artistic addresses of individuality – tempered Marx's insistence upon 'social production ... of existence ... independent of their will'. The Austro-Marxist thinkers lived in the Habsburg Empire, most maturing as thinkers in Vienna, Austria where many of the greatest contributions to the new understanding of complex individuality were created by their contemporaries, such as Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl, and Christian von Ehrenfels, all of whom will be read and considered by one or another of the Austro-Marxists. The stress upon education by the Austro-Marxists was directed to 'choice', to a focused will in the face of the plethora of other choices presented to the people of Austria by a still existent aristocracy, as well as the hegemonic voice of the bourgeois who defined 'normalcy', and thus 'normal choice'. To be sure, the most significant difference in the recognition by the Austro-Marxists from the creative minds in psychology and philosophy, as well as new social scientific thinkers that focused upon individual choice (such as Max Weber or Georg Simmel), was the Marxist foundation of thought that provided the new substantive ground of how and why individuals were free to think and choose with a deep understanding of their own subjectivity and their intersubjective relations: the role of self-chosen willing towards the omnipresence of others in every deliberation, and towards the social production of their mutual existence, was the Marxist orientation that was absent from even the best minds in Austria who did not question their societal structural inheritance. The Austro-Marxists recognised the objective facts of social production which the individual will could at best alter in minor ways through action, but to whose productive realities as process and material fact one could only adapt, accommodating their everyday lives and expectations to the bald material gravity of these realities. Nonetheless, to be a Marxist thinker meant to comprehend how Marx's social scientific theses could be augmented by new understandings of individual agency, integrating this newly understood personal dimension of everyday power into the theoretical validities of Marxist dialectical thinking – within the materially objective limits of one's possible effects on their lived context. The Austro-Marxists saw incremental development towards a socialistic society as not only seminally active in the bourgeois world of their time, but within the deliberative praxis required to further this development, seeking how the new understandings of human thought and will could better make this incremental development occur.

Lucien Goldmann, a student of Max Adler – one of the main Austro-Marxist thinkers – reflects in his thought, as a Marxist *Nachwuchs*, this balance between the determinism of social production of a time and the expression of free will studied in its nuanced manifestations in cognition and praxis by humanists and social scientists. His work augmented dialectical materialist understand-

ings within the compass established by his teacher Max Adler, even as Adler never fully developed it in his own cultural studies. Goldmann, writing in his monumental study of individuals within their context of social production in the mid-1600s, *The Hidden God*, indicates the necessary recognition of complex individuality, albeit in the deterministic structure and superstructures of that time. In his introductory presentation to his readers, Goldmann includes the significant fact that the mind of the person who looks back at such a past, the writer of history himself, is determined in his cognitive foundation by dint of the processes of social production in their foundation and superstructures of his own time, even within the free will and personal agency he can maintain in the material conditions of his own time. Goldmann, in establishing the freedom and determinism of his own cognition for his readers, refers to those thinkers who co-existed with the Austro-Marxists, the great psychological, philosophical, and social scientific thinkers of the Austro-Marxist generation, whose thought engendered a balance between the complex individual and the collective social realities into which a person is thrown by birth and the inherited practices into which the person is educated, and which form the ground of all a person's choices:

At a time when, thanks to the existence of psycho-analysis, of Gestalt psychology, of the work of Jean Piaget, we have a better awareness than ever of the extreme complexity of the human individual, there is something paradoxical in any attempt to understand the work of Pascal, Plato, or Kant by a study of their life. However great the apparent rigour with which research is conducted, any conclusion is bound to remain extremely arbitrary. We must certainly not exclude the study of biographical details, since these often provide extremely useful information. However, it will always remain merely a partial and auxiliary method which must never be used as the final basis for any explanation.

Thus, the attempt to go beyond the immediate text by incorporating it into the author's life is both difficult and unlikely to provide reliable results. Should we therefore go back to the positivistic approach, and concentrate on everything implied by a 'complete study of the text'?

I do not think so, for any purely textual study comes up against obstacles which cannot be overcome until the work has been fitted into the historical whole of which it forms a part.⁴

4 Goldmann 1964, p. 9.

Goldmann ends this thought with a reference to the ‘part-whole’ purview by which any individual act or, indeed, cooperative or collective movement must be judged. This is a theoretical perspective of Karl Marx as sharpened in its incisiveness by Max Adler – every human action and predication, every cooperative action and predication, must be understood within the totality of social processes that finally can be traced to their causative ground of social production – the goods, services, the technology, the normative social praxis attendant to the productive means and ends, and the attendant reinforcing ideas of this determined social basis of interpersonal life. No human action can be super-humanly heroic in its effects; intentions themselves arise in the immediate objectivities of existence – even for revolutionaries – from the existent ground of the totality of the forms of social production of a time. Individuals are cognitively able to discern the human thought and praxis that forms the deterministic net that embraces and contains them – as Max Weber expressed it, the ‘iron cage’. With new insights and methodologies, individuals can increase their ability to turn this determinism towards a new and more freely chosen system of production and social relations. This process, as the Austro-Marxists will argue, takes more than one generation. The weight of tradition and its material presence is too enormous to simply eradicate by any act of individual or collective will. The huge humanly constructed world of things, practices, and supporting ideation is only discerned and changed, at best, over a lifetime of activity.

The Austro-Marxists were Austrian, members of a multinational Empire, throughout their formative years, and even when this Empire was dissolved by World War I, they still formulated their strategies for social change within the understandings that came from their youthful experiences within the political, social, and intellectual dynamics of this complex political state. The experiences of their formative years of thought, and the praxis of their young maturity, established distinct foundations for their formulation and addressing of political-social realities. Here the epigraph of Otto Neurath has pertinence: there is no *tabula rasa* upon which an individual can write wholly original ideas, or create an entirely new life practice; rather his or her experience begins with the normative experience he or she inherits. The Austro-Marxists were sailors on a ship of state that was launched centuries and centuries before, sailors who inherited norms of the Austrian multinational Empire, some clearly recognised, while others functioned as a normative gravity, but not self-consciously considered. These inherited norms influenced how the Austro-Marxists thought about politics and life; indeed, such norms influenced the very formulation of their ideas. In describing and judging the Austro-Marxists as thinkers and political activists, one must understand that they had

to work with the materials and ideas 'at hand', and the imperfect development and failures of their ideation and action must take this inherited ship of state into account. We will see that Austrian Marxism had a distinct praxis that was shared with non-Marxist parties of Austria, as well as interpersonal values, which were shared over the entire Austrian political spectrum. As Lucien Goldmann indicates, Piaget's view of developmental psychology is among the pertinent bodies of theory that an intellectual historian must bring to a comprehension of how the Austrian Marxists formulated the thought of Marx and Engels. Distinct norms of ideation and praxis can be recognised in their collective life of thought and action, norms that each man's distinctive philosophical orientation accommodated as an aspect of its expression. One must attend these commonalities as well as the distinctive individual differences. Why did the Austro-Marxists stress 'unity' among all members of the Austrian Social Democratic Party, but also a unity, in the Second International, the Two and One-Half International, and even through some means of conjoining with the Third International, over the course of their life of thought and praxis? The answer is more complex, more deeply-rooted in each man's thought than the self-evident fact that socialism is an understanding of a collective equality among its members who share certain essential forms of social production as a means of life, and that all who are socialists comprise this unity. The Austro-Marxist intention to comprise a unity among themselves, the workers of Austria and the world, and the other socialist parties of the Western world of their time (and the non-Western world as they then knew it) was rooted in their political-social Habsburg inheritance.

Since Charles IV was the Holy Roman Emperor (1355–78) there was a conscious policy in the Empire, especially within the German-speaking lands of Austria and Bavaria, and the Slavonic realms, to reconcile national ethnic differences in order to establish a cooperative societal praxis. It is worth quoting a significant twentieth-century historian of the Holy Roman Empire, Friedrich Heer, on this propensity that I will argue can be seen as an inherited norm in politics, jurisprudence, as well as philosophy, psychology, and social science in the centuries to follow, even up until today within Austrian political-social norms of thought and praxis:

In the Golden Bull (1356) Charles admonishes the electors to see that their sons learn the Italian and Slavonic (i.e. Czech) languages, as this would improve their handling of imperial business and lighten their task, 'since the fame of the Holy Roman Empire arises from the variety of customs, ways of life and language found in the various nations which compose it, and it requires laws and a form of government which pays

heed to this variety'. This is the best 'definition' of the Empire there is, and even the greatest of the Habsburg rulers took it as their guide. Charles' autobiography, written as a 'Mirror of Princes' with the didactic purpose of showing how the Christian prince ought to think, act and live ... Charles used his sacral political position in the Empire to promote his policy of reconciliation.⁵

The 'variety of customs, ways of life and language found in the various nations which compose it' remained the state composition of the Austrian Empire until 1918. This variety of customs, ways of life, and language was addressed by Charles IV through legislative policy, but also with the rhetoric of autobiography. The human proportion of a personal life, in its way of understanding self and others, and acting towards and with others, became a model for socio-political praxis in his Habsburg descendants, and the culture around these rulers. The personalism of an autobiography which Charles IV reintroduced to the Christian Middle Ages, one of the first autobiographical expressions since St. Augustine's classical humanist text, followed the more profound insight into the deliberations of subjective self-understanding, called by some a Second Humanism that emerged in the writings of Aquinas and Dante less than a century before. This Second Humanism, and the Third Humanism⁶ which developed among the contemporaries of the Austro-Marxists, are perspectives of judgement that continued prominently in the arts and sciences of Austria over the lifetime of the Austro-Marxists. These perspectives gave a complex 'human proportion' to all life issues, so that abstract ideas were always deliberated with life instances of persons interacting in their choices, in the ways of life suggested by certain ideas. Moreover, Austrian humanistic expression, in the writings of nineteenth-century writers and thinkers, stressed interpersonal realities, each character having a voice as valid as the person who spoke alongside or against the protagonist. In contrast to the cultural norms of Germany, the 'human proportion' was dialogical, indeed, of multiple voices. Analysis shows German norms to be more didactic, univocal in its imparted and imposed perspective.⁷ In the history of Austrian letters and the inquiry into approaches and explanations of the arts and the sciences, one can see this emphasis upon multiple voices participating in an interdependent interaction.

5 Heer 1969, pp. 116–17.

6 See Thomas Mann's discussion of the Second and Third Humanism, the latter emerging in his youth with the insights of depth psychology and philosophy, as well as the literature and art of that time – i.e. the greater complexity of mind and individuality – in Mann 1939, pp. 189–93.

7 See Blum 2003, pp. 131–42.

It can be recognised in the Austrian Shakespeare, Franz Grillparzer's *König Ottokars Glück und Ende*, as well as later in the nineteenth century, in the novelles of Adalbert Stifter's *Bunte Steine*. This humanistic praxis is the necessity of each person listening to what was said, and relating it to his or her own view before responding. The philosophy, science, and literature that arose within the influence of the Third Humanism generated this interdependent 'human proportion' that included a deeper, non-conscious intelligence, and the concomitant requirement for a more effective listening and empathy. Whether the dialogical therapy of Sigmund Freud that recognised transference and counter-transference between therapist and patient – placing both, respectively, in error as well as normalcy – or the oblique tales of Franz Kafka – where the imperfect narrator discovers his errors through the voices of those with whom he interacts – or the dramas of Hermann Bahr – such as *Der Querulant* where the multiplicity of linguistic forms of address (Kanzleideutsch, and the 'Mundarten' of Austrian provincial speech) weave in and out of the dialogue, becoming weapons of communication by which some suffer and some command authority – or the new oral history of Heinrich Friedjung that allowed the historian and his agent in dialogue to flesh out the varying possibilities of what had occurred (his interview with Otto von Bismarck on the latter's intention towards Austria in the 1860s), to be an Austrian mind one had to open one's own thought to the parallel or transversing thought and action of others. Friedrich Nietzsche saw this profound recognition of the multiple voices of events in his appreciation of Franz Grillparzer, when he quoted him in *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life* (1874). Grillparzer wrote:

What else is history ... [E]very person at the same time has his individual necessity so that millions run in directions parallel to each other in crooked and straight lines, cross, support and restrict each other, strive forward and backward and in this assume the character of chance for each other, and so, leaving out of account the influences of natural events, make it impossible to demonstrate a penetrating all-inclusive necessity of events.⁸

The perspective of this interpersonal 'human proportion', or its absence, will be a significant factor in how the Austro-Marxists thought, argued, and addressed their audience. Every educated Austrian was submerged by their *Bildung* into this interpersonal depth. To fail to live or think within its model, stimuli, as

8 Nietzsche 1980, p. 35.

well as its constraints that barred didacticism, the univocal point-of-view, was against the grain of Austrian *Bildung*. One can best understand this ‘personalism’ in relation to Marxist thought by considering Jean-Paul Sartre’s attack on Georg Lukács whose Marxist generalisations ‘liquidated the particular (i.e. the complexity of the person) by the generalization’.⁹ In its best instances, Austro-Marxist theory reveals individuals in their everyday life and mutual concerns. This is especially true of the writings of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer. Indeed, the Austro-Marxist theorists often create dilemmas for themselves when they feel into the ordinary person’s issues that belie the ethics demanded by a party position.

The great cultural tradition of this intersubjective human proportion extends from Charles IV through Austrian history with exemplars in every generation – in literature, the arts, and politics. One reads of this interpersonal ‘personalism’ as the public policy of administration in the Habsburg multinational state in the writings of Josef von Sonnenfels. Administrative policy and praxis at this time was within the scope of European cameralism, governance by chambers headed by the ministers of monarchs. Austrian cameralism was distinctive in its interpersonal focus. Sonnenfels demanded that Austrian officials, in their proactive oversight of agriculture, trade, and manufacture, engage the populace with intersubjective understanding, with respect to each client’s particular situational needs.¹⁰ Moreover, Sonnenfels emphasised ‘the aggregate will’ of the populace in its differences as a baseline for formulating public policy within the Empire. His statement that ‘even the ruler has no more rights than those equated with their stewardship of this “aggregate will”’,¹¹ can be seen as a direct link to the democratically multi-ethnic policies of the Austro-Marxists. German cameralism was more distant in its interface between official and client, directed by statute-law, more *laissez-faire*, but thereby more impersonal.¹² The German cameralists stressed, on the other hand, the state as having its own reasons in the interests of the people, but not in the sense of being its aggregate will.¹³ I will speak of this distinction between Austrian and German thought as the former insisting on a totality where ‘the one is the many’, and the latter as ‘the many is the one’.

9 Sartre 1967, p. 28.

10 See Sonnenfels 1820 [1784].

11 See Small 1909, p. 484.

12 Sommer 1920, p. 12. See also Sommer 1951, p. 160. It should be noted that Sommer’s 1920 study appeared in Vienna in the tumultuous years when administrative praxis was on the minds of the Austro-Marxists, as the new Republic was formed.

13 See Dittrich 1974, pp. 52–4. See also Sommer 1920, pp. 162–4.

The dichotomy of the Austrian interpersonal concerns and the German legal rights-based concerns was also reflected in criminal law. Sonnenfels used his influence to 'soften' criminal justice and its punishments. Albion Small writes of this 'softness' in relation to the written law:

A favorite idea of his was that in criminal cases the penalty of ascertained guilt should be determined by the vote of the majority of judges; the question of guilt or innocence however, as well as of the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, should be settled only by a unanimous vote. In practice this proposition would in most cases simply lead to the release of the accused.¹⁴

Reinhard Merkel has pointed out that this 'soft' attitude toward a rigorous application of civil or criminal law persisted in Austrian society, differentiating it from the German.¹⁵ Paragraph 48 of the 1803 legal code, and paragraph 4 of the 1854 legal code, called 'ausserordentliches Milderungsrecht', were designed to regulate the parameters of exceptional circumstances and the accordingly softened penalties. Increasingly, this 'mildness' became a self-evident norm in Austrian justice. In 1911, a German jurist referred to the 'anarchical condition of Austrian legal practice' in this regard.¹⁶ It is this 'softening' of categorical differences between public groups, even among the political leaders who will consider themselves political-social enemies, which in the Austrian mind is a normal praxis. We will see this 'shades of gray' public praxis in the Austro-Marxist policies in relation to their 'class enemy' the Christian Social Party, and its leaders. What Otto Bauer will define as an 'equilibrium of the classes' is formulated in the spirit of establishing cooperative, if theoretically hedged, policies and legislation before and after World War I.

The profound contributions in interpersonal understanding that arose in the forms of practice in Austrian psychiatry, law, drama, literature, and the fine arts in the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century *fin de siècle* culture can be linked to this stress on the intersubjective nature of human reality and its ancillary ethic of reaching cooperative, empathic, common practices that was the hallmark of the Austrian governance of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, and its successor governments. Even in the autocratic regime of Franz Joseph, one sees the centrality of the issue of an interpersonal, cooperative understanding

14 Small 1909, p. 484.

15 Merkel 1994, pp. 90–2.

16 Merkel 1994, p. 91.

in public policies. In characterising Frantisek Palacký's vision of what had to be done to insure coherence of the Austrian Empire in the time of the young Franz Joseph, Robert A. Kann writes:

[H]is plan, or plans ... realized that the solution of the Austrian empire problem, the establishment of a just balance between centralistic and national federative forces, did not rest in setting up fairly homogeneous units, but in the establishment of a true coordination and cooperation among these forces.¹⁷

Coordination and cooperation, the inherited praxis of Austrian cameralism, continued as the self-evident normalcy to be brought to any socio-political conflict. This acting within the intentions of coordination and cooperation ran through all policy attempts to integrate the allegiance of the nationalities in the unity of Empire, from the liberal attempts at a constitution which equalised rights among the Empire's nationalities in the post-1848 era – most notably, the efforts of Kremsier in 1849 and, under the influence of the Czech Palacký, Count Thun's and Clam-Martinić's efforts to counter the policy of German centralisation of the Empire in the 1850s, which found resonance in the October 1860 constitution of the Empire – through the enduring conservative aristocratic realisation that equity must be found among the nationalities if the Empire was to function, which was witnessed in the attempts of Hohenwart-Schäffle in 1871, through Taaffe and Badeni in the 1890s, and the influential programme of Popovici which attracted the support of Count Czernin in the decade preceding World War I.¹⁸

Thus, we will see coordination and cooperation as the guiding, self-evident thought of the Austro-Marxist thinkers in all matters of political, social, and economic policy within the working class and its differing spheres of work, yet also between the classes within the very recognition of class warfare – a warfare that prompted in Austro-Marxist thought and the political praxis of their Austrian Social-Democratic Party many occasions for coordination and cooperation between 1889 and 1934 among the active combatants. Writing of the Austrian Social-Democratic *Brünn Party Program* (1899), Kann again shows us the policy norms of coordination and cooperation: 'the fact that the programme of Brünn introduced and manifested the reconciliation of the work-

¹⁷ Kann 1950, p. 27.

¹⁸ The best review of these efforts at 'a true coordination and cooperation' between the centralistic and national federative forces from 1849 through 1914 is to be found in Kann 1950.

ers with the Austrian Empire idea. Its consequences, had they been rightly understood by the government, might have entailed hope for a future permanent solution of the national problem'.¹⁹ Almost all historians of Austrian Social Democracy have recognised this policy stance in all their issues, even when the centrality of the attitude is not given adequate significance by them. Peter Kulemann, for example, in his discussion of the 1907 Austrian Social-Democratic Party Congress brings out Viktor Adler's support of the 'minimal' political programme of the party that avoided the notion of violent overthrow, and insisted that the taking of political power need not be stressed in articulated principles, because a political party is self-evidently interested in having power within the state.²⁰ Adler's guiding message of cooperating and coordinating within the existing aristocratic-bourgeois parliamentary system became the very foundation of policy for the Austro-Marxist thinkers who continued this line of thought, especially in contradistinction to the Bolshevik model of violent political and military action that emerged after World War I.

Our volumes are divided between the theory and the tactics of Austro-Marxism. In its translated texts, this volume considers theory as 'strategy', that is, ideas that contributed in a manifest articulation to long-term praxis which enabled the development towards and realisation of socialism. In his 1979 review of Austro-Marxist theory, Raimund Loew emphasises that political activities were the central conditioning factor of their theoretical work, and thus theory was in its own articulation 'strategy': 'As active political leaders, the Austro-Marxists saw their theoretical activity determined, at this point, by the political tradition of the movement in which they stood, and by the problems that faced the Social-Democrat(ic) Party'.²¹ What characterised Austro-Marxist theory was its emphasis upon action within social-economic environments. All its individual proponents adhered to Marx's Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it'. These strategies emerge from a complex of factors: each man's theoretical approach to Marxist thought, as well as from their own social-psychological conditioning within Austrian norms of thought, and the distinctive psychological aspects of their individual personalities. Lucien Goldmann's tenets of interpretation – themselves indebted to the creations of the complex thought of the Austro-Marxist generation, and yet which incorporate the

19 Kann 1950, pp. 156–7.

20 See Kulemann 1979, pp. 78–81.

21 Loew 1979, p. 1.

further insights of his own later generation – will inform my own approach. I trust that the further augmentations of Austro-Marxist understandings that I incorporate in my interpretations are cognisant of their own theoretical self-understanding, benefiting from the historical awareness of the historical ‘linguistic turn’ that is normative now in the early twenty-first century. Moreover, my appreciation of the continuing (even heightened) relevance of the seminal possibilities of Austro-Marxist ideas – as a ‘strategy’ for supporting the fundamentals to be developed further for the realisation of a socialist society, where societies as such will be developed in the differing cultures of our global reality – can be considered a move beyond the limited historical account of differing periods of thought that separate the Austro-Marxists from today in its ideational analyses. Rather, the fundamental building blocks of an interpersonally complex, effective, and interdependent society, are to be seen as a structural possibility on the foundations of Austro-Marxist ideation.

One will find that the Austro-Marxists had seminal ideas that are still very relevant, despite them having not been fully developed during their respective careers, either because of the pressures of the socio-political issues which demanded their attention, or due to problems of personality that sapped energy and focus. Otto Bauer offered a *mea culpa* as early as 1907 in relation to the case studies which would have developed the detailed analyses of the cultural-historical character of each European nation, and the implications of these respective national characters for the path and character of socialism in those respective nations. Friedrich Adler and Max Adler did not see the possibility of micro-sociological studies of interpersonal behaviour encouraged by later Marxists such as Lucien Goldmann, studies that could have made their ideas so significant in comprehending the very *sociation* [*Vergesellschaftung*] that remains the core problem of our capitalist societies – competition – which seems to be respected as gravity itself, obscuring why and how ameliorating cooperation could be furthered. Thus, Ortega y Gasset saw clearly among his contemporaries in 1932 this incomplete address of vocational potential when he challenged them with the following question: ‘Does [the person] subscribe to [his vocation] basically, or, on the contrary, is he a deserter from it, does he fill his existence with substitutes for what would have been his “authentic” life?’ Our task in this anthology of Austro-Marxist writings is to show the acuity of each man’s social and political thought, and the methodologies brought to their interpretations and strategic policies, and yet also to indicate the still undeveloped potential of their respective ideas.

PART 2

Overview of Austro-Marxist Theoreticians

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Max Adler

Alfred Pfabigan complained in his biography of Adler that the latter repeated the same ideas over and over throughout his career of thought, from his early twenties onwards, and that his early thought was little better than a sloganising, which shared with his fellow Austro-Marxists the communication of ‘illusions masked with pompous expression’.¹ Although Pfabigan adds that Adler’s early concepts were deepened with a more philosophical justification in his maturity,² his reading of Max Adler fails to see how a philosophical mind works. Max Adler, as any significant thinker, formulates a key idea, little more than a metaphor initially. A career of thought is required to ground it in its plethora of implications, and integrate it critically against the history of ideation it challenges. Marx’s initial ideas in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* required such a lifetime to test within the historical facts of the cultural past and his changing present. Max Adler’s thought is a gradual refinement of his earliest ideas, summarised initially in his 1904 *Kausalität und Teleologie im Streite um die Wissenschaft* [*Causality and Teleology in Conflict over Science*] – when he was 31 years of age, and developed further in contradistinction to the thought of others of his generation in publications over the next several decades. Through a focused amplification of aspects of his central ideas over several decades, by the time of his last major work, *Das Rätsel der Gesellschaft* [*The Riddle of Society*], he was able to provide links to every major social philosopher of his time. Allow me a metaphor to characterise the process of thought over time in which Adler had to engage if his thought was to be properly prepared: he had to take up the diamond-like density of his core concept, and cutting and polishing its surfaces to enable its brilliant contribution to the understanding of social thought to be adequately seen, even by Adler himself.

Nonetheless, Max Adler could have done more with the application of his thought to human issues, and perhaps Pfabigan’s negative judgements of Adler’s life of the mind and his lifelong praxis is made, in part, by a certain flatness of interpretation Adler brought to the understanding of other thinkers and those around him. This flatness is an inability to probe the complexity of human relations. The diamond-like density of his neo-Kantian, Marxist social theories generated valid understandings of the generalised human in historical society. His own gem-like conceptions were not offset with suf-

1 Pfabigan 1982, p. 8.

2 Pfabigan 1982, p. 14.

ficient contrast that genuinely appreciated the depth of other lives in their careers of thought. Yet, as we will see, the intellectual biographies of scores of other historical thinkers filled the pages of his works over his lifetime, as if he sought again and again to actuate the Austrian norm of personalising thought at the level of biographical or autobiographical complexity. Otto Bauer and Karl Renner will give us a clearer view of the full personality of others, as well as of themselves, as their respective socio-political ideas are developed. Bauer and Renner – themselves not free of psychological defences that limited self-understandings – were still able, influenced by the Austrian humanism of their education, to help us see their contemporaries as struggling individuals, each having their own dignity and even justice in their choices of existence – even when these choices did not square with their own Social-Democratic scheme of values. In his theoretical writings and his tactical praxis, Bauer will evidence elements of psychological interference, but not to the extent that one finds in the thought and praxis of Max Adler, and his fellow Austro-Marxist, Friedrich Adler. Max Adler shared with Friedrich Adler powerful psychological defences against a depth understanding of self and others. Friedrich Adler's psychological defences stemmed from his relation over his life to his father, where his choices can be interpreted as a resistance to the super-ego presence of his father, and other issues that stemmed from what Freud famously termed the 'Oedipus Complex'.³ Max Adler's condition was not that of the Oedipus Complex; rather it was the experience of being always 'separate' from the immediacy of 'others', indeed, an 'asocial individualism'. Can this be so in the case of a Marxist who devoted his life to the proletariat and his interactions within the Austrian Social-Democratic Party? Yes, if such association is more an abstract identification than the physical-spiritual interactions of the everyday in its changing times, places, and manners. There is evidence of this abstract distancing in his thought, writing, and, to a degree, in the praxis of his everyday life, a life which suffered from a psychological condition that kept him from knowing the imperfections of self and others, which preserved him from knowing his own mortality in its everyday efforts. Pfabigan, who has more biographical primary evidence than any other person of Max Adler (other than Adler's own immediate family) speaks of the absence of the particularities of life in the thought of Adler, and consequently in the public record we have of his ideation and engagements with others: 'The concepts of a public and a private life ... is not applicable for Max Adler. Other than the public, professional-political biography, his course of life was without

3 See Blum 1985, pp. 140–52.

events (ereignislos). In spite of intensive investigation, we can only give a few dry-as-dust dates. That is the case for his youthful life as well.⁴ Of course, there were events, marriage, children, and the many interactions of someone who entered into public political controversy continually over a life. What is true is that in these engagements a distance of mind and spirit separated him from the empathic agon with singularly distinct others. In my book on the Austro-Marxists, I described his condition with the Jungian concept of the *puer aeternus* – the eternal youth.⁵ Max Adler's psychological defence against an introspection of his own everyday experience was carried over into an inability to see in depth how others were conflicted in making choices. Adler's self-justification for his neglect of the everydayness of self and others in its complexities was given in his last major work, *Das Rätsel der Gesellschaft*, in which he expressed disdain for the 'the historical personality', which he viewed as 'dross' that interfered with a proper conception of the societal significance of the ideas he is charged with by his spirit: 'The person was and is only a historical form – dross [*Schlacke*] of the past – in which an impersonal, enduring spiritual content appears, which often does not show its full importance, until it is freed from that element that is called the historical personality'.⁶ Adler uses distinct Marxist and neo-Kantian Marxist categories to create a topology of human actions in history, but never descends into human choices at the level of the immediacy of persons, places, and things. Here, again, one must see the counter-example in Jean-Paul Sartre's use of the life of Gustave Flaubert in

4 Pfabigan 1982, p. 11.

5 Blum 1985, pp. 115–22. See von Franz 1981. I give here some of the introductory remarks von Franz offers on the psychological condition's symptoms, ones which, besides the 'asocial individualism', are complained of by many of Max Adler's associates in their challenges to his thought and tactical positions. Von Franz writes: 'there is always a fantasy that sometime in the future the real thing will come about. If this attitude is prolonged, it means a constant inner refusal to commit oneself to the moment. Accompanying this neurosis is often, to a smaller or greater extent, a savior or Messiah complex, with the secret thought that one day one will be able to save the world; that the last word in philosophy, or religion, or politics, or art, or something else, will be found ... There is a terrific fear of being pinned down, of entering space and time completely, and of being the specific human being that one is' (von Franz 1981, p. 2). Max Adler's propensity for educating others into a belief in the future, while not pedagogically unsound, are out of balance in their relation to the immediate situations which occasion his voice. Alongside his conception of the perfect justice of the classless society, these are trains of thought that fall into this symptomatology, and are attacked as such by fellow Austro-Marxists (see articles by Otto Bauer and Friedrich Adler included in this volume).

6 Max Adler 1936, p. 118.

his *Search for a Method* in bringing alive the idea of a class-based influence on thought.⁷

Yet it is vital for this historian of ideas to preserve the enduring ideas of the Austro-Marxists, free of all psychological limitations at their core; ideas that can enable us in their seminal value to better comprehend and act within our present. While for contemporary relevance, augmentation is necessary for all Austro-Marxist ideation, this is but a natural historical necessity that the Austro-Marxists themselves saw as being needed for the ideas of Marx and Engels. As we will see, understanding the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels as a 'social science', not a philosophy of existence, meant that ever new applications and refinements of Marxist concepts were required for the inquiry into what transpired in the contemporary world and acting accurately towards these more clearly identified political-social-economic problems. Moreover, regarding Max Adler's position of the historical personality as 'dross', I do not deny that the historical personality carries with it the spiritual treasure of ideas whose significance is inherited to be taken up anew by each successive generation. *Art is long, life is short* (Hippocrates). I only add that, as with Jean-Paul Sartre's study of Gustave Flaubert, a spiritual idea that carries the understandings of past generations into the present with its heightened acuity, must not only be augmented with its stimulus and chrysalis engendered by the general political-social-economic influences of a time, but also descend into the mental and cultural struggle of the thinker himself or herself who wrested the idea into coherence.

The core idea of all Max Adler's thought is that of *Vergesellschaftung*, which is translated here by the uncommon English usage 'sociation'.⁸ By this term Adler referred to the manner in which humans organise their inherent interdependence as a species in a societal form. This concept is introduced by Adler in his first major work, *Kausalität und Teleologie im Streite um die Wissenschaft* [*Causality and Teleology in Conflict over Science*] in 1904. Adler cites Aristotle's definition of human ontology as that of a *zoon politikon* as he introduces the concept of 'sociation'; human nature as requiring a communal association will be a central idea that is informed more and more in his development of corollary ideas and their historical exemplifications. In this early use, he sees Marx's

⁷ Sartre 1967, pp. 57–64.

⁸ See 'sociate' in Murray and Bradley's *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles*. The first definition is 'associated *with* or *to* something or person; joined *together*'. The implication of a tight or, indeed, fused association one finds in the 1526 use 'sociate and kynitte', and Daniel Defoe's political use in 1706: '... who made the patrimonial power comply, and sociate Rule submit to Monarchy' (Murray, Bradley et al. 1919, p. 359).

own use of such an ontology, quoting Marx in the footnote to his own sentence where ‘vergesellschaftet’ is the verb describing the ontological human need and capacity for community:

In society producing individuals – thus the societally determined production of individuals is naturally the inception point (see *Critique of Political Economy*) ... The human is in the most literal sense of the word a *zoon politikon*, not simply a *sociable* animal, but an animal that *can only individuate itself within society*. Production by isolated individuals beyond society – a rarity, which could occur accidentally to a civilized person who became trapped in the wilderness and who already dynamically possessed the forces of society – is as great an absurdity as the idea of the development of language without individuals living together and talking to one another. We need not dwell on this any longer.⁹

Adler repeatedly comes back to this idea, with it becoming more and more central to his thought, as well as in his choices and justifications of praxis. In 1930, in his *Lehrbuch der Materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung* [*Instructional Manual in the Materialist Conception of History*], he offers a chapter entitled ‘The New Concept of Sociation’. His initial paragraphs in this chapter give evidence of the growing significance it has to him and should have for others – for, evidently, 26 years of use in his writings had still given it little traction as a vital conceptual instrument for the development of socialised institutions.¹⁰

The concept of sociation with Marx is throughout a new kind of concept of an essentially *sociological* character, that is, it contains no ethical or psychological meaning in itself.¹¹ The *new* slant of this concept has not yet been properly

9 Max Adler 1904, pp. 180–1, n. 2, citing Marx 1903, pp. 710–11.

10 Max Adler 1930, p. 220.

11 Karl Marx uses the concept of ‘Vergesellschaftung’, ‘sociation’, in *Das Kapital*, Volume 1, in his discussion of how capitalism generates a ‘sociated’ organisation of labour that will inevitably burst the envelope of capitalist organisation (Marx 1957, p. 803). The English translation of the term in that passage is ‘socialisation’, but this conflates the pre-socialised societal organisation with what will become socialised, which is the significant difference which Max Adler indicates in his argument that this is a ‘new concept’ not adequately understood by even socialists. See the English translation of the ‘Vergesellschaftung’ in the following comparison: The German original: ‘Die Zentralization der Produktionsmittel und die Vergesellschaftung der Arbeit erreichen einen Punkt, wo sie unverträglich werden mit ihrer kapitalistischen Hülle. Sie wird gesprengt’. The English translation: ‘Centralisa-

understood, and not only by opponents, but also followers of Marxism. One can best clarify the concept if one shows the difference between the concept of sociation, and a long-existing concept with which it is often confused, that is, the concept of the sociable nature of humankind. When sociation meant only that the human was a sociable being, then one could say that Marxists have taken up an old understanding which Aristotle himself knew, merely giving it a new name.¹²

It must be brought out that Aristotle's much-cited statement that the human is a 'Zoon politikon' has not been well-understood when it is translated in the usual way, that is, the human being is a sociable [*geselliges*] being. In reality, the Aristotelian proposition says the human is a political being, that is, a being intended to live in a state, a being who cannot be conceived other than as a member of community, who cannot live otherwise, and that this concept is that which is understood as sociation [*Vergesellschaftung*], which is something quite different from the concept of a social life [*geselliges Zusammenhang*].

Max Adler's concept of 'sociation' is an ontological one. Human beings are in their cognition and instinctual bases communal creatures. The history of humankind gives witness to the fact that every society has integrated its population into some 'sociated' form of existence – that is, the creation of an interrelational system that regulates the ownership, acquisition, production, and distribution of the means for sustaining and valuing life among all who live together. In Adler's concept of 'sociation', this arises not merely from the causal needs of the human group, but from the very way in which humans conceive of themselves and their environments.

Max Adler's reliance on Immanuel Kant's ontology of human cognition and social existence is central to this thought over his entire life, and this influenced

tion of the means of production and socialization of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder' (Marx 1926, p. 837). 'Sociation' captures the interdependence of tasks generated by capitalism more accurately than the term 'socialisation', which in fact will not exist until a later, political stage. One can argue that unionisation is a 'socialised' form of labour under capitalism, but to do so loses the phasal specificity of the historical materialist understanding, as well as the epistemological-cognitive comprehension that Adler attributes to Marx in his understanding of the development of social forms.

- 12 George Simmel uses the concepts of 'Vergesellschaftung' [*sociation*] and 'Geselligkeit' [*sociability*] as identical in that 'Geselligkeit' is 'how sociation [*Vergesellschaftung*] is concretely realised as an intended relationship in society'. The Wikipedia article states further that 'Geselligkeit' for Simmel is the sense in which the process of sociation 'Vergesellschaftung' is lived [*erlebt*] as a value in social reality. See [http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vergesellschaftung_\(Soziologie\)](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vergesellschaftung_(Soziologie)).

Otto Bauer, in particular, in his early development of socialist ideation. Adler found in Kant a conceptual treasury that he saw as not only deepening the foundations of Marxist thought, but enabling a more effective Marxist social science. 'Sociation' as an *a priori* potency of mind was recognised in Kant's table of *a priori* judgemental forms. Kant included its intuitive perception or cognitive idea of the 'totality' of all members of any deliberation under the cognitive power of *relation*, that is 'of community (reciprocity between agent and patient).'¹³ Adler termed this category of the understanding 'the social *a priori*', that cognitive order imparted to every conscious predication which created an explicit or implied *relation of interdependence* – *at least for that predication*. Language itself came from that need to include others in what one perceived. Kant addressed this interdependence of being human in thought and in one's everyday praxis among others in an essay that can be seen as a foundation for Max Adler's reflections on individualism and interdependence. In the Fourth Thesis of *The Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Standpoint* (1784), Kant wrote:

The means employed by Nature to bring about the development of all the capacities of men is their antagonism in society, so far as this is, in the end, the cause of a lawful order among men.

By 'antagonism' I mean the unsocial sociability of men, i.e. their propensity to enter into society, bound together with a mutual opposition which constantly threatens to break up the society. Man has an inclination to associate with others [*sich zu vergesellschaften*]; because in such a condition he feels himself more as a person, that it is, feels the development of his natural capacities. But, he also has a strong propensity to separate himself from others (isolate himself), because in that he expresses his unsocial characteristic of wanting everything to go his own way, expecting, in turn, a resistance on all sides from others, knowing the others feel as he does. This resistance is that which awakens all the abilities of the human being, brings him to overcome his disposition to laziness, and driven by a search for honour, mastery over others, or merely greed, he creates for himself a rank among others, whom he cannot tolerate, but from whom he cannot withdraw. In this way the first true steps from barbarism to culture occur, which express the real societal value of the human being.¹⁴

13 Kant 1965, p. 113 [A 80, B 106].

14 Kant 1922, p. 155.

Is such competitive conflict inevitable? One will see in Max Adler's discussions of Kant an awareness of Kant's own bourgeois limitations. Adler saw the 'sociation' of the bourgeois society which emerged in its force of idea in the late Enlightenment as a troubled, distorted possibility of how humans could conceive the 'ranks' that ordered how one stood among others. Kant's paradoxical dilemma of being human – of wanting to sociate, but wanting to be isolated – generated the values of a competitive society. Adler saw how the sociative practices of unionised labour and cooperatives were a truer expression of the 'social a priori' which even Kant formulated in his *relational* concept of the *a priori* understanding. Kant used the concept of *vergesellschaften* as the very gravity of the human world – the inescapable pressure to be among others, even in one's own self-imposed separateness. Socialisation required sociative practices, but these sociative practices could vary from enforced slavery, to varying forms of hegemonic oppression and suppression, to a sociative form that actually enabled democratic socialisation – the interdependence of equals who through free will maintained their voice in a cooperative system of living. From an Aristotelian perspective, 'sociation' was the *energeia* that inhered within the human instinctual and cognitive capacity, but its *ergon*, its visible forms of praxis, were dependent upon human conditions and self-understandings that did not necessarily realise the equality of rights that corresponded to the fact that every human had this same natural propensity to join with others by an act of free will. Max Adler dedicated his praxis as a Marxist thinker and activist to social theory, as well as pedagogical theory, the fundamentals and the praxis that could transform how 'sociation' was to be understood and practised. The society into which he was born was a society that educated all as if the Kantian formulation of competition and the desire to integrate with others were essentially an insoluble paradox. One could only relate to others through the work given one to perform over a lifetime by the existing system of production. Thus, as did Kant who could not see past his own bourgeois-instilled social values, one accepted this view of the dilemma of human nature – to compete and yet to desire to integrate – as one's lot. But Adler argued for a future possibility in which human nature found a better balance, where individual expression could be singular in its individuating movement of thought and action, yet be able to more easily integrate with others because of how interdependence formed the basis of these individualities' cooperation. Human nature itself would be enabled to find its actuality in new forms and, thereby, in a new appreciation of human capacity.

Max Adler's effort to think through 'sociation' as a principle of human nature, indeed, as the species foundation for the formation of socio-political systems, oriented him in his early readings to one particular thinker who has baffled

his biographers, Max Stirner (1806–56). Adler's fascination with, and indeed respect for, Max Stirner seems contrary to a Marxist mind. Stirner has been characterised as the archetypal anti-social thinker of the nineteenth century. Adler's first writings dealt with Stirner, as early as 1891, and his involvement with Stirner's thought lasted throughout his life.¹⁵ A biographical essay appeared in his 1914 studies in the history of ideas of socialism,¹⁶ and an article intended for a social scientific encyclopaedia was found in his *Nachlass*.¹⁷ Stirner's 1844 book *The Ego and His Own* [*Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*] has been referred to by those of his time as one of the prime texts supporting the radical, societal-denying anarchism of the nineteenth century, and has engendered late twentieth-century appreciations of its early post-structuralism, as well as its secular existentialism.¹⁸ That Karl Marx attacked Stirner at length in *The German Ideology* makes Adler's deep interest in Stirner even more curious.¹⁹ Alfred Pfabigan asks: 'Why Stirner? Surely, there must be correspondences of content between Adler and him [to be discerned]'.²⁰ Pfabigan, who belittles the depth as well as the development of Adler's thought throughout his political-social-intellectual biography of him, discounts that there is a genuine linkage. The only answer given by Pfabigan is the correspondence between Stirner's rebellious individual subjectivism and Adler's youthful, young-Marxist, rebellious spirit, quoting a passage from Adler's unpublished take on Stirner in 1900 'with such a marked individuality there must be an even stronger, unmistakably self-conscious spirit which completely transcends things, knowing no other limits than those which he himself sets'.²¹ There is truth in Pfabigan's recognition of a subjective identification based upon the young counter-culture intentions of each man. But in the attraction of Stirner's self-imposed path and limits, there is also an objective relation to what Adler understood as the Marxist conception of personal autonomy in a democratic society. It is this objective connection that moved Adler to take up Stirner again and again throughout his own life of mind. Writing of 'sociation' in his 1930 *Lehrbuch der Materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung*, Adler offers the main idea that he will find as an implicit centre of gravity in Stirner's *The Ego and His Own*:

15 Pfabigan 1982, pp. 14–27.

16 Max Adler 1914, pp. 173–99.

17 Pfabigan 1982, pp. 14–27.

18 See Paterson 1971, and Newman 2001.

19 Marx 1976.

20 Pfabigan 1982, p. 25.

21 Pfabigan 1982, p. 26.

Even loneliness and unsociability are only possible within sociation. One cannot separate oneself from society, one can isolate oneself only within society. Indeed, even the hermit and the hater of humanity, as long as this is not pathologically expressed, are bound to society, just that they want to know nothing of it. A really isolated individual is a condition that begins where his spiritual connections to others is interrupted, that is in madness. When Marx once said that Robinson is a figure in a novel that could never appear in an actual economy, that is also the case for sociology.²²

For Max Adler, as we see in his 1914 essay on Max Stirner in *Wegweiser: Studien zur Geistesgeschichte des Sozialismus*, Stirner's demand that one set one's own course and limits was the cornerstone of the Marxist democratic vision of change in society from the ground up, from the will and choice of separate individuals who came to recognise their interdependence, but whose thought may not have begun with that appreciation. What mattered most was an individual judgement free of any authority that dictated the limits to thinking and acting that were not self-imposed. Yet always in Stirner's thought was this background of societal gravity, which must be comprehended in order to insure the autonomy of self-directed praxis. Adler writes:

It is not one who is separated, isolated, or vaunting a super-human singularity who speaks. The singularity [*Einzigkeit*] claimed [by Stirner] is only the middle-point in relation to the points of the periphery; the universality of will, feeling, and thought contained in the idea of one's own ego and that of another. Any act by the person takes into consideration this individual singularity of self and others in order to properly appreciate what inheres in an act. Thus, 'the singular individual' is not a necessary adversary of the in-common, in the sense of the public-at-large, he only does not wish to be its sacrifice.²³

Adler continues this line of thought, using Stirner as a pragmatic example of a praxis guided by the Kantian categorical imperative, in a way that also makes Kant relevant for Marxist democratic praxis within society in its current and changing nature:

²² Max Adler 1930, p. 223.

²³ Max Adler 1914, p. 188.

In egoism, Stirner understands an essential determinative aspect of one's psychic nature, that is the universal manner of practical comportment *within which* the differences in value of every ethic occurs. This is an ethical orientation in which good and bad are not conceived in terms of their social usefulness or harmfulness, rather only within the commandment to obey the categorical imperative (i.e. act as if your willed choice is universal for everyone), thus there is not contradiction to be seen in its egoism in that such egoism is to be seen as its mode of action, not that which defines its ethical value.²⁴

The importance of such a willed egoism for societal change is developed in more depth as this chapter continues:

Stirner asserts that egoism is for him even more important than freedom. Egoism means being oneself in thought and feeling, that is the independence of a spiritual being; to be one's own self is not merely to develop one's own character, rather such a stance enables one to develop an individuality in a form which connects one to others in a way that is no longer compelled, rather an act established by one's own choice. 'How can you truly be an individual', asks Stirner, 'so long as a connection exists between you and I?' If this connection remains, we cannot separate ourselves from it. If a bond encompasses us, we are something other than ourselves, and our twelve makes a dozen, our thousands a people, our millions humanity itself ... [O]nly when we are separate individuals can you be as you really are in our intercourse with each other.²⁵

Stirner, and Adler, here eschew the liquidating generality of a concept that includes all, insisting upon the singular individuality that can, in an aggregative agreement on particular issues, combine with others for what can be done in-common. Adler immediately states after the above sentences of Stirner's that they negate the 'solipsistic' accusation of his egoism.

Adler quotes Stirner's revolutionary view toward the compulsion exercised over our self-definitions by the competitive society of capitalism, demanding that the individual liberate oneself from the 'must do's' that inhere in the definitions of one's place in the world, and thus one's identity, given to one by society. Stirner states: 'It is always more useful to form a unified view concerning human

²⁴ Max Adler 1930, p. 191.

²⁵ Max Adler 1930, pp. 192–3.

work so that we do not waste all our time and effort within the competitive demands of the present. In this regard, communism can bear fruit'.²⁶ This citation gives evidence that even though Stirner attacked the communist thought of his time as robbing the individual of his own self-establishment of how life is to be lived, because it would create a system of community with its own compulsive authority, where one was a 'communist', a bond that negated individual difference and choice, he nonetheless saw the most heinous limit to an individual existence of the actual present – the bourgeois conception of meaningful activity in competitive work. For Stirner and Adler, only command of one's own time and choices could enable the full development of one's capacities as an individual. Nonetheless, while Adler saw the necessity of a systemic effort of the adherents of socialism, his post-World War I writings were devoted increasingly to the tenets of such a systemic effort politically, socially, and pedagogically, Stirner's refusal to see the need for any systemic effort towards a more humane society led Adler to pen his final essay on Stirner that was included in his posthumous papers, entitled 'Den Fehler Stirners, Allgemeinbindungen überhaupt zu negieren, hat zum Teil Marx korrigiert, indem er die klassenmässige Realität und Gegensätzlichkeit dieser Bindungen aufzeigte, zum Teil aber erst die erkenntniskritische Soziologie (Max Adler) völlig widerlegt, indem sie zeigt, wie alles menschliche Leben überhaupt auf vergesellschafteten Bewusstseinsformen und dadurch auf formalen, allgemeinen Bindungen beruht' [The error of Stirner was to negate the universal connections (between persons), which Marx corrected in part (in *The German Ideology*) in that he showed the class-based reality and contradictions within the connections, but Stirner's error was completely exposed through epistemological sociology (Max Adler), in that all human life was grounded upon the sociated forms of consciousness, and thus upon formal, universal connections].²⁷

Stirner had created an ideational platform of a thought-problematic for Adler as early as 1891, when he was but eighteen years old, that would engage him for the rest of his life. The problematic comprised: the role of consciousness in resisting existing conventions, the impositions of others, and its power to generate its own praxis, and how we are bound in our intentions by common practice and its justifying concepts and systems of interrelating within society. Change in these systems required a clear understanding of how one formulated judgements, a deeper comprehension of a process, not a manifesto of beliefs – even Marxist beliefs. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Critique of Practical*

26 Max Adler 1930, p. 195.

27 Pfabigan 1982, pp. 19–20.

Reason became texts that offered an avenue into why judgement was ultimately singular for each individual. Max Adler's significant augmentation of Kant was to be the cognitive *a priori* concept of understanding that Kant understood as 'relation', which was expanded in Adler's writings to the more fundamental 'social *a priori*' which generated in its percepts of immediate experience, as well as in its precepts of verbal understanding, a foreground and background of *totality* – each attended person, place, thing, or idea was considered in the known totality of its relations, or possible relations, as its implicit referential universe. 'Sociation' was the praxis, the pragmatic fulfillment of how this totality informed the particulars attended. The competitive, bourgeois reality submerged the totality, deforming its presence, highlighting only separate individual realities as property and in their properties. In order to understand how to change the system, functional practices needed to be informed by the interdependent 'totality' that was the ecology of all existences.²⁸ Adler's focus upon the intentionality of willed action will be seen as informing Otto Bauer's and Karl Renner's significant thought on the cooperative activities in factories and in the consumer cooperatives. Many of the translations of Adler's work in this volume deal with epistemological issues of judgement. They are by and large neglected today, and not translated, as they seem to be a spectre of the neo-Kantian Marxism that is ignored as a past metaphysics. What can be clearly seen in Max Adler's work on cognitive operations of judgement is how our predications are influenced by certain conceptual heritages, and how through a phenomenologically-informed reflection upon everyday experiences in society, we can begin to counter the deforming conceptual heritage of systems of living that prevent the cooperation central to a socialised society.

Max Adler can be seen as one who prepared the Marxist social psychology generated by his student Lucien Goldmann. The crucial chrysalis of how our intentions are formulated within a consciousness warped in its judgements subtly by our social systems. There were non-Marxists, contemporaries of Max

28 The concept of 'totality' became a Marxist heuristic in the 1920s with Georg Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), and was central to Jean-Paul Sartre's methodological heuristics in *Search of a Method* (1963). The connections to Max Adler's career of thought from 1904 through 1936 with this concept of totalisation in his discussion of the 'social *a priori*' cannot be overlooked – though not directly established, as neither Lukács nor Sartre developed their use of 'totality' and 'totalisation' with the epistemological framework so carefully worked out by Adler. Lukács' references to Max Adler in his *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* (1924) are a single sentence in length and dismissive in tone, an unfortunate trait of criticism that one can see as normative among those socialists whose tactical positions influenced their theory; see Lukács 1977, pp. 18f., 103, and 183.

Adler, who contributed to the epistemological deepening of intentional life, who offered a more complex palette of understandings more properly differentiated than the more general concept of the 'social a priori' or its praxis as 'sociation'. Focus on the intentional life of persons was of the age of the Freudian non-conscious intelligence. Edmund Husserl and his student Max Scheler examined conscious judgement from a phenomenological perspective. Scheler, who published his own more differentiated approach to what Max Adler had already termed 'the social a priori', was known by Adler; they evidently read each other's work. But Adler was only critical in his sole address of Scheler's thought in his late 1936 work, *Das Rätsel der Gesellschaft*.²⁹ The implications of the intentionalities that generated certain 'sociative' relationships were in Scheler's publication of *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, between 1913 and 1916.³⁰ Scheler's characterisation of the 'sociative' praxis, while he does not use this term, which infuses the intentional directions of our thought and its fulfillment in action, could be put into (or taken from) the mouth of Max Adler:

Thus, not only does everyone discover himself against a background of, and at the same time as a 'member' of, a totality of interconnections of experience which have somehow become concentrated, and which are *called* in their temporal extension *history*, in their simultaneous extension *social unity*; but as a moral subject in this whole, everyone is *also* given as 'person *acting with others*', as a 'man with others', and as 'co-responsible' for everything morally relevant in this totality.

We must designate as *collective persons* the various centers of *experiencing* [*Erlebens*].³¹

Scheler was concerned with identifying the manifold of value-toned intentions within the social intercourse of the members of large groups, small groups, or between friends and family. The nature of our intentions that can be co-existently complex in their character in any one situation among others, from interacting impersonally with them for one's own ends, to sudden cooperative interactions required for the mutual goals of the moment or of longer range, to a more primary personal caring for these particular persons, for reasons that emerge in the praxis itself. For Scheler, recognition of this diverse spectrum of

29 See Max Adler 1936, pp. 161–4.

30 Scheler 1973.

31 Scheler 1973, p. 520.

intentionalities and the values carried by them were more important than the diverse material goals towards which these value-toned intentions among others were exercised:

For it is by virtue of their intentional *essence*, and not on the basis of their contingent *objects* or what they empirically have in common, that these acts are factual acts, that is, *social* acts, acts that find their fulfillment only in a possible community.³²

There is no hard evidence, but one can imagine Scheler having read Max Adler's *Kausalität und Teleology im Streite um die Wissenschaft* as stimulation for his phenomenological address of social realities as they are created through the intentional praxis of persons. They were almost year-mates, Scheler born in 1874. Scheler eschewed socialism; he felt that communities of cooperating, mutually-respecting persons occurred only through the intuitive, immediate actions of need generated by in-common concerns.³³ Socialism, for him, was too explicitly thought out as a system; its very theory an obstruction in the immediacy of an intentional act, as awareness of the societal ethos of the system reifies the intentions of praxis. Only the natural care and concern that generates the social act is the true expression that can solidify a community.³⁴

Scheler's phenomenological sociology might have helped Max Adler develop actual studies of the complex wealth of intentionalities that occur in the praxis of everyday life, for example, of the workers in factories. After all, Max Weber studied the reports of worker's intentional acts in his factory studies between 1905 and 1910, developing from these studies the art of the open-ended question, which enabled the differentiated motives for work behaviour to be articulated and studied, so that problems in, as well as what facilitated, work might be more carefully addressed.³⁵ Yet Adler did not take advantage of the publications by non-Marxists either before World War I or in the 1920s, when these materials first became available from Scheler. Adler never conducted empirical studies of cooperative activity with a phenomenological rigour that might develop his own more general theory of 'sociation' further. That would have required close attention to the behaviour of individuals with one another, their spoken thoughts, gestures, and emotive expressions. Adler considered

32 Scheler 1973, p. 521.

33 Scheler 1973, pp. xxiii, 373n., and 503.

34 Scheler 1973, p. 503 ff.

35 See a discussion of Weber's research in Lazarsfeld and Oberschall 1965. The empirical record of data can be found in Weber 1924, pp. 61–225.

such a proximate phenomenological study of the intentions that 'sociated' one with another a mere plane for 'metaphysical' assumptions. He wrote in his 1936 address of Scheler:

[F]or merely describing a phenomenological fact does not enable one to comprehend the reality of one's fellow man. For even the greatest immediacy in the experiencing of a lived content creates only subjective evidence for us, not an objective knowledge of its existence. It is the major error of this theory that the evidence of the living experience of another can be substituted for a critical certainty of that person's reality.³⁶

What Adler saw as the basis of objective critical certainty was the systemic form of the 'sociative' practice within which the person acted and interacted with others. One could know the essential intentionalities of another by understanding the system of intentionalities of a certain social form of intercourse. The Marxist comprehension of the systemic deformation of human nature, and consequently the person's intentional life, was more vital to recognise than the manifold of intentionalities that might occur within the interactions dominated by this systemic reality. The workplace was competitive because of capitalism. If a workplace was to be cooperative, it required not only structural changes within it to facilitate non-competitive practices, but also a change in the productive system in which such societal work was done. Certainly, Max Adler is correct in this Marxist caveat, even if at the same time one must understand Adler's hesitation to engage in such 'phenomenological' studies of the 'this-there' of specific interactions as the pathology of the *puer aeternus*, the resistance to an in-depth inquiry into the mind and motivations of self and others. Yet the Marxist caveat is very important, and must accompany phenomenological understandings. His student, Lucien Goldmann, justly criticised the group dynamic movement of Kurt Lewin which emerged in the United States after World War II, because even those who engaged in the self-study of how cooperative interaction could be improved – significant understandings realised through a phenomenological rigour of group reflection and intervention – when returning to their work-sites failed to sustain what had been experienced in the group learning. The systemic drive of the capitalist society infused the praxis of those who had learned to see the problems of cooperative interaction, chilling these potential gains in the demands of their everyday life. Goldmann wrote of this lack incisively:

36 Max Adler 1936, pp. 161–2.

Let us add that microsociology in general, and sociometry in particular, which may offer a limited but indisputable usefulness, *on condition they are framed within a comprehensive vision*, become distorting as soon as they attempt to comprehend – and this is most frequently the case – relations between the individuals who compose a partial collectivity (such as a scholarly class, factory or village) outside of essential social groups (such as social classes and nations) and antagonisms, balances or collaborations between them.³⁷

Indeed, micro-sociologists within the group dynamics movement saw the lack of carry-over from group experiences to the actual workplaces of the participants, in Goldmann's words, as a failure to take into consideration in praxis the larger collectivities within which the micro-group functioned.³⁸

Goldmann's call is for what might be called a two-pronged address of 'sociation', a study of the larger system of productive relations in a society, which informs the political, economic, and social 'strategies' that can inseminate the existing system with practices that foster socialism, but accompanying these larger understandings, with the political and legislative actions that actualise them, with a phenomenological 'micro-sociology' of how 'sociative' intentions are expressed in the everyday encounters among persons at work, at home, and in other societal sites. The objective evidence for the structural changes, both large and small, required for the liberated humanity sought by Marxism are the product of these macro-sociological and micro-sociological studies.

Max Adler was to concentrate only upon the macro-sociological studies from a Marxist perspective in the moiety of his post-World War I theorising, continuing, however, to work on the epistemological understandings that supported his idea of the 'social a priori' in how it engendered 'sociative' systems of cultural praxis and value – but never with the micro-sociological studies of actual practice in work environments that social psychologists who were not Marxists had begun.³⁹ After World War I, Adler turned to the real opportunit-

37 Goldmann 1969, p. 48. Jean-Paul Sartre has the same essential criticism of Lewin and the micro-sociological movement in his *Search for a Method* (Sartre 1967, pp. 68–9).

38 See House 1967; Liberman, Yalom and Miles 1973; and Smith et al. 1992.

39 See, for example, the inquiries into worker performance conducted under the guidance of Elton Mayo at the General Electric Plant in Hawthorne, Illinois, from 1924 until 1933. The micro-sociological studies conducted over this decade, which attended the thoughts and behaviour of workers with one another in small groups, was also attentive to macro-sociological factors of the plant's environment as a profit-seeking business, as well as the larger political-social economy. See Mayo 1946; Landsberger 1958; and Gillespie 1991.

ies of a revolutionary environment in Vienna in his thought and writings, taking up themes of what a classless state would be in the future, and what the transitional stage of the proletarian class struggle in the post-World War I Austria should accomplish. This macro-question understandably was foremost in the minds of those who were active in Austrian Social Democracy. One could insist that there was ample opportunity in Vienna for Adler to study the complexity of human intentionalities among others, even as he worked for systemic change. But the times for any social activist were more of initiating systems than studying them. Workers' councils had begun in the factories, democratic goal-setting, and cooperative forms of self-administration were being attempted. Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, especially, were keenly interested in these efforts, seeing them as the structural changes within the bourgeois, capitalist economy that were seminal and a model for the greater changes possible, as the Austrian Social-Democratic Party continued to both gain and lose power over legislation and administration within the new republic of Austria. The political efforts of the 1920s into the early 1930s commanded the attention of Adler and his fellow Austro-Marxists, with theory becoming less evident in their writings.

Max Adler's *Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus* (1922) was an example of this concentration upon what the systemic form of a political-economic effort in the present and the future might be for social activity in the post-World War I world. In its conception, it was an extended polemic against Hans Kelsen (1881–1973), who had been instrumental in the constitutional framework of the Austrian Republic. One finds in the 315 pages of this text Adler's vision of the transitional movement from a class-based society to the classless society of the future. The non-need in the future for a formal judicial system is one of the most interesting sections of his text, a discussion which sets the Marxist idea of 'anarchism' in contradistinction to the historical forms that had emerged in thought and actuality before World War I.⁴⁰ Adler used a term later in the early 1930s to describe the systemic goal of socialists that can be traced to the writings of Max Scheler in his aforementioned writings between 1913 and 1916, that of the 'solidarity society'.⁴¹ For Adler, the solidarity society was to be the classless society, having overcome class-based distinctions in the sociation of everyday life.⁴²

40 Max Adler 1922, esp. chapters XV–XIX, pp. 217–316.

41 See Scheler 1973, pp. 527–38.

42 See Max Adler 1964, pp. 12, 34–6. The title of this posthumous work was given by his editors after World War II, based upon his own plans to publish a third volume of *Lehrbuch der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung* that focused upon the concepts of 'solidarische' and 'unsolidarische' sociation. See Adler's projection of this work in Max Adler 1936, p. 184.

Of particular interest in relation to Adler's further development of his epistemological ideas regarding sociation, and its underlying ontology of consciousness – the social *a priori* – is his second volume of *Lehrbuch der Materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung* (1932), in which he takes up the issues of personal and social psychology. His position is that of environmental causation, where the distorted sociative impulse affects persons and groups. One of the most interesting sections is his use of Sigmund Freud's concepts of the 'super-ego' and 'regression', where Adler uses these concepts to explain the bourgeois belief and praxis on an outmoded form of economic life.⁴³

Max Adler's pedagogical efforts were constant over the course of his life, before and after World War I. This dimension of his thought was oriented towards engendering a body of ideas that could stimulate a belief-based praxis among the young. Adler's pedagogical thoughts enable us to appreciate how 'propaganda' was conceived as a level of rhetoric that in itself was not false, as it has come to be understood since World War II. He uses the term in his 1922 *Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus* to describe how the results of the Marxist scientific method in delineating the changing course of society is to be disseminated so that the 'moral' strength and purpose of socialists is upheld in everyday praxis.⁴⁴ Writing late in his life, he gave a more direct definition of what 'propaganda' was, and what it accomplished, in the face of criticism of the term, and its socialist usage:

For Marxist propaganda is not that which the opponents of Marxism and the socialist workers movement usually imply, a merely political and party-based means of agitation, rather it is the generally understood [*populäre*] communication of the necessary sociological knowledge of the economic structure of the capitalist society, and from that understanding what is the necessary class-standpoint. And it is the goal of such dissemination among the industrial proletariat and throughout all levels of proletarian life to correspondingly further the conscious transformation of the thought and will of this populace so that in the forms taken by their thought and will the desired political and cultural consequences will follow.⁴⁵

43 Max Adler 1932, pp. 161–4.

44 Max Adler 1922, pp. 294–5.

45 Max Adler 1964, p. 33. Of interest in this regard is the general understanding of socialist movements in the post-World War I societies, that 'propaganda' had a positive meaning. In the United States, for example, The Socialist Propaganda League of America was established in 1915 by C.W. Fitzgerald, as a direct lineal antecedent of the Left Wing Section

Adler's epistemological consideration of 'belief', as an ontological dimension of how we form judgements, supports his use of the understanding of 'propaganda' as a necessary level of communication to others. Based upon a Kantian understanding of 'belief', Adler makes a genuine contribution to the phenomenology of judgement.⁴⁶

of the Socialist Party and its governing National Council – the forerunner of the American Communist Movement. The term 'propaganda' can be traced to 1622 when a branch of the Catholic Church was created that called itself *Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* [*Congregation for Propagating the Faith*], which was informally known as *Propaganda*. See <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propaganda>.

46 Max Adler 1924, pp. 226–43.

Otto Bauer

Otto Bauer's most significant theoretical contribution to Marxism, indeed to historiographical analysis as a field free of any political standpoint, was his thought concerning nations – their origins, historical existence, and, as a source of investigation never carried out in writing by Bauer, how the character of nations differed from one another in the everyday life of persons. The latter understanding, which was central to his observational historiographical method – honed in his deliberations of the Austrian nationality conflicts – especially between the Germans and the Czechs over the period of his young maturation, is an orientation that remains to be explored by contemporary cultural historians, and that is pertinent to the globalism of today. Bauer saw that each nation has its own cultural 'character', given to it by the actions and supportive ideation of those who addressed the 'destiny' of their societal development in the midst of other nations of varying strengths. In our contemporary world, where nations are changing their character because of global emigration and immigration, transnational economics, and transnational economic, political, and social institutions, the coming-to-be, the changing character, and even the eclipse of nations is of equal if not greater relevance than it was in Bauer's time.

Otto Bauer's address of this cultural character, which is termed by him as it is today 'national character', synthesised several philosophical, social scientific, and natural scientific perspectives that emerged from the late nineteenth century into the decade in which he wrote the most significant book of his career, *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy* [*Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*] (1907). His approach to 'nation' is from the fulcrum of 'national character', and what is still seminal in his development of this concept is the person-centred focus, which provides potentially a point of examination that embraces both the formal and informal educative experience of the person in his or her maturation. For Bauer, national character is a complex cognitive foundation that generates a praxis, which integrates many levels of individual, family, community, and societal historical legacies and self-representations. This complex cognitive foundation which is the amalgam of 'national character' is found in every judgement and judgement-based behaviour of an individual. The individual, through his or her comprehension of a state-of-affairs, directs his or her will towards a certain kind of engagement with others that has a certain horizon of possibility and meaning. The 'national character' which the person inherits from his or her upbringing and education determines the contours of this comprehension, and thereby the person's praxis.

What is remarkable about Bauer's treatment of this complex cognitive basis of judging and praxis is the detailed menu for further research into the role of a cultural nation upon the thought and praxis of the individual. The individual, for Bauer, is always an interdependent being, who may not be fully aware of this embeddedness in the cultural milieu of others. Interdependence is a Marxist understanding; indeed, Marx was the first to fully comprehend the gravity of this interdependence, and how vital the concept was for social scientific inquiry. Bauer's concept of 'national character' shows how a Marxist can augment Marx's own conceptual direction, particularly in relation to the problems posed by the inheritance of cultural differences if an interdependent cooperation among humankind is to be realised. Bauer wrote this work before World War I, and since that time global organisations have begun the attempt to facilitate the factual economic and environmental interdependence that is so significant for our contemporary world. Bauer formulates 'national character' as a complex amalgam of beliefs, a 'life world' that sets the stage for certain horizons of understanding and possible directions of judgement and action. Yet this national character is not a static entity, even as many who act within their understandings of culture see its horizons as enduring. National character is laden with constraints to the openness to others not of that cultural inheritance that obstruct interdependence. Bauer helps his readers to see that this obstruction, which bourgeois societies of particular nations do not recognise in themselves, can be changed through the reorientation of education and praxis. National character is never constant, its development is upon a ceaselessly changing cultural ground, and thus the very ground upon which its constraints upon societal interdependence can be addressed. By focusing upon the 'direction of willing' insofar as how states-of-affairs were situated in the belief systems of an individual, Bauer was able to peel away and reveal the horizon of the person's 'life world' in its embeddedness in the practices of his or her milieu. As a Marxist, Bauer saw clearly the changing cultural bases of persons who carried the complex intentions of cultural inheritance, as well as the constant augmentations to this inheritance, generated by the immediacies of a changing political, social, and technological world. The many differing levels of personal, family, and societal memberships are given by Bauer *a concept* for their individual separation for being studied – that is, the 'character of the willed object' [Die Verschiedenheit des Willensrichtungen, die Tatsache, dass derselben Reiz verschiedene Bewegung auslöst],¹ or, as the philosophers of Bauer's age began to call it, 'the intentional object' that guided choice and behaviour.

1 Bauer 1907, pp. 111–12.

In this central conception of the 'willed object' that informed the praxis of individuals in its differing perspectives, Bauer was indebted to Max Adler's *Causality and Teleology in Conflict Over Science* (1904).² Adler's discussion of the 'social will', which is understood in the Kantian perspective as a category of consciousness that is overlaid with cultural content in its direction of expression, is translated in this anthology in his 1924 discussion of the concept in 'The Social Character of Mental Life' and 'The Will to Advance', in *The Sociological in Kant's Epistemology*. Bauer used the concept of the 'social will' in a complexity of layers with specific historical differentiations that Max Adler did not pursue, as Adler's concern was a clarification of the epistemological understanding of this concept. Moreover, Bauer foresaw by a generation the call for research into cultural-historical differentiations of a social will that the great Austrian phenomenological philosopher, Edmund Husserl, would call for in 1934–5. It is worthwhile to quote Husserl's entire passage, as one can see it fulfilled theoretically, and at least for its time with factual content, in the 1907 work by Bauer:

The multiplicity of cultures are differentiated from each other by the particularity of their categories of goal-orientations. We speak of the unity of the German, the French, etc. cultures. Again, of the European culture. In the unity of the national there is a historical personality, expressed in one's personal associations and communities of interest, but these are not merely known side-by-side with one another in their separate goals, rather as included within the nation in its national goal-orientations; the nation is a closed (a comprehensive) personality, and thus all the included personalities ordered within it (the sub-associations) are synthesised by its contextual ends.

Within a national history the special cultures have their history. The question is how precisely can we determine the cultural sphere as a closed as well as historical culture.

There are further, more differentiated questions in the face of this problem.

We have the problem of what the nation is in a pregnant sense, that is defining its personality as a higher-ordering concept, as well as what would be super-national, that is a regional or cosmopolitan identity, in

² See especially Max Adler 1904, pp. 140–1, for Adler's concept of 'Zweckwollen', or the 'willed goal-orientation', which is noted as having historical boundaries as it changes over time in cultures.

that it functions as such simultaneously. Between individuals there is an agreement for a time [*zeitweise*] of a personal union. This agreement, understood as a living community, extends in its intentions over a 'life-time', constituting in its implied relations, as does a marriage, an enduring personality of a higher order. The people of the nations of Europe came into warfare with each other (despite living 'beside each other', although sharing the same spiritual space of Europe with and towards each other, mutually motivating each other thereby); the 'European war' ended in a peace, in a unity, a transient agreement.

How is it now with a national and international culture?

Are all the particular cultures of a national culture within its unity? The nation is naturally as such interested in the extension of its labour within a national territory, for the extension of its agriculture, its transportation, etc., nationally. Is this the case, as well, for its fine arts, its sciences, its religious culture? – and what is the situation with its military culture, its weapons, its arsenals, etc.?³

What is remarkable about this projected phenomenological sociology by Husserl is that it was already the conscious project of several Austrian Marxists as he wrote, most notably the pre-World War I Otto Bauer. Bauer in his social scientific studies, and Max Adler in his neo-Kantian conceptual augmentation of Marx and Engels, are 'phenomenological sociologists' in their focus upon the 'intentional objects' of the will of individuals and groups, with an articulate understanding that what they examine is 'of a time' [*zeitweise*].

As a Marxist thinker, the general state of the economy in a nation imparted by the dynamics of the class struggle of his time was the primal cause of personal social experience. However, national character gave this condition its singular manifestation – a level of cultural understanding that in turn enabled the economic person to address his or her condition with an understanding and praxis that differed from the character developed in another national culture. Bauer saw that the character developed by individuals in a nation as learned over maturation through the mediation of 'social forms' that were 'mediating links' [*Mittelgliedern*] 'which integrate the development of working processes and working conditions to the concrete individual manifestations of consciousness in history'.⁴ Bauer continues to describe the gain in comprehension of individuals within their nation by dint of such a study of the social forms that

3 Husserl 1950, pp. 58–9.

4 Bauer 1908, p. 940.

are 'mediating links' between the person and the national, qua international economy:

Such a formal sociology will enable us to differentiate between two kinds of social phenomena, instructing us at the same time of their lawful dependence upon one another. The individual can be connected to a group in such a manner that each individual is affected by the same power, the same manner of existence, or the same destiny, which has had or continues to have an effecting influence (where one must differentiate whether it is the same or only a similar manner of living and undergoing). The connection which integrates the group is not a rule that connects the individuals from the outside, rather a force which binds them together internally: there is in fact, in each individual's thought and praxis, side-by-side with other abilities, a determining agency which lives not only in that individual, but in all who belong to that group.⁵

Bauer, then, apologises for his not offering the detailed studies of the 'social forms' that are the 'mediating links' between the general economy and the ways in which the individual lives out this situation in his or her culture. His excuse touches upon several levels of his own personal make-up – the extroverted activist, and, as I have argued thoroughly elsewhere, the psychically wounded individual.⁶ Bauer states:

My investigation of the essence of nation has proceeded from such a study. But its planned continuation has been disrupted by the needs called up in me by political struggles. The Austrian Social Democrats have seen for many years their struggle made more difficult by the devastating power battles among the nations, and there are events that allow us to fear that the working classes will be dragged into these, and the unity and decisiveness of the proletarian army could be destroyed by these national contradictions. Under these conditions, I saw it as my duty to publish the tentative results of my studies of the nationality question, although I was fully conscious of the inadequacies and incompleteness of the materials with which I worked. Under such conditions, I did not see fit to burden my book with difficult methodological investigations, so as not to make difficulty for its immediate political efficacy. Therefore, I had to publish

5 Ibid.

6 See Blum 1985, pp. 72–87.

my theory of nations without the thought sequence which established its foundation: without my intended sketch of the doctrine of social forms which contained the seminal principles of the materialist conception of social groups – of the mediating links between the productive forces and living individuals.⁷

To be sure, Bauer's political activity within the Austrian Social Democratic Party burgeoned in 1907–8. Besides the growing authority he was given and wielded in the everyday life of the party, he and several others founded what was to become the authoritative journal of the party, *Der Kampf*, in this period. It was in this period that Karl Kautsky compared Otto Bauer to what the young Marx had been, insofar as his political energy and activism combined with his theoretical brilliance.⁸ Yet Bauer's refraining from delving into the phenomenological studies of individuals in their interaction – models for which were extant within the German-Austrian culture by the first decade of the twentieth century (Freud's studies of Dora, The Rat Man, etc.) – had another reason, similar to Max Adler's inability to conduct phenomenological sociological studies of sociational practices, namely, a neurotic repression of personally reflective inquiry that precluded thorough probing of other individuals as well. Bauer's inability to offer a conclusive, evidence-founded judgement of the exact thought and behaviour of others, while taking his reader to the threshold of such an understanding, will be seen in one of the translated essays he wrote most likely as he composed the orientation to nationality in 1906, that is, an article titled *Marxismus und Ethik*, which begins to probe the ethical dilemma of an unnamed worker who comes to him for advice. The worker asks Bauer whether he should commit himself to his immediate family responsibilities and be a 'scab', or commit himself to the strike that furthers the class struggle. Bauer's formulation of the worker's plight is quite articulately empathic. Nonetheless, no answer is given to this man's individual plight, and the worker, dismissive of Bauer, simply leaves the room.⁹ The essay continues within a neo-Kantian Marxist categorical imperative, the reader waiting in vain for the human dilemma to be resolved. It is well known by now that Otto Bauer was the brother of Freud's 'Dora', who was Ida Bauer. His case study monograph of Ida and the family offers not only a phenomenologically rigorous micro-sociology, but also a rare case study of the origins of this major political personality.¹⁰ Otto

7 Bauer 1908, p. 941.

8 See Braunthal 1961, p. 16.

9 See Bauer 1906, pp. 486–7.

10 See Freud 1963.

Bauer read Freud as he matured, but never took Freud's study of the dynamics of consciousness as a personal tool for insight into his own life, or a method that might enable his own micro-sociological understanding of the sociational practices of certain groups in the class-based society of his time. He did stand on the threshold of such an engagement with Freud, however. Respecting Freud at a distance, Bauer interpreted Freud's Oedipus Complex from a Marxist perspective of how such a psychic condition was reinforced sociologically in certain classes. He saw the combative attitude of the son towards the father as a product of the middle-class where the child is more dependent upon the father than in an agricultural economy, where children become independent sooner.¹¹

As I elucidate in my psycho-biographical study of Bauer, the family dynamics, and possibly the genetic heritage of the brother and sister, were conducive to the self-protective pathology of hysteria, which limited self-inquiry and generated the personality trait of indecisiveness when confronting practical, ethical, or other forms of seemingly insoluble situations.¹² One can read Bauer's apology for not writing of the social forms that were mediating links as an extended metaphor whereby instead of the proletarian army, the young brother and sister faced their parents as 'devastating power battles among the nations', and feared 'to be dragged into these', thereby losing their 'unity and decisiveness', and thereby being 'destroyed by these national contradictions'. Being witness to the dynamics of the parents in their troubled relationship gave Otto Bauer training in seeing multiple positions, each which had justification, each which was uncompromising, and thus enabled him to see what was at issue in human interactions as he matured, even as there was a paralysis of action in crossing the threshold to an effective address of the problems he recognised around him. I infer here that he was capable of comprehending issues that brought others into conflict, yet could only appreciate the circumstances, not change them; and so, he learned to turn away from any act that might counter or heal what was occurring. Bauer was a sensitive observer, as his mature writings reveal, and he was able to coexist and cooperate with his fellow socialists in achieving the degree of civility and unity that characterised the norms of the Party. The seeds of maturity are in one's development, thus one can speculate that at times he aided his parents, as well as his sister in their mutual existence with a knowing statement or act. There was a carry-over in this learned ability to empathise. Bauer's insightful understanding of the socio-economic dynamics of his time both broadly and in their impact upon individuals will lead to

11 See Bauer 1924b, p. 211, n. 3, as reproduced in Bauer 1980, p. 83, n. 3.

12 See Blum 1985, pp. 73–6. See also Rogow 1979 and Loewenberg 1985.

Marxist political-economic-social understandings, and his many contributions theoretically and practically that made him a respected leader among his fellow Marxists. But his was an understanding marked by a paralysis in the praxis of intervention at key moments, a learned incompetence.

Bauer's written theoretical thought remained at a high level of categorical abstraction. Aside from my contention that Bauer exhibited, as in the case of Max Adler, a self-defensive, abstractive penchant whose consequence was to eschew the very micro-sociological study that each man's theories opened a threshold towards, Bauer's dialectical turn of mind – his historical logic for the construction of historical events – favoured such abstraction. To think dialectically means to formulate antitheses and syntheses that treat situations in their broad dynamics. One sees with a *stylistic analysis*¹³ in each sentence that characterises Otto Bauer's written expression a dialectical grammar, where counterposed nominative phrases or clauses that articulate antitheses are integrated by a synthesising phrase or clause. Such a grammar favours the broad brush of collective realities, but it is also a threshold for the particularities that individuate evidence to uphold such conceptual assertions. Great thinkers with such a style of judgement provide the particular evidence. Karl Marx wrote *Das Kapital* in all its detail in order to show the particularities that proved his dialectical understanding. Immanuel Kant, whose sentences also expose this dialectical grammar, offered throughout his *Critique of Pure Reason* the 'this-there' of instances and examples. A typical example of Bauer's dialectical formulas is offered by his twelve 'axioms' that present the dynamics of national character development and change. I offer several as examples. These are 'axioms' inasmuch as they remain to be proven with a detailed exposition:¹⁴

13 Stylistic analysis of grammar emerged as a discipline to comprehend the individuality of writers, poets, but also, potentially, of ordinary persons in the generation of the Austro-Marxists. The German-Austrian Edmund Husserl wrote of this possible way of differentiating judgements among persons in his *Logical Investigations* written in 1900; see Husserl 1970, pp. 518–22 [Investigation Four, Par. 13]. Wilhelm Dilthey joined Husserl in this conversation in the last years of his life at the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, encouraging study of a descriptive analysis of articulated thought; see Dilthey 1985, p. 229. The most work in this field of grammatical stylistic analysis was done by Leo Spitzer (1887–1960), a contemporary of the Austro-Marxists, who took Dilthey's cue. See, for example, Spitzer 1961. I have made stylistic analyses of dialectical thinkers in Blum 1995 and Blum 2006, pp. 298–301, 346–63 and 392–410.

14 Bauer 1912a, pp. 247–59.

1. The greater the minority, the smaller the attracting power of the majority; the smaller the minority, the more certain of assimilation.
2. The smaller the fraction of the majority in the total population, the easier the assimilation.
3. National assimilation is easier, the more similar the majority to the minority in matters of race, culture, religion, and speech.
4. Assimilation proceeds more rapidly the greater the increase in population of the majority in proportion to population increase in the minority.

'Assimilation' is the synthesising verbal noun, coordinating the generalised assertions concerning the 'minority' and the 'majority'. In this presentation, Bauer gives several cultural examples, but only at the level of an axiomatic truth – not in any detailed argument. For example, he writes to justify his first 'axiom' above:

The first group is assimilable minorities. As for example: the German minority in North America and in French Switzerland, the Czech minority in the German areas of the Sudetenland and the Alps, the Jewish minority in Galicia. The national assimilation of these minorities is an unavoidable process of nature ... We must not permit these minorities the right to their own schools, although we must protect these minorities against infringements by the majority nationality, which would only slow down their natural assimilation.¹⁵

The arbitrariness of Bauer's policy, given his axiom, is not justified by further 'case study'. Bauer had thought in more detail about evidence; his axiomatic assertions did stem from thought, but not thorough, comparative, deliberative thought that writing might generate. For example, writing in 1911 about the Czech worker whom he had observed one imagines many times, both in his father's factory and elsewhere, one sees only stereotype:

The Czech worker, who works on German soil, is not a pleasing presence for the German nation ... The whole manner of the Czech worker has a provocative strangeness. For the essence of the robust Czech proletariat who roams [continually through the German lands] in search of employment, having been driven out of the hunger-stricken land of Bohemia by the expansion of capitalism, is quite different from the race of German

15 Bauer 1912a, p. 262.

worker who spends his life in the quiet, remote retreat of his mountain village dreaming and musing.¹⁶

Bauer's second significant contribution to theory, at the level of an axiomatic 'strategy', was his development of the concept of 'functional democracy' throughout the 1920s.¹⁷ 'Functional democracy' was understood as the manner in which people did their tasks, an equalisation of the dignity of work, even while there would be certain hierarchies based on the need for management, levels of skill, and other decision-making roles in the myriad branches of the economy as a coherent, planful economy was sought. Functional democracy as exemplified in the new workers' councils in the factories offered concrete facts of practice, and as a model could be applied in its tenets to other working groups within the national economy. Bauer writes in 1927 in his discussion of 'The transition of the capitalist to the socialist society':

Here is the decisive point of workplace democracy. The relation will only change when the worker is no longer a subject who one commands, rather is a community which he himself administers. Workplace democracy is the definitive form of co-administration by the worker. One cannot just turn over the enterprise to the workers themselves to administer; but the leaders of the enterprise may not be the sole authorities. One must find a combined form. One can hardly figure this out theoretically; it must reveal itself practically out of experience.

Towards this end in Austria there are beginnings within the works councils. One prominent form of this development is that of organised, in-common management. With such a form, the works councils are in a stronger position than in capitalist enterprises. The works councils of these enterprises are organised as directing committees. Even in independent economic enterprises one finds this new form of business operations.¹⁸

Bauer uses Max Adler's term of 'sociation' [*Vergesellschaftung*] throughout his writings on functional democracy, from 1919 through the early 1930s. 'Sociation'

16 Bauer 1911, p. 557.

17 See Bauer's use of this concept in 1924, as he reviews what has occurred and should occur in the 'sociative' [*vergesellschaftet*] transition from capitalism to socialism – the transitional stage Austro-Marxists saw themselves in during these interwar years (Bauer 1924b, pp. 65–7).

18 Bauer 1927/1928, pp. 864–5.

is not used as a generic term for any societal order, but rather as the means of furthering cooperation towards a socialist understanding of human interdependence. Bauer's usage is aimed toward discussing how the state can be directly and indirectly instrumental in furthering the sociation of forms of economic activity in the transition period between a capitalist societal order and the socialist order to come, that which existed both for him and other Austrian Social Democrats in the post World War I Austrian Republic. Bauer addressed not only factory work and other industrial operations, but also small businesses, and the agricultural community. His 1925 book, *Der Kampf um Wald und Weide: Studien zur österreichischen Agrargeschichte und Agrarpolitik*, offered a thorough review of Austrian agriculture and a coherent Austrian Social Democratic programme for the present and the future.¹⁹ Unlike what would occur in Russia, Bauer and Austrian Social Democracy saw the continued maintenance of individually owned farms, even within the future socialist society, but a furthering of the cooperative associations among farmers that generated the norms of interdependent sociation in that population – a norm so central to socialism that would one day instantiate the classless society.

Establishing forms of functional democracy in industry, business, and agriculture were central developments within this transitional period, a period that Bauer defined as one of 'class equilibrium'. He took the term from the ideas of societal transition, particularly that of 'the negation of the negation' formulated by Friedrich Engels between 1873 and 1882 in his composition of *The Dialectics of Nature*. Although Engels's work was not published in full until 1925, that is, after Bauer began to write of 'the equilibrium among the classes', this concept could be found conceptually without the explicit term 'equilibrium' within Engels's discussion of 'the negation of the negation' in his *Anti-Dühring*,²⁰ and as an explicit concept in the writings of Georg Plekhanov in the 1890s.²¹ Engels understood there to be an 'equilibrium' between one order

19 Bauer 1925.

20 'When I say that all these processes are a negation of the negation, I bring them all together under this one law of motion, and for this very reason I leave out of account the specific peculiarities of each individual process. Dialectics, however, is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought' (Engels 1975a, p. 131).

21 Plekhanov writes: 'The organisation of any given society is determined by the state of its productive forces. As this state changes, the social organisation is bound sooner or later to change too. Consequently, it is in a state of unstable equilibrium wherever the social productive forces are developing. Labriola quite rightly remarks that it is this instability, together with the social movements and the struggle of social classes to which it gives rise,

and another throughout changes in nature or in society. The objective was to comprehend the character of that equilibrium in order to intervene in such a manner as to enable the qualitative change in the direction one desired. Engels wrote in *The Dialectics of Nature*:

Equilibrium is inseparable from motion. In the motion of heavenly bodies there is *motion in equilibrium* and *equilibrium in motion* (relative). But all specifically relative motion, i.e. here all separate motion of individual bodies in motion, is an effort to establish relative rest, equilibrium. The possibility of bodies being at relative rest, the possibility of temporary states of equilibrium, is the essential condition for the differentiation of matter and hence for life.²²

Most importantly, Engels understood certain occurrences as dirempting the generation of a certain natural state or desired societal state. Using Aristotelian language, he spoke of the failure of the potential form of *energeia* to realise its *ergon*:

The indestructibility of motion cannot be conceived merely quantitatively; it must also be conceived qualitatively; matter whose purely mechanical change of place includes indeed the possibility under favourable conditions of being transformed into heat, electricity, chemical action, life, but which is not capable of producing these conditions from out of itself, such matter has *forfeited motion*; motion which has lost the capacity of being transformed into the various forms appropriate to it may indeed still have *dynamis* but no longer *energeia*, and so become partially destroyed.²³

that preserves man from mental stagnation. Antagonism is the principal cause of progress, he says, repeating the thought of a very well-known German economist. But right away he makes a reservation. It would be a great mistake, in his opinion, to suppose that men always and in all cases have a proper understanding of their situation and clearly perceive the social tasks with which it confronts them. "To suppose that", he says, "is to suppose the improbable and, indeed, the unreal". Available from: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/plekhanov/1897/history/part1.htm>. Labriola does not use the term 'unstable equilibrium', but as Engels, a phrasal synonym; Labriola describes, in his *Essays on the Materialist Conception of History*, 'the social antitheses, which make of every human community an unstable organization' (Labriola 1908, p. 233).

22 Engels 1975b, p. 525.

23 Engels 1975b, p. 333.

By using the conceptual language of 'the equilibrium of the classes', Bauer was able to think of strategic (long-term policy) and tactical praxis (addressing immediate issues and events) within the conceptual structure of dialectical history.

Understanding Bauer's tactics, as well as longer-term strategies within the dialectical concept of 'equilibrium', is vital for appreciating his own sense of planful political decision-making. This dialectical historical purview was, to be sure, more formally discussed in the previous generation as the constant effort to achieve the most effective equilibrium in the move towards the socialist society. In the 1920s, the pressing sense of reaching socialism as immediately as possible stemmed from the actuality of the democratic suffrage and the seeming *carte blanche* of a post-World War I world in which all classes struggled to regain civic stability, to be sure a stability defined by each class's point of view. 'Equilibrium' seemed a vacillating conception for a world that wanted definitive change. Those Marxists conversant with the past literature of dialectical materialism in the pre-World War I world knew that these pre-World War I comrades understood history as a measured change in their relatively powerless confrontation with aristocratic authority, as well as bourgeois authority, where ever-new equilibriums were achieved incrementally that permitted distinct changes towards the next phase desired.²⁴ Marxists who had this historical depth knew that in the post-World War I world even the 'classless society' of the future would have its own constant motion and new equilibriums.²⁵

Bauer's last important contribution to 'strategy' was his conception of 'integral socialism', an attempt to coordinate a cooperation among the 1930s Social-Democratic Parties of Western and Central Europe and the Communist Third International.²⁶ This effort must be seen in relation to Engels's notion of furthering the *energeia* of the socialisation of society through deliberative intervention into the existing equilibrium of social forces or to achieve a new equilibrium. An 'integrating' socialism was a marshalling, a concentrating of differences in order to gain some leverage of those persons and their parties who

24 Nikolai Bucharin, an exception to this neglect of the concept in argumentation, uses the concept of 'equilibrium' throughout his text that he refers to as the ABC's of Communism (see Bucharin 1922). Bucharin is informed by Georgi Plekhanov's writings, especially that of a 'labile equilibrium' in differing structures of both nature and society (see Bucharin 1922, p. 165).

25 See Max Adler's discussion of this continual changing balance even in the classless society, in the chapter on 'Utopianism in Marx and Engels', in his *Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus*. A translation of this chapter appears in this volume.

26 Bauer 1936, pp. 312–35.

claimed to uphold a genuine democratic socialism. The particular forces, tensions, and possible grounds for cooperative, coordinated activity were to be examined jointly by the Social-Democratic parties and their potential cohorts of the Third International, identifying the particular 'problems of their time' which resisted cooperative agreement, as well as those which sought the destruction of this democratic socialism.²⁷ The adversary to be overcome was Fascism, dominating the structure of the majority of European countries in one form or another. This was a formidable foe, not only because of its armed force, but also because these fascisms masked themselves as a democratic socialism under the authority of one party, and its dictatorial leadership. Bauer's theoretical construction was too little and too late for any hearing. Yet, as a further employment of his political-theoretical methodology, it offers us a perspective that can weigh any equivalent state-of-affairs today.

More must be said regarding Bauer's tactical failures, as his depiction as a leader who failed the Austrian proletariat at key points in the 1920s and 1930s continues to haunt his legacy. These 'failures' are complex moments, and must be addressed at several levels. Theoretically, it must be kept in mind that Bauer deliberated the tactical moment in Engels's sense of what could further the *energeia* of the emergent sociation of societal forms. 'Strategy' inhered in every tactical decision – at least in Bauer's own self-justification. Moreover, there is another level that can explain the failure on the part of Bauer and his fellow Austro-Marxists to act effectively between World War I and World War II. Given the norms of cooperative and coordinative tolerance within Austrian culture generally, and Bauer's learned disposition to rely on such accommodating norms, one must evaluate his actions on 15 July 1927 and 12 February 1934 – as well as the disintegration of democracy in the Austrian Republic in the intervening years – with these expectations on the scales of judgement. The tactical level of Bauer's praxis will await our second volume devoted to these everyday events, as well as to the extraordinary events of the everyday, such as 15 July 1927 and 12 February 1934. However, granted that a vacillating attitude and a failure to act did exist in his leadership record, such hesitancy had its cause not solely in his external adversaries, nor was it the result of any weakness in his philosophy of praxis. To comprehend the continuing value of Otto Bauer's philosophy of praxis, one must separate in analysis the singularity of his persona and its role in his praxis from the objective contributions of his philosophy of praxis. Otto Bauer remains a koan for socialist thinkers, as well as every cultural historian of twentieth-century

27 Bauer 1936, p. 314.

Austria. Wilhelm Ellenbogen, a close associate of Bauer, depicted him most succinctly as a Hamlet who indeed was prepared for every eventuality, but whose will met a paralysing, self-inflicted counter-will in actual situations.²⁸ In his characterisation of Bauer, Ellenbogen offers a less metaphorical discussion that is a denotative guide for comprehending his praxis:

The deliberating and the acting Otto Bauer were two different personalities. If a situation was to be comprehended in its deeper complexities, no one was as masterful as him in grasping it with thoroughness and acumen. Out of this foundation arose his brilliant exposés, his recommendations for the amelioration of political crises, his wide-ranging plans for the stimulation of the economy, his preliminary studies for the revision of the party programmes, his learned studies ... He would have been the greatest light of the science of political economy if he had remained with the handicraft of the inquirer ... This personality transformed itself completely as soon as Bauer entered actual politics. To be sure, here also his keen intellect enabled him to penetrate the complexity of definite situations, to expose the weak positions of his opponents as well as to recognise the strengths and weaknesses of his own position. However, all of that was insufficient for the political business whose task is success, and not just for the moment, rather lasting. Here one must rise above the general categories of action. One must accommodate a choice of means with formal, mathematical precision to the minutest detail of the situation ... One must know how to deal with individuals – of no matter what authority or station – with a psychological finesse. Besides the fine touch for every single thread of the power relationships, political action requires above all a cool head.²⁹

Ellenbogen's remarks had some justification. My reading of Bauer's praxis in actual events show them to be too emotional and premature in the developing moment,³⁰ or as described by others, vacillating once having engaged the issue.³¹ Bauer's inability to will in the situation itself his pre-deliberative insights, are considered, explained, and form the bases of the contending views of Otto Bauer's philosophy of praxis in the recent scholarship. What Ellenbogen

28 Ellenbogen 1980, pp. 1101–2.

29 Ellenbogen 1980, pp. 1096–7.

30 Ellenbogen 1980, pp. 1097–8; Blum 1985, pp. 74–7.

31 On this 'trait of character', see also Hanisch 2011, pp. 273–4.

characterises as a Hamlet-like counter-will touches upon the hysterical personality disorder that Peter Loewenberg, Arnold Rogow, and I have explored in Bauer, and which several of the above authors address. Bauer's personality disorder, as with all neuroses, must be considered as central to his praxis – configuring the temporal-spatial event within its cognitive-emotive lens, the same lens brought to each event, directing the course and qualities of his interaction. Contemporary Marxist thinkers – such as Slavoj Žižek and Joe Valente – have included such personality factors in considering individual action in history.³² One may say that Bauer's strategy was objectively sound, but that his tactics in their day-to-day actualisation suffered from his personality disorder. As succinctly stated by Valente: 'The task of the signifier in which hysterical and obsessive neuroses inextricably knot pleasure with suffering, action with paralysis, passion with debility, also happen to form the exclusive and necessary condition of the object-relation as such'.³³ As Freud explains, such a symptomatology can be more or less marked in behaviour in certain periods of mental balance or mental stress. Bauer's intellect and much of his everyday behaviour did not exhibit these hysterical traits in times of less stress. In the critical moments of the drama of Austrian Social Democracy between the wars, however – on 15 July 1926, and in the events of February 1934 – Bauer's Hamlet-like vacillation did condition his judgement and interfered with his pre-deliberative understandings, which were able to see not only the political landscape, but also the character of its key players.

Indeed, as has been pointed out, Bauer was aware of the psychological norms of interpersonal behaviour, and considered Freud's Oedipus complex not only as an individual symptom, but also as a condition which was also affected by the social-economic environ in which the person interacted with others. Here the 'Mittelglieder' of community and societal membership contributed to the reality of a highly personal character structure. Bauer saw the Oedipus complex as either potentially ameliorated or worsened by the economic practices of differing Austrian agricultural regions as it conditioned father-son relationships.³⁴ A personality disorder can be influenced by the environment in which one must interact with others. Sigmund Freud discussed this in his *Civilization and Its Discontents* when he considered 'pathological cultures'. In this awareness of the personal as a highly individual, psychic complex, yet nonetheless as conditioned in its potential problems through the norms of the economic

32 See Žižek 2006, pp. 16, 21; Valente 2003, pp. 153–72.

33 Valente 2003, p. 154.

34 Bauer 1980, p. 83, n. 3.

practices in which it must participate, Bauer preceded the multi-leveled understanding of individual character exemplified in Lucien Goldmann's *The Hidden God*. Endre Kiss calls this multi-leveled perspective of Bauer's 'synoptic', and credits him with the ability of an accurate empathy that extends to the single individual in taking up the broadest collective questions.³⁵ Yet Bauer could not see the role of his own personality in his errors of immediate judgement. As Immanuel Kant wrote of thinkers in their blindness to their own thoughts (and themselves): 'it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention'.³⁶ Bauer's decisions and action in many political events of the First Republic must be qualified by the timing and hesitations of his judgement in the actual situations. While he could discern the intentions and motives of others, his own complex profile was opaque in his reflection. Just as Kant could penetrate the core concepts that inhered in and structured an argument through his own, new 'special orientation' of 'pure reason' (compare his 'History of Pure Reason' in the *Critique of Pure Reason*), which his contemporaries could not discern in their lack of an adequate hermeneutic, Bauer lacked the thorough depth of a psychobiographical orientation that some of his contemporaries had begun to develop, which we now have in our array of 'special orientations'.

35 See Endre Kiss, 'Ein Revolutionär mit Genauigkeit und Seele (Otto Bauer im dritten Jahrtausend)', in *Otto Bauer, Zur Aktualität des Austromarxismus, Konferenzband 9, Juli 2008*, eds. Pavlina Amon and Stephan-Immanuel Teichgräber (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010), p. 28.

36 Kant 1965, p. 310 [A 314].

Karl Renner

Karl Renner characterised his own approach to theory in his first significant publication – *Staat und Nation* (1899) – in the initial two sentences:

Only the encouragement of those who heard the lecture that I gave on the 9th of February, 1899 has occasioned my publication of it. For I knew quite well: for the politician – especially the Austrian – it is too theoretical, and for the Austrian theorist too political.¹

Renner spoke, wrote, thought, and acted within the conceptual praxis of what might be called English pragmatism, characterised by the approach to life and thought of John Locke – who was also a prominent political mind and activist. Like Locke, Renner would derive concepts that organised his inquiry into society from the parlance of his fellow citizens, test their range of coherence and applicability, and coin new concepts if needed to better guide his activity and the thought that accompanied that activity. Again following Locke, Renner thought inductively with the aid of these conceptual guides.

It is worth quoting Locke in his Preface (Epistle to the Reader) that precedes *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* because we read that not only does he credit those with whom he discussed his ideas in actual situations over time as the stimulus, site, and data that provided him his discoveries – confirming the value, and indeed the need, of an audience for thought and the work of the mind² – just as Renner does in his first reflections that introduce *Staat und Nation*, but also that, as Locke did, Renner clearly articulates that the testing of concepts that serve the pragmatic purposes of one's everyday judgements must begin and end in such an audience, and with such an audience in mind:

I know there are not words enough in any language to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into men's discourses and reasonings. But this hinders not but that when anyone uses any term, he may have in his mind a *determined* idea, which he makes it the sign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annexed during that present discourse. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to *clear* or *distinct* ideas: it is plain his are not so; and therefore there can be expected nothing but

1 Renner 1899, p. 1.

2 Locke 1964, p. 56.

obscurity and confusion, where such terms are made use of which have not such a precise determination.

Upon this ground I have thought *determined* ideas a way of speaking less liable to mistake, than *clear* and *distinct*; and where men have got such *determined* ideas of all that they reason, inquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes at an end; the greatest part of the questions and controversies that perplex mankind depending upon the doubtful and uncertain use of words, or (which is the same) *indetermined* ideas, which they are made to stand for. I have made choice of these terms to signify, (1) some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it, distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it; (2) that this idea, thus *determined*, i.e. which the mind has in itself and knows and sees there, be *determined* without any change to that name, and that name *determined* to that precise idea. If men had such *determined* ideas in their inquiries and discourses, they would both discern how far their own inquiries and discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of the disputes and wranglings they have with others.³

Renner's conceptual lexicon that served this *determined* certainty was his engagement with Austrian law, as it existed in practice among all in his society, as well as the parlance and literature of national culture, particularly that of the German culture as it existed in what was accepted as the canon of being of German spirit, and in the Marxist notions of the political party he adopted as the most effective agent in establishing a culture – not yet extant – which would correct the political, social, and economic issues that pressed upon him since his youth. His party, the Austrian Social Democratic Party, was a second home for him as he matured, his first home being a casualty of the position of his father as a proletarian victim of bourgeois society.

Karl Renner's tribute to Marx in 1908 on the twenty-fifth anniversary of his death can be seen as the credo of Renner's life:

The worker who wished to understand his relation to Marx must, as I do, think back to his father, his grandfather, and his ancestors as far back as they go – then he will encounter men who were not industrial workers or proletarians, rather fathers of families [*Hausväter*] ... who lived in their own homes and exercised an iron rule over their children and domestics. One never spoke to one's father and mother in the familiar 'thou', for one's

3 Locke 1964, pp. 60–1.

parents were authorities [*Obrigkeiten*] who were the highest authorities next to God and the emperor ... And the despairing words 'I do not know why I was born' were seldom heard and considered wanton. Nothing appeared more taken for granted than 'where one came from and where he was going'. 'We have come from our fathers ... we will become fathers ourselves, and then return to our fathers from whence we came' ... And on this path of life man enjoyed much happiness and suffered much pain, but he lived his own life among men of value – he was indeed a person. But then a magical upheaval came to the world and threw our ancestors and grandfathers from their homes into the street. A person on the street – it makes no sense! How can a man play his part of father, of a family in the rubble of the street? Is that a home? ... A man who lives in the street, where does he come from? Where is he going? No one knows, least of all himself ... and if he dies in the street, how does he then find his way to his father's home and his father's grave for his burial ... Thousands have asked themselves from the graves of the streets: 'For what purpose am I in the world?' And found no answer. *Those workers, however, who have conceived the whence and whither of this capitalistic world according to Marx, win back their world again.*⁴

Karl Renner's own father was a victim of the socio-economic pressures of his lower middle-class position, a harried man whose uncertainties were keenly felt by his son.⁵ Renner longed in his adolescence for the certainty of authority and place, admiring his maternal uncle, Leo Habiger, for his traditional German paternal authority and the very household he headed:

What deliberation, what constancy, what decisiveness in comparison to my place of origin ... Impressive was the fact that the whole property of the Habigers was laid out in a single, undivided piece that extended from either end of the main house, which itself was built four-cornered, in the four directions of the compass ... my place of origin (on the other hand) had streets where the houses were stuck together and the neighbors continually saw and heard one another, whereas in the case of my father's house the building itself could be divided in the middle into two families.⁶

4 Renner 1908, pp. 241–2, emphasis added.

5 See Renner 1946, pp. 23–5, 64–6.

6 Renner 1946, pp. 107–8.

Renner's pragmatic turn of mind evidenced the concreteness where spatial, sensuous experience became a metaphor for the meaning of existence – actual times, places, and manners serving as symbols for what was or could be. The 'four points of the compass' was a place Renner sought to replace his unstable childhood home. Returning from a visit to his uncle, Renner wrote of his feelings towards his actual father and his place in his home: 'And so I returned, not without a certain melancholy and not without apprehension for my immediate future ... with a feeling of dread I entered the house of my father'.⁷ Eventually, Karl Renner was to take Karl Marx as his grandfather, Victor Adler as his father, the Austrian Social Democratic Party as his ancestral home, the stable place that would be 'the four points of the compass'. As he wrote to Victor Adler in 1909:

As far as my knowledge of myself goes, I know: I do not belong among those who must outdo the next man; I have no incentive to compete ... My so-called 'ego' wants nothing. Rather, as far as socialism concerns me, I would like to use the proud words of the Nazarene: 'In my father's house here are many rooms'. There are so many spiritual areas [*Bezirke*] opened to us by it, so many still not built.⁸

That Renner uses a term for 'area' [*Bezirke*] that normally refers to 'administrative districts' is telling insofar as it relates to the orientation of his thought by 1909, where the public world of Austria was now a semi-abstract home – actual geography to be transformed within the conceptual compass of socialist intentions.

Once within the patriarchal domain of socialism, Renner found a peace his life had lacked; he transferred the mental and emotional bonds to his family that had developed in his childhood to the party fathers of Austrian Social Democracy. *Transference* is the concept used in psychoanalysis to explain how and why emotional and mental conflicts that were experienced and unresolved in childhood are lived out with the analyst. Transference, however, is not limited to a psychoanalyst's office; it can occur in any human situation that provides the individual with a person or persons and an environment that are conducive to reenacting parts of the past that cry out for understanding and resolution.⁹ By transferring past conflicts to a new situation, one can recapture the

7 Renner 1946, p. 121.

8 Renner, cited in Hannak 1965, pp. 311–12.

9 See Freud 1966, pp. 431–47; Freud 1959a, pp. 312–22; and Freud 1959b, pp. 377–91. Especially

emotional depth of childhood and overcome psychic obstructions to growth by reentering, and conquering, the conflict situation in the new environment.¹⁰ Unless one realises that he is inappropriately treating the present environment with past emotional values and relations, however, he will approach the demands of the present inadequately and use people and events metaphorically, as representative for a past psychic struggle. Renner never fully recognised his inappropriate associations of a personal past in his relationship to the Austrian Social Democratic Party, and as a result, he treated the party structure as a home to be enjoyed and used for many primary needs other than those of representing the working class in a social struggle.

Otto Bauer once said about Renner that just as there are occasional drinkers, so also there are occasional theoreticians and occasional politicians, and the typical example of this was Karl Renner ... In later years, when the demanding cares of his life were conquered, Renner loved ease, comfort, sociability, relaxation, and amusement. Those qualities often led, indeed, to idleness.¹¹

Bauer saw the problematic praxis of Renner accurately. Austrian Social Democracy and the themes Renner inherited as a young political voice within the Party became 'the four directions of the compass' for living and thinking about society, but the very security given to him of a shared family of social change agents hampered his rhythm of praxis, and one can add, weighed heavily upon the pregnant promise of the theories he developed. Locke, whose mind, like Renner's, was of an effective, pragmatic bent, who inductively tested concepts so that they could be effected in practice, who believed that the mind was 'a blank slate' to be written upon anew, did generate new laws to guide society – such as the 'insanity plea'. Renner's mind was never completely open to the new, rather a slate where past writing obscured the clarity and promise of genuinely new determinations. His failings did not eradicate the potential of the theoretical ideas he offered, which I contend remain fecund, although in need of reformulation so as to be applied in the new settings of our global multinationality. Much like Max Adler and Otto Bauer, a failure of micro-sociological

interesting in regard to transference and its appearance in non-therapeutic environments is Loewenberg 1969. Loewenberg, who has studied the Austro-Marxists, describes the debilitating effect of unrecognised transference between graduate students and their advisors.

10 The healing potential of transference in life situations is described fully in Jung 1966.

11 Hannak 1965, p. 56.

study curtailed Renner's own work, as well as the recognition by later Marxists and non-Marxists of how his ideas of law, nationality, and the cooperative movements achievable in every consumer society could change society for the better.

Renner is most well known for his address of the nationality issues that were pervasive in the Austrian Empire as he matured. Renner brought his interest in law, his legal training, to a solution that he felt would satisfy the contending nationality groups, whose contentions with each other had brought the Austrian Parliament to a standstill in the decades before World War I. In *Staat und Nation* (1899) and subsequent writings throughout the first decade of the twentieth century, Renner held that each nationality required legal standing in the Constitution of Austria. He took the idea of the 'personality principle', which Charlemagne coined between 800 and 814 AD, to guarantee autonomy of the tribal communities – the Saxons, Bavarians, Swabians, and so forth – in a federation, as it were, that became the Holy Roman Empire with its subsequent constitutions.¹² Each nationality had a cultural personality as Renner held, an idea that would be reinforced when Otto Bauer wrote of the 'communities of character' in his book on the nationalities in 1906. Renner's conception of 'personality' raised the cultural identification of a nationality to a level not limited to territory, but rather made it a supra-territorial identification that could enable rights and protections to be guaranteed by the Imperial constitution, protecting nationality minorities in the differing 'crown lands', i.e. territorial regions of Austria, but also enabling nationality majorities in a crown land to do normal business beyond the obstructions created by minorities. In Bohemia, for example, there was a bitter rivalry between Germans and Czechs, and although Germans were in the minority, they had enough power to stalemate the legislature there for more than sixty years.¹³ Moreover, because the nationalities were dependent on the legislature for funds for their cultural needs, such as schools and churches, many of the minority nationalities had no chance for satisfaction of their demands within a crown land dominated by another nationality – thus, the Slav nationals in German areas such as Lower Austria had little hope for maintaining their cultural desires. Renner had a two level solution based on the notion of a new legal status as a national 'personality'. On the one hand, nationality corporations would be created – transcending any 'crown land', incorporating all nationals of that culture over the entirety of Austria – that were funded in part by government, as

¹² Renner 1899, pp. 13–17.

¹³ See Bauer 1912b, pp. 481–8.

well as by nationalities themselves that had their own legislative powers for their own peoples in matters of culture – schooling, church, and other cultural matters. The second approach created local authorities for the nationality, even in geographical areas of the ‘crown land’ where, though a minority in the crown land as a whole, in the local area they were a majority. This new administrative level was to be considered a ‘middle authority’ [*Mittelstelle*]. It was equivalent to what in English lands was the ‘county’ government. Here, the nationality member would function merely as an Austrian citizen, but these Austrian responsibilities and rights would be dominated by members of that local nationality hegemony.

The weakness of this theory lay in what could be a ‘nationality’ project or activity in time and space, as opposed to the constraints and interests of being merely a Habsburg citizen. Moreover, it was unclear where the ‘class struggle’ fit into this vision. Renner was compelled to listen to the criticisms of his ‘national corporations’ as a ‘Platonic realm’ theory.¹⁴ The strength, nonetheless, was to call for a focus upon the issue of a day-to-day personal identity and its concomitant values – an issue that could better facilitate a committed interest to the class struggle from the humanist core of the Marxist perspective. One’s own national-cultural identity was more proximate to the consciousness of the individual than whether he or she was a proletarian or bourgeois within the class structure of society. While Marx himself saw cultural nationality as a bourgeois consciousness to be overcome, the persistence of this cultural meaning for Renner, Bauer, and Max Adler, in particular, evidenced a psychological factor which had to be addressed in terms that recognised its *de facto* presence, as well as the very humanist values carried by Germanic cultural identity, which had informed the education of Marx and Engels. Renner cites August Bebel in this regard in a 1909 article in *Der Kampf*, in his commemoration of the fiftieth edition of Bebel’s *Die Frau und Der Sozialismus*:

While Marx writes for all peoples in all times, Bebel’s *Frau* is above all specifically *ours*. It is a *German* book, a part of our struggle, our emotion, immediately a product of the evolution of German socialism at the turn of the century and the world of feeling attached to this struggle, in a way that no other book is ... Bebel speaks not of world economy and the state, not of economic and political matters, but ... immediately of our social conditions, of the daily, everyday life, the relationship of man and woman,

14 See the discussion of Social Democratic reaction to Renner’s theory in Mommsen 1963, p. 330.

of the mystery of the German family ... Bebel's book lacks a clear and logical sequence: the unarticulated thought is the hallmark of the book! The blemish in the book speaks most audibly of how specifically German it is, and most obviously of how it is born from the unique emotional world of the German.¹⁵

Schooling in one's own community, the funding of which was to be determined in the 'Mittelstelle', made this administrative plan one which could integrate Marxist and nationality consciousness. Renner's ideas were to influence the pedagogical outreach of his fellow Austro-Marxists. Even after World War I, when Austria became simply German, Renner's focus upon the daily life of work and culture preserved this emphasis on how what was distinctively German was also the sound basis for the emergent socialist society.

The most distinctive characteristic of all political strategy shared by the Austro-Marxists was the necessity of the gradual, generational development of a new consciousness of self in society. Karl Renner's theoretical critique of bourgeois legal conventions was implicitly written in this understanding, that the re-education of even the brightest, most sophisticated minds required a deconstruction and reconstruction of existing norms, considered by the ordinary populace and these minds as equivalent to the law of gravity. Renner's *Institutions of the Private Law* (1904) [*Die Rechtsinstitute des Privatrechts und ihre soziale Funktion*] takes on this law of gravity, recognising the law as the equivalent of such a natural law not only in relation to its creation of the very foundation for human societal interactions in their enduring certainty, but also with regard to how these foundations came to be and can be altered:

Every social system presupposes socialized man ... If the preservation of the species is the natural law for every social order, then every economic and consequently every legal institution must fulfill a function therein. Marx and Engels have called this preservation of the species the production and reproduction of the material condition of life on an expanding scale. It is the production and reproduction of human individuals as well as their conditions of existence. Thus all legal institutions taken as a whole fulfill one function which comprises all others, that of the preservation of the species.¹⁶

15 Renner 1909, pp. 98–9.

16 Renner 2010, pp. 69–70.

Every social order in its hegemonic determination of the 'right order' of society believes itself to be a natural law of *Homo sapiens*. To change that understanding in actuality is more than an ideational exercise, it is a way of living among others. That is why 'sociation' [*Vergesellschaftung*] became such a central conception among the Austro-Marxists. The socialisation process was one of being reintegrated among others in how cooperative forms of interaction occur and how this informed one's own idea of the 'right order' of how one was among others. Challenging existing law in its tacit claim as a law of gravity or for the preservation of the species was a revolutionary act of thought. An understanding of its basic arguments will help separate the Austro-Marxists from any charge of revisionism. Legal analysis could help raise a culture lacking self-consciousness to an awareness of legal changes that could improve human relationships:

There is no legal regulation, then, of goods or of labor within bourgeois society, whereas the whole of the medieval world was obviously built on such conscious regulation. Society, the conscious organization of mankind, in the eyes of the law an entity, here denies its own consciousness. It prefers blindness to recognition of the distribution of the goods, it pretends to be deaf so that it need not listen to the complaints of the dispossessed, it abdicates as a legal entity, as the common will, in favor of the individual will. But though it feigns death, it is alive, and inanimate stones cry out where it remains silent ... The so-called bourgeois society, distinct from the political society of the organized state, is not conscious of itself. *It confronts the individual as a dark power of nature*, a ghostly inhuman force which does not talk in imperatives to the member of the community, which does not utter commands or threats, which does not punish afterwards in forms of laws, which requires to be divined by speculation and destroys him who does not grasp it, which achieves its object by the force of blind matter and allows this to rule over man.¹⁷

Renner's 1904 *Institutions of the Private Law* will be influential in a direct way for Max Adler's post-World War I attacks on Han Kelsen and aspects of the legal norms of the new Austrian Republic. Indirectly, all Austrian Social-Democrats, not solely the prominent Austro-Marxists, were reinforced by this work in its confirmation of the gradualism inherent to their strategic vision.

17 Renner 2010, p. 91.

The factual ground of the gradualism were in the sociative developments in the unions – the workers councils – but as important, if not more so, in agricultural Austria – the cooperative societies of agricultural producers and the consumers of their products. Moreover, consumer societies for all goods and services developed in tandem. Renner took an active part in these cooperative ventures, which in the praxis changed values and activity from a competitive to a cooperative system of interdependence. Writing in the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* in March of 1924, Renner called for renewed attention to the importance of the cooperatives as real steps forward towards socialism:

The freely organised consumer cooperative fulfills in its democratically administered community its own needs, and excludes in that way every exploitation of commercial capital, dividing all its gains among its members. If workers and employees both public and private desire to avoid a second level of exploitation beyond their meagre wage, this time by commercial capital – where what they earn is given back entirely in providing for their everyday needs – then they need the consumer cooperative as a weapon in the struggle for existence!¹⁸

Renner likened the daily praxis as ‘the work of building coral reef’, but this was central to the theoretical understanding of Austro-Marxist gradualism.¹⁹ Renner had established a credit bank for these small enterprises before World War I, and reconstituted it on a larger scale in 1923 to support the large-scale purchases of the consumer cooperatives. He was President of the Austrian Consumer Cooperative association, as well as Director of the savings and loans banks developed to support their enterprise, throughout the years of the Republic.²⁰

18 Renner 1924, p. 2.

19 Ibid.

20 See Rauscher 1995, pp. 240–1.

Friedrich Adler

Friedrich Adler was an adherent not only of the political-social ideas of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, but also of the Austrian physicist and philosopher of science, Ernst Mach. Mach's theory of physics, and his address of the history of scientific systems, stemmed from phenomenological acuity – observe, describe, and be willing to jettison systems of inquiry and explanation that do not work, rather than obscure or fail to recognise the facts of a phenomenon or situation. This phenomenological attitude and praxis strengthened Friedrich Adler in his willingness to reject established socialist thinking in Austrian Social Democracy. Nonetheless, Adler, as all Austro-Marxists, and Austrian Social Democrats (except those who became Communist in the wake of World War 1), shared the gradualism of generational change as a central element of theory and praxis. Friedrich Adler's twin scales of judgement – radical change if called for in thought and action, and a willingness to accept the inherited positions of his forefathers, unless evidently insufficient – is expressed in his 1909 article which explains the meaning and necessity of theory. Typifying this scalar balance is the following paragraph:

An individual can only have few experiences by himself; he is dependent upon the other humans, and that is just as true for everyday life as it is for the complicated work of science. The only belief possible comes into play, and that is, one must recognise science, and entertain that belief which the great thinker Josef Dietzgen formulated: '*We must believe in the knowledge of other individuals*'. That is the only belief we must maintain, without which no work, no success would be possible. But we must, nonetheless, *not believe blindly*, not always believe. The descriptions we get from another *may not be accurate*. They can be mistaken; there can also be *a lack of intellectual acumen*. Such false information can also be given intentionally, where there is *a lack of integrity* in the communicator. If we believe to be on the ground of such questionable circumstances, then we must test the situation ourselves, have the experience ourselves in order to determine the facts, finding out if what has been said can be corroborated. But, on the whole, we operate in the world with a large dose of good will towards what has been said, but not excluding the need for more work on determining the state of things.¹

1 Friedrich Adler 1919, p. 196.

Austrian thinkers, most probably because of the norms of thought that stress continuity over generations, insisted upon the idea of reconstruction of ideational systems, rather than their replacement. This generational perspective, I believe, results from the model of the Habsburg family over half a millennium, determining the direction of public policy in a consistent manner over the lifetime of the Emperor in power. Franz Grillparzer voiced this understanding in his *Kaiser Ottokars Glück und Ende*, when Merenberg sends his son Seyfried to the Archbishop of Mainz, an elector of the Emperor-to-be, with a letter that will warn the Archbishop of the poor character of Ottokar. If the letter does not arrive on time, Merenberg reflects, Germans will be under the influence of the wrong man for a lifetime: 'One day too late is thirty years too early!'² Franz Brentano, so significant in Austrian phenomenological thinking, and an influence upon Ernst Mach, Sigmund Freud, Edmund Husserl, and a host of other philosophers and Austrian writers, as well as Austrian social scientists, in deliberating the history of science, articulates the Austrian intergenerational perspective:

The investigations of conic sections begun in ancient times by Archimedes and Apollonius were at first of purely theoretical, mathematical interest. Centuries later Kepler made their work applicable to astronomy, but again only because of a theoretical interest. Yet as a result the investigations became of practical use, inasmuch as the progress made in astronomy did a great deal to forward navigation. The seaman who avoids a shipwreck by observing with precision the geographical latitude and longitude owes the fact that he is alive to theories which originated solely from a yearning for knowledge twenty centuries earlier.³

Ludwig Wittgenstein spoke in this spirit when he emphasised the need for a platform of assumed certainty for the doubts that generate new directions of knowledge. As he states in his *On Certainty*: 'If you tried to doubt everything you would not get far in doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty'.⁴ The aphorism preceding that is even more specific: 'If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either'.⁵ Friedrich Adler was sure of the theories of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. As Max Adler, Otto Bauer, and Karl Renner had done (as well as, we

² Grillparzer 1938, p. 8.

³ Brentano 1973, p. 2.

⁴ Wittgenstein 1969, p. 18e.

⁵ Wittgenstein 1969, p. 17e.

will see shortly, Rudolf Hilferding and Otto Neurath), Friedrich Adler sought only to augment the theories of Marx and Engels with new applications. In this essay of 1909, Adler wrote of this augmentation that depends upon refinement of the existing theoretical perspective:

In theory we observe *how certain appearances are dependent upon others*. Theory says to us: until now these appearances were always dependent upon these others. Yet, suddenly one can see that other appearances come forward seemingly accidentally in place of what had been a constant. This result is wholly other than the theory had supposed. Let us take a simple example. The child who proposed the theory: 'If I touch the oven, it hurts', comes across the oven once more and experiences no pain. He sees that theory does not hold for every instance. Then, he precipitously says 'The theory has made a fool of me: I don't need theories any longer!' When, however, he is a bright child, he will say: 'This theory wasn't sufficiently perfected; I must augment the theory; I must see in which circumstances it is always the same, and, what circumstances I have not adequately attended which may have intervened'. And, after some investigation he finds: it is not touching the oven in general, rather touching it *when it is hot*, that generates the pain. When the theory was created it was winter; in the meantime, it became summer. The more complete theory is more exact, accommodating a greater number of experiences.⁶

Friedrich Adler's use of Mach began in his own doctoral studies in physics, but as became apparent, Mach's phenomenological approach to the phenomena studied by physics could be effective in studying social phenomena in their immediacy. Mach introduced existentialism to Europe in the field of physics. He asserted that all truth is immediately given in the phenomena of the moment, and that any knowledge of this moment is possible only as a description, not as an explanation of cause, because all statements about the phenomena were derivative experiences, that is, new phenomena.⁷ Mach's ideas were similar to those developed by Husserl in his later years, but Mach never adhered to the strictness of the phenomenological method.⁸ Perhaps the most important concept that Mach introduced, besides the notion of phenomenological investigation, was that of the unity of subject and object in the phenomena

6 Friedrich Adler 1919, p. 198.

7 Friedrich Adler 1918, pp. 56–62.

8 See Robert Musil's discussion of Mach's theory of observation and description of phenomena in Musil 1980, pp. 15–42.

of consciousness, that is, the understanding of the ego as merely a moment of a total field of experience. This insight was tremendous for his age, and in its existentialist basis antedated most of the cultural developments in science and literature in the Western world today.⁹ Such an insight could hardly have come from an eclectic reordering of past theories. Mach struggled to capture in the language of his age the sensation of being one with nature, of having dissolved the abstract barrier between himself as cognising ego and the world as objective presence.

Because of this stress upon the materiality of experience – the material presence of things, but even more importantly, the materiality of other lives within whose presence one was always living and active – Friedrich Adler's Machian Marxism was even more suitable for comprehending the micro-sociological dynamics of sociation in differing societal contexts than the thought of Max Adler. While Max Adler comprehended the totality of relations that informed every personal judgement and action in his stress on the sociative totality of interdependent relations – recognised or unrecognised – in a culture, Friedrich Adler's Machian Marxism was a more proximate envisioning of the moment, not a theoretical description. Mach's instruction in texts, and in the immediate demonstration to his students, of the ever-changing manifold of elements in any state-of-affairs made the social world into a dynamically changing world of events. One should not even say 'state-of-affairs' when speaking of the Machian sense of one's world; rather, one should say 'the situation of the moment', for to say a 'state-of-affairs' is too static an expression. Every 'situation' was seen metaphorically as a 'knot' [*Knöte*] of various 'threads' [*Fäden*], each 'thread' an ongoing element [*Elemente*] with its own materiality, laws, and accustomed understandings of human judgement that were fused in the moment. These 'knots' presented an image for the perceiver that can be likened to a Gordian image of a knot, a 'Knäuel', which to be properly understood had to be unraveled in its inherited environmental, institutional, interpersonal understandings, and the freshly formulated personally perceptive understandings.¹⁰ Yet with every careful observation, which separates threads of the materiality involved, in its manifold of meanings, the Gordian image changes for the perceiver. New balances are understood:

As we engage in the image of the complex knot [*Knäuel*], all the threads are not seen at once *in combination*. The whole system is constantly con-

9 See Friedrich Adler 1918, pp. 77–82; and Friedrich Adler 1908, pp. 233–4.

10 Friedrich Adler 1918, pp. 87–8.

ceived by us as perceivers as developing; continually, aspects (elements) disappear from our subjective vision only to re-emerge as one observes. The knots do not represent a stable connection of elements, rather they are points in which elements disappear and arise anew, these changes representing new connections between them – materially, but also in our experience of them.¹¹

What the perceiver knows as he or she engages in this phenomenological immediacy of sorting out what is presented us has a lasting effect on the perceiver's conception of reality in its flux. When the informed perceiver then acts towards the 'situation', it is with an entry and grasp that has an influence correspondent to what has been seen. It is this informed praxis that becomes the connection to Marxism in Friedrich Adler's discussion of the relevance of Mach to the social scientific project of theoretical positioning to a political, social, and economic environment in its ongoing situations. Through careful observation of what is of more duration and what is of a newer expression of these enduring material political-social-economic realities, the Marxist can affect the course of events more readily, the analogy here being that of the use of an informed 'lever' in tipping the pyramid of events towards one's goals.

The ordinary understanding of such situations in persons who lack the foundations provided by this phenomenological rigour is simply to be carried by the hegemonic norms of how any situation in this environment is to be seen. To be sure, all persons who share an environment – those who are informed by phenomenological knowledge, which I call also 'micro-sociological' understanding insofar as it is insight into interdependent, i.e. sociative practices – and those who are simply carried by situational events, are themselves changing by dint of how they engage in the in-common existent. The ordinary understanding is influenced by the hegemonic power that affects it; the Machian understanding is more precise in its scalar balances, which weigh and position the elements.

Friedrich Adler's own recounting of his thoughts and perceptions when he shot Count Stürgh on 21 October 1916 evidence this attempt at a scalar balance of understandings, a balance in which subjective perception is at the same time a comprehension of oneself among others in a societal moment. Adler's own words are important evidence of a micro-sociological understanding that counterbalances the psychological problem that his act of assassination also

11 Ibid.

expressed. Here is Adler's account as they appear in the transcript of his hearing later that month:

I took a table that was free, closest to him [Count Stürgh]. It was directly across from the entrance, but two tables separated him from me. I ordered my meal with rather agitated words, if I remember correctly, and with great effort brought myself under control. After the first course I asked the waiter as casually as possible: 'Isn't that the Minister-President?', which was affirmed. I asked this question since because of my excitement, I wished to have an objective control [over myself]; also, I hadn't seen Count Stürgh since the closing of Parliament in January of 1914. An hour and one quarter went by until I executed the assassination. There were continually objective obstacles that arose that made me postpone the deed. At first I noticed that at a table separated from Count Stürgh by a pillar a woman sat: whether she was alone or accompanied I could not tell. But I said to myself that the possibility existed that the shots would go between the wall and the pillar and strike an innocent person. I decided, therefore, to wait until Count Stürgh arose and left the restaurant, and when he passed by my table, as he had to, in the moment I would shoot him. Count Stürgh remained sitting, however, talking first with one man who came to his table and then another. I had paid shortly after finishing my meal, and began to get uncomfortable for I feared that I might betray my emotions with my remaining so long at the table, I was not sure if my inner excitement was externally evident. Around a quarter past two the table behind Count Stürgh became free. I said to myself now the moment has come, but found again and again small external circumstances (people passing the table) that hindered me from acting on my decision. Finally – the clock across from me read two thirty, and for the moment no one was in the area – I gathered myself together and went to the table of Count Stürgh, pulled out the revolver from my right coat pocket, from which I had removed all other items (while I ate) in order to be able to quickly grab it, and whose safety catch I had properly adjusted in my pocket while I ate. I stepped towards Count Stürgh, and fired, to the best of my recollection, three or four shots towards his head. I then cried loudly: 'Down with absolutism, we want peace!' This formulation as the characterisation of my act had been determined [*zurückgelegt*] by me as I sat at the table. I definitely uttered this cry for I remember the physiological affect of its expression. This cry cost me a great deal of energy. Then I went to sleep and did not do anything more that was active. I only knew that my thought then was I must go into the ante-

room, since the officers who sat in the background [*Hintergrund*] would certainly draw their swords and attack me. I went into the anteroom; I was not conscious of where I turned in the main dining room. I didn't see Count Stürgh fall; the only impression from him is a trace of blood which I believe was on his left cheek, during or after the shots I fired. I know also my arm was half-extended and the revolver held in my hand as long as I was in the main dining room. I am not aware if I set the safety for the gun once more. In the main dining room I was at once surrounded by people who threatened me in every possible way. I know that someone seized me by the back of my shirt collar and choked me, that an officer swung his sword over me and that someone tore off my glasses. I had in the moment only the thought to shake loose in order not to become a victim of mob justice. I cried to the people: 'I am giving myself to justice, my name is Dr. Adler'. Then I had some air, and took a few steps forward, a man came to me and said: 'My name is police agent Müller'. I answered: 'Please, I will go quietly with you'. He took me under the arm and walked into a side room. While I was surrounded by people, that is, before the scene with police agent Müller, I heard another shot fired. Whether I still had the revolver in my hand, or whether it had fallen from it a moment before, I am not conscious of. I couldn't say whether it occurred in the same room in which I found myself, or whether it was in the main dining room. Several minutes later police agent Müller had come, I was led into the office of the Director, after my hat and coat were taken.

In the hour in which I waited for the right moment for carrying out the assassination, I was very excited, had in that time a strong heartbeat, which was very apparent to me as an obstruction in itself for carrying out the act. The obstruction did not exist insofar as keeping me from taking Count Stürgh's life, rather that I was made conscious of the fact that now my life was at an end. This thought was side-by-side with my sense of duty in carrying out the assassination; this thought was present with the full weight of its force, a second soul which is in every person, which holds itself on to the world with the lust for life with its heartfelt grasp. This ending of my life was the most difficult thing. After the act which was decisive for my life, I won back completely my spiritual equilibrium, and felt clearly a distanced calm in contrast to the uproar taking place in my environ. This consciousness came to me as I sat in the office, especially in my conversation with the Police-President Gorup, who had completely lost his grasp on things. I heard, while I sat in the office, about five to ten minutes after the act (to be sure, a subjective assessment), how in the same space of time the rescue society [*Rettungsgesellschaft*] was

contacted by telephone. The police official said that the reason for the call to the rescue society was ‘the assassination of the Minister President’. I had a strong, disquieting feeling that the assassination was not fully successful, and perhaps Stürgh was merely injured. This disturbed me since I feared that the effects of the assassination were cancelled in that the very attempt could be hushed up, especially the news to other countries and above all kept from the Emperor, so that despite his injuries Stürgh could remain in office. On the other hand, I had the thought that in case he did die from injuries, he would suffer unnecessarily, and finally the unpleasant feeling that this would not be in accordance with my intentions. I did not want to ask if he was dead, but received absolute confirmation of that fact in the days that followed; but I also heard that someone else was injured as well, and that the rescue society had to be called once more. Once I had confirmation that my plan [*Vorhaben*] was fulfilled, there entered a condition of complete peace of mind and satisfaction.¹²

From a Machian point-of-view, one sees clearly in Friedrich Adler’s reflections the descriptive details of conjoined periods of time where his ‘ego’ seeks to establish itself among others in an objective, interdependent situation, and while recognising subjective feelings and intentions, seeks constantly a balance that favours the objective circumstances during and consequent to the assassination. This is a ‘micro-sociology’ as it is intended to be understood in the criticism of its omission in the work of Max Adler, Otto Bauer, and Karl Renner – although their theoretical postulates prepared for such empirical study, and the practice of such ‘micro-sociologies’ as were conducted and published as complete case studies, most notably by Freud, in the first decade of the twentieth century, but are also to be found as evidential support to sociological theory in the writings of Max Weber, Werner Sombart, and Georg Simmel. Friedrich Adler was trained to note each moment of an observation so that what contradicted or was not taken into account of an expected event-sequence as stipulated by previous theory could be augmented. His awareness of the setting in its space and normal temporal flow, as well as the possible structuring of the event he planned and carried out, show a consciousness of societal expectations and how they transpired around him. Concomitant to this level of understanding we are told of his inner state of emotion and idea, its divided aspects of biological self-preservation, yet intentional choice in its tenets, and the role of

12 Friedrich Adler 1918, pp. 230–1.

these tenets in the sequence of acts, including the aftermath. One can imagine Max Weber's worker discussing his or her workstation, how decisions are made within the interdependent situation of workplace cohorts and authorities, the existence of the thought process and emotions involved in the interdependent activities, details that led to work-breaks and other changes in how jobs were done as a result of Weber's studies. 'Sociative' norms are integral to Friedrich Adler's account.

There is, of course, another level to this assassination that must be brought out, for Adler's act with its accompanying self-understandings, indeed *as reported*, do provide evidence for this other level – the psychopathology of the act. The Oedipal killing of authority, the father figure, is a motive and act strongly evidenced in the previous and subsequent life of Friedrich Adler.¹³ The assassination can be seen, of course as it must be, as a rational act of war, of due violence, against a class- and national-enemy, given Friedrich Adler's attested politics – his view that the workers of Austria and beyond needed a symbolic act to protest against how they had been enlisted by higher authorities in what Adler and many others saw as an imperialist war, at the daily cost of the lives of these workers who had no say in what was demanded of them. In our second volume that considers the tactics of the Austro-Marxists, several of Friedrich Adler's anti-war essays will be translated, and his fostering of the left-wing objection to the war within Austrian Social Democracy tracked. Yet, in understanding the thought of the Austro-Marxists, indeed the failures to fully develop the potentialities of their own theory, personality issues must be considered.

The Oedipal pathology in Friedrich Adler was reinforced over his adolescence and young maturity by dint of the fact that Austrian Social Democracy began as a political party by Friedrich Adler's father, Victor Adler. Victor sought to keep Friedrich from following in his footsteps as an activist, even as Friedrich committed himself to the plight of the proletariat as a teenager. The life plan formulated by Victor for his son began to be objectively instituted in Friedrich's fourteenth year when Friedrich was made to attend the *Realschule* which would provide a technical education that led to a practical profession, rather than his attending a *Gymnasium* which would lead to a higher education of humanist studies, and thus a threshold to socialist political activity – the course of development taken by all Austrian Social Democratic leadership.¹⁴ Friedrich was allowed to go to the University of Zürich, rather than going into a practical profession upon graduation from the *Realschule* only because the *Realschule*

13 For a thorough discussion of Friedrich Adler's Oedipal complex, see Blum 1985, pp. 140–52.

14 See Braunthal 1965, pp. 78–9.

degree excluded him from entrance to the University of Vienna, where Victor saw him as taking the path that led into the Party and activism. As fate and competence would have it, the Swiss Social-Democrats saw leadership potential in Friedrich, and made him the editor of their journal, the *Volksrecht*. Victor Adler, perhaps motivated by his unrecognised or unacknowledged participative conflict of father and son, summoned Friedrich to come back to Vienna and take up activity in the Austrian Social Democratic Party. This invitation from Victor has been puzzling to historians, given Victor's resistance to Friedrich's political activism over his son's entire adolescence and young maturity, just as Friedrich's acceptance is seen as puzzling in that he had to leave his wife and children to take up the post offered him on the editorial board of *Der Kampf*.¹⁵ From an Oedipal perspective, this can be seen as the acceptance of a mutual challenge of father versus son, an Oedipal moment of truth.¹⁶ Friedrich's strong anti-war stance that emerged in 1914 pitted him radically against his father and the 'party fathers'. The need to act was reinforced by background, and a transference of the conflicted relation to his elders was borne by Count Stürgh, as indeed it might have been by any governmental official responsible for the war. Friedrich's account of his feeling having pulled the trigger, and crying out his challenge to authoritarian absolutism, can be seen as an orgasmic release of tension: 'I definitely uttered this cry for I remember the physiological affect of its expression. This cry cost me a great deal of energy. Then I went to sleep and did not do anything more that was active'.

The pertinence of this discussion of pathology in the theoretical introduction is in line with what has been said of the personality problems involved in the relationships of Max Adler, Otto Bauer, and Karl Renner to their political life and its responsibilities. Theory was curtailed for political activity in a way that created a vacillating politics and a truncating of the potential developments of the theory. Psychopathology, even as minor neurosis, robs the individual of physical, emotional, and intellectual energy. The theoretical contributions of the four Austro-Marxists thus far considered were harmed in their systematic thoroughness, as well as the theoretical aspects of praxis. The micro-sociological applications to workplace activities or other sociative activities that might have generated a more informed and effective praxis among the populace of Austria was not taken up by Friedrich – although his keenness of phenomenological insight as a learned Machian physicist prepared him for this task of observing and analysing the immediacy of human encounter and

15 See Braunthal 1965, p. 200.

16 See Blum 1985, pp. 146–8.

cooperative activity. Instead, Friedrich devoted himself exclusively to politics after his release from prison in 1918.

For the rest of his life, Friedrich's political involvement was to be chiefly with socialist international politics. Friedrich Adler began to develop tactical ideas concerning the role of the Second International in the fostering of a socialist world before World War I, and took up the reality and problems of international cooperation among socialists after World War I. The International became 'his' constellation of praxis, separate from what his father had generated or what his father furthered. He was not successful in his attempt to re-establish the Second International, but it became the obsession of his life of thought and action, 'his' to foster as his father had fostered Austrian Social Democracy.¹⁷ This will be taken up in our discussion and in Adler's writings that concern tactics, which will be translated for the second volume.

¹⁷ For an account of the neurotic relation Friedrich had to the Labor and Socialist International (2½ International), see Hannak 1949, pp. 195–7.

Otto Neurath

Otto Neurath was an Austro-Marxist thinker in the sense of being of the same generation as the four to five men normally considered such, and being a member of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. There was not the same mutual discourse that conjoined Otto Bauer, Max Adler, Friedrich Adler, Karl Renner, and Rudolf Hilferding in their pre-World War I cooperation, and growing dissensions in World War I and its aftermath. But Neurath's 'logical empiricism' is sufficiently original and significant for Marxist theory to underscore his thought as Austro-Marxist, particularly as it had influence in his time and has relevance in addressing in-common global concerns that bear upon socialist thought and strategies today.

Neurath thought of history developmentally, as all Austrians appear to have done. The human groups and conflicts that establish the character of communities, indeed civilisations, evolve gradually over generations. He shared with Friedrich Adler and Adler's scientific mentor, Ernst Mach, a deep respect for past knowledge in both what it had accomplished and its enduring validity, but also a constant concern with any scientific language that obscured reality and diverted humans from properly addressing their needs. Neurath's 'logical empiricism' evolved as a scientific epistemology from Mach's observational perspectives.¹ And, like Mach and Friedrich Adler, he saw past scientific thought and its use as potentially valuable even as it would need to be re-addressed and the material realities that occasioned it reassessed with renewed observation. His famous aphorism of the plight of human culture, quoted as an epigraph to begin this volume, informed his theoretical dimensions – 'We are sailors who must rebuild their ship at sea from the best materials available, not having the luxury of returning to port, putting our ship of state, as it were, in dry-dock'. Neurath was attentive to the pragmatic necessity of constantly attending societal purposes within the compass of what could be done. While believing in formulating strategic plans and more proximate tactics, they were always to be based upon a clear understanding of what could work with available means in the present. His philosophical orientation enabled this constant refining of tools and their targeted implementation. Logical empiricism entails an attention to the conceptual language that is fashioned from existing terms informed by more careful observation of the phenomena that have been imputed as its basis.

1 See Neurath 1983, pp. 48–50, 217–24.

Most importantly, Neurath's 'logical empiricism' was not intended merely to improve the language of science and its implementations, but rather to improve the social dimension of all sciences. Neurath's Marxism was an appreciation of the social sciences as the basis of all individual and collective efforts of the human community, and Marx and his 'logical empiricism' as the foundation of the social sciences, most notably sociology.² *Empiricism*, for Neurath, is to observe physical actions that are 'intersensual' and 'intersubjective' – that is, engaging always the agent and the recipient of the action, individually, in small groups, and in larger groups that include societal norms. He calls this attention to the actions of persons a 'physicalist' orientation to human praxis.³ Human action is not interpreted through the intentional statements of those who act, but rather through a description of the behavioural actions in their systematic occurrence and individual instances. Neurath connotes this with the 'behaviourism' in the psychological sciences of the 1920s and 1930s, calling it 'social behaviourism',⁴ but stresses that Karl Marx first formulated this orientation to human praxis a century before.⁵ The appellation *logical* that qualifies the empiricism signifies an attention to the acts of 'speech thinking' that accompany, explain, and justify the social interactions.⁶ One acts within the channels of thought that speech facilitates, its origins coming as Marx holds from the productive relationships, and those acts of power associated with the efforts of social existence by the human community.⁷ One must enable others to clarify their language of description, analysis, justification, and so forth, with an attention to language that maintains its purview upon behaviours, not diluting or contaminating it with 'metaphysical' or other indiscernible terms.⁸ The common parlance must be used as a basis, not technical jargon, for the intention is to enable the populace to comprehend events with in-common 'intersubjective' language.⁹ This does not mean that scientists cannot use mathematics, or other social scientists use formulaic means of description and analysis, but that these terms must always be generated with the topics of in-common understanding in mind. Aristotle articulates a similar thought in the opening section of the *Topics*, where he states: 'those opinions are "generally accep-

2 Neurath 1983, pp. 82–3.

3 Neurath 1983, pp. 62–8.

4 Neurath 1983, pp. 70–1, 75.

5 Neurath 1983, pp. 82–3.

6 Neurath 1983, pp. 66–8.

7 Neurath 1983, p. 83.

8 Neurath 1983, pp. 68–71.

9 Neurath 1983, pp. 96–7.

ted" which are accepted by every one or by the majority'.¹⁰ Neurath states in this vein: 'A physicist should, in principle, be able to satisfy the witty thinker's demand: "It must be possible to make the main features of any strictly scientific theory plain to a hackney-coach-driver in his own language"'.¹¹

Just as Aristotle proceeds to do in the *Topics*, Neurath then stresses that any discourse that takes up mutual concerns must begin with, and be guided throughout by, carefully formulated propositions which are evident in meaning to all concerned. As a proposition addresses an in-common concern in its intersensual and intersubjective nature, its wording is essentially the same whether stated as a problem or the proposition that will give one entry into addressing it. Neurath will explain such propositions as 'protocol statements':

Protocol statements are factual statements of the same linguistic form as other factual statements, but in them a personal name always occurs several times, in a definite connection with other terms. A complete protocol statement might for example be worded like this: 'Otto's protocol at 3:17 o'clock: [Otto's speech-thinking at 3:16 o'clock was: (at 3:15 o'clock there was a table in the room perceived by Otto)]'. This factual statement is so constructed that, after 'deletion of the brackets', further factual statements appear, which, however, are not protocol statements: 'Otto's speech-thinking was at 3:16 o'clock: (at 3:15 o'clock there was a table in the room perceived by Otto)', and further: 'At 3:15 o'clock there was a table in the room perceived by Otto'.¹²

The setting of a personal name creates the 'person, place, or thing' that can be identified by everyone as the agent or site of the event or situation that is descriptively observed or later investigated. This avoids 'generalisation' that reifies what is examined to any time, place, and manner. The protocol statement (or proposition) must also include the predication attached to the subject, the predication formulated in precise terms of time, place, and manner. The 'further' statements in the above thought by Neurath are impositions of 'fact' that cannot be verified as stated, but rather become narrative truisms stemming from the protocol statement – which must be verified. The '3:17' account is the protocol that is to be investigated and verified, the onset of all other understanding.

10 Aristotle, *Topics*, available from: <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/topics.1.i.html>.

11 Neurath 1983, p. 92.

12 Neurath 1983, p. 93.

Laws can be generated from sufficient verifications of protocol statements that propose certain events and outcomes, thus the social scientific promise of historical materialism. Marx's careful studies are accepted as such empirical verifications, open, nonetheless, to empirical inquiries that address the changing social forms since Marx. But his understandings when formulated carefully can function as 'protocol' statements that, while being susceptible to being proven inexact or inappropriate for the present, are tenets within systems of material knowledge that remain orientations for contemporary thought.

Neurath stressed behavioural evidence for all 'science', and eschewed the distinction between 'environmental' and 'mental' sciences. Yet he did not discount the mental investigations that informed behaviour, such as Freudian psychoanalysis. He spoke of using Freud's learnings as establishing certain 'unconscious pre-conditions' of behaviour to be observed.¹³ The interpersonal context and its environmental setting – both natural and technological – is the alpha and omega of scientific inquiry. He was aware of Kurt Lewin's micro-sociological work in studying small-group behaviour.¹⁴ Thus, Neurath as a Marxist sociologist in his social behaviourism was an ideal person to make the studies of workers in factories and people engaged in competitive and cooperative activities in other contexts that were neglected by Max Adler, Bauer, and the Machian Friedrich Adler. Establishing these epistemological foundations took up his life in the 1930s. Had he lived on into the late 1940s and 1950s, I believe he would have joined other logical empiricists, even Lewin, in micro-sociological observations, either in England or in the United States. His 'protocol' sentences were an ideal tool for close observation.

Neurath's contextual thinking dissolved the exclusive methodological boundaries between disciplines. He saw scientific disciplines cooperating in addressing situations and problems of a given time, place, and manner by using in-common protocol statements, reformulated only slightly in their wording or terms to accommodate disciplinary needs.¹⁵ He called the outcome of such cooperative activity among the sciences 'Unified Science'. He and cooperating scholars began to publish an encyclopaedia of the unified sciences in the late 1930s. 'Unified science' would not be 'one' science, but the existing sciences that consulted each other's work and cooperated in deliberating how protocol statements and their associated laws in one discipline could be used by another

13 Neurath 1983, p. 80.

14 Neurath 1983, p. 199.

15 Neurath 1983, pp. 98–9.

discipline, augmented, and in its turn provide guidance for the first discipline and other disciplines.¹⁶ Neurath stressed the democratic, self-initiated nature by researchers within each discipline in such cooperative inquiry, objecting to those who mischaracterised his efforts as seeking a monolithic science. Changes in society, as well as disciplinary change, were the horizon within which the individual and groups of individuals participated as equals in their intersensual and interdependent contextual endeavours.¹⁷

Neurath's ground-breaking work with the 'ordinary' non-verbal language of figural 'isotypes' – ideal-typical images of persons, places, and things – is probably his best known legacy. This was done in the spirit of 'protocol' sentences in its articulation of noun placeholders that conveyed social ideal-types that could function in statistical discussions, and wherever figural language could be useful in conveying issues or states-of-affairs. This figural language accommodated less educated adults and was very advantageous in the instruction of young students into the political, economic, and social facts of the world. Moreover, the variety of human cultures could be quickly presented in 'isotypic' figures, not only in demographics, but pictorial stories of 'ways of life', and as a Marxist socialist Neurath generated graphic tables that made clear the political-economic hegemonies of his time. Neurath writes of the promise of isotypic communication as early as 1925:

Nowadays all of us must understand social correlations. It is not enough to be able to read and write and to know something about arithmetic, science, literature, and history: social changes have to be understood. However, the teaching of this field has hardly begun.

Modern man is conditioned by the cinema and wealth of illustrations. He gets much of his knowledge during leisure hours in the most pleasing way through his eyes. If one wants to spread social knowledge, one should use means similar to modern advertisements.

Informative pictures and models should be part of a comprehensive whole, a course for everybody who wants to study social and economic questions without special preparation. Graphic representations of statistics should be made in such a way that they are not only correct but also fascinating.¹⁸

16 Neurath 1983, pp. 148–50.

17 Neurath 1983, pp. 145–6.

18 Neurath 1973, p. 214.

In a 1937 essay, Neurath stresses the quick comprehension possible with a figurative language that can generate a cosmopolitan appreciation of human societies. He also champions a figurative language curriculum as a way to empower the individual beyond the need of technical academic languages, so that thought can be self-generated and based upon accessible understandings of the complex relationships within a society. Isotypes engender an in-common language that can be made sufficiently complex to communicate intersensual and interdependent realities:

Visual education leads to internationalization much more than word education does. One can use the same visual arguments, connected with different words for explanation in various languages; one can even vary the remarks on the same visual material. Visual education is related to the extension of intellectual democracy within single communities and within mankind, it is an element of international social planning and engineering.

This is a period of planning, planning for getting something done, where without planning defects are manifest, such as destruction of coffee, unemployment, etc. But we can remove all this without regional planning, without city planning; we can imagine a nation with planned production as far as raw materials are concerned, but also building up 'planning for freedom', which signifies intentionally *not* interfering. Much city planning is full of pomposity, with a totalitarian undercurrent, pressing forward some way of life. Perhaps people want to do so; but the dictatorship of planning is a danger in itself and is not connected with planning against want. You may be in security, but free to choose your kind of life within this security. The either-or is important. We may create certain conventions in language without unifying the laws; a world of language does not imply a world dictatorship but may help world understanding. For a democratic society it is important to have a common language ...

Besides being more international, visual education from the beginning enforces a more human approach than education through words. It can only deal with things which are within the grasp of everyone's understanding. Because of this, too, it is international. We may present a lot of visual arguments, not in any way offending the various religious creeds, the various kinds of philosophies or other formulated or not formulated ways of life found on earth ...

It would be childish to think of educational means as something isolated from social organisation. But some people like to produce an international environment. With visual aids, one could create something that is

common to all, we could educate children in various countries, in Europe and other continents, in a way which gives them the feeling of a common environment. Visual education is neutral and satisfies a feeling of having knowledge in common for human brotherhood. Because I believe that visual aids have this peculiarity, I wish to promote visual education, as an element of human brotherhood.¹⁹

19 Neurath 1973, pp. 247–8.

Rudolf Hilferding

Rudolf Hilferding left Vienna for Germany in 1906 when he was twenty-nine years old. He had made his voice as a theorist heard by that time with the publication of *Böhm-Bawerks Marx-Kritik* in the initial volume of *Marx-Studien* in 1904, a series he was to co-edit with Max Adler. This treatise concerned Marx's concept of labour value, and was defended by Hilferding in a manner which bred a slightly differing economic concept of labour value, yet in the spirit of Marx's intention.¹ Hilferding's manner of thought inevitably generated this creative difference, one that corresponded to the realities of his time as he saw it. Hilferding can be considered a pragmatic nominalist, in the sense one can appreciate in the likes of Richard Rorty or, of Hilferding's own time, Bertrand Russell. Concepts were important as guides for thought and praxis, but concepts are coined to correspond to sensed realities so that these realities can be taken up with adequate recognition and seen with sufficient clarity to enable one to address or actively engage it, so that it could be brought under rational control as much as possible. William Smaldone captures Hilferding's movement of thought towards this pragmatic orientation in describing the initial influence of Ernst Mach because his scientific philosophy eschewed the epistemology of consciousness and cleaved to material reality, but brings out Hilferding's rejection of this orientation as it was too theoretically reliant upon individual cognition and the biological bases of such cognition:

At a time when many socialists and Marxists were attempting to connect the ethical teachings of Kant to the 'scientific socialism' of Marx, Mach's views acted as a materialist counter-weight to neo-Kantianism. To Hilferding, Mach's basic perspective in some ways approximated Marx's materialist conception of history, but his later writings show that he was as unwilling to fully accept Mach's 'natural biological' views as he was Kant's a priori categories or Hegel's self-developing idea. Whereas Mach believed that the adaptation of idea to reality was a biological necessity, Hilferding believed that ideas developed in response to changing material reality and their interaction with one another in the thought process itself. For him 'the logical development of theory paralleled the real development of capitalism', but the adaptation of ideas to one another

1 See Smaldone 1998, pp. 21–2.

was also the general condition or logical requirement of scientific thinking as such.²

Hilferding was not a budding phenomenologist, either in the neo-Kantian vein offered by Max Adler or that of the phenomenal exactitude of Ernst Mach's thought as championed by Friedrich Adler. Nor was the 'logical empiricism' of Neurath – a more conceptual orientation to the phenomenal act – of interest to Hilferding. I do not believe it was the biological bases of Mach's ontological reflections on perception that steered Hilferding away from his thought, but rather the phenomenological exactitude required in observing a specific act or event, a person, place, or thing. Hilferding's thought was more comfortable with societal systems as they affected individualities, and in this sense he was perhaps closer to Marx's own vein of thought than to his fellow Austro-Marxists. The material reality of these systems could be seen in facts and figures, balance sheets and organisational charts, as well as in how productive and consumer relations in their interdependent transactions between persons functioned as a system in the society as a whole. To closely observe one set of actions by one or several individuals, a more behavioural orientation, albeit of great value in terms of human relationships, was to not see the concept that governed and guided these forms within which humans must interact in a given system. Karl Marx, writing of this systemic reality in considering the issue of 'labour value' wrote:

In the expression 'value of labor', the idea of value is not only completely obliterated, but actually reversed. It is an expression as imaginary as the value of the earth. These imaginary expressions arise, however, from the relations of production themselves. They are categories for the phenomenal forms of essential relations.³

Marx here tells us that conceptual syntheses of real activities are vital in order to comprehend the way that these activities are sustained, rewarded socially, or condemned and changed. Concepts of systematic behaviour are the terms and thus ideas that guide human praxis in any age. Neurath's protocol sentences could have been useful in their logical exactitude in the description of the 'phenomenal forms' in their systemic functioning for Hilferding, but Neurath wrote by the time Hilferding's mind was completely absorbed by the tasks of

2 Smaldone 1998, pp. 16–17. The quote is from Hilferding 1910–11, p. 623.

3 Marx 1967, p. 537.

practical politics in Weimar Germany. Within his pre-World War I economic analyses of systems, Hilferding either amplified existing Marxist concepts so that they could be useful in comprehending what occurred and what should be done, or he coined new concepts – albeit of a Marxist orientation – to facilitate the understanding of and action towards the economic class structure of his time in its operations.

Hilferding's treatise on Böhm-Bawerk's address of Marx's labour theory of value and his most important work, *Finanzkapital*, published in 1910, took up the economic system as a whole in its material range of operations. The phenomenal forms of the essential relations that comprised the capitalist system, for example, were tracked in their operations under the names that were the channels and compass of their activities. This 'abstraction' of the individual transaction to that of the phenomenal form that was being enacted was the core of Hilferding's criticism of how Böhm Bawerk conceived of Marx's system of economic analysis. Böhm-Bawerk criticises Marx's concept of 'labour value' by pointing out that he does not take up any specific product generated by the labourer, that is 'all geometrical, physical, chemical, or other natural qualities of the commodities', and considers them solely within the phenomenal forms of 'use' or 'exchange' value.⁴ This obviates the valuing of the individual producer or consumer in his or her interest in some specific 'this-there'. Böhm-Bawerk, from the individualist, capitalist conception, needs individual psychology as the crucial moment of how decisions are made, by producers, consumers, as well as labourers, who enter into contracts to produce the commodities. Hilferding counters with the Marxist concept of 'phenomenal form', where 'labour value' has been translated into that of 'exchange value' within the system buying and selling – and thereby is 'social labour' – the coining of a term that highlights the proper socialist understanding of how 'labour value' is to be seen and treated within the capitalist operation of its hegemonic system:

The term commodity, therefore, is an *economic* term; it is the expression of social relationships between mutually independent producers in so far as these relationships are effected through the instrumentality of goods. The contrasted qualities of the commodity as use value and as value, the contrast between its manifestation as a natural form or as a value form, now appears to us to be a contrast between the commodity manifesting itself on the one hand as a *natural* thing and on the other hand as a *social* thing. We have, in fact, to do with a dichotomy, wherein the giving of the

4 Hilferding 1949, pp. 125–6.

place of honor to one branch excludes the other, and conversely. But the difference is merely one of point of view. The commodity is a unity of use value and of value, but we can regard that unity from two different aspects. As a natural thing, it is the object of a natural science; as a social thing, it is the object of a social science, the object of political economy. The object of political economy is the social aspect of the commodity, of the good, in so far as it is a symbol of social interconnection.

A commodity, however, can be the expression of social relationships only in so far as it is itself contemplated as a product of society, as a thing on which society has stamped its imprint. But for society, which exchanges nothing, the commodity is nothing more than a product of labor. Moreover, the members of society can only enter into economic relationships one with another according as they work one for another. This material relationship appears in its historic form as the exchange of commodities. The total product of labor presents itself as a total value, which in individual commodities manifests itself quantitatively as exchange value.⁵

The commodity being, as far as society is concerned, the product of labour, this labour thereby secures its specific character as socially necessary labour; the commodity no longer exhibits itself to us as the product of the labour of different subjects, for these must now rather be looked upon as simple 'instruments of labor'. Economically regarded, therefore, the private 'labors' manifest themselves as their opposites, as social 'labors'. The condition that gives its value-creating quality to labour is therefore the social determination of the labour – it is the quality of social labour.⁶

Smaldone sees this limitation of 'labor value' to the phenomenal form of 'social labor' a trait in Hilferding's thought that inclined him to overlook Marx's own consideration of specific markets where goods are produced that are targeted for specific 'use values'.⁷ This neglected aspect by Hilferding shows Marx was concerned with more concrete operations in relationships between owner and labourer. Indeed, Hilferding does incline towards the more systemic range of social relationships regardless of the quality of specific goods, and that can tell us something of his mind-set, what was of the moment in the pre-World War I economy, and why his thought was able to identify the new

5 Hilferding 1949, pp. 130–1.

6 Ibid.

7 Smaldone 1998, p. 21.

'phenomenal form' of *finance capital*. Let us see how Hilferding discounts the concrete practice of the individual labourer in his or her relation to the producer as a 'use value' is created in a specific product:

A use value is an individual relationship between a thing and a human being. If I disregard its concreteness (and I am compelled to do so as soon as I alienate the thing so that it ceases to be a use value for me) I thereby destroy this individual relationship. But solely in its individuality can a use value be the measure of my personal estimate of value. If, on the other hand, I disregard the concrete manner in which I have expended my labor, it nevertheless remains a fact that labor in general has been expended in its universal human form, and this is an objective magnitude the measure of which is furnished by the duration of the effort.

It is precisely this objective magnitude with which Marx is concerned. He is endeavoring to discover the social nexus between the apparently isolated agents of production. Social production, and therewith the actual material basis of society, is, according to its nature, qualitatively determined by the nature of the organisation of social labor.⁸

It is the 'objective magnitudes' that integrate specific acts of capitalist and labourer in distinctive forms of 'social nexus' that Hilferding wishes to comprehend. The nature of the organisation of social labour in the 1890s through 1914 had become even further removed from the direct outcome of individual labour; it had become a commodity of finance capitalism, and thereby a new phenomenal form to be understood and addressed by socialists.

Finance Capital examines how credit institutions, especially banks, merged with and gained control of large-scale industry. The increasing importance of money and credit in the development of large-scale industrial enterprises generated a new 'objective magnitude' whose leverage of capital provision enabled it to direct large-scale industrial policies. Its systematic network of financial institutions exercised authority over industrial enterprise through its targeted interest rates and loans, and with increasing board representation within industries themselves, gave direction to production externally and internally. Writing of the change of authority from industries to banks in the capitalist system, Smaldone reviews Hilferding's insights into this phenomenon:

8 Hilferding 1949, pp. 131–2.

[T]he primary purpose of investment credit was to enable production to expand on the basis of a given supply of money. Industrial capitalists could use the money provided by the banks to expand production by investing either in fixed or circulating capital. It is the investment of fixed capital that is of particular importance to Hilferding's analysis. 'So long as the banks merely serve as intermediaries in payment transactions', Hilferding wrote, 'their only interest is the condition of an enterprise ... at a particular time ... This changes when the bank begins to provide the industrialist with capital for production'. Thereafter, it develops a long-term interest in the prospects of the firm and the condition of the market and 'the larger the amount of credit supplied and, above all, the larger proportion of the loan turned into fixed capital, the stronger, more abiding that interest will be'.⁹

Smaldone brings out Hilferding's underscoring of how this new 'objective magnitude' transferred policy authority to the financial institutions:

One of the most important effects of this merger of bank and industrial capital was the placement of control over society's productive forces in the hands of a continually smaller number of decision makers ... [T]he banks expanded simultaneously with the growth of industry and gradually became dominant over it due to their control over a greater amount of the total social capital. As the process of cartelization unfolded, the banks also grew and amalgamated. Not only was competition reduced inside cartelized industrial branches, but this tendency also developed in banking.¹⁰

Finance capital was becoming a capitalist distortion of a socialised economy, fostered by capitalism's own progressive enlargement and expansion. Finance capital was 'social capital' because it marshaled the money of all classes through the banks, and the banks funneled this money from the societal savings and interest payments as a whole into this small sector of productive giants. Hilferding wrote in this regard:

[W]ith the development of banking and the increasingly dense network of relations between the banks and industry there is a growing tendency

9 Smaldone 1998, p. 42.

10 Smaldone 1998, pp. 44–5.

to eliminate competition among the banks themselves and, on the other side, to concentrate all capital in the form of money capital and to make it available to the producers only through the banks. If this trend were to continue, it would finally result in a single bank or a group of banks establishing control over the entire money capital. Such a 'central bank' would then exercise control over social production as a whole.¹¹

Hilferding saw such finance capitalism as the 'antithesis of capitalism' because it represented the organisation and control over the anarchy of the market. Although resembling a socialised form of productive planning, it was still a form of organisation adapted to capitalism. It was the socialisation of other people's money for use by the few and therefore as a 'fraudulent' kind of socialism.

Hilferding's lasting contribution to socialist theory is this emphasis upon the nature of the 'objective magnitude' of human labour or any other human praxis that becomes systematic, and thus a 'social nexus' for channeling and governing the quality of human life. Society has changed since World War II in its organisations of production, distribution, and consumption, but these material grounds remain the bases of intersensuous and interdependent relations (as Neurath would state it). Examining new 'phenomenal forms' that guide these relationships in societies (Marx), particularly as to their systematic impacts upon how people thought, valued, and acted both before and after their imposition, is a continual imperative for Marxist social science. This level of abstracting the micro-sociological evidence of specific human transactions to its phenomenal form is not just a legacy of Marx; it also recognises the torch passed on by Hilferding.

11 Smaldone 1998, p. 45.

PART 3

*The Translated Theoretical
Texts of the Austro-Marxists*



Max Adler

We begin our translations of Max Adler with his more formal formulation of the key concept of his career of thought, that of 'sociation' [*Vergesellschaftung*]. This concept was examined as an epistemological explanation of human judgement. In every judgement the individual person, place, or thing is seen in its empirical reality against a background of others of like or different kind. This form of positing is the 'sociation' of the individual amongst others. This form of judgement which is pervasive in perception or argument is either semantically explicit in its manifestation, or implicit, and by its lack of semantic presence understood as needed by the discerning listener. The human being perceives and judges in relation to other human beings and natural phenomena. The person is never isolate in his or her predications, but rather an integer in a totality of other integers. Humans develop systematic forms of relating self to others, either the negative polarity posited in the competitive vision of capitalism, where there is an assumption of the war of all against all, or the positive pole of the interdependence of everyone. Adler made this concept distinct in this long chapter in a 1930 'instructional manual' of Marxist socialist conceptions with an awareness of how it was not yet fully appreciated as a basic mode by which all human consciousness operated.



Max Adler 1930, 'The New Concept of Sociation', Chapter XIV, in
Lehrbuch der Materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, Berlin:
E. Laubsche Verlagsbuchhandlung

1 *Sociation* [*Vergesellschaftung*] is not *Sociability* [*Geselligkeit*]¹

The concept of sociation with Marx is throughout a new kind of concept of an essentially *sociological* character, that is, it contains no ethical or psychological

1 [The concept of *Vergesellschaftung* as 'unifying into a common body' ['zu einer gemeinschaft (gesellschaft) vereinigen'], and the verb 'vergesellschaften' as the act of realising such uniting by the individual(s) ['zu einer gemeinschaft vereinen'], can be identified as first coined after the 30 years war. See Jakob und Wilhelm Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*. Several of Max Adler's contemporaries, who were sociologists, but not Marxists in self-identification, had written on the concept of sociation [*Vergesellschaftung*] in a more general sense of the sociable nature of being human – which Max Adler takes issue with in this essay. One, however, Ferdinand Tönnies, whose *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* was first published in 1887, does

meaning in itself.² The *new* slant of this concept has not yet been properly understood, and not only by opponents of, but also adherents to, Marxism. One can best clarify the concept if one shows the difference between the concept of sociation, and a long-existing concept it is often confused with, that is, the concept of the sociable nature of humankind. If sociation meant only that the human was a sociable being, one could then say that Marxists have taken up an old understanding which Aristotle himself knew, merely giving it a new name.³

It must be brought out that Aristotle's much-cited statement that the human is a 'Zoon politikon' has not been well understood when it is translated in the usual way, that is, the human being is a sociable [*geselliges*] being. In reality, the Aristotelian proposition says the human is a political being, that is, a being intended to live in a state, that is, a being who cannot be conceived other than as a member of a community, who cannot live otherwise, and that this concept is that which is understood as sociation [*Vergesellschaftung*], which is something quite different from the concept of a social life [*geselliges Zusammenhang*].

What then is the difference between *sociation* and *sociability*? The doctrine that arises from the rule that the human is a sociable being conveys a *psychological characteristic*, which, while it may apply to many persons, asserts it as an invariant characteristic of human nature itself. It takes a speculative presumption to be the basis of its perspective of social life, and thereby articulates

take a materialistic-historicist approach to the concept. Yet, as we will see, none of these sociological commentators take 'Vergesellschaftung' to mean 'Sozialisierung', 'socialisation', a political concept that one sees as a later stage in the historical materialist understanding of society. See the Wikipedia discussion of the use of this concept by Max Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Georg Simmel, [http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vergesellschaftung_\(Soziologie\)](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vergesellschaftung_(Soziologie)). The Wikipedia discussion states: 'Max Weber defines Vergesellschaftung as a social relationship "that occurs within a social transaction motivated from the perspective of rationally (rational goal or rational value) motivated realization of interests". Weber derived this orientation of the concept from Ferdinand Tönnies who wrote in his *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, that every human relationship "... is a mutual effect insofar as from either side it is designed either to maintain or disturb the will and body of each party: affirming or denying it" ... Then Tönnies goes on to define "Vergesellschaftung" more closely as the process by which the individual integrates himself in some way into the social context (or negatively integrates)". The Wikipedia discussion states further in its gloss of Tönnies that he holds that "'Vergesellschaftung" is fulfilled by every class, ethnicity, and sex in a particular way that reflects the changing social-historical conditions'. This will be very close to the understanding of Max Adler, and other Austromarxists who used this concept].

2 [See Part II: Overview of Austro-Marxist Theoreticians, Max Adler, fn. 8 above].

3 [See Part II: Overview of Austro-Marxist Theoreticians, Max Adler, fn. 9 above].

an essentially optimistic meaning. Such a viewpoint flatters quite easily, for one likes to hear such an understanding of the person – being essentially good, striving with others – so that a society of isolated individuals or, indeed, where a discord is preferred, is a condition that appears as a degeneration of nature. Many great thinkers have held this position, among them the early modern founder of natural law theory, Hugo Grotius, giving this view, thereby, the character of science. But a critical glance at everyday life opens to us too many facts of the daily ill will, animosity, and cruelty in the actions of persons towards each other, indeed, at best the lack of concern for one another, to entertain this positive view of human nature as in any way founded. Does human nature really have the benign characteristics associated with the lamb, which pastures in peace beside another, and enjoys their close association? One would expect a thinker who had the most conviction concerning ethical duty to agree. Immanuel Kant recognised the good will of the human in his essential being as a free person, but at the same time saw the person as he really was, having thereby a dim view of individuals, in that he doubted if they could really perform virtuous activities, since the human being as he actually was could be considered a crooked piece of wood from which nothing of value could be made. And the great contemporary of Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, was quite distanced from seeing human nature as well intentioned and sociable, as he directly compared the human being with wolves. ‘Homo homini lupus!’, ‘[t]he human is the fellow-creature of the wolf’ – so rang the famous statement of this thinker, which he then followed with his characterisation of the natural condition of human life as contrary to a peaceful living together, rather a ‘Bellum omnium contra omnes’, ‘a war of everyone against all’!

That was indeed a pessimistic outlook. But when we ask ourselves which opinion of the two philosophers we would agree with most – the doctrine of the lamb-like being or that of the wolf nature of the human – the contemporary person within the exploitative conditions of the capitalist society, and especially since the horrors of the world war, would find it quite difficult to hold on to the unconditional ‘The person is good’. Yet there are those who cling to this conviction despite all the adversities, who will not allow their belief in the goodness of human nature to be taken away, and hold that this nature will have its way in the final analysis. *Which of the two people are right?* We see immediately that we have entered into a question of worldview, the subjective outlook of the person and its essence – whether one is optimistic or whether the other conceives pessimistically, whether one has this conception of the totality of the world’s context or is of another perspective, whether one finds this view of human nature or another truer. Upon such grounds a profound philosophy of history can be constructed, but not a *scientific understanding*. Neither the concept of

a sociable nature, nor one that is unsociable offers an *objective* foundation for sociological knowledge.

2 *The Objectivity of the Sociation Concept*

In contradistinction, the character of the concept of *sociation* [*Vergesellschaftung*] is rigorously scientific; it has nothing to do with subjective conceptions of the essence of human beings, with psychological characteristics of them, or with some other manner of valuing. For the concept of sociation is quite neutral as to whether the human is sociable or unsociable in his nature, or whether he is good or evil, *since any of these aspects can only occur within sociation itself*. Not only is the sociable being *but also the unsociable* being a form of sociation. And, just so, the friendly and sympathetic relations of persons to one another, just as the ill-willed and malevolent behaviour *are only possible within society*. One can only be unsociable in society, and only in it can one be good or hateful to another. Yet there is the expression that one can act in a benign or hurtful way towards oneself; this has only an individual meaning, that is, one's way of behaving is either helpful or hindering for his own individual well-being. Insofar as this self-directed behaviour has a moral meaning, one measures oneself by an individual ideal, even as one presumes this ideal has a universal value. Whoever acts benignly does so as everyone should who would act morally. One sees here that the concept of good or evil behaviour towards oneself is inseparable from how one relates to others; for a wholly isolated being, if such a thing were possible, there would only be the consideration of whether his actions were useful to himself or injurious. But as soon as one judges whether his action is good or evil, one places oneself upon the ground of the consideration, whether this action which is considered is in reference not only to the isolated person, but to every person who so conducts themselves. Even loneliness and unsociability are only possible within sociation. One cannot separate oneself from society, one can isolate oneself only within society. Indeed, even the hermit and the hater of humanity, as long as this is not pathologically expressed, are bound to society, just as they want to know nothing of it. A really isolated individual is a condition that begins where his spiritual connections to others is interrupted, that is, in madness. When Marx once said that Robinson is a figure in a novel that could never appear in an actual economy, that is also the case for sociology.⁴

4 See Marx 1903, pp. 710–11: 'The human is in the most literal sense of the word a *zoon politikon*, not simply a *sociable* animal, but an animal that *can only individuate itself within society*. Production by isolated individuals beyond society – a rarity, which could occur accidentally

For sociology, it is not pertinent whether one is a sociable being or not, or whether society is constellated out of love, or through a cooler, rational consideration, or finally, out of the compulsion of necessity, since sociology does not know humans other than in society, and therefore does not begin with some concept of the individual, rather always with an already constituted understanding of one's work and intercourse with other individuals to whom he is connected, for without this connection nothing is possible, in short, for the sociated individuals.

The concept of sociation expresses this completely objective fundamental actuality, which is the indissoluble connection of humans with one another in their form of existence. To be a person is to be among persons. No other kind of person has ever been, and it is only a fantasy to speak of the 'last man', who could only be that by carrying the legacy of all others known in his life to his grave. This objective connectedness of humans is completely free of valuation, of all values whether they be that of a friendly or ill-willed connection, just as the benign or malevolent character of persons develops first *within* their sociation. They are the products and forms of it, those that arise in its historical process.

3 *Sociation as a Concept of Being*

So it arises that the mental nature of humans is the same as that of their *social* or *sociated nature*. And it follows from this that when one speaks of persons sociologically, of their willing and actions, one always means *the sociated person*, even when one considers wholly individual ideas and plans, or speaks of individualistic or selfish attitudes.⁵

to a civilized person who became trapped in the wilderness and who already dynamically possessed the forces of society – is as great an absurdity as the idea of the development of language without individuals living together and talking to one another. We need not dwell on this any longer'.

- 5 One can see this truth operative by critiquing Othmar Spann, who with such pathos and aplomb puts forward in all his writings the principal of universalism in contradistinction to individualism as the basis of his sociology, giving it its truth, and which he so passionately wields as a conceptual basis in combating his view of the incomprehensibility of Marxism. If the antitheses of universalism and individualism has, for Spann, a methodological meaning, that is, whether there is a primary connectedness between individuals, or rather individuals are the primary element in themselves, then it is that universalism is the basis of sociology. Then, he would not be so distanced from the Marxist way of thought, and would not therefore combat a causal sociology, which he nonetheless does reject in defence of his way of privileging universalism. Universalism with Spann is not a methodological principle, but rather a metaphysical conception of society, in which there is a spiritual substance which emanates

And just so the artful expression of a natural law of historical development, or of a natural economic necessity, is not a natural law or a natural necessity in the sense of physical nature, rather it is a natural necessity of a social nature; it is not a natural process, but rather a sociational process. And all these expressions say the same thing: that the causal process in its basis of sociation is a mental process, and that the person walks everywhere within societal necessities; the thinking, willing, and valuing person is not so in these separate functions that he can creatively shape in any direction, but rather in all these functions is determined by the external circumstances under which he lives, and in exercising these functions he is not to be understood as a self-reliant, solitary person, but instead as a sociated person.

4 *Sociation as an Epistemological Concept*

Sociation is the fundamental fact of sociology. It is as a singular concept, exceptionally precise in a foundational way, as we will see as it has been developed in Marx and Engels. It is the reason that Marxism is to be considered essentially a sociological discipline, and in Marxism, which is certainly not the completion of sociology, but until now its most consequent, and for further development, richest in its perspectives for the beginnings of sociology as a causal science. Even when we see, however, the Marxist concept of sociation as the founda-

from each individual. Therefore, the distinction between individualism and universalism is not a methodological one, but rather a substantial distinction: individualism is one who is completely *isolated* in his standing beside another, which Spann justly rejects as an idea; universalism, on the other hand, is their connectedness through an independent higher value that stands above them, which in its highest emanation is grounded in God. In this way, *this* universalism has as its basis a particular method which can no longer be causal, but rather is normative, because the social connection of humans is not of their being, but rather exists in a certain order within a whole (hierarchy, a table of values, and in consequence a subordination and super-ordination among humans). It is no wonder then that this sociology is a political glorification of the corporate state, and in spite of its vainglorious display of the 'German' spirit, it has become the best stanchion of a Roman fascism. At this point we cannot go more deeply into Spann's 'sociology'. It remains only to say that in this author's latest writings, he has more unreservedly, indeed willfully, asserted what he earlier chose to take issue with, that his societal 'science' is nothing other than a societal metaphysic. See, in this regard, my comments on the *Deutschen Soziologentag in Wien* (5th Volume) and the answer by Spann in the *Kölner Vierteljahrsheften für Soziologie*, 6. Jahrg., Heft 1, as well as the article by Dunckmann, 'Der Streit um Spann' (Berlin, 1928). In closing one more thing must be said, that the 'individualistic' as the universalist standpoints are only antitheses *within* sociation, and that as a particular ideology, that is, a particular reflection in the final analysis that represent the economic relations of a definite set of economic situations.

tional phenomenon of a causal sociology, it is still evident that the theoretical completeness of the foundation of a sociology as a science of being requires social facts that cannot be generated with the concept of sociation. These facts are revealed first with an *epistemological* investigation, which makes sociation into a problem, and raises the question: *How is sociation possible?* This question has not been brought up in Marxism, and that wholly correctly. For the positive science emerges from its specific objects which are simply *given*. As little as the physicist or biologist must give epistemological prerequisites for physics or biology before they begin their physical or biological specialist inquiries, so little then is it necessary for the sociologist or national economist to do so. This is not to say that such epistemological investigations would be superfluous. On the contrary, it is beyond dispute that epistemological deepening for the specialist sciences are of the greatest importance in that they not only clarify the meaning, scope, and boundaries of one's particular methodology, but also free him from the traditional prejudices and the jeopardising false problems which can derail research. One can say that the most important inquirers into nature in the nineteenth century all instituted, with more or less depth, epistemological and methodological investigation into their own science. Marx, in an even deeper effort than Engels, took this path of methodological inquiry into his own social scientific work. But just as is the case in Engels, only occasional remarks of this inquiry surface; moreover, the standpoint taken was an immanent methodological inquiry, rather than an epistemological one. In the context of this book, which is a presentation of the materialist conception of history, it is not possible to go fully into the epistemological bases of sociology. Only enough must be presented here to make one aware that the concept of sociation still needs an epistemological foundation in order to be considered a concept of being which can hold its own against the critical attacks of normative conceptions of societal problems, as well as those conceptions which are metaphysical solutions to liberate society. For the question of how sociation is possible is not superfluous, as many critics would have it, who hold that sociation is a self-evident, immediately 'graspable' fact. On the contrary, closer critical investigation into the facts of social connectedness exposes a profound problem. For if one remains simply upon the ground of experience, the latter seems to indicate nothing other than individual conscious contents. *The other* with whom a social connection exists, as well as the many others that build finally a society, are only given as elements of individual consciousness. And even when one speaks in an uncritical way of one's fellow man as something 'outside' our consciousness to be considered as independent givens, there is no bridge of experience between *my* consciousness and the '*consciousness of the other*'. That one's fellow man has a spiritual internality just as I do, would

upon this foundation be nothing other than the notorious judgement by analogy, or indeed a mere conclusion from the effects of the cause, both logical methods of proof known to be absolutely unreliable. The reality of the fellow man would be in this way a mere probability and the spiritual agreement of the fellow man with my consciousness, moreover, an amazing coincidence. This spiritual agreement among men, the sameness of their consciousness, offers actually a problem in itself. And since one, with justice, wishes to know more clearly the facts of this mutual understanding among men, which seems evident as the foundational prerequisite for every social connection, one does see immediately that this fundamental problem of understanding in the final analysis is merely grounded upon probability, accident, and the miraculous, which is a poor beginning of a science of social actualities.

In the face of all these difficulties there is only one way to arrive at a genuine solution, namely that of epistemology. It must be the same question that Kant asked of the natural sciences, which must be addressed to the social sciences: How is social experience possible? This question leads to the new concept of sociation; it is no longer an empirical concept from which the special science of Marxism proceeds, indeed from which it must proceed as it develops its historical forms; rather it is the epistemological (transcendental) concept of sociation which no longer concerns the historical concreteness of sociation, but instead only contains what belongs to the necessary thought principles of all sociation in which empirical-historical forms can arise. This epistemological-critical concept can only be found in the analysis of human consciousness, which is given to us only in the individual form of ego-consciousness. This analysis reveals that all individual consciousness in its own possibility of thought is not structurally possible as an individual consciousness, but rather that it is already in its ego related to an infinite many of other egos of the same structure. In this way the individual subject can think of itself as one among other subjects. Or put more clearly: the ego is only the experiential form of consciousness; it experiences itself not merely as ego, that is, as a spiritual singularity, rather as a generic-determined subject, whose spiritual contents are nothing other than the necessarily common possession of the infinity of other subjects. From this fact follows the logical and normative value of its conscious contents, which only exist so that the true, the good, the beautiful, and so forth of the individual are contents which are not for only this individual being, but rather for 'everyone' the true, the good, the beautiful, and so forth. The process of consciousness is not first found in its ethical or aesthetic 'social' form; rather it is from its very beginning as a logical form, in which no truer, that is, logically more correct content can be thought without the individual subject thinking 'everyone' is the object of the thought. The consciousness is thus

merely a self-conscious form of ego, an individual, but in its essence from its inception a 'we', a supra-individual. Consciousness is only lived in the ego, but in this ego as not only ego, rather as belonging to an infinite many other egos, it thus stands together with these other experiential-egos in the possibility of an experientially-connected association. One could also say: consciousness is given only as a 'we', that is, as a mentality in which the I is from its cognised inception contained with other 'I's. And from this recognition, it can be said that sociation does not arise first in the historical-economic process. Sociation, then, is not initially the product of the interactions of human beings who exist before or after sociation, *rather sociation is already in the individual consciousness*, given with its very being, and thus the prerequisite of all historical connectedness among the majority of individual subjects.⁶

This necessary relationship of the 'I' consciousness to the 'we' consciousness, that is, this necessary relation of ego consciousness to a foreign consciousness and connection with it, I term the *transcendental-social character of the consciousness*, and see in it the final epistemological foundation for the special characteristic of mentality that gives us the particular manner of our social nature and our social experience.⁷



6 The much-discussed problem of the *emergence of society* is a false problem. Human society never arose from the individual existence of humans, neither through contract nor through power or through selection and inheritance. Much more is it already there with human beings; society and humanity are exchangeable concepts. The favourite expression of the descent to the 'animal societies' does not help us here. For the so-called animal societies became by humanisation a 'society' out of the unknown behaviours of animals.

7 I have addressed the meaning of the 'transcendental-social', and with it the foundational epistemological meaning of 'understanding' for a causal social science in my book *Kausalität und Teleologie*, which was published in 1904 (*Marxstudien*, Volume 1, Chapters 14, 15, and 20). See also *Marxistische Probleme*, Chapters 1 and 7. Further discussion of this topic is in my book *Soziologische in Kants Erkenntniskritik*, pp. 451 ff., and especially my book *Kant und der Marxismus*, as well as my essay 'Soziologie und Erkenntnis', in *Jahrbuch für Soziologie*, hrsg. By Prof. Salomon, Volume 1, p. 4.

In his last publication, *The Enigma of Society* [*Das Rätsel der Gesellschaft*] published in 1936, Adler wrote more explicitly about the epistemological basis of consciousness that led to the 'phenomenal forms' of sociation in any given historical society. 'Sociation' was the evident systems of hegemonic or equal interdependence generated; 'the social apriori' was the mode of consciousness that generated the totality of individual and collective in every predication. Social science studied the 'sociative forms', which Marx called the 'phenomenal forms'. The 'social a priori' was a Kantian explanation of how the mind created the totality of an interdependent reality in every judgement. Adler originally coined the epistemological concept of the 'social a priori' in his first publication in 1904, *Causality and Teleology Contend Over Science* [*Kausalität und Teleologie im Streite um die Wissenschaft*]. His treatment here is more thorough, and an introduction to an extensive treatment of how other thinkers address the problematic he poses in the second section of *The Enigma of Society*.



Max Adler 1936, 'The Social A Priori', in *The Enigma of Society: Towards an Epistemological-Critical Foundation of the Social Sciences*, Vienna: Saturn Verlag, Pars. 1–4, pp. 87–96

1 *The Progress to the Social A Priori*

Freed from the ghost of metaphysical idealism and solipsism, we now continue with the line of thought earlier established ... [that is, how Kantian transcendental method provides the basis for understanding 'the given' in perception and judgement – Eds.].⁸ The objection based upon the existence of the 'given' was not able to shake the transcendental standpoint, rather it helped only to deepen it inasmuch as it made us aware of the danger of not falling into naïve realism where the 'content' of consciousness is separated from the laws of consciousness. The qualitative, the content, is nothing other than the *functioning* consciousness.

But when we enter more deeply into this issue, we arrive at a surprising new insight, which not only allows us to take the step from a merely natural to a social understanding, but rather necessitates that understanding. For this multiplicity of consciousness is as sensed and perceived wholly subject-

8 [The succinct reference Adler makes here clarifies the above problem of metaphysical idealism. See Max Adler 1936, chapter 2, paragraph 5, pp. 78–82].

ive. The perceived existence of things does not, however, have the character of the merely subjective; rather, on the contrary, it has an objective presence, and with it the existence of the objective experience is first established which we have called a recognition experience [*Erkenntniserfahrung*]. Here we must note that this conception takes us beyond our normal course of natural thinking to a new side of the form of consciousness, what Kant includes implicitly in his concept of universality, which when first explicitly considered and represented in its meaning is seen in its wholly epistemological theoretically modified consequences. For one will see that the mere existence of natural things, which are true for everyone, is only possible through a particular form of our consciousness, *the social a priori*.

This new character of consciousness makes itself apparent in consequence of the following question: all experience is determined by consciousness in the subject; how is it then that we do not understand this *more* as merely subjective conscious determination, why is it we call this *objective experience*?

The answer is: because the forms of consciousness have the character of the *supra-subjective* [*Übersubjektiven*] ... Here one sees a fundamental dialectic of consciousness which is the origin of all historical dialectics. Although consciousness only exists in individuals, that is, only personally experienced, it is in its function not individual, rather wholly supra-individual [*überindividuell*].⁹

Indeed, the conscious form upon which the experience of the personal depends is the ego, which is individual insofar as it is known in reflection as one's individual knowing (i.e. in the psychological sense). This individual knowing is not a form of consciousness, but is rather wholly of the material of experience. The supra-individuality which we ascribe to the ego is not transcendental in a metaphysical sense, that is, as the radiation of an idea or the 'in itself' of an absolute thing, rather it is a necessary manner of function of the ego consciousness itself, which we know as a formal and a priori *social relationship*, and which we must now take up in more depth.

9 The expression *individual* is wrongly identified with singularity. It connotes in its meaning a 'totality' (of which the individual is an exemplifying member). On the other hand, we have a wholly other concept of singularity with the word '*individuality*'. The adjectival word 'individual' contains both meanings, in that it either refers to the attribute of a single thing or to the singularity of an appearance. In this last sense the word 'individual' cannot be utilised for the *I as a form*, for the 'I-form', as the ego-form is neither a one-time thing nor a singularity, which we will see more clearly below; rather, on the contrary, it is a unifying relation that is the same in every consciousness. For that reason we call the experiential form of the I, i.e. ego, which is a psychological one-time thing, not an *individual*, rather a personal.

2 *The Supra-subjectivity in Consciousness*

In the previous discussion we have learned to see the ego as a form which is not isolated in itself like a monad which contains the world within itself. The being alone of the ego has only in its usage been grounded in an abstraction of ordinary usage. Now, we must take a meaningful step further in our discourse, presenting how and why it opens the *new* view of social experience. The ego finds in its content only that which is objectifiable, even though it considers it subjectively; and it must depict this content immediately as something that is more than subjective, independent of it, that is as an objectivity. So we see: the ego is a personal form which designates all experience as 'mine', that is, personal experience; but not all that is experienced is fully personal. Rather, there is a marked difference in the content of consciousness, the difference between subjective and objective contents. And if we designate the essence of the latter as that exists *not only for me*, but for everyone, we see its character as more than either subjective or objective. In that unalterable way, the fellow-subject is related; without this inherent relation, the concept of objectivity or validity has no meaning. That something is true, beautiful, or good only has meaning insofar as a dignity is expressed of which I am convinced that it is not so only for me, *rather for every other*. In the midst of the apparent individual experience of the ego, and seemingly only in regard to the thing so experienced, there is a new thing recognised – 'the Other' – an inter-individual, that is spiritual community with it as an indefinite many. And this fulfils itself just at that point where *the objectivity* of consciousness first is grasped, that which is the *recognition* experience. And thus we see that the ego has not yet been sufficiently determined if it is judged merely as a personal form of the unity of consciousness. It is, rather, the point of intersection where the impersonal, supra-individual character of *consciousness in general* becomes self-conscious, and speaks necessarily with a personal, individual expressiveness, belonging, in this manner, to the necessary dialectic of our thought and knowing.

We see ourselves in the objective conscious contents, in this remarkable way, as beyond the isolation of the monadic ego. If we follow this clue, we move more deeply into the transcendental character of objectivity, in which a transcendental theory heretofore unknown (1904)¹⁰ leads into the area of the *social*.

We ask now: what is objectivity really? Objectivity is the antithesis of subjectivity, and means that a conscious content is not merely *my* content, but

10 [Adler refers here to his own groundbreaking monograph, *Kausalität und Teleologie im Streite um der Wissenschaft*].

everyone's. *The relation to everyone* is to be understood that the designated content not only is a possible content for everyone, rather it must be. Objectivity means thus the same thing as *general validity*. Everything that we ascribe as objective has necessarily a relation to general validity. In this we do not mean only the exception-less agreement of all subjects in an empirical recognition process, which would never have achieved the *logical* quality of general validity. With such an agreement one is never at an end. It means rather *that a judgement that we call generally valid is already that within each individual consciousness itself, an immanent relation to an infinite many of necessarily agreeing thinking subjects*. This many, this agreement, is not a characteristic of an empirical process of knowing, rather it belongs to the form of *individual* consciousness, that is, *my* consciousness. In this I am saying that every single consciousness has represented in its objective judgements necessarily a context of many thinking subjects. The objective is that which I cannot experience as otherwise, as simultaneously the conscious contents are not only for me, rather *what every other* must also think. Or expressing this differently, the character of the objectivity of experience, in respect to the true or valid judgement is not possible without the immanent relation of consciousness to the other. Objectivity, truth, and reality are categories that have their genuine value not in some mystical quality that they bring to our recognition, compelling it or accommodating it, but instead only in the relating that is of a transcendental-*social* nature. And only through this a priori social relation can we have *reality*, and differentiate it from a condition of dream or hallucination.

3 *The Social Character of Reality*

Let us take the instance in which one continues each night a dream from the previous night, from that point where it ended, taking it as a memory into the day, thus being unable to determine which part of his consciousness contents was dream and which was reality by dint of the measure of a unified and contradiction-free experience. This unity and contradiction-free measure is disrupted by the behaviour of the daylight humanity (fellow man), whereby I mean, to avoid psychological misunderstandings, it should be expressly remarked that these daylight persons are to be considered only as the conscious contents, not their empirical corporeality [*ihrer empirischen Leiblichkeit*]. One sees quite quickly that a part of the experience of the ego does not exist for one's fellow subjects, and thus the togetherness of experience cannot exist for it. In consequence of this differentiation, we can only see as that which is *in-common* with our fellow man what is in our real world: and therefore we consider the dream experience in spite of its apparent continuity after waking as something merely subjective, as a dream. If the dreaming

in the dream also has recollections of the day experience, this differentiation would nonetheless exist, since to the daytime memories the fact that the night experiences within the day were dream, that is, as that which were not experienced as in-common with others, is yet cultivated in the dream, thus having consciousness that one dreams.¹¹

It is similar in considering the difference between hallucination and reality. When someone in his room has the hallucination, for example, of a cat, which he clearly hears purring, as soon as he attempts to pet it he may wonder how the cat has gotten into his room, but not doubt as to its reality; and if a friend comes into the room and does not see the cat, he will even doubt the normalcy of that friend. How can this discord be resolved? Only by enlisting other persons whose ability to observe cannot be doubted, and in whom one has complete trust. When such a person does not see the cat, as well as perhaps another who has accidentally arrived, the hallucinator will see his error, even if the hallucination persists. It must be stated here that it does not depend upon the empirical quality of the control person, and therefore not the number of them, but rather upon the fact that the statements of the other persons involved represent conscious contents to the hallucinating person, whose objective contents he too can sense, by dint of the reality and judgemental ability they all share, which thus cannot be united with the hallucinatory images without contradiction. It is not a matter of agreement as to whether the cat is really there for the hallucinator, rather of the thought-possibility of the cat as real. It would also be possible, in principle, for the hallucinating person to realise his error without the help of a *direct* statement by another, although that situation must be such that the possibility of a statement by a person regarding the reality of the situation is in play: for example, if the hallucinator observes that his friend sat upon the chair where the cat was lying without noticing anything, or, if the hallucinator could establish that the cat in the room was in a space that was impossible to enter, as, for example, on a ship upon which no cats were to be found. The remark from the other regarding the reality or unreality of the conscious contents of the hallucinating individual is not necessary in such

11 One can over-work this comparison. Naturally, we can still say here that in such a dream-content one could see the lack of agreement between the daytime persons with the dream content as a falsehood, so that the dreamer sees the daytime life as a dream. In such a case, life would be given in two experiential worlds, in which each could be held as reality and the other for dream. In such an eventuality, we would call this state-of-affairs an abnormality, a special case of schizophrenia, but even in light of this, in accordance with our beginning thesis, the differentiation of dream and reality would still be based upon the relations to possible experience in-common with one's fellow subjects.

instances, because the hallucinating individual can know from the character of reality he experiences whether or not there then exists a contradiction in the contents of his consciousness.

Objectivity and reality are always supra-individual, even as the specific situation can only be experienced individually, as what is given to an ego is something immanent and *socially* a priori. *Reality*, which is quite different from a matter existing by itself, as it appears to the naïve consciousness, *achieves its objective character only* because it arises from the laws of consciousness, but also because, at the same time, it is such that *in its relation to another ego beyond it, it necessarily forms its own personal conditions of experience*. In this way the character of reality or concrete objectivity *is only the correlate of the unification in consciousness of a mental system of a manifold of associated subjects*.

There is a difficult objection to be addressed here. It seems that the differentiation between reality and unreality does not need a relationship to the possibility of a necessary general agreement among the multiplicity of subjects that impinge upon the consciousness of the individual, so that a solipsistic person would still derive his own meaning. When I see, for example, the moon upon the horizon as larger than it is on the culmination of its path, I judge that the moon has not 'really' become smaller in its journey; I differentiate the reality and the appearance wholly without some input from my fellow-subjects. And even a solipsistic thought – one opines – could judge so, that some parts of his thought which are in contradiction with other parts could be seen by him as merely appearances of reality that must be differentiated. But this objection confuses an absence of contradiction with reality, and transfers the form of *our* experience wholly in a deceptively self-evident manner to the wholly impenetrable, because of its un-thinkability, that is the solipsistic experience. The objection raises correctly that the principle of a lack of contradiction must lead always to the exclusion of the thought contents that are counter to the real in thought, that which would contradict reality. But the difference between the contradictory and non-contradictory is not the same as that between appearance and reality, or subjectivity and objectivity. We can only know that in experience, as it occurs, which is a situation that always involves other thinking subjects in-common with the reality that we experience, creating thereby a thought-necessity that has no contradiction; and so we are inclined to ascribe this thought-necessity which has the character of reality to individual, indeed, even solipsistic thinking.

Solely the distinction that a content of my consciousness, because it can be thought, can be called a mere illusion does not yet mean that the corrected content can be determined as 'real', only that it is a necessary thought-constellation *for me*. How can we then speak of reality? According to the well-known defin-

ition of Kant, we designate that which is real 'by what belongs to the material conditions of experience (sensation)'. These material conditions are established through *perception*. To be sure, a concept of reality is not always forthcoming from a direct perception, but it is sufficient to be able to speak of reality if that which is indicated can be associated 'with some perception made possible by an analogy of experience'. This context of experience we can only have in *our* experience by establishing its relationship to the experiential contents of a multiplicity of subjects, who would have the same experience of the given as me. First, in that way, can an objectivity that differentiates the appearance from the reality in an otherwise contradiction-free experience be realised. For I differentiate the difference between the 'real' and the 'apparent' even in dream. If this is true for every individual consciousness, then it is true for the solipsistic. Yet, with a solipsism, this objectification of the simple difference between the objective and subjective as a necessary context of thought becomes impossible. Recall that we earlier [pp. 82 ff., i.e. in *Das Rätsel der Gesellschaft* – Ed.] discussed the concept of solipsism. We found that this is not an actual thought-possibility in the human; for it means not merely an isolated individual, but rather one *who does not have* in consciousness the concept of a multiplicity of subjects and the necessary association of them in general. Such a consciousness would certainly have the differentiation of a material content that could be contradiction-free under the forms and categories of this consciousness in its objective presence, but separated in that from the solipsistic characteristic. And surely, the possibility would exist, in the solipsistic consciousness, to rule out contradiction as an error. But the antitheses of appearance and reality in the sense of our experience would not occur here, since each contradiction-free material context of conscious contents would be of equal value. A differentiation, for example, between dream and reality would be impossible here, if the dream continued each night and played out in a milieu that was completely different from the contents of the daytime milieu. Here the question of what is dream, and what is reality, would have no sense, because the one as well as the other would be the same experience for the solipsistic being, because both would be equally 'real'. One sees immediately that *this* concept of reality is wholly different as our experience, which knows only *one* reality, namely that it is not only for me, but for every possible subject. The reality of a hypothetical solipsistic being is in its possibility plural, and in this plurality completely unassociated; the solipsistic being could live in differing 'real' worlds. The reality of our experience, in contradistinction, just because of its possibility of relation to a plurality with other associated subjective relationships *within a single subject* is always individual, yet throughout a union.

4 *The Social Character of the Normative*

What has thus far been a discussion of the objectivity of *Being* (reality) will be true for other forms of objectivity, that is, for the differing forms of *normative* validity. The *logical* norm says not only how I should think, if the character of the product of my thought is to be deemed correct, but also how the thinking of everyone should be formed in order to have this character. In the concept of correctness or *truth* there is contained essentially the immanent relationship of the thought contents with the necessary agreement of an infinite multiplicity of thinking subjects. This postulates that the logical does not have the character of an individual thought context that is thinkable, rather that *all logical estimation entails the social* as a transcendental element of its possibility. Since Hegel, under the stripping away of logic from its metaphysical form, one has ceased to conceive of logic as merely a science of norms, instead identifying it as a formal logic. But we see now that we have not completely described the essence of this formal logic until we augment the traditional description of it as the principle of correct thinking with the principle of a thought that is *contradiction-free for a plurality of single subjects*. And the so-called timelessness of logical thought does not mean the lifting of the thought beyond the course of time, a mystical eternity, rather that it *never* can give a thinking subject who cannot agree with the logical context that is presented. The timeless validity of logic is only another expression for that which occurs in the individual thought in its thought-necessity of agreement with innumerable, infinitely associated subjects.¹²

In just this way the norms of *ethics* and *aesthetics* are to be conceived. The *good* and the *beautiful* are meant as a generally valid value, that is, a characteristic that without the immanent relationship of valuing of an innumerable multiplicity of necessarily agreeing valuing subjects would not be possible.

12 In another sense, one can certainly speak of the timelessness of logic, and not only of this, but of the laws of consciousness in general, insofar as time is only a form of the laws of consciousness, and these laws of consciousness are 'before', that is, beyond all time. With *this* timelessness, however, another principle of consciousness is implied, not only with regard to its empirical givenness, but also as a transcendental concept of consciousness law in general. In this sense one can say that all temporal being and occurrence is established by an atemporal ground. This is the *intelligible* realm, but not one beyond the world or its spirit, rather the spirit and world of empirical humans, only as conscious laws grasped in their determined facticity. I hold it thus as very error-prone when Rickert conceives of the intelligible as the unreal, what is established by relating being [*Sein*] to a should [*Sollen*]. See more of this in the essay on Heinrich Rickert, pp. 217–26, below [i.e. in *Das Rätsel der Gesellschaft* – Eds.].

I have termed this compelling and immediate manner of the ego-form, where it is not merely a personal relationship (transcendental unity of apperception), rather just in its individual relationship invariably an indeterminable multiplicity with and in the ego of rule-based subjects, with which the ego sees itself in a supra-personal generally valid context, *the transcendental-social relationship of the ego* [reference to his discussion in *Kausalität und Teleologie im Streite um die Wissenschaft* – Ed.], and spoke in this context of the *transcendental-social* of consciousness or of the *social apriori* as a particular form of consciousness. With this new transcendental form of consciousness one finds the constituting element of social conceptions and of social experience, whose meaning must now be more closely established.¹³

At this point of our discussion, two objections press themselves upon us that represent two opposing views, using quite different methods of thought, both of which put into question the results we have achieved in our pursuit of the question of objectivity. We have seen objectivity as the result of a general transcendental agreement of knowing subjects. The first objection is aimed at this necessary relation of the multiplicity of subjects; the second denies the transcendental character of this relation. On the one hand, we have indicated that objectivity itself is to be designated as a generally valid value. That means, however: objectivity is generally valid, and this has nothing to do with the actual agreement or sense of agreement among subjects. On the other hand, one raises the objection that general validity in the sense of an exceptionless actuality of agreeing thinking-subjects is merely a psychological-empirical fact, which has no epistemological meaning in the sense of a transcendental method.¹⁴



13 The first presentation of the social apriori was given in my book *Kausalität und Teleologie im Streite um die Wissenschaft*, which appeared in 1904, in the first volume of *Marx-Studien*, published by me in cooperation with Rudolf Hilferding.

14 [In Part II of *The Enigma of Society*, Adler takes up 22 separate thinkers, contemporary to himself, who either voice one of these two objections, or, in part, agree with his own vision of the transcendental basis of the social apriori. Among them are Wilhelm Dilthey, Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, Werner Sombart, Leopold von Wiese, Eduard Spranger, Heinrich Rickert, Theodor Litt, Othmar Spann, Richard Höningwald, Edmund Husserl, and Alois Riehl. His arguments are interesting and insightful, and for this reader wholly convincing in their fine discriminations].

Max Adler addressed the issue of 'transcendental objectivity', misconceived as either a psychological inference not necessarily shared in its evidence by others, or an unnecessary abstraction from the positivism of a position that held empirical facts 'given' to any perceptive eye in the environment, with several pages in *The Enigma of Society* devoted to why the transcendental method began and ended with a conscious grasp of what was 'given' in ordinary experience.



Max Adler, 1936, 'The "Given" as Living Consciousness', in *The Enigma of Society: Towards an Epistemological-Critical Foundation of the Social Sciences*, Vienna: Saturn Verlag, Chapter Two, Par. 5. pp. 78–82

Here we encounter a point whose correct understanding is still rarely developed, but whose understanding is necessary if one is to comprehend the consequences of the transcendental method, and its further development from merely natural experience to the social area it inevitably makes apparent. One could object that such an argument, which has certainly been made, of the foundational conscious immanence of the transcendental method must destroy the concept of natural experience. For Kant's famous definition of nature, that it is more than mere lawfulness, the existence of things is *a content* of the laws of consciousness, something qualitative. This is not to generate the thing from the laws of consciousness, but rather to comprehend them in the *given*. The 'given', the 'material' of experience seems to suggest a dualism by this thought, where transcendentalism falls into the categories of form and content. Here all naturalistic and metaphysical misunderstanding of Kant begins.

But this is a complete misunderstanding of the transcendental method, whose work is exactly resolving the so-called 'given' into an element of the lawful action of consciousness. Seen from this standpoint, there is no conscious *content*, a word or a representation, which would thus pose the dualistic perspective of which Kantianism is accused. For the so-called conscious contents are nothing other than consciousness itself, only not as its forms, but considered in its activity. In a short formula, one could articulate this state-of-affairs as follows: the *forms* of consciousness give *the shape* of experience, the *actuality* of consciousness (its life) gives *its content*. Therefore, according to the often repeated precept of Kant, the material of experience, that is its qualitative manifold, is *given*. This famous precept has not been properly understood, however, in its critical transcendental meaning, as long as this 'given' is com-

prehended as something that is found before it is shaped, something that the consciousness stands across from, and not as it should be, that is something borne itself by consciousness, and determined in that very process.¹⁵

Thus, it is completely false to believe, as many do, that the concept of the 'given' means a destruction of Kant's transcendental method, in that he is not able to derive the qualitative of experience from the laws of consciousness, and that it is simply an empirical fact before consciousness takes it up as a transcendental conception. For these critics, it is a deplorable inconsequence to transfer suddenly what must be a content of the always limited nature of thought to the grandiose consistency of the transcendental method. This objection, however, arises because of the difficulty of the transcendental method. One does not realise in the naïve standpoint that the material of experience is seen as somehow 'outside', that is divorced from consciousness, and thus is something 'foreign' over against it. In this way, the transcendental epistemological theory becomes the dualism that we have earlier rejected, whereby the conscious 'contents' stem from a 'material' that the forms of consciousness take up, but cannot completely work up, so that a kind of muddled and indefinite residual remains called 'the thing in-itself'.

This concept is completely wrong. The material of consciousness is in no way something that somehow and somewhere in itself would be there, and merely enters the formation of consciousness or in some other way 'is contained in it', rather it is *consciousness itself*, to be considered not in its formal, rather in its content-laden, concrete, living existence. The lesson: the material of experience is given means therefore nothing other than *the facts of consciousness themselves* in relation to its objective fulfillment. It states that consciousness *is there*, one with the livingness of consciousness in its identity as an objective multiplicity. One cannot further question this beginning and end, all theories and critiques of consciousness must somehow begin with the facts of its livingness, that is, begin with its content-filled consciousness, with the givenness in its multiplicity. In order to comprehend *this identity of the given in its materials of experience with the givenness of consciousness*, one must finally cease to comprehend transcendentalism as an empty theory of forms and the concept of pure reason as an equipment of empty consciousness. Transcendental epistemology is always concerned with the whole consciousness, and this is not found otherwise than in the living content as it *occurs*. The forms of consciousness

15 The concept of the 'given' is one that has been taken up by many in modern philosophy, and thus is not merely 'self-evident' as it appears to naïve or naturalistic interpreters. See here the very careful and elucidating study by Joh. V. Malottki 1919, *Das Problem des Gegebenen* [*The Problem of the Given*], Berlin: Pan Verlag.

allow themselves to be separated from their content only in thought itself, that is, the transcendental method. There is thus no space, time, ego, or category of consciousness as such, rather all these forms contain a content, a 'material'. To state this more drastically: consciousness is always that which occurs, that is, consciousness *is itself* blue or hot or a tone, and so forth, wherefore the strange experience of achieving a deeper understanding of something as we sink fully into a content of consciousness so that in such a moment the empirical ego disappears as the content in its depth and detail emerges.

The difficulty of connecting the identity of the material of experience with consciousness itself disappears when it is realised that all 'material', that is the qualitative of experience, is only possible as a sensed and perceived content, that is only something that is capable of being cognised. The sensations are differentiated from the conscious elements in the gradations that come from their givenness, not from any other apriori form, as Kant has fundamentally demonstrated. The multiplicity of consciousness that must be lived is nothing other than consciousness itself that is only learned of in its living activity. Thus Kant stated the character of reality is determined by perception and the sensations that accompany it, so that one can say that the character of reality is determined through the givenness of a living consciousness. We will see that the concept of reality seen in this way is more deeply anchored than it appears in the simple facts of natural experience, rather we will encounter this reality in the *social* nature of the objectivity of perception. In the context of this discussion, it is enough to have shown that all we call the material of experience are not derived from the forms of consciousness, which it does not need; rather it is itself, in its forms, living consciousness. Thus, where the qualitative multiplicity of consciousness comes from *is no longer a critical question*; such a question is metaphysics of the old style, which asks of the cause of the world, or why things are as they are, or why is it so and not otherwise, and such unanswerable, but meaningless questions.¹⁶

16 See Max Adler 1924, pp. 106–7. – When this above passage and similar questions are handled with mockery, this is only from the point of view of epistemological theory. I do not dispute that such a deep thinker as Leibniz repeatedly called such questions as those I reject the very bases of philosophical thought, the very 'consequences' of what Leibniz prized as the principle of sufficient reason. 'It is this principle that once assumed which enables the first question which can be asked with justice: why is there something rather than nothing ... let one proceed further, that things must exist, so one must then ask, why they should not exist other than they do' (Leibniz, *Hauptschriften*, herausg. by Ernst Cassirer, Volume 2, p. 428). But Leibniz himself raises the issue in what follows, that the 'simple physicist', who desires answers to such questions, ceases to be

Epistemology has nothing to do with these matters. It operates from the fundamental position that everything that is and occurs, of which we know or are able to know, is offered by a conscious process whose forms cannot be separated from its contents, which emerge only in and with it.

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a physicist, pursuing instead 'metaphysics'. And he himself in this context shows that pursuing the idea of sufficient ground in its empirical context is not sufficient. One can only discover the final grounds for existence, and for the character of why things are so, beyond them in a necessary essence, in – God. This use of the 'principle of sufficient reason' concerning experience is the schoolboy example for what Kant disparaged as 'the amphiboly of reflexive concepts', that is, for the inexorable psychological compulsion to use the concepts with which we think and must think in experience, where no experience is possible.

Adler's more thorough discussion of the 'activity of consciousness' follows in *The Enigma of Society*. It is meant to offer a comprehensive understanding of the relevance and utility of the Kantian epistemology of conscious knowing to the Marxist thinker. This epistemological discussion is quite relevant for the Marxist as it takes up the issue of *praxis* as the basis of evidence for how consciousness functions. The *deed* of action is the basis for establishing the transcendental dynamics of consciousness. Adler stresses the live movement of judgement in its operations, the consequence of which is the sociative evidence of Marx's 'phenomenal forms'. Sociative praxis can be clarified or deformed by the language of the person(s) as they apply their lexicon to perception with their judgemental explanations for the direction of their praxis. It is important to comprehend the 'neutral' process of consciousness as it formulates its judgements so that one can comprehend how sociative praxis can deform the evidence consciousness offers it. Adler incorporates in his discussion the latest breakthroughs of philosophy and psychiatry, most notably in this section the function of the 'unconscious' as an element of the processes of consciousness in its judgemental forms. What one sees in this explanation of the 'activity of consciousness' in its transcendental operations is the neutral objectivity generated in knowing, which then can become the conscious ground for social objectifications and social goals. This neutral basis of knowing can be deformed or rationally built upon by social theory and praxis.



Max Adler 1936, 'The Activity of Consciousness', in *The Enigma of Society: Towards an Epistemological-Critical Foundation of the Social Sciences*, Vienna: Saturn Verlag, pp. 121–40

Par. 1 *Consciousness in General*

Is it the case that in the foregoing discussions a misdirected substantiation and hypostatisation of consciousness has been realised, so that for the ego the rejection of its being turned into a 'thing' has instead become a station in itself misplaced behind the ego? If that were true, then all our epistemological investigations would have been bogged down in the metaphysical. This objection would exaggerate the critical principle in a similar way, but in another direction, as that which we earlier have examined as a misdirected epistemological question, that is, from whence does consciousness arise and why in these forms, but not others. We showed at that time that these questions are not really critical ones, because they are the same as asking why is there something at all. But just as uncritical is the objection which now engages us, in which

every indication to the facts of consciousness is seen as some sort of misdirected substantiation; for this objection follows the premise that *nothing* is given. The facts of consciousness cannot be expressed other than in the categories of being, to which, as we have seen, objectivity belongs. In spite of this, consciousness is not a thing, rather only having the characteristics of being, from which a representation emerges in the ceaseless flow that we make into a static thing, which we then experience in the form of an inseparable, unstoppable stream of existence.

In that an epistemological analysis of the ego as a form is traced to consciousness in general, functioning as this form, or better said, that *has* this form, no misdirected substantivising is thereby connoted, rather one tracks in the final analysis the determination of the object that is discerned. The appearance of having made the ego into a thing is only a product of the words we must use in order to make ourselves understood, remaining anchored with the concepts of thing and its characteristics. Thus, when we speak of the consciousness that we are (living experience), consciousness is an object of experience, that is, the represented thing. What is meant is not the represented thing, but rather the singular activity of liveliness itself, which is expressed in the *having* of this represented thing. It is clear that even critics of the concept of consciousness must begin somewhere, or, what is the same, must stand upon some ground. This last point is *a fact of consciousness itself*, or, not to rely on the word fact, which we have already designated as a product of consciousness, the activity of consciousness itself. Epistemological criticism since Kant's disrupting principle of the paralogism involved in the representation of the 'I', disallows the deceptive conclusion of Descartes to be repeated: 'I think, therefore I am'. One can better stand upon the ground of the more correct conclusion to this famous statement, which would be: 'I think, therefore *there is* thought'.

For this ultimate ground of consciousness which epistemological theory can access, Kant gave the name *consciousness in general*. But it is this concept that some hold to be a grave mystification, in that one sees there an ancestor of Hegel's world spirit or in any case, a spiritual supra-substance upon which all transcendentalism lamentably founders, returning to a wholly primitive transcendence. But, if we look more closely, this accusation is proved to be premature and unfounded. How then do we come to the concept of 'consciousness in general'? In that we must recognise that the 'ego' as a form must be differentiated from the activity of consciousness. The setting apart of 'consciousness in general' from the ego is a differentiation of consciousness itself in its forms, not, however, the separation and substantivising of a 'consciousness in general' from the ego-form and from its other forms. There is no conscious kind of thing that is 'consciousness in general' that stands over against the ego or places it

under itself. That would not even be a metaphysic, rather some sort of pitiable phantom, which becomes by abstraction an engendered essence. No – even the ‘consciousness in general’ is only known in the form of ego, as well as other forms of consciousness, otherwise we could not know of it. Why then this concept? It is a similar ‘boundary concept’ as the ‘thing in itself’, and has this same function of a transcendental *admonition*. Just as the concept of the knowledge of an inaccessible thing in itself which one should guard oneself against in thought, so one should not presume that consciousness has an independent character, a substantiality, that is, an experienced object to be identified in a transcendent reality. And the concept of consciousness in general is also a transcendental admonition that consciousness is not to be identified with the ego-personality of our experience. The being of things dissolves itself transcendently into the effects that operate within the laws of consciousness, just as the being of persons dissolves within these effects in themselves.

Par. 2 *The Synthesis of Consciousness as Activity*

Added to the two transcendental determinable parts of consciousness, conscious form and conscious content (‘the given’), is a third which also belongs to the conditions of experience, namely, *the mode of action* that operates through form and content, that which gives consciousness its *animation*, its activity and spontaneity. Fichte found in Faust’s investigative drive the expression that consciousness is originally a *deed*; and in Hegel this basic insight is expressed in his powerful thought of *goal-oriented movement*, in which consciousness develops dialectically. But in both these suppositions, what is lost is the third constituting element of a transcendental determination of experience, as in both these philosophers the course of thought goes immediately into a metaphysical-ontological conception. But already in Kant one finds – what has scarcely been attended to date – the same inception point, but more fundamentally introduced in its essential activity. In Kant’s close attention to the transcendental method of analysis, he wards off the metaphysical detour. I mean Kant’s concept of *the transcendental synthesis*, and the attendant concept of *the transcendental imagination*. Within these seemingly mere conceptual determinations, Kant introduced the activity, the living character of thought into the transcendental method. This has as yet been little recognised, but for a correct understanding of epistemological theory it is of decisive importance, because by it the charge of an empty formalism is removed. And through it, the concept of the ‘consciousness in general’ is more clearly developed, so we must address this object of discussion in more depth.

The concept of synthesis is with Kant to be understood as in an indissoluble bond with all forms, as well as all contents of consciousness, in that it is the con-

crete manifold that first enables the content and form to come together. This is only possible because the forms are not figures at rest, but rather contain binding functions, that is, they are active forms. The manifold of sense is merely the stuff of experience. In order to know it, it is necessary 'that this manifold is thought through, taken up, and connected in order for knowing to occur. This activity I call synthesis'.¹⁷ The synthesis of which Kant speaks is not a psychological process, since all psychological, as well as empirically binding activities, already have the ability to unify, that is, have the prerequisite function of initiating consciousness. Thus, Kant calls this synthesis a priori or pure, which as 'the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction' makes initially possible all perception and representation, and as 'synthesis of recognition' all development of concepts and ideas. Thereby, this synthesis is not to be understood as what is added to the forms of intuition and thought, but rather as what from the inception is active and effecting, so that the forms of consciousness are not really an accurate name, because they do not rest, but instead are thoroughly something that generates form. In *this connection of form and activity or animation*, which does not occur as a consequence of the mere forms of consciousness, is situated the character of *the spontaneity of consciousness*, to which Kant always returns. The foundational moment of his analysis is seen by him as of the same process as the synthesis: 'By synthesis ... I understand the act of putting different representations together, and unifying them into a certain content; it is to synthesis, therefore, that we must first direct our attention, if we would determine the first origin of our knowledge'.¹⁸

Now, Kant has quite often designated the synthesis as a function of the understanding, and thus one could conclude that the synthesis is nothing other than a function of the forms of thought (the categories). This is reinforced as Kant repeatedly refers to the activity of understanding as the spontaneity of the forms of intuition, which correspond to receptivity. But here there is only a shortened manner of speaking, in that by receptivity Kant means only sensing, and the forms of intuition are not merely receptivity, but forming in themselves. Space, for example, is not a finished form which the consciousness takes up, but is rather a certain way in which conscious contents are ordered, as Kant brings out in the famous passage that we cannot represent a line without drawing it in thought.¹⁹ On the other hand, the spontaneity of the forms of thought do not arise from the categorical forms themselves; rather they can be traced back

17 Kant, *Kr. d. r. V.* (Phil. Bibl.), p. 128. [See this citation in Kant 1965, p. 111 [A 77] – Eds.].

18 [See Kant 1965, pp. 111–12 [A 78]].

19 [See Kant 1965, p. 198 [A 163]].

to where the thought forms first acquire their activity. Kant says of this: 'The synthesis is merely the effect of the imagination, a blind, although essential function of the soul, without which we would have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious. To bring this synthesis to concepts is a function which belongs to the understanding, and it is through this function of the understanding that we first obtain knowledge properly so called.'²⁰

Par. 3 *The Transcendental Imagination*

Kant introduces at this point the transcendental imagination, a strange expression which is not easy to comprehend. It is not chiefly a matter of a physical power or a psychic sense; rather the term 'imaging power' [*Einbildungskraft*] designates, just as the term 'judgemental power' [*Urteilkraft*] or 'sensing ability' [*sinnliches Vermögen*], only a particular condition of the possibility of the entirety of consciousness, achieved through analysis. Further, this concept of the imagination has nothing to do with what is usually understood by it, although Kant borrows from this understanding. He takes from the usual understanding the idea that it is an ability to visually represent an object without its presence, and to unify a multiplicity into an image. This ability is only empirical and belongs to psychology. Kant names this kind of imagination reproductive. It corresponds to what we construct in our representational activity and call in its poetic form, fantasy.

But Kant goes on to speak of a pure synthetic power, an ability of the imagination, which he differentiates from the psychological, calling it the *productive* imagination, that is, the pure imagination a priori, which has the same meaning as the transcendental synthesis. For what is in-common with every synthesis, in the usual understanding of 'imagination' or fantasy, is the forming [*das Gestalten*], that is, the activity which shapes imaginistically a content into its connectedness, giving it a definite figuration, that is, 'formed into a unity' [*einbildet*]. This older use of the word 'einbilden' as a transitive verb, no longer in use today, we offer in thought here. Only, the *pure* imagination with Kant is not that of the empirical mental constructive activity or fantasy activity; rather it is the *originating* basis for these activities, whose function is to connect the possible manifold that emanates as the empirical or fantasy image. Thus, we read in Kant: 'Now since every appearance contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they cannot have in sense itself, is demanded. There must therefore exist in us an active faculty I give the title, imagination. Its action, when

²⁰ [Ibid. See also Kant 1965, p. 112 [A 78]].

immediately directed upon perceptions, I entitle apprehension'.²¹ And here he adds a note relevant not only for contemporary psychology, but also for epistemology: 'Psychologists have hitherto failed to realise that imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself. This is due partly to the fact that that faculty has been limited to reproduction, partly to the belief that the senses not only supply impressions but also combine them so as to generate images of objects. For that purpose something more than the receptivity of impressions is undoubtedly required, namely, a function for the synthesis of them'.²²

Thus, the transcendental synthesis and the a priori imagination flow together. But the entire conceptual content which is at issue here is not yet exhausted. For all connection which is engendered by the imagination creates a unity of that which is connected, but this unity is only possible because of the transcendental unity of apperception, that is, as we already know, the ego form that all consciousness has as its prerequisite. This transcendental unifying relation of the ego is not at rest, rather it has the same character of animation known in the transcendental synthesis, and this is only possible in its animated unifying relation, in itself. The pure synthesis thus gives evidence of itself, pure imagination and the pure ego as interchangeable concepts, of which one cannot exist without the other, and from whose function of a pure *activity* or *animation* they flow together. They all contain transcendental determining aspects of consciousness, only from a differing viewpoint. In the concept of the form of ego, the essential relation of all consciousness on the one point of which it is conscious is demonstrated; in the concept of synthesis, the functional character of consciousness is also made; finally, in the imagination, the instantiating moment of the transcendental analysis is where the unifying relation and binding function in a *goal-oriented mode of operation* is rooted, which generates *the animated character of consciousness*. One could express this as follows: the pure imagination of Kant, or his notion of the goal-oriented animated character of consciousness, is nothing other than the instantiating condition of experience itself, namely, the originary unity of apperception, but in this instance not understood as a result, that is, as the ego form, but rather as the productive function, which produces the ego form itself, and in the ego form locates its content as an operation (spontaneity) of consciousness. The degree to which Kant held there to be this third constituting element beside the form and content of consciousness, can be found in the following, interesting passage, which pulls together his whole doctrine concerning the pure synthesis

21 [Kant 1965, p. 144 [A 121]].

22 [Kant 1965, p. 144 n [A 121]].

and the imagination, and which considers the three transcendental elements of consciousness in differing organisational perspectives: 'The first, which enables our knowing of all objects, which must be given a priori, is the manifold of pure intuition; the synthesis of this manifold through the operation of imagination is the second, but this does not yet give us knowledge. The concepts which give to us the synthetic unity, and which exist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, enabling knowledge of the objects brought forth, the third power, is understanding'.

This passage leads us to another remark that for the present context of discussion has significant meaning. We see, namely, that according to Kant the pure imagination, that is, the goal-oriented animation, does not actually create knowledge, rather effects solely the connectedness of the manifold, that then only by dint of the categorical forms of thought (pure understanding) can be brought to conscious concepts. That is why in the aforementioned passage, the concepts that provide unity for the synthesis 'exist only in the representations of the necessary synthetic unity', in that they make conscious the spontaneous realised connections. That is in concord with Kant's earlier remark that the imagination is '*a blind*, although essential function of the soul, without which we could have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are seldom conscious'. Here we seem to be pointed towards something *unconscious*, which belongs to the conditions of experience. In what relation does this reference to the meaningful role of the concept of the unconscious, a result of epistemological analysis, exist in relation to modern philosophical and psychological inquiry?

Par. 4 *The Unconscious in Epistemological Theory*

The unconscious enters the thought of contemporaries in two differing spheres of meaning: on the one hand, it is a metaphysical, spiritual fact of origins, and on the other hand, it is a psychological theory. In neither one of these meanings does epistemological theory have relevance, which is to say, the concept of the unconscious immediately negates epistemological thought, *epistemological theory having nothing to create from such a concept*. Thus, when transcendental analysis approaches something that appears near to a concept of unconsciousness, this must be treated *as something other* than a metaphysical or psychological unconscious, thus another concept is to be recommended in taking it up. In providing another sense of the unconscious for comprehension, we must investigate some other words that will enable us to differentiate the epistemological from the psychological or metaphysical.

The easiest beginning for this redefinition is in relation to the *metaphysical* unconscious. The metaphysical unconscious is a transcendent concept

that exists essentially before any consciousness, and is seen as the origin of everything mental, as well as being a teleological, that is, spiritual originary power from which our consciousness emerges. This unconscious is a metaphysical construction; it is in no way an empirical fact, and cannot be demonstrated evidentially as an effect agent in our spiritual life; rather it is but a *supposition* which enables us to explain, with a unified ontological conception, the essence of all things, and in that, our consciousness. As for the relation of this concept to the possibility of experience in the logical sense, it is hardly a matter of discussion. One can merely speak of such a metaphysical causal relationship; the epistemological objection to this metaphysical concept is that such 'causality' is, as a misdirected concept, only a form of our consciousness, and as such it cannot indicate something actual beyond our consciousness.

This concept of the unconscious is thus nothing other than an expression for a fundamentally spiritual concept of the world, whether the unconscious emerges directly from the world spirit, which in its dialectical development first comes into one's self-consciousness, as Hegel argues, or that it is a blind will to live, driving the intellect to create better life realisations, as Schopenhauer describes, or that it is an immanent goal-orientation working itself out as one sees with E. v. Hartmann, or finally, it emerges from an originary life force which reaches its highest creative synthesis in the human spirit, as Bergson and others who champion this view in contemporary philosophy.

None of this is to be considered by our epistemological point of view, for the characterisation of the consciousness in general as a fundamental activity or goal-oriented animation does not mean some primitive or primary reality beyond consciousness, rather it is a condition for its own possibility. That is why it is 'consciousness in general', as we have said, not something detached from the forms of consciousness itself, that has its own ground. We consider here only the forms whose lawful activity are active in constituting consciousness; consciousness is not considered as a mirror, but rather as a forming, living presence. Nothing comes from 'consciousness in general' that can be considered before it, as some sort of pre-existing unconscious. Yet we do not say that an individual consciousness and the multiplicity of one's fellow consciousnesses come from 'consciousness in general'. When we say as a placeholder that the transcendental relationship of individual subjects is as if the 'consciousness in general' resolves itself into a multiplicity of egos, that is not to be seen as the emergence of some primordial substance into individual subjects, as the pouring forth of the holy spirit on the saved. Rather, this manner of speech is used solely to make evident in its expression that for the transcendental analysis of consciousness, indeed, for the individual ego itself, its givenness is such that its

activity is seen as carried by its own consciousness, which it cannot experience in itself without at the same time experiencing others.

Much more difficult and more important is the differentiation in relation to the *psychological unconscious*. It is a subject of dispute as to whether one can call the psychological unconscious a fact of psychological experience or merely a theoretical construct whose purpose is achieving a complete psychical-causal entity. For example, Wilhelm Wundt and Franz Brentano have completely rejected the concept of the unconsciousness. The above dispute revolves solely around terminological questions. Those who would see such a fact as residing in consciousness must surely understand that the unconscious cannot be designated as such a fact, but rather must see this as a contradiction in his argument. But to me, this dispute – whether the unconscious is a fact in consciousness or merely a construct for describing the psyche – misses the essential point. The unconscious is not a category of the *experience* of the psychic, but a scientific *purview*. That means the unconscious can never be as such in the consciousness it enters, but can be considered a psychic element of this consciousness, and considered as contributing to its causal unity. The essential is also the condition that in the totality of causal conscious processes, accessible to those who are scientific investigators (which in the case of self-analysis, there need not be a second person), there is given a range of connecting links, which in all their relevant relations act as conscious processes with a single exception, that they are not conscious. In this sense, the unconscious is an essential concept in modern psychology. It has not only entered the depth psychology of Sigmund Freud, but also enabled as a decisive factor other directions in modern psychological investigation, independent of Freud, such as experimental psychology, rational psychology, and Gestalt psychology.²³

23 In regard to the dominance of the Freudian concept of the unconscious, it is not superfluous to point out that the concept of an unconscious effect of mind was not introduced initially by Freud. It does not diminish the epochal importance of the Freudian concept for psychology, since it is he who first made accessible the area of depth psychology and the insight into the wealth of heretofore hidden or, more happily, unseen facts of the life of the mind. Because of its rigorous psychic causality in practice, and especially its rigorous psychogenetic conception, which treats psychopathic phenomena, his conception is methodologically a thorough orienting power. But precisely for this reason, it is important to point out that the idea of an unconscious in the life of the mind is quite old, even if the differentiation of the psychological and the epistemological unconscious was not carried out. One sees this in Augustine, where we read: 'It is the great power of memory [Augustine uses this word in part in its understood usage, in part, as here, for the concept of consciousness] to overwhelm, my God, a secret holiness, broad and without boundaries.

In this manner, the unconscious, beyond the Freudian doctrine, takes on an even more radical role. For with Freud the unconscious manifests itself fully within levels belonging to the consciousness, where it is 'repressed', either in an individual genetic or psychogenetic sense. Yet it can be taken up into conscious awareness through an appropriate analytical process. On the other hand, the unconscious, in many experimental forms of rational or Gestalt psychology, which are all directed at showing how an unconscious act in perception and figuration is fulfilled, assert that this act can never be made conscious, but rather reveals itself only in a concrete perception, perception of figure, or act of thought as it is fulfilled. These kinds of psychological analyses are quite close to the epistemological-theoretical, especially in the example of the so-called rational psychology [*Denkpsychologie*], whose leading proponent Hönigswald derives his rational-psychological precepts from transcendental epistemology. And, in fact, this psychological art of analysis is essentially different from epistemological theory only insofar as the psychic phenomena that take place are seen essentially as *processes*, rather than the conditions of the possibility of consciousness, that is, experience.

And, in that, the difference between the psychological unconscious is always different from the metaphysical, with which we began our analysis. The psychological unconscious is always something that is a content of our experience.²⁴ As an element of psychic occurrence it must be considered as a conscious

Who can come to its foundations. And such is the power of my spirit which belongs to my nature; and yet I do not grasp it in the entirety of what I am. For the spirit is too narrow to grasp itself. And so what may it be, that cannot be grasped of it? Would that be something beyond itself, not within itself? But if it is within itself, why can't it be grasped? Powerful wonder empowers me, astonishment seizes me'. (*The Confessions of St. Augustine*, Reclam, Book 10, Chapter 8, p. 239). In the same sense, one reads the ancient words of Heraclitus: 'The boundaries of the spirit cannot be discovered, no matter what avenue one travels; so profound it is'. With these expressions the ancient philosophers have already expressed the basic idea that the spirit reaches beyond what one can be conscious of. Even Leibniz plays with a type of unconsciousness, where the often used concept of 'petite perception' has a role in which conscious impressions are found, which are in themselves so small that they cannot be brought into a conception, but in their totality offer a certain perception, for example, the sound of the surf or of a mass of people. These auditory perceptions emerge from the sound of individual tones as a totality: 'which in themselves escape observation, but in spite of this are sensed, otherwise one would not be able to hear them as a totality' (*Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie*, hrsg. by Cassirer, Volume 2, p. 57 and p. 215 etc.).

- 24 Indicative of this is Freud's concept of 'the system of the unconscious', which indicates the content in its characteristics as known by the individual, and at the same time a second set of content, unknown to him, but having an effective *character* within him.

part in order to make possible a causal theory of the entirety of psychic life. Because of this internalisation in consciousness, one could paradoxically, but pregnantly, state: everything psychologically unconscious is only given in consciousness. On the other hand, that which has the character of unconsciousness in the transcendental sense is not given consciously, and cannot be thought, *is rather consciousness itself* in its immediate effect, that is, its living activity. This is the deeper sense of the principle that a rectification of the substantial concept of the ego is required: that one cannot really say, I think, rather only that it thinks in me. In this way transcendental epistemology also has its 'I' and 'it' [*ein Ich und ein Es*]. But this transcendental 'it' is wholly different from the psychoanalytical 'it' of Freud. The psychoanalytical 'it', although the greatest part of psychic life, is a phylogenetic inheritance.²⁵ Over against the transcendental, the 'it' [*das Es*] is not a part of psychic life, neither a greater nor a smaller part, nor is it an inherited part of the ego, rather it is part of the form of ego consciousness itself, only not of the form of ego, but of its activity. The empirical ego announces that it lives; but more accurately, one must say, it is lived, it experiences itself in that its life is that singular, and at the same time, corresponding activity which has its effects in the conscious forms that are operative within and are only known by the ego.

Thus we can now find the correct designation for this 'Es' of the consciousness in general. It is not 'an unconscious', rather *an impersonal*, which does not permit the terms conscious or unconscious. For there is no longer a reason to ask whether consciousness itself is conscious or unconscious.²⁶ This impersonal in the consciousness in general is blind, but goal-oriented, that is, it can be designated as a self-guiding efficacy, which is merely an expression for its ultimate actuality which gives the forms and contents of consciousness their animated existence.

25 See Freud 1931, pp. 366 ff. [It must be noted that the translation of Freud's 'Es' is 'the id', which is the Latin for 'it'. The article to which Adler refers, which first introduced the 'es' in Freud's writings, was a reprint of his 1923 essay, *Das Ich und Das Es* (Leipzig, Vienna, and Zürich: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag), pp. 77 ff. One can access the English translation as a separate text, *The Ego and The Id* (see Freud 1960).

26 Regarding the unconscious in an epistemological-theoretical sense, the lecture by Wilhelm Windelband 'The Hypothesis of the Unconscious', Heidelberg 1914, was the first, as far as I know. See its pp. 15–16.

Par. 5 *The Activity of Consciousness as a Transcendental Concept*

The concept of activity appears within a transcendental investigation as a foreign element, as something 'without mentality', but that which can be associated as a somewhat warning feeling of spiritual discomfort. For it must appear as a grotesque paradox that what is essential in our being, activity, should stem from the rigorous method of epistemology. All complaints of the 'lifeless formalism' of the transcendental method would have justice if this were seen as a paradox. Yet, seen in the traditional, that is, the purely formal, conception of the transcendental method, it does appear counter to the senses that life as a transcendental determination of consciousness, and thereby a concept of epistemological theory, is pertinent here. It is usually understood that life is known in an empirical process, and thus can only be considered as an object of experience.

That is the case only as long as one identifies the concept of life as a natural process. Yet one comes quickly to the understanding that the singularity of this process, that is, its organic character as a totality, and the sustaining of this process, is of an immanent goal-oriented spontaneity that cannot be wholly explained by natural concepts. Rather, one sees that all understandings of life, and those of the natural processes, even when deeply hidden, are derived from our psychic experience, and modeled after our conscious understanding of organism. One must not forget in this context that the only life process which can be known in our experience is our own. In this, the life of consciousness is inseparable, so that for our point of departure, experience of life and mentality are one and the same. This is a fact made clear even in the animistic form, as it thrusts itself forward in the judgement of popular opinion as well as of the primitive person. Thus, when someone dies, he gives up the spirit; and the primitive considers life identical with the spirit, and sees around himself nature as full of spirits.

Life as a biological process is an empirical fact. But just in this arises the question regarding for whom this experiential fact is possible. For it injects within natural experience something new, a wholly other kind of experience – life experience. And, let us recall, we only know life as experience *within ourselves*, so no independent, empirical fact arises from the biological or physiological process, rather they are derived from an enabling fundamental set of functional associations which are identical with consciousness. Organisms without the concepts of life are not possible objects of experience. What life is, even in the most torpid monadic movement, can only be grasped through an analogy from one's own life, so that without a spiritual referent, the thought of it is impossible. Thus biology presumes life at the outset, which tells us that biology simply describes life as this or that created, original phenomenon, but

cannot explain it. It is thereby only to be known as a mental determination; for whatever one selects from the range of its biological functions as that which can be called its foundation, such as the ability to assimilate and to reproduce – it returns to the truth that all of these are processes that have their own laws, whose characteristic in each case cannot be understood other than as a *goal-oriented, striving, spontaneity*, so that it is the same as the inner essence of everything that is of consciousness. Quite significant in this context is Kant's definition of the concept of life, often given by him, but most clearly in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. It states there: 'Life means the power of a substance, out of *its inner principle*, to act ... to determine ... Now, we know no other principle of a substance that can change its condition as *desire*, and no other inner activity as *thinking* of that which is so involved, *the feeling* of pleasure or displeasure or *desire* or will. These grounds of determination and attendant actions do not belong to the representations of external sense, and thus not to the determinations of materiality as material. Materiality as such is without life'.²⁷

In these words Kant clearly expresses how the concept of life becomes one with consciousness, when one proceeds in understanding from the *immediate* experiential concept of life, and asks of its possibility. This does not contradict the fact that biologists have shown the living processes which have no correspondence to consciousness, as with plants, lower animate beings or even humans in a condition of a lack of consciousness. For all these life processes are not life itself, rather construed partial appearances or theoretical auxiliary concepts, which all emanate from an original picture of the entirety of consciousness that is immediately identical to the presumption of an experienced life whole.

Par. 6 *The Dynamic in Transcendentalism*

There belongs to the conditions of the possibility of a conscious whole in its production and sustaining of its own continuous unity, a goal-oriented activity, which in itself has no conscious character, but instead is only a self-guiding and reproducing spontaneity, which we differentiate as vitality from the ability

27 [Max Adler offers the wrong source for this citation from Kant. The citation as given in its cobbled form is found in Eisler 1977. The first edition was published in 1916; see this information in Eisler 1977, title pages, pp. v–vi. The heading from which the reference is drawn by Adler is Eisler's first offering of Kant's definition of 'Leben' ('life') on p. 328. Adler misreads the Kant citation by noting the source before the citation, instead of that which follows it. The actual source of the Kant citation is *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* (1786), Drittes Hauptstück, Lehrsatz 3, Anmerkung].

to be conscious. Vitality or life in this sense is not the product of an organism, nor is it a characteristic of the organism, indeed it has nothing in itself to do with the organism, if we understand by that a *physiological organism*. Life is the dynamics of the conscious process itself, and is only an organism insofar as it participates in the unity of consciousness, which through its operations it *animates* and sustains. Life is thus the prerequisite of every concrete process of life itself, just as the determinations of consciousness represent the prerequisites of every concrete conscious process: in short, life in this sense is only an element of the conscious processes themselves, *in which these do not proceed according to their logic*, but rather must be considered the dynamic prerequisites of these conscious processes. The dynamic is just as transcendently determinative in the epistemological process as the consideration of its logical elements. This narrow and elementary transcendental context of life and consciousness – whereby one must cleave if one is to comprehend the biological concept of life – is documented with the expressions ‘centre of consciousness’ [*Bewusstseinszentrum*] and ‘the experiential centre’ [*Erlebnismittelpunkt*], which are equivalent expressions. The concept of experiential centre in the application of the most rigorous transcendental method is an unavoidable conception.

One should not believe a mere tautology is expressed when we say that everything conscious is experientially lived [*erleben*]. The objection that it is a tautology would misconceive the *epistemological-critical* concept of life, and the *new* purview that *augments* transcendentalism would be lost. The instance which we understand under the term ‘lived experience’ [*Erlebnis*] is always to be understood as something conscious, and so we are accustomed to use the term ‘lived experience’ for conscious facts, even as this usage is a noteworthy circumstance in that we take a word from the sphere of life and apply it as a synonym to a part of the mental sphere, creating thereby a deeper contextual significance that bears greater study. And this is understood as soon as we attend that the word ‘lived experience’ [*Erlebnis*] in this usage means nothing organic or physiological. When I say: ‘this was my greatest life experience: [*mein grösstes Erlebnis*]’, I do not think of something biological, however – and this is the crucial point; nor do I think of something merely logical or emotional. Much more, what I will say by that, is that something in me by dint of its conscious contents has been strongly affected and brought to light by what I perceive as my Self, but not as my Self in the sense of a merely formal, logical point of unity, but rather as a whole which is finally indescribable in its conscious determinations, and is only given as a form of activity, which is capable of a graduated intensification. Consciousness and life are thus not to be separated in *their fulfillment of experience*; but they must be separated in the transcend-

ental analysis of experience, and then are not tautological, rather differentiations. Consciousness contains *the reflexive*, that is, the ego-centred relational mechanisms of *the mental structure* of experience, life, however, the dynamic, spiritual mechanisms that *move*, put into operation (function), the realising *activity*. Consciousness and activity are thereby the same, but only in the sense that consciousness and objectivity are the same: consciousness is always consciousness of something, and this something, this objectivity, belongs to the conditions of consciousness. Thus consciousness is always active, and in spite of this activity, there is in the conscious process something to be differentiated, as that which is objective. The latter is what can be said to be the material component of consciousness, the first its activity, its dynamism. The centre of consciousness and the experiential centre, although identical in relation to the synthesis of experience, are like the two sides of one page. Although the front side can never be separated from the back side, we must differentiate them in order to be able to give what is the case for the one and for the other. Thus, one can never separate the experiential side from the consciousness side. But transcendently 'lived experience' [*Erlebnis*] means the stressing of that which is contained in the dynamic that can also be called consciousness.²⁸

Par. 7 *The Transcendental Concept of Movement*

The transcendental concept of activity, whose essential characteristic, as we have seen, and even more clearly, will see, exists in its differentiation from the ego function. This seems to me significant enough to explain it from yet another point of view. Activity is in the closest relationship to the concept of *movement*, by which an empirical and a transcendental meaning must be distinguished. It is no accident that the primitive concept of life is closely bound to the conception of movement, and that for the primitive, as well as

28 In this regard, one can more clearly distinguish between the transcendental and the biological concepts of life, by saying: the transcendental knows 'life' [*Leben*] only as 'lived experience' [*Erleben*], by which the indissoluble context of life within ego consciousness is intimated. For the biological standpoint life as a lived experience is not considered; rather it is seen as an objectified occurrence, for which an experiential centre is not forthcoming. The character of this occurrence will be described by biological characteristics, which are known, however, only from the sphere of lived experience. One sees clearly from this point of view in the determinations of the individual characteristics of life, and in how these determinations contribute to the natural context in which they are applied, that these biological concepts of life are only partially derived facts of the primordial lived experience itself, and that as every scientific concept in its methodological application, they arbitrarily relate to a one-sided, partial experience.

for the naïve, in their conceptions of past and present, life and movement are identical. The deeper ground of this view lies in the primordial image of all movement, that is, the possibility of the concept of motion itself stems only out of the character of the activity of consciousness. This leads us to a short discussion of the transcendental concept of movement. This will clarify that activity as self-movement is a particular transcendental determining part of our experience.

It is greatly prejudicial to know movement as something that only occurs in experience [*Erfahrung*]. This meaning is central to the naïve realism of everyday life, but also in the materialistic metaphysics of movement of the natural sciences. What is motion in the ordinary sense of this word? It is a continual change of place by an object. That would mean, however, that the object is in each moment of time in another place. *Where then is the movement?* This way of seeing the issue leads finally to the well-known Eleatic paradox whereby there is no movement whatsoever, because at every point of its movement the thing is at rest. Without a doubt, however, movement is that which makes the object go from one point to another. Yet it is just this that is not found in external experience. Attending to that which is really the issue when we speak of movement, that is movement, as paradoxical as it sounds, is never experienced there where one would put it, that is, in space; rather it is experienced only in us. The primordial image of movement is the intuition *of succession* in us, and not the concrete succession of some event, rather the pure intuitive succession, as well as the temporal 'running off', and the spatial gauging, which we never have as a completed image, rather only complete. In that we traverse a temporal-spatial moment, or draw a line, we experience motion in its character, that is, *in the act* of continual change of an individual temporal and spatial point. While the forward movement of a thing in space from one point to another is wholly unexplainable, indeed never perceived, this movement does not occur from the spatial and temporal forms in themselves, rather from the *intuition* of space and time.

Therefore, Kant has not designated these intuitions as merely complete concepts, but rather as living functions. Thus, we find here as well a clear differentiation between the empirical and the transcendental concept of movement. All movement, says Kant, as an external change of place, assumes a perception of that which moves as being in space. Since space, considering it as something in itself, is not in motion, a moving thing in space is only found in experience; and all movement of objects is therefore empirical, which does not belong to geometry or epistemological theory. 'Motion, however, considered as the describing of a space, is a pure act of the successive synthesis of the manifold of outer intuition in general by means of the productive imagination, and

belongs not only to geometry, but even to transcendental philosophy'.²⁹ This means, however, movement as such stems from an act, that is from the activity of the process of knowing or from its activity; and it seems to me no accident that Kant in deriving the above determination of the transcendental concept of movement from a synthesis of pure consciousness, has the productive imagination as having generated it, as it is a blind activity, that is an activity of the process of consciousness. This corresponds with what Kant will later say about pure movement, when he says that if we refrain from talking about the change of place, which is an empirical concept of movement, then only the activity of the perceiving subject remains, who determines the motion, and who initially posits the concept of succession.³⁰

So, we see here the concept of movement actually in its transcendental sense with the activity or action of the subject's (perceptual) confluence. Movement and activity are prerequisites of the conscious processes, the possibility of experience, which does not mean that both are forms of consciousness, even as the action of these forms are not to be separated, because they are what in themselves make this action possible. They form a *content* [*inhaltliches*] a priori.

Par. 8 *Demarcation to Prevent a Metaphysics of Life*

The elemental transcendental context of consciousness and life, of life and movement, has such a significant meaning that we must make it abundantly clear for ourselves how the transcendental investigation cannot remain merely with the conscious *forms* of the a priori intuition, categories, and principles, but rather must first find them in their activity, not however as a physiological process, but rather through the transcendental concept of the immanent-goal-oriented spontaneity as a dynamic process where one can see their realisation. The uncustomary use of a transcendental concept, on the one hand, but over against that, the contemporary philosophical work that stems from a powerful metaphysical philosophy of life, makes it necessary to stress that animation, activity, vitality, immanent goal-oriented activity or other forms of consciousness which may be designated as the functional capabilities, do not pre-exist or form a basis or provide an order for consciousness. Thus, we differentiate *this* concept of life as transcendental from all the transcendences of the so-called philosophy of life. Life in the transcendental sense is not before thought; it is not an original 'life stream' which carries the course of an individual life as

29 Kant 1965, p. 167 [B 156].

30 Kant 1965, Analytic, Par. 24.

waves that rise and fall; it is also not an 'èlan vital', from which the entirety of the organic world is a creative development; and, thus, it is not a special force, which organises as entelechy the body and the soul. On the contrary, all such and similar views must recognise that life in the sense of an epistemological theory is first only possible as something to be known in our experience, that is within the processes of consciousness, which disclose determinative parts of what in its possibility belongs to life, as we have shown to be the chief contents which the transcendental method makes known as forms of consciousness. All of that which the modern philosophical work of so many profound thinkers (Dilthey, Bergson, Driesch, Simmel, Müller-Freienfels, et al.) have produced in the name of a life philosophy that augments the apparently formal-schematic and bloodless transcendental philosophy, must be seen, with some justification, as merely a metaphysical understanding. To be sure, not a metaphysic in the classical style, rather as the foretaste of a new and quite different metaphysic, which can only occur on the border of transcendentalism, indeed supported by that perspective. There remains, thus, this strong impulse towards life philosophy, which should act as a caution to not treat the problem of transcendental philosophy merely as a rational and intellectual matter, which Kant knew by making it a primary consideration in his writing of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. And that caution is complied with when one uses the transcendental method, where life is the place, in the transcendental sense, where the investigation must, indeed, be carried out.³¹

This activity belongs to the activity of 'consciousness in general', whereby it is said that all ego consciousness is active and all activity of conscious character, homologous to consciousness. In the well-known posthumous reflections of Kant, it says: 'Life is an activity of a simple essence, because it operates through goal-orientation, which is effected only through the absolute unity of the subject's power of movement. Material activity is a *contradictio in adjecto*; the directing principle is always immaterial'.³² This sentence sounds metaphys-

31 In the transcendental character of activity of all consciousness lies the ground for the continuing danger of gliding from epistemological theory into psychologisms, because the transcendental determinations of consciousness are also elements of life. The concept of psychic life must maintain rigorously the differentiation of two meanings. On the one hand it treats concrete psychic processes, which do construct *objects for psychology*, which can investigate these processes in their lawful connectedness. On the other hand, 'psychic life' means a prerequisite of thought which generates these psychic processes themselves in their connectedness, in which sense the concept of psychic life is not an object of psychology, rather belongs to *epistemological theory*.

32 *Altpreussische Monatshefte*, Vol. xx, 472, Note. [Again, this citation is taken from Eisler 1977, p. 328].

ical, but it need not be seen so. It says, rather, that life is only a constitutive principle of a mental connectedness. The concept of life is thus removed radically from its biological-physiological basis, in that the foundational basis of the physical organism is derived as a product of experience, as life has a psychic organism as its basis. 'Material activity is a *contradictio in adjecto*' because materiality is already a product of external experience, thus, in order to have something interior that is life presumes a 'directing' element, that is the immanent, goal-orienting principles, which we have known as the impersonal activity of consciousness.

Par. 9 *The Impersonal in the Activity of Consciousness*

Consciousness and life designate epistemological-theoretically one and the same given, whereby the expression 'consciousness' is taken up as the ego-relation and the personality takes note of this given, while the expression 'life' can also be applied to the impersonality of the forms of consciousness in their activity. This impersonal activity is that which appears as an 'it', in contradistinction to the ego-relations and the clearly possessive relations of the subject's conscious contents ('my' thought, 'my' feeling, and so forth), by which we see the impersonal is not the blindness of a natural impulse, not an actual blindness, rather an impersonality by which the conscious processes are immediately life processes.³³

The unconscious or the it, which we saw in the process of experience, the 'it', that thinks in us, is the striving for unity spontaneously of the consciousness, which is so little a form of ego, that it is identical with the spatial form or identical to other categorical forms, which is then realised by the ego-form by a self-realisation which differentiates this content as not of the ego. Again, the consciousness shows as it does earlier in its forms of intuition and the categories, how its vitality is something not of ego, rather impersonal. The expression 'consciousness in general' will say neither more nor less. This concept is not a

33 This impersonality and activity of spirit in post-Kantian philosophy has been worked out in depth by no one more than Hegel in his doctrine of 'objective spirit'. He constructs the persisting epistemological core, even as it is a metaphysical argument. Thus, this metaphysic reveals in its mystical movement the 'world spirit' as a functional condition of consciousness. This impersonal of psychic life appears everywhere as something of universal validity, and is especially clear in his 'Philosophy of Right'. In this text, our fundamental knowledge of the transcendental-social character of consciousness is contained more than in most of the little understood teachings of Hegel. Everything that can be known can only be known conceptually, he asserts, so that all reality is only possible in its universal determinability. (See also, his doctrine of individuality in his *Phenomenology*).

hypostatisation of consciousness, rather, on the contrary, it energetically confronts the fact that the ego itself is but a form of consciousness derived from its knowing activity. It rejects, thereby radically, the easily misdirected metaphysical concept of a 'life stream' by considering the ego as a transcendently determined part of the processes of consciousness, where such a streaming can occur within the ego, but not through it. Thus, the determination of the concept of 'consciousness in general' leads us not to a metaphysic, but rather to what epistemological theory offers, to the boundary of the metaphysical insofar as it shows the actual existence of how the ontological problem is to be clearly known.

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Given the activity of consciousness in its epistemological understanding as the basis of sociative praxis, Adler turns in *The Enigma of Society* to the best praxis, that is the social sciences as the guide to a socialisation of society. How are the social sciences constructed in their address of the social being of humans and their interdependence in society?



Max Adler 1936, 'Social Being and Social Science', in *The Enigma of Society: Towards an Epistemological-Critical Foundation of the Social Sciences*, Vienna: Saturn Verlag, pp. 178–200

Par. 1 *A Repetition of the Consequences of the Conceptual Use of the Social A Priori*

We have finally reached the point where we can continue with the answer to our initial questions: is there a certain kind of social experience that can be called an experience of *being*? Is there a social being beside natural being, and is there then a social science possible as a science of being that can stand beside natural science in that regard? The way we have taken in our deliberations thus far has been long, but not because of the difficulty and breadth of our foundation (for such a science), on the contrary, once we have grasped the spirit of transcendentalism it became easy, indeed almost self-evident. The length and difficulty to this point of our deliberation has come, rather, from the necessity of clearing the path from prejudicial assumptions, misunderstandings, and incomprehension, which, ever anew, like a rank, proliferating underbrush presented itself from the naïve dogmatic point-of-view, yet even a transcendental perspective not consequent in its outlook, opposing the correct understanding.

The main result of our critical elucidation of the processes of consciousness that are considered pertinent here is the transcendental social form of the ego. This form establishes from the onset the ego as the *mental* reference-point of unity of an infinite multiplicity of subjects of like kind. This organisation of the ego where it takes into account fellow-subjects beyond itself is not that of forming relationships to isolated external others, whereby an individualised lack of contextual relatedness, moreover a metaphysical mutuality would be surmised, rather it is an immanent relation to others as members of one's own mental contextualisation. The transcendental social relationship of the individual ego is thus not so much a relationship towards indefinite others as that of a relationship to *a unity* of an indefinite multiplicity, whereby from the onset the ego sees itself internally as embedded with others, that is, finds

itself sociated [*vergesellschaftet*]. This is the transcendental sociation which is wholly a form of the individual ego. It does not arise among or between the many; rather the individual consciousness *is a priori sociated*. The essential point is that the social is known as an element from the onset of the *logical* thought process. It belongs thereby to the conditions of experience in general.

The social then is not the product of human association in itself, of the thinking interactions of individuals, or the activities in cooperation or in conflict with one another, rather of a form of consciousness that first makes possible all historical life together and all social development. This form of consciousness is a form of *being*. And thus the social does not exist first in the form of norms, be they of an inner, moral should or an external regulation, rather it is already something natural, as being. Only this being is *social being*, this naturalness is *social nature*. And therefore it is necessary now to differentiate correctly between what is natural, and what is social being in their respective fundamental characters.

Par. 2 *The Difference between Natural and Social Being*

This difference does not lie in that between nature and spirit, if one understands these words as two different essences. Then all epistemological explanation would be fully lost. Thus, the conventional understanding of the difference between the natural and the human sciences, although not wrongly made, is nonetheless error-prone, and better to be avoided. To maintain a contradiction between nature and spirit is to fall back into the most naïve metaphysic – in which being is a fully independent construct, that is, an independent thing – here nature, there spirit. We can only approach these concepts from the epistemological concept of being, thus, all being is but the lawfulness of a concretely fulfilled consciousness, as Kant has designated nature as the existence of things under laws. If there really is a differentiation in being, this can only occur *within* the laws of consciousness, that is, within the mental. This offers then immediately the transcendental social as such a division with clarity that is not to be overlooked.

In what does the singularity of the transcendental social consist? One of the most defined elements of being among all the elements of being *is in the differentiated ways it is given*, which can be best characterised that the element of being, which is the natural element, *is perceived*, while the others must be *understood*. In this latter kind of being there is an augmentation to the understanding of space which adheres to the former, a new dimension – the sensed which can only be understood. This new dimension effects itself without the character of externality that is of natural being. The ‘understandable’ is that

which includes us in its effect, since all its sensed meaning is only to be found in us. In consequence, it stands in opposition to natural being in that it is an internality that comes only from our spirit, to be grasped as arising within our internality. The 'understandable' is also a part of being that never is as such alone, rather a part of a spiritual community, that is *a social reality*.

Here the objection can be raised that this epistemological-theoretical understanding is also valid for natural being. We have earlier incisively set forth how the being of natural things achieve their objectivity only in that they are not there only for me, rather for everyone. But the a priori social relationship of natural experience belongs only to the conditions of their objectivity, not, however, to the conception of their concrete structure. In this conception there is nothing of space-time and quality. In the experience of a natural thing, for example, a stone, the social relationship of knowing as a structural element of the stone is in no way forthcoming. In this experience the ego remains complete outside of its object; or better said, the social relationship of the ego lies certainly in the act of *objectively* knowing the being, but it does not enter as an element into the being itself, so that the natural thing here is divorced from the ego's grasp and stands beside itself before the ego. This has always been the way of natural experience and natural science, that the ego falls away, not only as a valuing subject – which occurs with social experience and social science – but as an element of the context of experience itself.

It is quite different wherever we speak of the social experience. Here it is impossible to grasp the being of the social object without co-experiencing its relationship to an indeterminate multiplicity of embedded subjects in the concrete experience. The social ego-relation belongs here not only to the conditions of the objectivity of experience, rather itself constructs the *constitutive* of a particular experience of being, in consequence of which the object is never merely standing over against the ego, rather forms an inner unity with it. Through that process the character of the social object changes in that *it ceases entirely to be a thing*, like a natural object is, *rather the relations among subjects are represented*, either directly or through objects. Beside the natural world as a thing-like being comes the social world as a spiritual being.

Still it must be said: social being no longer has a thing-like character; it is no longer as it appears, particular things, rather it reveals itself as the transcendental-social ego-relationship of consciousness in itself in all the individual acts of its thought, willing, and activity. *Here* as well it is where we encounter a character of being, but not as natural being; rather, the being of spiritual embeddedness. Natural being is the separateness of things and processes in their lawful relations to each other, social being is the being together of the ego-subject with fellow-subjects within one consciousness.

To further clarify the concept of social being we have discovered, let us recall, before we go on, the example of a stone covered with signs. This is chiefly natural being, as any other piece of the natural world. It may have drawn our attention because of its regular form. Such regularity is found in crystal forms quite often, and we were about to throw the stone away when we suddenly saw a sign carved upon it. At once the stone ceased to be a mere stone. Indeed, the stoniness, mineral, crystal quality, in short, that which was natural of it, became wholly without interest. The essential is now that the stone interests us more because of its signs, even if we do not understand them, or perhaps, as occurs with certain Etruscan discoveries, no one is capable of understanding them. Then, the signs open up a being, which is of quite another kind than natural being, namely, the being of a sense which is now of the dimension of the social construction of our consciousness, placing us immediately in a world of subjects which this stone informs us of. The being of the sign on the stone is not the social being, rather *its meaning*. As far as the stone is concerned, it belongs to natural being, insofar as it carries meaning, it reveals its social being. This social being is not comprised of the materiality of the stone or its signs; it exists now not in its materiality, rather only in its relationship by which things and processes of nature – here the signs on the stone, or otherwise, perhaps, as a tool or a book or even a human sound or human bodily motion, etc. – are to be understood as elements of a spiritual embeddedness of subjects.

Everywhere, where experience without a sign of meaning, that is, without a social relation of the ego is possible, lies natural being, even if it is a human or spiritual product (in this case their material side) is concerned. Thus, I can take up an artifact of an ancient culture, which I do not recognise, as a mere natural thing, as one might look at certain ground swellings as a natural hillock, while it is later discovered through investigation to be a grave site. But in contradistinction to that, everywhere one's sense of meaning presents experience, social being will be found, as experience that is sensed cannot occur without its presence in some manner. Even if human interaction is not directly involved, as in things of nature, if they give information of human meaning there is social being. Everywhere where social being occurs it is involved with we ourselves, with the being of the ego in its immanent relational function with fellow egos, no matter in what way: while, conversely, where there is natural being it involves an externality, something apart from us or strange, no matter how near and difficult its encounter with us may be. For that reason death is incomprehensible and feared, because this cessation of our natural organic being is a glaring contradiction in its concepts to our experience of inceptionless and endless life of consciousness.

Par. 3 *The Epistemological and Sociological Sociation Concept*

Everywhere, where concrete experience is possible, without having to connect the contents of it with a sensing subject, there is a realm of natural being. Where we must, however, include in the experiential content's meaning an element or product of a possible spiritual meaning-embeddedness, we enter the realm of social being. In short: natural being is the being of objects, social being is the being of subjects.³⁴

Social being is thus only another expression for the transcendental sociation of the ego-consciousness. The existence of the ego is the same meaning as the existence of social being, even when this ego is a completely isolated person hostile to humanity or a Robinson Crusoe on a desert island.

With that we can offer the following definitions: social being or sociation is the necessary thought-relationship of the ego of an indefinite multiplicity that is with him in a mental unity of spiritual interacting subjects. This relationship is not only that of thinking, but, likewise, in feeling and willing; and the sociation that is realised is not of external origin, rather an internal, immanent product of the individual consciousness. In order to have a more accessible word for the several moments of this process, we will call this relationship and the sociation which it realises a *mental* one. We can briefly state it: social being is a mentally necessary sociation of *individual* consciousness.

This concept of social being is an epistemological one; it is *the epistemological-theoretical concept of sociation*. That means: all the forms and kinds of social experience and historical sociation stem from this ground. The *historical* (experiential) form of sociation I call '*society*'. Society is no longer an epistemological concept, which belongs to the prerequisite conditions of social exper-

34 In my first development of the concept of social being (in my book *Causality and Teleology*), I described the difference between the natural and the social being in a different way. I wrote at that time: 'As long as we consider *what* is given through the agency of consciousness in general, the immense realm of existence is developed, which is nothing other than natural existence in its givenness ... as soon, however, as we go further in this direction of knowing in order to attend *how* this natural existence is given, how it is taken up, judged and changed, and why in these ways of relationship ... and how an agreement and mutual understanding is possible ... a particular kind of existence opens to us, that of a social existence' (Max Adler 1904, p. 235). This formula appears to me insufficient because of its manner of articulation: 1. the danger of a misunderstanding is proximate in that the difference between natural and social being is such that it seems merely a conception or judgement; and because 2. the decisive point is not clearly brought forward, that the social being is not in its epistemological sense approaching the things in their independent existence, rather only in the ego consciousness itself as an immanent relation of the embeddedness of things in the unity of a plurality of subjects.

ience, and is as such independent of space and time. It presumes rather a definite form in time and space. We can say thereby: under society we understand the historical form of appearance of the mental sociation of the individual consciousness. It is more accurate to describe as the external relationships of individual persons to an indeterminate multiplicity of fellow humans by means of the forms of work and intercourse, through which they are bound by an economic-cultural unity.

Par. 4 *Society and Community*

Now, what the conceptual pairing of 'Society and Community' represents can be varied, but they do not have the essential difference asserted by Tönnies, rather there is merely an empirical difference *within* the sociation.

Neither the epistemological nor the historical concept of sociation say anything of the manner in which it occurs, most especially whether sociation is harmonic or antagonistic. Only this can be said, that either the harmonic relationship of subjects to one another or their antagonistic relations have as the same basis the a priori social relationship of the ego. Epistemologically both agreement and antagonism are sociations. But with regard to the *historical* form of sociation, this difference is of the greatest importance. We will give each of these forms a particular name – the unified or harmonious form that of the solidarity or classless society, the antagonistic form that of the lack of solidarity or class-antagonistic form of society.³⁵

35 Concerning this distinction see my next work, which will be the third part of the *Lehrbuches der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung*. Sociation itself as the foundation of both of these historical forms can neither be termed solidified or unsolidified. If the solidarity society is conscious of its own solidarity or articulates this in its demands, then we speak of *community*. Community then has a twofold meaning: the first is the meaning of the word as a kind of social being; in the second sense, it is a social *ideal*.

The expressions 'society' and 'community' are therefore not meant as antitheses, as they are supposed since the well-known book by Ferdinand Tönnies. Community is more just a particular form of society. And this is not just another terminology I employ; no – it comes from a new, essential understanding derived from the concept of social being in its differing manifestations, and the relationships between them. This is even more relevant insofar as Tönnies's distinction does not come from a sociological understanding, rather from that of a metaphysical distinction. For it is well-known that Tönnies sees community as something 'original', 'maturing of itself', stemming from a social will which emerges from an *essential will* [*Wesenswille*], while society is the creation of a conscious *rational will* [*Kürwille*], thus an artificial, rational product. This essential will, and the social will that emerges from it, are for Tönnies concepts which in an undifferentiated manner exist somewhere between biological and metaphysical characteristics. There is

What is really intuited and sought by Tönnies in the distinction between community and society is actually the epistemological fact of the *social a priori*. This is not artificially produced, does not rest upon a rational will, not even an essential will, rather upon the essence of the ego consciousness. The ego is always from its inception sociated, and as soon as this is recognised and becomes part of conscious goal-formation, always of community. For in the realm of spirit, the ego is always related to this unity, and thus cannot countenance a contradiction of it, rather must mentally overcome the contradiction. This community of spirit in its possibility is the condition of every actually developing community within historical existence. It is lived not as something arbitrarily willed, but rather as one with the spiritual-moral development of individual adults and those who are yet maturing. We will term these persons who intentionally in their goal-orientation strive for communities, *associations*. The demarcation of the concepts of society, community, and association, all forms of sociation, does not mean merely a terminological difference in relation to Tönnies, rather the setting-aside of the metaphysical errors and the false problems arising from them, when the origin of the essential will is taken up.

Par. 5 *Setting-aside the False Problems of Sociology*

The purging and clarifying function of the epistemological insight into the particular role of social being is its setting-aside a series of false problems, and establishing a surer foundation for sociology as a science of being, which addresses not only what is studied, but the methodology to study it. From this perspective and only from this perspective will the interminable strife over

also a problem in the derivation of the social forms of community and society from mere individual psychology in its attendant forms of essential- and rational will. Thus, the differentiation of community and society as Tönnies constructs it, loses its genuine sociological problematic of the constant connectedness of humans in general, whether that of community or society, within the antitheses of 'made' or 'matured'. Upon such a basis the social problem assumes a strange constriction whereby Tönnies sees only a positive, furthering relationship among humans which counts as social, ruling out the presence of antagonisms, because antagonism in his eyes can generate neither a community nor a society. In this way Tönnies' basic concepts are not only confusing, but also directly destructive, because in the apparent clarity of his concept of community, which is rendered solely with an organic analogue, he presumes to generate a clarification of the social concept, whereas in reality he renews only the old, universal metaphysical concept of society. I have made this critique in detail in a semester offering at the University of Vienna, which treats the psychological and historical-philosophical details of Tönnies's doctrine. I hope to be able to publish this soon.

object and method in the social sciences finally be resolved. So derived, the object to be studied, the concepts of sociation, society, or community can be freed once and for all from every direct or hooded metaphysic in the social sciences. I refer here to the mystique of spiritual universalism as well as the self-evident belief in society as an organism, realising the insufficiency of such constructions, which even as comparisons are more injurious than useful, because the social problem which lies in individual judgement is not recognised. 'The society' that is an existence over people or envelops them does not exist. In that, the skeptics and denials of sociology have justification when they always argue that sociology, if society is its object, is not capable of showing this object in experience. Society is not something supra-individual, and even less so something 'between individuals' [*Interindividuelles*]. This latter meaning leads either to a no less mystical conception of spiritual 'connections' between individuals, or if one will be more 'realistic' to the beloved concept of social impulses. Here one would be free of mysticism, but on the path of an individualism of interacting human atoms, wherein the essentials of the social problem, the spiritual engagement of individuals, is lost. Where the basic understanding of unity with universalism and with organicism missed the mark, it is missed here by the inter-individualism (to which the ideas of Leopold v. Wieses belong).

The object of social science is, as we have seen, neither to be found in individuals, nor between them; rather it is to be found where social being is to be found, that is, *within the single individual*. As paradoxical as it sounds: the object of societal science is in no way 'society', rather the individual, and only upon this basis can it proceed, its most concrete beginning for the inception of thought. Yet, to be sure, this is not isolated individualism, which is the usual perspective, seemingly self-evident, rather that of the *sociated* individual, the individual that is already an immanent and invariant *social being*.

Here we find the epoch-making service of Marx and Engels, who by working out the historical concept of sociated humanity through a sociology that is the science of being, gave it its new and lasting foundation. I have offered the Marxist concept of sociation thoroughly in another publication.³⁶ I should only point out here that Marx articulates the concept of the sociated individual with such pregnancy and depth that it can be considered a historical-empirical correlate of the transcendental-social ego. In the essay so central to Marxist

36 See Max Adler 1930, *Lehrbuch der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung*, Volume 1, Chs. 12–15. [See the translation of Chapters XIV of *Lehrbuches der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung*, Volume 1, in this collection].

thought, of which, unfortunately, only a fragment remains, that is, his *Critique of a Political Economy*, one reads: 'The human is in the most literal sense of the word a *zoon politikon*, not simply a *sociable* animal, but an animal that *can only individuate itself within society*. Production by isolated individuals beyond society – a rarity, which could occur accidentally to a civilized person who became trapped in the wilderness and who already dynamically possessed the forces of society – is as great an absurdity as the idea of the development of language without individuals living together and talking to one another. We need not dwell on this any longer'.³⁷ And the elucidating, problem-focusing meaning of this concept of sociation is demonstrated immediately by Marx in his treatment of the effect of dissolving economic fetishism and ideological hypostatisation, which exist especially in the political ideas of 'the people' [*das Volk*], fatherland, humanity, and so forth. The Marxist analysis brings always into prominence the dialectical sociation of active individuals that is the background of the economic and political self-evidences, that is their individual self-interests, which can only come into play in a sociated milieu. The relationship of the individual to society can only be comprehended and defined by the dialectical sociation already part of the individual-ego. The process of the creation of general ideas and general feelings that individuals strongly assert (as community demands, as ideals, as objective spirit, and so forth) has its source here in the social apriori of the individual consciousness.³⁸

With our epistemologically formulated concept of social being, another false problem shows itself, the *emergence* of society. It has the same meaning as the problem of the emergence of human consciousness. Sociation does not emerge; rather it is simply there with the person. The beloved concept that society is the product of a developmental process that can be traced from the realm of animal existence does not help us. For from this perspective either it is a question of the utilisation of the so-called social impulse and instinct, which we have already shown to be incapable of addressing the problem of sociation, because it conceives of humans as only next to each other, not, however,

37 Marx 1903, pp. 710–11.

38 The relationship of the individual consciousness to the general, and the deceptive ideas that arise from this relationship to general ideology, is discussed by Marx in depth in *The German Ideology*, published in the Frankfurt Marx-Engels edition. In this regard, see my essay 'Der Kommunismus bei Marx', in *Archiv für Geschichte des Sozialismus*, Volume 6, hrsg. Grünberg, and my address of the parallelism of fetishist productive appearance discussed by Marx with the fetishist appearance of ego considered by Kant in my book *Kausalität und Teleologie*, Ch. xv, reproduced as an appendix in the third edition of my book *Marx als Denker*.

leading us to comprehending how they are with or intertwined amongst each other as individualities. This is also the reason why 'animal societies', the 'societies' of bees and ants, may seem puzzling as long as we consider them as products of instinct. Or we can consider the animal societies as already sociated, but then the problem of 'society' has only been moved backward by one station, in that we must then answer the question of when sociated animals emerged. There is no emergence of sociation out of non-social elements, just as there is no emergence of consciousness out of non-conscious processes, for the concept of emergence is already a function of consciousness, since only in a consciousness can the question of the emergence of consciousness be discussed.

And so it is with sociation, which is already a way of being of the conscious; only in the sociated consciousness can sociation develop. There is a history of the development of mental life and society, but *only within* consciousness and sociation. But the problem of how consciousness itself in its form 'became', that is, in its manner of mental development, as in the Hegelian world spirit, out of earlier stages, perhaps from some unconscious spiritual spark, is not a problem of science or epistemology, as it goes beyond both, and can be traced as a question solely to the developmental idea which is an emanation of the form of time of our consciousness, and cannot be considered apart from this form of time.³⁹

39 Insofar, however, as the concept of time is always a quantitative form, that is, the mere transpiring, and from the qualitative side, that of what endures, that is, as the intensive, lawfully changing effects of something that must be distinguished in judgement, which Bergson has explored in depth; but independently from his quite valid differentiations of the concept of time, one must assay an idea about development beyond the quantitative temporal vision. But *this* concept of development is surely quite different from that of historical evolutionary theory, and belongs only to transcendental premises. It does not belong to the formal a priori, rather it can be considered as part of the content-a priori, which we have taken up in our discussion of the transcendental concept of the living qualities of consciousness, belonging to the still little studied laws of this dimension of consciousness. [Max Adler here opens up an area of future research – into the laws of the 'content-apriori', which govern how not just social entities and institutions, but also the ideas that generate and sustain them, change or endure. These laws of consciousness can only be explored by tracking the forms of sociation in distinct periods of time, exploring the range of conscious laws that are at play. Of course, the dialectical materialism of the given epoch studied conditions how and when the laws of consciousness are brought into play. Max Adler's student, Lucien Goldmann, has contributed to such a study in his *The Hidden God: A Study of Tragic Vision in the Pensées of Pascal and the Tragedies of Racine* (see Goldmann 1964); see especially his discussion of Jansenism in its emergence and

Another similar, indeed ancient, polemicised problem is that of the emergence of life. We must here recall what we have already discussed;⁴⁰ that we must differentiate between life in the sense of spontaneity of consciousness, and life in the sense of its organic existence. The latter concept is a derived one taken from the activity of consciousness itself. In respect of this primary concept of life, there is actually no problem as far as the emergence of life is concerned, since life is established by consciousness itself. Yes, there is a question of the emergence of plant and animal life from materiality, since it concerns a definite historically experienced materiality. But one must be clear about what one is actually asking. If one asks about the emergence of plant and animal life from materiality, then, as cannot be doubted since the repeated and penetrating exposition of H. Driesch, one asks of something that is impossible to know. For the characteristics of plant-animal (organic) life, their intrinsic ends, their methods of sustenance, of regeneration and propagating activity, one does not find that in the material itself. The history of organic life can only show us that life is always bound within material, using this for its ends, but not that it stems from the material itself. And so the developmental theory of organic life as phylogeny presumes life itself. The question of the emergence of organic life can only indicate which stage of the physical-chemical compound of material the first stirring of life occur. Why this occurs escapes our knowledge, not because we do not know enough about the physical-chemical constitution of the life processes, but because the phenomenon of life lies on another plane from that which physics and chemistry derive their knowledge. What is not excluded, however, is that a further penetration is made into inorganic matter, which will lead to the discovery that there is no difference between inorganic and organic matter, and that they are somehow united structurally, which is not materially, rather in the tendency toward its form of organism. With a certain compound of chemical and physical components it would be *noticeable* what has been prepared within the inorganic. Yet, even within this 'inspirit-

change (Goldmann 1964, pp. 142–67). Goldmann's doctoral dissertation, completed in the closing years of World War II, takes up the Kantian question of the dynamic laws of consciousness which constitute 'totalities' at any point in thought, the epistemological background for his study of the 'content-apriori' of Jansenism in the time and thought of Pascal and Racine. See Goldmann 1945, especially pp. 118–26, where he discusses the dialectical interaction of individual thought with the influence of societal theories, and with the conditions that affect the sociation of the members of society in a particular epoch].

40 [See the translation in this text under Max Adler's rubric *The Activity of Consciousness*, Chapter VI in *The Enigma of Society*].

ing' of matter the organic remains, in the respect of the goal-oriented endowment of its matter, something other than mere material being in its need for thought.

Par. 6 *The Middle Position of Organic Being*

We have not arrived at this discussion of the concept of life, and of the organism, to offer some example, rather because the consideration of this question reveals a further, and an important, side of the difference between natural and social being. One sees that *already within natural being* there is a division between physical and organic being which in many respects is similar to that between natural and social being, and also, just as we have seen in the problem of the emergence of life, similar problems are apparent. Thus, it is necessary to make clear what is similar between organic and social being, and how we distinguish between the two.

From the outset, it is evident that the similarity between organic and social being is so great that a major direction of sociology – the organic-logical – founds itself upon the similarity. We will see that more is at play here than mere similarity. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the organic belongs to *natural* being. We are speaking of a *differentiation of the physical being*, because it is a being that beyond its mere spatial-temporal-qualitative determination, still comes forth with a definite form, a form that is a totality. This concept of totality means a relationship of parts and functions that is conditioned by an intrinsic goal. This form is a self-determining and self-orienting totality, which constitutes what we call an organism. From the physical side, it is something beyond us and its epistemological conditions are not required. Yet the thought forms derived from the life of consciousness are required to comprehend the organic occurrence. For this activity of consciousness is the actual site where the totality is immediately experienced. Insofar as all that is organic is related to consciousness, we must conceive of the organic only in an analogue to our conscious life. We cannot conceive of organic life, even in its most primitive protoplasmic movements, other than as a form of *striving*, that is, somehow related to our own willing essence. And that is the reason we can only consider organic appearances as explained when we have understood them, that is, when we have included them somehow within our essential community. Organic processes thus represent a special form of being whose conception requires transcendental conditions, the same that are required for comprehending the totality of social being. At the same time, organic being belongs to natural being, because it remains part of its totality in its relations, not having the social relations as its epistemological conditions that would be necessary for social being.

The organic then is that kind of being whose processes can only be conceived of as the immanent property of the totality of ends of a subject whose *functions* they are; the social, on the other hand, is that kind of being whose relationships to a totality are only in their immanent relations to a union with an indeterminate multiplicity of subjects, which appears as *a carrier* of this totality. Epistemologically, the organic and the social being in relation to physical being have in common that each is always *a subject*, only with social being it is an immanent multiplicity of subjects. This characteristic is of such significance that it is a fundamental difference from either of the other two forms of being, justifying the categorisation of organic being with physical being as natural being, that is, as such in its processes of being that they refer to themselves alone, and where they have relationships among themselves, this is only in the form of an *external* interaction.⁴¹

Par. 7 *The Object and the Methods of Sociology*

Thus, the endless conflict over the object of sociology has been positively terminated in the above discussion. This object is not a mystical essence over humans, or some incomprehensible bond between them, or some other abstraction or hypostatisation: it is social being, that is as real and concrete as the individual person, because it only exists in sociation. The object of sociology is found in the same space which is taken up by the natural sciences, namely within a temporal-spatial determination, only upon a particular plane of sociated totality, and represents a givenness of processes of being, just as does nature. The particular processes are not derived from their nature as being, which are shared with all the processes of the physical, the organic, and the social, all which require the thoughtful treatment of consciousness, that is, the arena of all the sciences of being. Sociology differentiates itself from the natural sciences not because it is another kind of science, but rather only in that within its logical art of science it takes up a particular kind of being, that which we will see has a decisive meaning for its methods.

Finally, one must show that social being, through its immanent relation to the inner union of subjects, which only can be conscious, is always a mental

41 The term 'external interaction' is really a pleonasm. This is as yet hardly appreciated. Indeed, quite the opposite, the spiritual interaction is seen as a type of inner connectedness, a position which has been strongly justified by G. Simmel, who has asserted that within spiritual interaction the essence of the social bond resides. This is deceiving, as we will make clearer in our discussion of Simmel in Part II (below). This deception is furthered by conflating the mere interaction as a factual effect and counter-effect with an assertion of it as a spiritual bond.

relation, while organic being must always be seen as biophysical, not spiritual. The so-called unconscious social is not an unconscious social being; rather it belongs to the effects of social being in the unconscious of individual psychology. The identity of social being with spiritual being, as we have earlier said, is an expression of the 'spiritual sciences' [*Geisteswissenschaften*], which as far as the science of the social is concerned is not actually untrue. But this expression can easily be misunderstood in the popular psychological understanding of a personal spirit, missing the relationship of the social character of spirit, and, moreover, because of its deficient differentiation of psyche and spirit providing no clear boundary that separates one from an organic interpretation. Thus, the term 'spiritual sciences' leads to error. We have chosen the name 'social science' for this reason. It designates clearly that it is not the difference between nature and spirit, but rather that between nature and social experience that is the issue.

What now concerns us is the scientific treatment of social being, and immediately we must confront the conception that the matter to be taken up here is that of being and occurrence, and that only the methodology of the science of being is relevant, that is *causality*. Thus, the endless conflict over the method of the social sciences is determined, one that has its core in the great alternatives of the normative or the causal. The assertion that social science cannot be causal – whose chief proponents are R. Stammler and O. Spann, the one an epistemologist, the other a metaphysician – has been shown to be wholly without adequate grounds. Its justifiable core is only that a normative perspective of social life is completely different from a causal perspective, and cannot be derived from the causal nor 'explained' by it. The great service of the normative is that it repudiates all attacks by materialism, naturalism, and positivism once and for all, which held that normative appearances can be explained as causal in their 'emergence', a view that shows the blindness of these systems towards the problem of the normative, which is an expression of *the Should*.⁴² On the other hand, the normative perspective has no sense of the *being* of the should, which is the final epistemological ground of social being.

The causal perspective is thus the only and necessary method of social sciences, and with that it stands logically on the same ground as the natural sciences. Here we find, however, the earlier differentiation we determined *within* being between physical, organic, and social being. For each, there is a particular form of causal consideration. In this relation, organic and social

42 [See translation in this text under Max Adler's rubric *The Givenness of Ethics*, in Adler 1924, Ch. II, pp. 17–39].

being are closer than physical being, which is only to say that they both are to be treated as cases and kinds of psychic being. This commonality consists in the fact that in the organic, as well as the social, the being and occurrence can only be conceived *within the framework* of a totality or unity of relations, in the one organicism, in the other sociation, whereby all being and occurrence has from its inception *an immanent teleology* as its givenness. This has the meaning that the causal is teleological, and in social being this teleology has particular normative elements necessarily as its make-up, because here the causal connections are only to be understood through immanent teleological strivings, in this respect the establishment of the social through valuing. The orientation of the organic in the sense of an accommodative development, and the development of the social in the sense of progress is only to be understood from this viewpoint.⁴³

Par. 8 *Social Causality*

With this immanent teleological and axiological concept of social causality, we lay to rest all objections that are so often brought by representatives of differing spiritual sciences against the causal treatment of their areas of specialty, in that they understand by causality only physical-chemical or mechanical forms. We can now understand social causality in the sense that the social is always mental, and can call it in this sense a spiritual causality, by which we mean, most clearly expressed, that we have a particular form of occurrence in front of us. One must, however, guard oneself from the broadly shared misunderstanding of whether the expression 'spiritual causality' is a diminishment of the causal compulsion or an exception to its rule. Spiritual or social causality is *in principle* just as strongly exact as physical causality, it merely is a different process, namely that of motivation. To be sure, if one understands the concept of an exact causal relation as a measurable determination, one that is capable of being formulated in mathematical terms, then in the area of social or spiritual events there is no causality. And this is the case not only because the complexity of what appears makes measurement difficult, but also because the measurement of spiritual processes is excluded by their very nature. Spiritual effects do not permit spiritual causes to be calculated. Nonetheless, statistical treatment of these phenomena are not ruled out, as one can see even with the eighteenth century Süssmilch, as well as since Quetelet, who introduced the branch

43 Concerning the threefold form of causality, see my *Lehrbuch der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung*, Vol. I, Ch. 13; the problem of the immanence of valuing in social causality discussed here, and that of the meaning of progress in its development will be more fully dealt with in the third volume of this text.

of science known then as ‘moral statistics’, a science which has developed an astounding evidence of the regularities of intentional behaviour in social phenomena, a condition of which even Kant was aware,⁴⁴ yet even here we are confronted with only a great number of repetitive individual facts, which in their concrete character do not lend themselves to reflection. The regularity proves here only that with a sufficient number of cases under the same external conditions motivation can remain largely the same, and that the few exceptional cases will not change the average. Nonetheless, in each individual case the effect may not be ascribed the cause which in the opinion of many statisticians is determined by the ‘law of the greatest number’, as, for example, in each month a certain number of people are judged to die by suicide, incorrectly. When it is statistically established, for example, that among all those of sixty years of age, every year a greater number die from suicide than those who are in their thirties, even then in an individual case nothing is firmly established. And the suicide of a sixty-year-old under certain conditions may be more incomprehensible than that of a thirty year old. The statistic regularity does not prove the calculability of spiritual processes. Such a default in spiritual-social events excludes an equivalence between cause and effect.

But in spite of that, it would be wrong to think that causality would be less exact in such instances, as soon as we understand under ‘exact’ the rigorous and exception-less determination of effect by a cause. Spiritual effects do not allow themselves to be *calculated*, but do allow *determination*. There is no such thing as pre-calculation, but there is a pre-determination, and a (in principle, at least) pre-determination of mental and social processes. The way of causality, which here through motivations, that is, through goal and immanent considerations, is different from physical causality, and thus must find methods of causal relationship that are other than in the exact sciences. These methods I have already designed as *sympathetic understanding* [*Einfühlung*]. Through a spiritual reconstruction of the entire or at least essential outer and inner life moments, the spirit of the inquirer can recreate the psychic and emotional course of the concrete spiritual-social events, so that the same motivation with its compelling force can be revealed, as in the calculation of the physicist the elements of an exact causal set of connections can be calculated. ‘The intensification of sympathetic understanding in the spirituality of the Other [*fremde Geistigkeit*] until a complete identification with it is not actually possible, and perhaps only realised rarely in cases of intuition or a momentary taking-the-place of the Other. But the complete causal derivation of physically concrete

44 See Kant 1922, p. 5.

occurrences for the future is also not practically possible; that doesn't prevent the principle from being uncontested; rather it is a logical ideal for the natural sciences. And so the complete pre-determination through sympathetic understanding as a principle is uncontestable'.⁴⁵

Only in the area of social investigation, the incompleteness of factual knowledge is much greater. And in play here are the various degrees of sympathetic understanding as one works up the materials. This does place limits upon the scientific treatment, and is the chief ground of deficient exactitude in the social sciences, but this does not diminish the stringency of social causality in itself.⁴⁶

45 Max Adler 1932, p. 192. – One may dispute the above assertion of the pre-determination of sympathetic understanding as a principle, in that one may point out that feeling oneself into the factual act of an event changes it so that a spiritual reconstruction cannot even be discussed. There is a parallel in this objection to the well-known physical dilemma alluded to by the Heisenberg theory of uncertainty. But aside from that parallel, which only refers to the uncertain relation of a physicist, not the indeterminability of the causal relationship itself (see my aforementioned book, pp. 193 ff.), the fact that the observer, that is here the sympathetic understanding person, adds a new element to the observed situation does not exclude a pre-determination. For if we understand the spiritual reconstruction of social causal contexts as a spiritual identification of the observer, we needn't assume that there is a complete bodily repetition. The essential is just that the causal context of the social event is recovered in its particular functional effects as made evident by its spiritual constellation, which in the consciousness of the observer is brought to life by the psychological character of the observation itself, which is not necessarily *altered* from the original. So, for example, an empathic grasp of anger or hunger in the other is certainly not identical with the actual experience of that person, but the psychological character of this emotional state and disposition of spirit will enable the observer to capture the essential facts. If this is true for concrete instances of the pre-determination of singular events, which is not necessary for the practice of social science, which only has to create logical postulates, then it is even more so for these sciences in that their actual objects are social laws, whereby they have only to establish general lines of determinability.

46 This explains why the history of a time must always be newly rewritten, even though it can appear that what has been will always be the case, as Schiller said: 'Eternally yet stands the past'. But not only does a thorough investigation into all the parts of the past open up through new sources and documents discoveries that have not been seen or even suspected, but the long known can be augmented by new experiences of the observer himself, experiences which those in the past had, yet because of these new experiences of the observer, new comprehension of those past events is made possible. So, for example, the contemporary person who has experienced the changes in democracy and fascism, and witnesses the unlikely advance of persons from the lower levels of society to the top ranks of the state, can comprehend much more adequately the nature of ancient tyranny and its context of mass needs than earlier interpreters who saw tyrants merely as ghostly

The particular form of social or spiritual causality is not the only property that can be determined by the special character of social being. One can also attend the *material dialectic* or antagonistic character of social events.⁴⁷ This is the direct consequence of the recognised transcendental dialectic of social experience, which exists only in the social experience of the individual, but in this individual consciousness is related always to a social milieu. In this exists the fundamental antithesis in the conditions of all spiritual being, that it is always individual in its self-assertive drive, but just as material as spiritual in that it must transpire within a social form. By the process groups are formed, and group struggles (class war) arises, and that the ideology of the communal forms must necessarily be dialectical cannot be fully elucidated here.⁴⁸ It is only necessary here to indicate that the particular character of the lawfulness of social being is to be found in the immanent goal-oriented causal forms of the social with its immanent material dialectic (antagonism of the individual and the social).

Par. 9 *Natural Science and Social Science*

We have established the justification, indeed the necessity, of a science of being alongside natural science: it is the science of social being and its occurrences, which we have called *social science*. Social science is different from natural science not because it is a different manner of science, be that a 'higher' or a 'lesser' one – it is just as rigorous a causal science as natural science and likewise strives for the laws of events. In this sense there is only *one* science, whose logical character is most clearly identified in natural science. If one speaks of value- or normative science, that is naturally counter to the use of the word science insofar as the addition of the words 'value' or 'norm' make one aware that we have here a *wholly other logical area* than that which the science of being concerns itself with. We must reiterate that the science of being asks about what is and occurs, while value science asks not of what is, but what should be, so that the fundamental difference of the two directions of thought is clear, and that one should avoid the ambiguity by using the term science for the latter. One should adhere to the tradition where considering being is a

figures. The tyrant of the classical times is more fully understood in the present by a better comprehension through the revelation of his fundamentally 'democratic' character.

47 Concerning the difference between the two forms of dialectic (dialectical thought and material dialectic), see Max Adler 1913, Chs. 2 and 4.

48 [See translation in this text under Max Adler's rubric *Das Formalpsychische im historischen Materialismus*, in Adler 1913, pp. 1–18].

science, but in considering values, while knowledge is gained, it is a knowledge of willing that is its basis, not that of knowing in itself.⁴⁹

The concept of social science encompasses in this manner, just as the natural sciences, a whole group of individual sciences, and has thereby both a wider and narrower scope. In the wider sense, all these sciences belong to it which occupy themselves with the differing appearances of spiritual (social) being and events, that is, the legal, state, and religious sciences, and so forth, and history, as well as the historical sciences such as the writing of history, insofar as the latter is not merely intended as an artistic formulation. Psychology belongs here as well, and not only mass or social psychology, but also individual psychology, the study of character, if we understand by this those psychologies that conceive of themselves as psychologies of understanding [*verstehende Psychologie*]. On the other hand, experimental psychology in its differing modern forms is to be counted among the natural sciences. We have already considered the expression 'spiritual sciences', especially as it has been introduced by John Stuart Mill. We found that it is not incorrect to understand, as we have established more closely, that social effects are spiritual, in that social being has a mental form. But because the character of the spiritual in the ordinary judgement is represented as connected solely with the individual subject of spiritual life, in which the social character of the individual spiritual activity is absent, so the expression 'spiritual sciences' leads to error, because it fails to present to us the fact that all spiritual manifestations are only possible socially. Nonetheless, H. Rickert's formulation of the term 'cultural sciences' must also be completely rejected because of its furthering of the contradiction between nature and culture, which differs from our antithesis of nature and sociation (1) as it is in

49 In a certain sense, we are a proponent of a *unified science*, to which both natural and social science belong, because they both have the same object in a logical sense, namely being and occurrence, and have the same methodology, namely the consideration of cause. Nonetheless, we reject decisively the new concept of a single science of the so-called 'Vienna Circle' whose most radical proponents are Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath. This concept states that all scientific knowledge, that of the spiritual-social as well as the physical, can be derived, indeed must be derived, from the physicalistic language, which is the 'universalist language' of the sciences. See here Carnap's essays 'Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft' in the second volume, and 'Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache' in the third volume of the journal *Erkenntnis*, as well as Otto Neurath, 'Soziologie im Physikalismus' in the second volume of the same journal. This unified science in spite of its critical presentation is fundamentally nothing other than a modernisation of the older materialism, and shows the same disregard of the transcendental problematic, by which its preference for logical studies does not cease to make important. I hope to treat this problem in a special context soon.

Rickert's formulation too narrow, and (2) as an antithesis of valuing, not of a differentiation in being. Rickert's formulation of the concept of the cultural sciences is immediately of the sphere of value sciences, which lacks a sufficient foundation to treat the problem of social experience as the experience of being.

In a narrower sense, the expression 'social science' is *sociology*, that is, the science of the essence and forms of sociation, as well as the laws of its variations. Sociology is an individual science with an independent, given object, that is founded in social being (sociation). It is thus not a 'general science' that puts together the results of the social individual sciences 'under the viewpoint of society'. That would be the object of a social or cultural philosophy, which would make this compilation within its particular standpoint, as if under 'society' something ethical or metaphysical, of a contemporary or futuristic *power* or an otherworldly idea is meant. Sociology is not a *mere science of form*, as Simmel has taught, since in the independent treatment of sociation, there is not mere form established; rather social being itself is represented, as well as the laws of its changes, that is, the laws of social *development* are sought. On the other hand, sociology is not merely another individual science alongside the other social sciences. For it is concerned with that which the other social sciences investigate only in part in their own special area, namely the patterns and laws of change of social being itself. And so, sociology provides *the foundational orientation* for conceptual development, problem formulation, and methods for all individual social sciences. Thus, sociology may be considered for its *general part* as *the foundational science of social sciences*. In its *special province* it conducts investigations in particular areas of social life under the application of general sociological knowledge and methods it has developed within state-, art-, and religious sociology, and so forth.

In this sense, a general sociology was first founded as a foundational science in Marxism. Its learned opponents have recognised this, coming from two wholly opposing poles. Rudolf Stammler has sought to counter the materialistic historical conception in his book 'Wirtschaft und Recht', in which he seeks in the course of his argument to negate the possibility of a causal sociology. And Werner Sombart has recognised Marxism as the most meaningful form of causal sociology, in spite of his often grotesque political struggles. In fact, the new and little understood Marxist concept of sociation and the historical-materialist conception is the most exact theoretical-systematic counterpart of the precepts of the doctrine of the forms of social being and social causality. This is quite accurate, for we can see that with Marx and Engels the knowledge of the character and singular laws of the social as opposed to nature is put forward with its own singular concept, namely 'spiritual nature'. This wholly new and significant concept which I have thoroughly examined in my monograph

on Marx and Engels, gives precision as well as comparability of the social as being with nature, and brings to expression how it is differentiated as spirit. And so we see that the entire logical construct of the Marxist societal doctrine is the 'data of social science', and that the transcendental establishment of it provides, just as the Newtonian 'data of the natural sciences' does, the first possibility of its foundation.



Max Adler's extrapolation of sociative forms of proposed socialist society over the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century is explored in his 1922 text, *The Marxist Conception of the State* [*Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus*].⁵⁰ The book initially addresses Hans Kelsen's new republican constitution for Austria, especially the issue of established codes of laws deemed necessary by some, and not by others, for the society that would become sociated as a socialist society.⁵¹ Adler does not agree that a judicial system as it exists in a democratic-republic government as developed by capitalist interests would be necessary. He argues by positing what he sees as Marx's vision of an anarchist society that can be ordered democratically by the will of all the people beyond the fixed codifications of an impersonal law.

Included below are chapters xv through xviii because it is such a thorough history of socialist ideation in addressing the "classless" society of the future, and a manifest project of Max Adler's vision of where his present society may be moving if socialist policies are successful. Adler concludes his study in Chapter xviii with the vision – which he asserts that he shares – of Marx and Engels regarding justice and system in the "classless" society.



Max Adler 1922, 'Excursus on Anarchism', in *Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus, Marx-Studien*, Volume 4, Part 2, Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, Chapters xv, xvi, xvii, xviii, pp. 217–312

Chapter xv *Excursus on Anarchism*

1 *The Denial of Force, Law, and Authority*

That anarchism does not mean the same thing as a doctrine of absolute lack of order and complete arbitrariness is already accepted as a position, even by its scholarly critics. Yet such a point-of-view has been and is held in an anxious popular understanding of the bourgeoisie, namely, that anarchism is the removal of any organisation of society. Karl Diehl, in his much-cited lectures on 'Socialism, Communism, and Anarchism', finds it necessary to counter this by explicitly rejecting the idea 'that anarchism presents only a criminal sect

⁵⁰ Max Adler 1922.

⁵¹ The text Adler focuses on in particular is the Kelsen's discussion of Marx, and the weaknesses of his socialist theory of the state. See Kelsen 1920.

which lacks any social or political programme'.⁵² However, since the very influential writing of Rudolf Stammler,⁵³ it is generally recognised that anarchism is a theory of social order, only one which denies the compulsion of law, establishing its basis solely upon convention. Whether this differentiation justly exists or not, we must now take it up.

Even as it is uncontested that the determination of anarchism is a societal principle of order, so it is generally connected to the conception that it denies compulsion. And in that one offers no clear concept as to what the denial of force might mean, while not raising the question of what kind of compulsion it is that anarchism rejects, and whether or not perhaps the concept of 'compulsion' has here a special meaning that the word 'compulsion' cannot precisely enough designate, there arises a lack of clarity in perception which finally lends the concept of anarchism a completely contradictory understanding. For an order that exists without the ability to use force to address disturbance is unthinkable. The rejection of any compulsion whatsoever is also highly suspect even in anarchism. And surely, this misconception exists even in the popular agitation of anarchism and with many of its fanatical adherents, as the rigorous thinking through of the concept and its associated conceptions do not belong to the virtues of anarchism.

In spite of that, it is still correct to see that anarchism strives for an order and thereby does not reject compulsion in itself; rather it is only that of a compulsion stemming from class contradictions within a dominating order. Anarchism represents lawlessness only in the sense that it rejects the law as a protocol of the willing power of one class in society against the other. The order, on the other hand, which stems from the solidarity of interests and the working community of the union of societal persons it not only recognises, deeming it the law, but is also decidedly in favour of defending this solidarity society with all its means. Therefore in coming to a correct understanding of anarchism, and also of its relationship to socialism – which is an associated realisation – one must not merely fix on the formal concept and thus be content with the principle that anarchism rejects 'compulsion'. Much more, one must ask: what kind of compulsion is rejected? And this question cannot be answered in a formal-juristic manner, but rather only through insight into the differentiated social nature which compulsion represents, that is, whether it occurs in a class-based society or in a classless society.

52 Diehl 1920, p. 96.

53 Stammler 1894.

If we look at the question in this way, then we can see that no anarchistic theoretician has ever denied compulsion in society; and this is true not only among communist theoreticians, but also those who take an individualistic direction.

Thus Proudhon does not deny the regulation of social life through *laws*, stating: 'Although I am thoroughly a friend of order, in spite of that I am an anarchist in the full meaning of the word'.⁵⁴ He asks: 'Is the domination of people over other people just? Every person will answer: No; only the law may rule over people which is just and true'.⁵⁵ And these words are not only an ethical declaration in their meaning, rather, especially in the last chapter of the aforementioned work, they form a social understanding that in a societal order, the place of economic inequality of conditions and the general welfare which are justified by law, may no longer be the laws of active power that set one person against another, rather these laws must arise out of the nature of society and through the scientific foundation of that society regulate its existence. 'Everything that is the object of law and politics is an object of science, not of private opinion: the law-giving authority belongs only to methodically recognised and proven reason ... justice and legality are therefore independent of our agreement, just as is mathematical truth. The people are the maintainers of the law, that is true; that is just. But their conviction obligates only that they must recognise the revealed truth of the law. What is then a recognised law? A mathematical or metaphysical operation that affirms an experience will be repeated, a phenomenon observed, a fact confirmed. The nation alone has the right to say: we command and order'.⁵⁶ One sees that Proudhon has no doubts that even the anarchistic society will have order and laws which can be compelling, and that he only wishes to make us aware that this compulsion has a different character from that of a class-based society. It is transformed from a compulsion of one person over another into an order of things that affects all equally, so that mathematical or physical laws of compulsion are exercised over everyone. One such law is: 'that one is dependent upon the facts of science and compelled by its necessities, a condition that never disturbs one's independence'. We should note here how Kelsen in such an off-handed manner treats Saint-Simon's thoughts on the transformation of an administration over persons to that of an administration of common cause, returned to by Proudhon in his own independent way, a topic that commands the whole development of

⁵⁴ Proudhon 1896.

⁵⁵ Proudhon 1896, p. 23.

⁵⁶ Proudhon 1896, p. 225.

the idea of socialism. This fundamental purview of the replacing of governance through a common-cause administration does not obviate the use of force by an administration against disturbing wills, rather this function directly belongs to an administration. However, the totally changed character of such order at the same time puts to one side the occasions of disturbance of a certain degree, these more pathological or criminal. In a later work, Proudhon illustrates this transformed character of the new compulsive order as 'mutualism'. The question must be borne by everyone whether he will respect the laws 'which exist because they are the natural order', in the widest sphere of the general welfare and freedom for all to perform. If one says yes, then he belongs to the society. 'If you say no, you are a savage. You have declared yourself apart from the society of humankind and are suspect. Nothing protects you. With the slightest provocation, one can slay you, and one can say to that person at most an unnecessary hurt has been given to a wild animal'.⁵⁷ Naturally, it does not occur to us to give weight to either Proudhon here or later to some other anarchist with regard to the manner in which they have depicted the future societal organisation; rather we only wish to show that it has never occurred to them to portray a society without the possibility of the use of force against those who act against it. Anarchism means for them an absence of domination, but not a lack of authority or of compulsion.

Quite similar is the *teachings of Bakunin*. He finds it necessary to explicitly explain *in what sense* he will be an anarchist: *only* in the sense that he will put aside all privileged legal order. 'In a word, we reject all privileged, patented, official and legal legislation, authority and influence, even when it is initiated by the general right to vote, since we are convinced that it is only to be applied in behalf of the a dominating and exploiting minority against the interests of the vastly enslaved majority. In this sense we are really anarchists'.⁵⁸ But we read in another section: 'does it follow that I reject every authority? This thought lies far from me. When it comes to the boot, I turn to the authority of the shoemaker, when it involves a house, a canal, or a railroad I ask the authority of the architect or engineer. For every special discipline I turn to this or that scholar'.⁵⁹ So it is in daily life. And in societal life in general, there is always an authority that can answer for the secure order of society. 'The only great and all-powerful, at the same time natural and rational authority, the only one which we can respect, will be the collective and public spirit of a society that is founded upon equality,

57 Proudhon 1851, pp. 342-3.

58 Bakunin 1919, p. 38.

59 Bakunin 1919, p. 35.

solidarity, freedom, and the mutual human respect of all its members'.⁶⁰ Wholly in agreement with that, but even more clear, he states at another point:

As much as I am an enemy of what one calls in France 'discipline', nonetheless I recognise that an equal, not automatic, but freely accepted and thought through discipline, which is fully in unison with the freedom of the individual, *is always necessary and should persist*, particularly among many freely willing individuals who are involved in a common work or action. This discipline is then nothing other than the freely willed and deliberated agreement of all individual efforts to arrive at a common goal. In the moment of action, in the middle of a battle, roles are differentiated naturally that articulate by the whole society, and valued by them, of the capabilities judged of to be necessary of each person: one leads and gives orders, another follows the orders ... In this system there is really no one power. The power lies in the communal existence and is the true expression of the freedom of each person, the true and earnest realisation of the will of all; one obeys because the leader only commands what each one wills for himself.⁶¹

While this understanding helps us to comprehend the differences between the subjugation and subordination under the order of socialism posed by Bakunin insofar as it relates to the revolutionary struggle, still there is no doubt that he wishes to characterise the essence of the societal order in general whose exercise of compulsion does not stem from the dominion of one over another, rather upon the solidarity which exists for all. There is also, even for anarchists, obedience to order and laws, only these emerge *from within the society* in a manner that is different from contemporary laws. Bakunin expressly confirms this when he says: 'What is freedom? Does freedom exist in rebellion against all laws? No, insofar as these laws are natural, economic and social laws which are not compelled by authority, *rather within things, within the relationships of situations themselves*, whose natural development are expressed by them. Yes, insofar as they are political and juridical laws which are forced by some on others, either by force of will, either as a hypocritical exercise in the name of religion or some other metaphysical doctrine, either by dint of a fiction, or that democratic lie which one calls the right to vote'.⁶² Certainly anarchism,

60 Bakunin 1919, p. 42.

61 Bakunin 1921a, pp. 9–10.

62 Bakunin 1921b, pp. 215–16.

as we see in Bakunin's propaganda as well as in our time, has raised the battle against every authority and legal structure of such kind that are merely slogans in themselves for their lack of measure and pure instinct for power made to control the masses. In this propaganda each phrasal and contradictory image becomes what anarchism really is: for in this conceptual form it exists only in books. But it is this conceptual form that is not foreign to a compulsion of those who resist it, and through an interesting, literary-historical and historical inquiry, its meaning becomes clear. For only in this way could Marx and Engels, within their internal struggle in the International, have been able to show in their necessary criticism of Bakuninism that just in his 'anti-authoritarian' play with socialism there was an overbearing emphasis upon authority even within the revolutionary struggle, just as there would be in the newly established society.⁶³ One can see this in the 'Publications of the Society of the People's Court' [*Veröffentlichungen der Gesellschaft des Volksgerichts*], which serves the Bakuninistic movement, in an article that carries the title 'Fundamentals of the Social Order of the Future' [*Grundzüge der sozialen Ordnung der Zukunft*], that after the fall of the existing social order immediately all the means of existence are made common property. The general duty to work is announced, the establishment of associations of workers [*Artels*] are authorised and plans of work are devised. In the course of a certain time:

each person must choose to be in one or another of these Artels ... [A]ll of those who remain alone without a compelling reason, not having joined a worker's group, have no right to enter a common eating area or sleep in a common hospice or find one's satisfaction of any life needs in the buildings that serve their working brothers, either those which store products, materials, foodstuffs or tools which are assigned to them: in a word, who without sufficient reason do not belong to an Artel remains without the means of existence. All stresses, all means of communication, are closed to him: for him there remains no other recourse than work or death.⁶⁴

Even so we read with Kropotkin in relation to that which could disturb the free Association of the federated Production Groups: 'As you set yourself apart with special conditions, and wish to avoid your comrades, then it is very probable that you will feel the consequence of this in your daily relations to other

63 Compare here the polemic by Marx 1920, and also Engels 1873.

64 Marx 1920, p. 64.

citizens. One will consider you a ghost from the bourgeois society and flee from you'.⁶⁵ There is for Kropotkin no question that the solidarity of the comrade groups in those seldom instances of ill-intentioned or irrational disturbances of order should be encountered with forceful means, which nonetheless should not be likened to the criminal penalties of today. We will say more on this.

If this is so with communist anarchists, then it is very interesting to see that the position of individualist anarchists in relation to the allowance of compulsion in order to support the social order is quite different.

Max Stirner combats the state not in the name of freedom, rather in that of singularity [*Eigenheit*]. To comprehend this concept in its relation to socialism and anarchism will now occupy our discussion. Stirner has no time for mere freedom as a bourgeois concept. 'I raise no objection to freedom, but I want more than freedom. You must not merely be free of what you do not wish to do, you must *have* what you want. You must not only be free, you must be "wholly your own" [*ein Eigener*']'.⁶⁶ In order to preserve this 'singularity', instead of the state, there is the union of egotists. But despite of that, forcible measures for preserving order are not absent from Stirner. 'It would be foolish to assert there would be no power over what is mine. Only the place which I give to myself will be other than occurs in a religious age',⁶⁷ whereby Stirner connects our present age to its dogma of the 'holiness of the law'. Stirner sounds quite anarchistic when he says: 'Whether I have right or not, there can be no other judge than me myself'. He means by this remark a shifting of the concept of the law to an inner conviction insofar as it is no longer a foreign, external or indeed secretive holy power over him, but he does not reject its actual connection to him. For immediately Stirner adds: 'In relation to that law others can only decide and judge whether they agree with it and whether it can hold for them as well'.⁶⁸ The 'right of all', the 'right of humankind', Stirner rejects only insofar as it is a means of compelling him by its name into a community forcefully *that is not him*. 'I will not defend everyone through a law', (note his use of 'defend') 'rather my right'.⁶⁹ Therefore, it is quite wrong to understand that he depicts the 'union of egotists' as merely a loose group in which one may do whatever he wants. Quite the contrary is seen by Stirner. 'Will I find in some society such an unmeasured freedom of whatever I may? *Certainly not*'. And when the supporter of the state replies triumphantly that this is what has always been,

65 Kropotkin 1920, p. 10.

66 Stirner 1892, p. 184.

67 Stirner 1892, pp. 215–16.

68 Stirner 1892, p. 219.

69 Ibid.

Stirner answers: 'Not so! It is quite different whether I bounce off another I or on a people, a general state-of-things'.⁷⁰ Quite clearly one sees here that for Stirner it is a question not of denying a compulsive order in itself, but rather of showing a wholly changed character which will exist after putting aside the existing social class organisation and its state ideology of an 'in-common' law. And now one understands for the first time the following sentences in the bright light that this most consequential of anarchists shines upon the question of 'compulsion':

There is a difference whether through a society my freedom or my singularity is limited. If it is solely the former, then that is *a unification*, an agreement, *a union*; if my singularity is threatened, *then society is a power in itself, a power over me* ... In relation to freedom, however, *there is no essential difference that underlies the concept of state or union*. The latter can arise or exist *without freedom being limited in any way whatsoever*, since the state carries with it immeasurable freedom ... [T]o be sure the union will offer a greater degree of freedom, as it is in behalf of 'a new freedom' that can be maintained, because through it one can escape the compulsion of the state and societal life; *but it will contain a sufficient absence of freedom and free will*. For its goal is not – a freedom in which singularity is sacrificed, but neither is this goal singularity in itself.⁷¹

One can see the fact supported that the 'anarchistic' societal order even in its individualistic form will be a compulsive order, not drastically stated as does Stirner, when he says that in relation to arbitrary will the individual may not behave other than the state.

Finally, Benjamin Tucker. In a propaganda lecture in which he sets forth the essentials of his theory, he says:

[O]ne will ask us 'what should occur with the individuals who intend without a doubt to injure the social law, in that they attack their neighbours?' The anarchists answer that the removal of the state will enable a defensive union to persist which is no longer based upon the means of force, rather upon a freely willed basis, and which then allows one to encounter the attackers with all necessary means. 'But that is what we now have', is the reply. 'You wish only a change of name essentially'. Not

⁷⁰ Stirner 1892, p. 247.

⁷¹ Stirner 1892, p. 360.

so quickly, please. Can one really assert, even for a moment, that the state, even as it exists here in America, is a purely defensive entity? Surely not, except for those informed by its most immediate gestures – the police on the corner – they will find that a good nine-tenths of all existing laws do not serve to generate fundamental social law, rather exist to create and preserve commercial, industrial, financial and other propertied monopolies which steal the greater part of all productive gains, these laws maintained by completely unchecked power.⁷²

From this unprecise language of Tucker one can translate a clear concept that one can only speak of a defensive union when the state is dissolved, when instead of class contradictions it is based upon economic solidarity, which in the place of ‘the bases of compulsion’, that is, from a dominating class order, a freely-willed solidarity of interests of all those who belong to the community-established order is instituted. And so Tucker concludes with an already cited passage from Proudhon in which an order threatens those who disturb it, that they, like wild animals, will be excluded from society and handled as such.⁷³ In his major work, *Instead of a Book: A Fragmentary Exposition of Philosophical Anarchism*, one finds his characteristic standpoint even more clearly impressed. Unfortunately, I was not able to get the book. But Dr. Paul Eltzbacher has so thoroughly quoted from the book in his own very objective work, *Der Anarchismus*, that the character of Tucker’s entire doctrine is made clear. As an anarchist, Tucker writes:

Resistance to an attack from another is not in itself an attack, rather a defence. It is justified that such attacks should be prevented. Therefore it is immaterial whether this resistance from a single individual against another individual takes place or from the community against a criminal to prevent his damage. Thereby there will also be legal norms in an anarchistic order, that is norms which rest upon the general will, *and whose obedience all can be compelled with any means necessary*, which includes jail, torture, and the death penalty. Insofar as an injury to person or their recognised property anarchists are decided in their obviation of discovering the causes of such damage; but we are dismayed by them even as we are horrified by any mass regulations which appear called for by reason and distinct conditions. ‘Anarchism recognises the right of

72 Tucker 1908, pp. 9–10.

73 Tucker 1908, p. 13.

imprisonment, persecution, sentencing, and the punishment of the perpetrator'. Yet, in such cases there is no exercise of authority, for authority is the subjugation of peaceful persons under a foreign will. On the other hand, persecution is the defence against and subjugation of an aggressive, in the united will of his comrades, intruding person. 'There are no fundamental principles in our societal life which forbids us to defend in intrusion of any kind'. In all such cases a jury judges, but not in accord with a fixed law, rather under the free findings of justice appropriate for each individual case.⁷⁴

The correct insight that the concept of anarchy does not mean lack of order, rather only an absence of authority, is amplified by its concept of a compelling order of societal life that not only does not exclude, but rather includes that a change in the character of compulsion is taught, in consequence of which those people put under such compulsion no longer see it as such. When the anarchists negate 'justice' and 'the law', it is always justice and the law of a class-based society, thus it is always that kind of societal norming which encounters the individual as a foreign voice, encountering his life interests as an enemy. We have seen this already with Bakunin and Stirner, and read as well as an ideal with Kropotkin:

The law is a relatively modern product; humankind lived for aeons without a written law ... [T]he relationships of humans among one another were in those times regulated by customs and usages, which in their continuing repetition made them respected, and which were learned from childhood ... but as soon as society was divided into two hostile classes – one which exercised its domination over the other, which sought to escape it – there began a war. The winner today has hurried to transform the accomplished fact into a form favourable to him ... [T]he law steps forwards, blessed by the clerics, a weapon that serves the warrior.⁷⁵

This law is negated by the anarchists, this justice, that once Hölderlin so accurately named 'the law of despotism, injustice in legal form', to which he bitterly adds that 'they carry the son of the North without reluctance'. For just as the oriental submits to a despotic arbitrary rule from an instinct of homage, so the men in the north 'believe too little in the pure, free life of Nature not to cling

74 Eltzbacher 1900, pp. 167–8, 179–80.

75 Kropotkin 1922, pp. 150, 158.

superstitiously to the law'.⁷⁶ This contradictory appearance of law and right is fought against by the anarchists, not upon the customary legal and judicial bases, but rather as first flowing from the real legality and solidarity that is realised socially.⁷⁷

76 Hölderlin 1905, p. 188.

77 In this regard the representation of anarchistic precepts in P. Eltzbacher is very informative. The author has set himself the task of giving the wealth of anarchistic instruction in the overview of a tabular form, which he orders according to individual viewpoints (position towards justice, the state, property, power). And in this way he differentiates normative and non-normative precepts, insofar as they are recognised legally or not (where a norm is understood as that which is generally observed, and which a power stands behind to guarantee its being followed [Eltzbacher 1900, p. 25]). And it is quite interesting that he includes normed precepts as central to all anarchistic teachings, only with the exceptions of Godwin, Stirner, and Tolstoy (Eltzbacher 1900, p. 249). In relation to the exception of Stirner, Eltzbacher is wrong, as we have seen. Eltzbacher viewed Stirner's ideological rejection of law as an independent authority in itself over every individual as identical to denying that there was no law between individuals that stemmed from the common will, and thus being a norm. As far as Godwin, Eltzbacher misconceives his words in a way to mean that he believed justice and law did not exist. In this regard Godwin too viewed the establishment of justice within the free, living community of comrades, rather than a justice based on rigid law. Therefore, Godwin too recognised juries, saying of them: 'Juristic decisions which occur immediately after the abolition of a law will not differ greatly from what had earlier been the rule' (Eltzbacher 1900, p. 39). Only within an ideal vision of a distant future does Godwin speak of a time where juries will finally cease to exist (what Eltzbacher often overlooks) and in their place be satisfied with the imparting of advice, for by that time what is rational for oneself will be seen in the necessary rationale for everyone. Law then will be the authority of a reason in-common. But this is a future dream that will arise out of the anarchistic society Godwin demands. The 'a-normative' Godwin means nothing other than the denial, on the one hand, of the class-based power of establishing historical justice, and on the other hand, the rejection in the new classless society of any static, established law, basing justice rather upon a free, investigative process. This explains the central position of justice in Godwin's thought. The same is true finally for Tolstoy, only here love for one's fellow replaces the emphasis upon justice. Indeed, one can perhaps see Tolstoy as the only 'a-normative' thinker because of his absolute rejection of any force in social intercourse, even that which would be used to combat injustice and the power to harm. But in this regard Tolstoy cannot even be included among anarchists, that is, as an opponent of the exercise of authority, because his thought builds in a different direction entirely wherein no social order is recognised, rather the consciousness of the individual of a just, religious manner of living together. 'If all would attest to what he knows to be true with the strength of his power to judge, at least not defending falsehood as truth, then in this year 1893 changes will begin that when completed will be in the future beyond anything we can now imagine' (Tolstoy 1894, pp. 486–7). Thus, Tolstoy

In order to see this clearly, one must clarify that the compulsion in the order governing compulsion in social life cannot continue to be conducted in the way that it is done so presently, that is, as in a class-based society in which the order of justice is effectively the compulsion for all is in the *societal* interests of an abridged portion of the populace. Wherein is the ‘compulsion’ of the order of justice? At a minimum, it is when a person is directly compelled, or otherwise occasioned, to cease an act or an oversight that he has intended. The compulsion of justice effects the fulfillment of a certain legally required performance in relation to the cessation of forbidden actions, on the one hand, through the imposition of penalties for those who do not obey, and on the other hand, through distraintment, that is, through the execution of a state ordered service by the guilty party. Both forms of coercive security of the justice system are not only possible in an anarchistic order, but are contained in the very concept of a unified, solidarity interest that upholds the rights of everyone. Merely the character of the coercive means is transformed according to the level of culture imparted by the new societal order. We do not recognise today the means of punishment of the C.C.C., the punitive court for capital crimes of Charles V, without which the progressive jurisprudence of that time – and the Carolina was an advance – could effect certain coercive laws. It is a punishment whether one jails a person for his violation of the social order or whether one imprisons him for the pleasure of the society.⁷⁸

cannot give us knowledge of what kind of society will exist in the wake of the practice of Christian tolerance and the love for one's fellow. The new forms of the order of living will be generated from these principles (Tolstoy 1894, pp. 372–3).

- 78 In this regard there is a pertinent passage in the third chapter of Georg Simmel's *Soziologie* in which he discusses the forms of higher and subordination, bringing to attention that in all coercive forms of subordination, whether they are ‘tyrannical’ or ‘despotic’, there has remained a degree of freedom for the subordinated to take on a lesser penalty in resistance to that order than a greater one. ‘There is’, said Simmel, ‘less an extinguishing of that spontaneity within the subordinated conditions in reality than the popular expression of it recognised, when they understood the concept of “coercion” loosely as the “having-no-choice”, “unconditioned necessity” ... [S]een exactly, the freedom of the subordinated was only completely eradicated within the hierarchical order in cases of immediate physical coercion; otherwise one chose a price, which we of course would not pay, for furthering the realisation of their freedom, and even when the circle of their external conditions in which they might realise this’ freedom became smaller and smaller, still it did not fully disappear, unless in the case of a direct physical coercion (Simmel 1908, p. 135). This masterful psychological insight, which is always the case with Simmel, into the relativity of compulsion illustrates at the same time the position we have held in our text that compulsion and freedom are, in all instances of their historical-sociological character, mutually determined.

And as long as a member of society remains within an association, willing to do so, there will always be punitive measures to protect his possessions from damage and for the not living up to definitive contracts of which he is a party. Will there not be demands on society, claims and requests for goods, access to scientific and art institutes, visits to the theatre, and so forth, and cannot one say that society is not withholding such requests when it turns them down or blocks their satisfaction until its obligations are met? This is quite another type of compulsion than that of the existing system of laws, because the application of such a coercion represents only a general rule of one's societal comrades, that is, it seeks to uphold an order in which no contradictory interests exist, rather there are just individual cases of societal disturbances occasioned by misunderstanding, passion, or the criminality of an individual. To be sure, there can emerge in such a society a new, still unknown interest group, which occasions a new group lacking solidity within the extant society. Then, this society will be faced with a new social problem, but one with which we cannot occupy ourselves at this time.⁷⁹

79 In this context it is perhaps useful to bring to attention that it is indeed possible, even within the contemporary system of justice, that sufficient theoretical and practical efforts exist to transform the character of punishment from a mere act of authoritative penalisation into a pure social defence and educational act, only this effort would be accompanied by little success as long as the order of justice has so many occasions to merely punish an offender. When one disallows the hungry to take nourishment, then 'education' within his incarceration will not prevent a 'recidivism' to occur as soon as one again has nothing to eat which would be considered 'according to the law'. Here only a change in the law is helpful, in the sense that it would no longer be against the law for someone who acts justly, otherwise, to starve. 'A well-ordered society', writes the first German communist Wilhelm Weitling, 'knows neither the committing of a crime nor laws and punishment. Everything that we call today a crime is a consequence of societal disorder. If we remove this disorder, there only remains the natural occasion of human illnesses and weaknesses; these one removes not with laws and punishments, rather with medicines and other healing means' (Weitling 1908, p. 190). We see that Weitling was also an 'anarchist' and in this sense one can see within the whole of socialist literature that takes up anarchists, indeed with many bourgeois reformers of the existing judicial system who have studied it thoroughly, that the greater part of existing criminality is not a consequence of social relations, but rather of existing laws and their sterile application. How many 'criminals' must emerge in a system that counts as a crime the theft of something worth over 4,999 Kronen when they have taken something valued at 5001 Kronen? How many are there in the criminal statistics considered as criminals who have committed a violent public act, who are honest, indeed ethically worthy individuals, who have because of a temperamental display fallen afoul of the law, or because of a stupid error in their handling of business or a loss of mental balance resisted immediate authority, not to mention an encounter with police,

2 *The Order of the Law and Conventional Order*

Contributing to the fundamental misunderstanding of the anarchist's societal goals as that which seek not only a lack of authority, but also a social order without any form of compulsion, are the conceptual arguments which Rudolph Stammler has articulated in his representation of anarchism.⁸⁰ According to his description, anarchism does not strive for a lack of order, rather its opposite, a new societal order, but one that will no longer be regulated by law. There are, according to Stammler, two kinds of external order in social life that do not stem from the subjective morality of persons: namely, legal principles and conventional rules. Neither one nor the other arises first in the order of the state. Law can arise in stateless societies, such as the horde in a nomadic people or in a community such as the church. The difference lies solely in the fact that the law 'raises a claim that one obey, quite independent from the agreement of the one subject to it ... [T]he conventional rule, on the other hand, in its very definition stems from acquiescence of the one subject to it', whether this is explicitly followed or tacitly accommodated.⁸¹ Anarchism is then the theory of an order of social life that principally rejects the compulsion of law merely upon the foundation of conventional rules.

Against this differentiation, Hans Kelsen has spoken decisively, namely, that it is logically insufficient because the concept of the validity of regulation is used in an ambiguous way that says nothing. The validity of a norm can mean, on the one hand, that *it really has value*, that means it really is followed, but it can also mean that *it should be followed*. If the first meaning is the case, then

because of political demonstrations. One must in such instances attend the weighty criticism of Dr. G. Aschaffenburg when he writes in regard to the needed social understanding of criminality in his significant text *Das Verbrechen und seine Bekämpfung*: 'The thoughtful criminal judge can have no pleasure in his vocation when he must determine the guilt or innocence in an individual case where there is not a clear determination of the facts, or certainty about the proper application of a certain paragraph, or in a mere schematic accommodation of the criminal measure to the case at-hand' (Aschaffenburg 1906, p. 2). The quite important direction of the *Freirechtsschule* [where the judge is not formally bound by the law in his decision] in modern jurisprudence is symptomatic of this joylessness in decision-making, indeed the inner torment of the thoughtful judge, and within this one profession it represents the emerging concern with factual and methodological certainty that is the same thought motive which in anarchism seeks a living, in each case concrete finding of law as a form of judgement, rather than the unchanging, once and for all textual expression of a law. As little as does the *Freiheitschule* want anarchy, just so the anarchists want lawlessness.

80 Stammler 1894.

81 Stammler 1894, pp. 23–4.

agreement to the law in respect to the recognition of the one subject to it is essentially what occurs when one follows a conventional regulation. If the last meaning is the case – and here we are concerned only in a discussion of the relevant form of the regulation – then the recognition or agreement of the person who is subject to the regulation matters the same for the conventional regulation as for the legal regulation. ‘For one should be obeyed without consideration of whether the subject wishes it or holds it for appropriate’. Quite right says Kelsen, that Stammler’s example for a conventional regulation indicates that ‘whoever gives no satisfaction to it stands outside the knightly honour code’, but it does not prove what Stammler intends with it, namely, that the conventional regulation of the honour code when it lacks the recognition of the ‘shirker’ no longer applies to him. Rather, the example proves its opposite. The honour code would lose its meaning if it were at the mercy of those who whenever they chose would not recognise its validity for its proscription of their behaviour. ‘In the societal disrespect exercised by those who refuse to give that society satisfaction, one sees clearly that these persons nonetheless stood under the authority of the honor code’. One could not speak of the infringement of a conventional rule if everyone who did not follow it was considered thereby outside of its purview.⁸² What is the differentiation that Kelsen sees between the legal and the conventional rule? He does not say too much, in that he does not place the same weight upon it that Stammler does. What Kelsen does say is that the difference between the two regulations lies where the difference is to be found between a legal law and a custom-based law, namely in that the latter is merely *followed*, whereas the first *can be applied*. Law is the embodiment of norms, which shall not only be valid, but whose validity can also be applied to those who do not obey it. ‘In this specific instance of the possibility of application’ lies the difference between the legal principle and the conventional rule. The latter can be disobeyed without the perpetrator ‘as with the law, subjected to a legal process which one must enter so that a wrong can be determined’. What also differentiates the two concepts is ‘that the legal principle is not only to be obeyed, but can also be applied so that its possible effect is *more* than can be expected of a conventional rule, and that it – because of its applicability by an external organisation: the court of justice – is the state in its broadest sense’.⁸³

One will find this differentiation by Kelsen wholly insufficient, and the discussion of its insufficiency will lead us to how anarchism and its relationships

82 Kelsen 1911, pp. 36–7.

83 Kelsen 1911, p. 38.

to socialism occur: namely, between the legal and the conventional rule there exists in actuality no conceptual difference, rather these are only differing historical forms of social compulsion.

We will not speak here of the norming of customs which Kelsen brings so closely together in his discussion with legal norms, rather we will address the apparent difference between legal and conventional rules Kelsen asserts. If the essence of the legal rule belongs to its applicability, then we counter that this is a characteristic of the conventional rule as well. What is at issue is only that of applying the correct relation of the norm. Application of a norm means that for one who violates it, a norm violation process can be applied. That is indeed the case with all conventional rules. Either a conventional punishment is administered, or there is the consequence of the exclusion from the conventional community, or the violator will experience the loss of respect and societal participation he could otherwise take as his right. Is not the continuing 'being cut out' or 'boycotted' no less a punishing consequence of violating a norm as a 1,000 kronen fine or being arrested for 24 hours? And is it not also the case that a formal organisation for exercising the conventional rule while absent does not prevent the consequence of the violation from being applied, nor even being first created for this purpose. The community of the conventional rule-carrying person is itself the originating organisation, nothing other, which exercises the law as the legal community it was and is. And quite often we see the conventional principle applied by a court of arbitration, which is an application by a community-constituted organisation. When the violator does not appear before this court of arbitration, for example, as might occur with a disciplinary court, this hinders in no way the function or judgement of the court, just as when a criminal or the accused in spite of being called does not appear before a state court.

The conventional rule differentiates itself then from the legal rule neither in its presumption of validity nor in its possible application. Both rules are of the same essence, hence the conventional rules continually pass into legal rules from the form of practice or customary law, in that courts apply them. Since this is only possible as a positive determination of the law, the allowance to do this in itself proves that it does not arise from the essence of conventional rules, but rather is in the first instance from the norming capacity of legality, that is, the perspective of authority within which conventional rule making has a secondary function. There are differences within social regulation, namely those that stem from the extent and meaning of the purpose from which it arises. All rule making follows a purpose and is determined by that purpose. From the purposes of playing cards to the purposes of life insurance and life enrichment, an infinity of other purposes are occasioned, each one of which

has its own rules. And in accordance with each of these purposes, rules can be of narrower or wider scope. There are indeed purposes whose instituting is taken-for-granted because they are moral purposes. And from that arises a certain array of social rules of the widest scope because all persons are comprehended, as they are valid for everyone who would be a member of the social community. That means one's self-exclusion from this community is in itself a violation of the rule. The idea of a general validity of rules based upon their foundation of purpose which everyone should have is the idea of law in itself. It encompasses conventional regulations which stem from universal purposes, which are differentiated from other conventional rules only inasmuch as the latter are indifferent to moral purposes and therefore can be instituted or not as one will. In spite of that, they are in the same category of rule making because once their goal is set they are immersed in the idea of law. This can be documented in that the content of such regulations never goes against the laws, and secondly, once the goal is set, the normative rules that are generated remain valid even if the participant in this purpose does not uphold the norm, but in his behaviour evidences injustice in the face of the conventional rule, that is, in relation to the law itself. One is not in violation of the law by not being interested the purpose of card games, but it is not merely a violation of card-playing conventions to cheat at cards, it is also unjust.

That the idea of law is finally founded in morality I do not see a deficiency in our discussion; rather quite the opposite, as a clarifying explanation for countering the idiosyncratic idea we have that somehow law is contradictory in its essence to morality. This apparent contradiction can be explained, as we will develop, on the basis of the historical forms each has taken. Conventional rules are generated as a societal form that rests upon class differences, so that one class can impose its one-sided purposes upon everyone. The deep difference which Kant makes between morality and legality remains in place. For there will always be a difference in whether the following of a norm occurs out of duty or from some other motive. But just because the difference between morality and legality exists in that the legal manner of conduct can lack the sense of duty, one must never overlook the fact that all legality must also be the fulfillment of duty, and that the notion that legality which is not a fulfillment of duty will always be seen as a contradiction in the idea of law. It is therefore the essence of law to be morally followed, and that the differentiation of law and morality is only a psychological reality, not a conceptual differentiation. The so-called heteronomy of the law does not exist in its normative essence, indeed this is completely excluded from that essence, rather merely in its psychological manner of appearance. Law as the content of norms, which should be generally obeyed without considering that one may not recognise

it, can only have this presumption because these norms should be *recognised*, that is, not merely followed but recognised as duty. Otherwise its validity would be without foundation. This duty can only come out of an autonomous self-determination of one's moral consciousness.

What is masked in the character of this rule of law is that in the positive law, that is, in the state's legal code, much of its 'validity' is neither moral nor autonomous. But there is a beginning in clarifying this well-worn discussion of law and morality in seeing that the positive law is foremost neither law nor morality, but rather the means of power of an authoritative organisation, and that one cannot proceed from the basis that this law stems from its normative essence, rather only pose the question as to how it is possible that the legal character of a rule can be applied that contradicts its very conceptual basis.

Then it will be seen that the difference within all social external regulation, namely between such that have morally necessary purposes and those indifferent to moral purposes, have a historical meaning in that certain purposes are given such power that they are capable of coercing everyone. And then, for the first time, the difference between a rule of law and the rule of convention in the customary sense of a historical-sociological meaning becomes apparent, that is, the law is a regulation that stems from the state, from a societal model, in which a ruling class provides the content or other conventional regulations. And then a powerful distinction can be made between both forms of rule making in that the 'law' now can be compelled not out of the conventional understandings that have given rise to the institutions of a whole society, but rather solely by a ruling class in its exercise of the means of power. In this way the 'law' becomes that model which is mocked in every logical address of it, namely in its form of claiming universal validity while it is patently the will of only a part of the members of the whole society.

From the foregoing discussion, it has become clear that the only real difference between the conventional rule and the positive legal rule is nothing other than that between a regulation expressed by a solidarity of interests and one in which a contradiction of interests exists. And the appearance that there is a lack of legal compulsion in the conventional rule rests solely upon a conceptual excluding of the heteronomy of the regulation, even when it can be expressed in individual cases as a psychological heteronomy. The negation and putting aside of the state by a class-based authority who applies a legal order that is necessarily an authoritative order, or its replacement through the conventional rule making of a societal whole, does not negate the coercion of law, but rather expresses simply the total sociological change of its character.

3 *The Real Difference between Socialism and Anarchism*

Perhaps at this point of our discussion Kelsen would say we have only been bringing water to his mill-wheels, since we have given a great effort in proving his thesis that between Marxism and anarchism, in respect of their social goals, there is no principle difference.⁸⁴ In answer to that, one can say that Kelsen is right, but in a different sense than he intends. There is in fact no difference between socialism and anarchism *in relation to the goal* of social development, but not because socialism is basically anarchism in its lack of compulsion; rather because anarchism is always socialism, that is, a solidarity society. Aside from this, there is a powerful difference between both movements, chiefly in the tactics that are stressed by anarchist theoreticians as they take up their essential principles of the social union and the manner in which social legislation is conducted. In this regard alone can one speak of the principal differences between anarchism and Marxism. The point of inception of social theory in anarchism is the individual, while in Marxism it is society. The anarchist builds society out of its conception of how individuals behave, whether this is in Stirner's sense of a conscious egotism or Tucker's take on this, or the mutuality among individuals as with Proudhon or Kropotkin, or upon the basis of love as in Tolstoy. Marxism, on the other hand, knows individuals only as members of the societal context, which determines them wholly with regard to hate and love, egoism and mutuality, and gives them their accordant roles of character in their scope assigned through their position in the processes of the production of societal life.

Yet this principled difference between Marxism and anarchism does not come to expression in formulating the goal of social transformation which both theories articulate, rather only in the way that this goal will be achieved, that is, in the manner of pursuing the historical development. With Marxism the masses mature their revolutionary will for this goal by economic development, which is progressive for every level of society in contradistinction to the present economic and legal order. The militancy of consciousness is the consequence of an economic process. The militancy of anarchism is first created when a small group of committed individuals become leaders of the people, whipping up in them a revolutionary will. Marxism sees the social transformation as a historical necessity, while anarchism makes it occur as soon as possible.

For a proper understanding of Marxism and its relations to anarchism it seems to me unavoidable – beyond the necessary explanation of the principle differences in its theoretical foundations – to make clearer the historical-

84 Kelsen 1911, p. 42.

tactical differences of each direction in relation to the goal for which each strives, for most surely huge and fatefully divisive rifts in the strength of socialism have occurred because of the differences generated in how the worker's movement has been understood. Only in this way can one remain protected from, on the one hand, misconceiving the import of the idea of anarchism and its meaning for socialism, and on the other hand, misconceiving socialism by limiting its treatment of individual freedom and developmental ideation merely to economic production, which among the masses has never been so limited or will be so limited in its living expression.

If we cast an eye upon the history of socialism, there comes into view what Kelsen calls the anarchistic tendency of Marxism, the negation of the state and the stress upon the freedom of the individual, which, as far as the latter is concerned, has been from socialism's very beginning the essential content of *all* socialist theoretical systems. In this sense we would understand the great utopians like Fichte and Weitling, just as the anarchists like Bakunin or Tucker. With Robert Owen we find a pervasive, completely anarchistic lack of interest, indeed a conscious abjuring of the struggle for political rights, evidenced by his distancing himself from the Chartist movement. Repeatedly he designated the laws and the government as the source of ill. He says in his programmatic writings that persons are compelled into error-laden societal organisations by 'a trinity of power'. This exists 'first from the revealed religions invented by persons; secondly from laws that are contradictory to the laws of nature; thirdly from governments supported by the ignorance and the self-interest of persons'. In their place should be 'self-sustaining and scientific foundations', regulations for the creation and distribution of wealth without the existing system of unjust and barbaric personal punishments and personal preferences. This new code of laws will emanate from establishments which support the community of 500 to 2,000 individuals that comprehend in their practices the customary lives of men, women, and children, communities which are self-sustaining with the help of the advanced knowledge and their own industry, supported through the unlimited help of technology and chemistry, which will free humans from all unhealthy and noxious conditions that can be associated with life.⁸⁵ This is in its articulation almost a word for word agreement with the depiction of an 'anarchist' commune of Bakunin or Kropotkin.

Fourier finally must be given the name of the father of anarchism, even more than Proudhon. He belongs with Stirner as the philosophers of anarchism, without ceasing to be counted among the most brilliant forerunners of the

85 Liebknecht 1892, pp. 50–3.

struggle for socialism. For his major idea is the complete freeing of individual development where no power over the person exists other than his own 'naturally inclined' unfolding of human drives. 'The completely free choice of work, determined by one's inclinations, is the definition of being human'. It leads humans into associations and groupings of working needs, which are united into phalanges, within which production is determined no longer by economic or political compulsion, but rather by the performance of 'societally-organised work'. A net of such phalanges replaces in its mutual exchange and cooperative reinforcement the previous state organisation of the economy, whose essence Fourier never tired in characterising as a system of enormous compulsive power over the majority of its people. The civilised state, what is it? 'A minority of dominating, armed slaves, who keep a majority of unarmed slaves reigned in'.⁸⁶

Historically there is no difference between the negation of the state and that of authoritative domination within the history of socialism. Since Godwin, all social revolutionary thinkers are more or less of this standpoint. *More decisive has been the negation of the capitalist economic order, and the demand of a new organisation of production and distribution of goods.* Those thinkers who can be considered as the spiritual ancestors of anarchism, with one characteristic exception, have not named themselves anarchists, neither Godwin, nor Fourier, nor Stirner; the latter two, quite to the contrary, have considered the capitalist economic order as anarchy, and have designated themselves as its enemy. The exception is Proudhon, who in his work *What is Property?* expressly introduced himself as an anarchist. But it is clear here that he means by this the negation and replacement of the class-based state and class law, just as Marx,

86 It is, moreover, interesting and instructive for the understanding of the differences between the compulsion of dominators and that of customs, as well as understanding how little anarchism is identical to 'lack of compulsion', to see that Fourier, in spite of the most far-ranging individual freedom within the phalange, gives the whole of this system a central organisation that has a residing 'omniarch', reminiscent of the Byzantine ruler in Constantinople, who governs over a carefully constructed hierarchy of group regents, each of which has authority of several united phalanges, each of which has its own 'Unarch' as its leader. But this entire organisation is not a 'government', that is, it does not subject its members to its own will, rather it arises itself from the needs and unified interests of this new form of work, a highly rational economic process, which wholly stems from the decisions of the members of the phalange. It is nothing other than a central administration, and the omniarch has as much similarity to the monarch in a contemporary state as the authority the president of a syndicate to the presidents of today's republics. Thus, it becomes clear that power without state compulsion need be no smaller, indeed can be greater than that now held by state regents.

in his own comprehensive and passionate polemic against Proudhon's 'anarchism' as a goal, does not mention that it is the replacement of the authoritative organisation with a mutually founded free association, because this is not a difference between socialists. Despite that, in *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Proudhon's tactical demand will be countered, as it flows into the course of many later articulations of anarchism, namely the rejection of the political and economic struggle of the worker for partial success within the existing society. Marx characterises this tactic, which sees the proletarian revolution as a purely societal transformation without any political or economic detour, as a kind of utopianism, as a striving 'to leave the old society to one side, in order to more easily step into the new society'.⁸⁷ Against this position, Marx, even in this early exposition, argues that in this class-antagonistic world there cannot be a societal revolution without the political and thereby economic coalitions of workers if they would realise their pure economic goals. They must gain power as the working class that necessarily has a political character. 'One must not say that the societal movement excludes the political. There is no political movement that is not at the same time societal. Only in an order of things where there are no class antagonisms will the *societal evolution* cease to be a *political revolution*'.⁸⁸

This is also Marx's critique of Proudhon's 'Anarchism'. The critique concerns itself only with the way to the goal, and neither Marx nor Engels have seen Proudhon as anything other than a socialist, to be sure a quite petit-bourgeois utopian socialist. Proudhon later replaced the appellation 'anarchism' with that of 'mutualism'. And it is interesting that later when Anarchism became a political party, he, as did Kropotkin who associated the movement with Proudhon, refused to identify with 'anarchism'. Proudhon's rejection of the revolutionary struggle marked his new position, where his utopianism was expressed by the peaceful mutualism realised through the organisation of credit.

The difference between socialism and anarchism developed initially as a question of party concepts after Bakunin's controversy with the Marx-led International, and even then was not a difference in the goal, but rather in the way towards that goal with regard to the forms and tactics of the proletarian movement. In this, it was *another direction of socialism* that Marx had not taken, which did not name itself anarchism. And, significantly, Marx and Engels in their writings of this time that opposed the founder of this direction did not

87 Marx 1952, p. 160.

88 Marx 1952, p. 164.

refer to him as an anarchist, rather as an 'anti-authoritarian socialist'. The designation of anarchist was forthcoming from the bourgeois opposition, reacting to what they termed under their impression of a nihilism, as 'the propaganda of the deed'. Going overboard, *every perceived attack on the existing order was denounced as 'anarchistic'*. For the petit-bourgeoisie, who resists better knowledge, anarchist and socialist are one and the same.

On the origin of the party designation, Kropotkin says: 'One admonishes us that we have chosen the word anarchy, which causes the influx of fear in so many people ... [W]e must observe however that a party of battle which represents new strivings seldom has the possibility to choose its own name. It was not the Gueusens (Villains) of Brabant who invented this name which later became so popular ... just so it occurred with the anarchists'. When in the womb of the International a movement arose which disputed the justification of authority within the association, decidedly against every form of authority, this group first gave itself the name 'federalist,' later the 'anti-state' or 'anti-authoritarian' direction within the International. During this time they avoided the term anarchism completely. The word 'An-Archie', for members of the International who fought Kropotkin's ideas, seemed appropriate for this new group, as the ideas were similar to that of Proudhon. Thus Kropotkin's opponents began to use the name in reference to Kropotkin's movement, and he tacitly accepted it, explaining that as a new party he wished to avoid disorganisation and chaos. The consequences of this acceptance did not occur to him. The anarchistic movement instead quickly took on the name given to them by others. In the beginning they stood on the tightrope between 'An' and 'Archie', in that they explained that the form 'An-Archie' was taken from the Greek, and meant *no authority*, not disorganisation. Yet soon they accepted both meanings, ostensibly not wanting to occasion their publication editor and the readers the extra work of a lecture on Greek.⁸⁹

In Marx's polemic *Ein Komplott gegen die Internationale*, we find the anarchists merely phrase-mongering, unclear to themselves, a direction full of contradictions that combats socialism; they are seen as alliance-prone [the countless small groups of Bakunin's or Kropotkin's theory of people's governance – Eds.], anti-authoritarian, as 'faithless' revolutionaries, not, however, as anarchists. In fact, *Marx will protect the concept of anarchy* so that it serves his understanding of its place in socialist development. 'Anarchy', writes Marx in his circular letter at the last meeting of the general council of the International, 'is the great stalking horse of its master Bakunin, who has taken the term as a headline from the

89 Kropotkin 1922, pp. 67–9.

socialist system. *All socialists* understand under anarchy the following: when the goal of the proletarian movement, the dissolution of the classes, is finally achieved, the power of the state ceases, which had only served to put the productive majority under the yoke of a numerous minority, and then the tasks of governance are transformed into the tasks of administration. The “alliance” operates differently. It announces anarchy within the ranks of the proletariat.⁹⁰ Marx refers to the concept of anarchy in the sense of statelessness, which for him is always the end of class dominance, and is the presumptive expression for ‘all socialists’. Marx’s polemic concerns only those who are contradictory, dishonest, who divide the proletariat, whose tactics confuse in their concept of ‘alliances’ to reach their goal, whose war with authority is but phraseology, while they form secretive plans to establish unlimited authority in the central committee, and their intended ‘putschism’ which they seek to convince the workers is the right path for removing the existence of today’s and tomorrow’s state.

Engels has a quite similar critique of the anarchists in his 1873 publication *Die Bakunisten und der Arbeit*, which seeks to show that Bakunin’s tactics, which are recommended by him as the only real revolutionary ones, not only have not reached their goals, but cannot reach them. Engels accuses them of not being ‘anarchists’, because rather than putting aside the state – which he too desires – the tactics of putschism mean that *he cannot possibly remain an anarchist*. ‘Instead of removing the state, he seeks to establish an array of new, small states’. Engels shows how little real understanding Bakunin’s group has for the economic and political necessities of the proletarian class struggle, so that they would be compelled ‘as soon as they seriously confronted an actual revolutionary situation, they would have to throw out their whole programme’.⁹¹ They will be stymied; first, by their refusal to participate in the political activities, especially the vote; then by their disinterest in a revolution which did not immediately set free the proletariat; and finally by their refusal to enter into a bourgeois-revolutionary regime. The whole of Engels’s critique relates to the tactical and theoretical contradictory way in which the Bakunin-led worker’s movement would proceed, never in a denial of their anarchistic goals. This is especially clear in the concluding remarks: ‘In a word, the Bakuninists in Spain have provided a striking example how a revolution is not to be made’.⁹² This explains why in the foreword to this new 1894 edition of his writing attacking

90 Marx 1920, p. 14.

91 Engels 1894, p. 32.

92 Engels 1894, p. 33.

the Bakuninists, he refers to the actions of these anarchists as a 'caricature of the worker's movement'.⁹³

Thus, Engels, almost in the same words as Marx, concurs with the concept of 'anarchy', that is, the overthrow of the state, defending the concept over against the anarchists' version. In an 1874 article directed at the Italian anarchists, which N. Rjasanoff has made available for us in the *Neue Zeit*, we read: 'All socialists agree that the state and with it its political authority in the wake of the future socialist revolution will disappear, that is, the public functions will lose their political character and will be transformed into administrative functions that oversee the social interests. The anti-authoritarians, however, demand that the political state be abolished in one fell swoop, sooner than the social conditions are eliminated that have been created by the state'.⁹⁴ Here also Engels's critique addresses the anti-authoritarians' contradictory and destructive tactics. For Engels immediately continues:

They demand that the first act of the social revolution be the abrogation of authority. Have these gentlemen ever seen a revolution? A revolution is most certainly the greatest authoritarian thing there is, an act in which one part of the population imposes its will upon the other with guns, bayonets, and cannon, all very authoritarian means in their compulsion; and the party which has won must exercise their authority through terror, because their weapons instill reaction ... thus, either-or: either the authoritarians do not know themselves what they are saying, and thus create in this instance confusion, or they know better, and in this instance betray the interests of the proletariat. In both cases, they serve only the reaction.⁹⁵

On the other hand, Engels, in a letter addressing the Gotha Programme which Bebel published, strenuously rejects the demand for a 'free people's state', claiming that this terminology gives the anarchists the possibility of holding forth on the pious idea of such a state for socialists. 'One should just avoid the entire discussion of the state', writes Engels, 'especially since it becomes a commune, not a state. The "people's state" *has been thrown in our teeth in*

93 Engels 1894, p. 5.

94 Engels 1914, p. 39.

95 Ibid. – In the same issue over the Italians, one finds an article by Marx attacking the Bakuninists under the title 'Der politische Indifferentismus', in which, just as the title indicates, the weight of his criticism lies in showing the complete misunderstanding of the necessities of the revolutionary class war (see *Neue Zeit*, xxxii, pp. 40 ff.).

excess by the anarchists, although one sees already in Marx's essay attacking Proudhon and in the "Communist Manifesto" *the direct statement* that with the introduction of the socialist societal order the state dissolves and disappears by itself.⁹⁶ It cannot be more plainly stated that the goal of anarchism is the same as Marxist socialism. And all critiques, which Marx and Engels have written over anarchism will only show, as we have seen again and again, on the one hand that anarchism is a utopian direction of thought, and on the other that it compromises through its individualistic theories and even more its irrational acts that bring into disrepute for the workers the great, economically necessary goals for reaching the state-less society.⁹⁷

4 *Socialism and Individualism*

As a result of the foregoing discussion we must designate the correct view of the goal of the class-less society, which is through an administration of solidarity, although two ways to this end have been asserted, one by socialism and the other by anarchism. This recognition is a basic assumption for a better understanding of the historical-ideological conditions of these two differentiated directions of the proletarian class struggle, inoculating one, once and for all, against the Kelsen position that has described the 'anarchistic' part of Marxism as an inner contradiction of his fundamental socialist vision. One sees these 'anarchistic' elements in Marx in their theoretical bases not as a mere protest against the compulsion of the state, but rather as the product of economic development. The state will not be overthrown, rather it 'dies of itself', that is, in a great historical developmental process in which the living conditions of the populace are changed, which also transforms the societal order of compulsion.

96 Bebel 1911, pp. 321–2.

97 There is a similar popular understanding of the contradiction between socialism and communism in the recent years arising from the historical conditions that has existed in this vein between socialism and anarchism. Under the influence of the Bolshevik propaganda, Russian Bolshevism calls itself communism, and its supporters call themselves 'communists', as one reads in the public discussions of newspapers, mass meetings, in parliaments, indeed in all socialist party polemics. The term is so strongly rooted that today many socialist party comrades speak of the antithesis between socialism and communism, where they actually intend their difference with Bolshevism. For the goal of Bolshevism, namely communism, is also willed by each socialist. Only, the path of Bolshevism must not be willed by everyone. In a similar vein, every socialist wills anarchism, the free unfolding of the individual within all freely chosen association. But, when he is a Marxist, he must reject the anarchist's theory and praxis as contradictory and harmful. See the 'antithesis' of socialism and communism in my introduction to *The Communist Manifesto* (Marx and Engels 1930).

However, in order to insure this more correct comprehension of the relationship between socialism and anarchism, a further point must be clarified which not only appears in the Kelsen polemic, but also arises in the frequent discussions over socialism and individualism. The ambiguity of the concept of individualism and individual freedom must be addressed. Most especially, all that Kelsen writes of the supposed 'individualism' of the youthful writings of Marx has fallen into this ambiguity.

I would like to present several theses at the beginning of my discussion that address this ambiguity and show a distinct division between the two possible meanings of individualism. Individualism can mean a limitless exercise of one's ego, on the one hand, and merely the many-sided development of one's own self, on the other. The first understanding is that of a complete atomistic standpoint by which the individual is a single entity in the world standing beside his fellow humans only insofar as they are the context of his selfish striving outwards; the other view is that of an internal self-development of personality that not only abjures the denial of one's fellow humans, but requires a harmonious cooperation with them if one is to realise his own self-development without contradiction. Individualism in the first sense is the striving for self-satisfaction; the goal of the first is the self-glorification of the person, that of the latter is the self-discipline of the personality; the first allows *the individual* to have his own way, the latter places him under the direction of *an individuality*. It is quite brilliant how Ibsen, who has been decried as a prophet of individualism, is actually the greatest apostle of the principle of individuality, the difference being that between the character of the strivings which are so often confused, in that the lower often takes the mask of the higher, which one can see in Peer Gynt and Brand, whose life choices show the fundamental differences of character in these directions with an unsurpassed graphic power: 'Be sufficient unto yourself' is the slogan of individualism; 'Be true to yourself', that of individuality.

When one calls the striving towards the development of a free, self-developed personality and individuality individualism, then one professes a view that is found in the popular idiom, but is so loaded with the popular notions that no conceptual differentiation is made possible, rather only a quick and thoughtless manner of expression. For a scientific discussion or critique by social theory in order to take a position, such a means of expression is impossible. In this sense Fichte was an extreme 'individualist', and when this individualism necessarily leads to anarchism, he was also an anarchist, as he was convinced that 'the goal of all governance is to make governance itself superfluous'. The command of the free development of personality is pervasive in all Fichte's writings. One must note that no one has more energetically identified the free development of personality as a process that is under moral duty;

moreover, he knew that conflating this process with mere individualism would be a paralogism.⁹⁸ Just this fact makes us aware that the striving involved in the development of the personality in the freedom of all its circumstances is completely consistent with a universal point-of-view (to use an otherwise error-prone expression, especially as it is used in epistemological theory). One understands under universalism the perspective whereby the individual is not to be thought of as an atomistic entity who can exist solely for himself, rather only as an inseparable member of a spiritual context that is greater than the individual, in the sense of Fichte's illuminating example that the striving towards individuality stands not only not in contradiction to universalism, but rather supposes such a universalism. And as far as this striving for the imprint of one's personality is very often called individualism, it is nonetheless a secured understanding that there is a kind of individualism that is *not* in contradiction to the so-called universalism.

The difference between these two understandings of the name individualism, which denotes two wholly different directions, becomes clear: if one refers to the personality in its most narrow context, the second concept of individualism can be called freedom. For this word has a twofold content. It can mean an absence of any association whatsoever, that is, absolute limitlessness and lawlessness. On the other hand, it can mean the opposite, that is, self-willing my will under the authority of law, yet this is really the law of one's own will, that is, the being bound through self-determination. It is superfluous to go more deeply into this state, for it is evident that only in this latter sense can one really articulate a non-contradictory concept of freedom. And isn't this the concept of freedom of classical German philosophy – which it has sought to ground only epistemologically – that is the concept of freedom which even the shallow thought of the everyday refers to when it begins to reflect upon what it means, giving itself justification. To be sure, at first glance the popular consciousness means that freedom is the absence of limits of any kind, and that one can do what one wishes, whatever one pleases. When, however, one comes to recognise that this 'as I please' is just a whim that can be extinguished with reflection, giving way to a passionate emergence of desire, or in a third time to a selfish calculation which can give one a feeling of inner-directed shame, and then once again a complete thoughtlessness, and so on back and forth, which can generate finally some decision, one then recognises that in this 'as I please' there is no freedom at all, that one does not do what pleases one, but rather acts according to the *situation* in which he finds himself, which conditioned him as it pleased.

98 See my essay on Fichte in Max Adler 1914.

And then it becomes clear to him what the only possible meaning of freedom is, that is, to obey, but only himself, that is, recognising a self-declared law that emerges from his internality as a command that must be carried out.

Thus, it is immediately clear that these two differing concepts of freedom overlay both meanings of the concept of individualism. The first meaning in which individualism connotes a complete lack of reflective execution of individual will corresponds to a freedom without any limits. And that other sense, in which individualism is understood as the expression of the individuality of the personality, of one's own character, that completes the concept of freedom in its meaning of self-determination, which – we need not go further into here, as its elucidation is the stupendous outcome of classical German philosophy – is nothing other than a moral self-determination, because only this understanding can be without contradiction.

And towards a more complete comprehension of our subject, it is especially important to consider a further outcome of what has been discussed: freedom in the sense of the autonomy of the will is thoroughly a *social* concept. It belongs to one of the greatest misunderstandings of the often misunderstood philosophy of Kant that one meets here an individualistic philosophy, because the laws of cognition, as well as the processes of will seem to refer only to the single individual, and seem to have no bearing upon the facts of society. However, one has not given sufficient attention to how Kant, and in that the whole of classical German philosophy, has treated the individual as a form of being in which a content develops, for the central problem of critical philosophy is how the content of individual experience expresses generally-recognised values of universal meaning. I have already indicated in this text how the concept of the social from Kant through Feuerbach was not fully coined, *yet their philosophy was the first great attempt to found an epistemological basis for what must be understood as the social context*, a characteristic which I will elucidate below. For our discussion of this social context, it is important to attend how with Kant the basic principle of the autonomy of the will, the categorical imperative, is articulated in his formula: act so that the maxims of your will can serve as a universal law, the single individual in a context with all others who will so act, is nothing other than the social context. The concept of the freedom of the autonomy of the will is only a system of willing in general, that is, without contradiction only possible in a social system; and therefore freedom in this sense, just as we have earlier discussed in reference to individuality, is only possible from a universal standpoint.

In the misconception of these relations, in the lack of clarity over the different senses in which individualism and freedom can be spoken of, lies the real contradictions and lack of comprehension concerning the individualistic dir-

ection of anarchism, especially in the popular agitation in its flyers and newspapers. It is completely the atomistic view of societal life which is the underlying conception of this entire direction of thought, which, however, in its gifted representative Max Stirner really is more a rejection of one's sublimation to the social context in the sense of its 'holy' binding elements of justice, law, and the state than a dissolution of these bonds in themselves.⁹⁹

It is then instructive to see that just in this extreme individualist of the 'limitless freedom' little concern for that in large. His chief work is not called 'The Free One and his Own' [*Der Freie und sein Eigentum*'], rather 'The Individual One and his Own' [*Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*']. [Our translation of *Einzige* as 'Individual One' is more appropriate here than the existing English translation 'The Ego' – Eds.] And the whole book is occupied in making clear this differentiation. 'I have nothing to raise against freedom', he writes in the most important chapter on the concept of singularity, 'but I wish for you more than freedom; you must not merely be free of what you do not wish, you must also *have* what you will, you must not simply be a "free one", you must also be "your own"'. And soon after that: 'What a difference between freedom and one's own! Indeed, one can be released of many things, but not from everything; one can be free from much, but not everything ... On the other hand, "singularity", that is my entire essence and being-there, when I am myself. I am free from that which I am detached, my own in that I have it in my power or of what I am capable. My own I am always under all conditions, when I understand that it is of me and not to be thrown away to others.'¹⁰⁰ Finally, 'That a society, for example a state society, should diminish my freedom, that does not disturb me immensely. Even if I allowed myself to be limited in my freedom by all kinds of powers and from every strong presence, indeed by all my fellow humans, and if I were at the same time the absolute ruler of all the Russians, I would not enjoy absolute freedom. But, *singularity*, I will not allow that to be taken from me'. Therefore, I call the Stirner revolutionary individual an 'Individual One', because he will develop an individuality which is always a singularity. The singularity with Stirner is not a being alone, but rather a singularity that is self-specification, and the oneness of the individual is not a thing to be pos-

99 I have deliberately formulated Stirner's critical destruction of social ideology as a kind of positivism to be compared to the subsequent attempts of Mach and Avenarius to do away with the tenets of natural law. As Mach intended the existence of natural things, the power of nature, etc. to be concepts that were overcome when he destroyed their metaphysical support, in the same way Stirner destroyed the ghost-like conceptions of justice, the state, etc. See my essay on Max Stirner as well as on Ernst Mach (Max Adler 1921, pp. 173 ff.).

100 Stirner 1892, pp. 184–5.

sessed, but a self-possession, a self-determination. Unfortunately, this whole great train of thought, which clearly places Stirner as a descendant of German classical philosophy, has been misconceived in its 'anti-metaphysical' character for extreme individualism, a problem with his language, not his essential meaning. The essential meaning is certainly not that of a merely a self-seeking individual, 'possessed' by a narrow-minded egoism. Stirner, as no other, has represented one so 'possessed' as a form of thralldom, bringing a brilliant psychological insight in his characterisation.¹⁰¹

And so we see that even with the most extreme individualists the goal of freedom is not a lack boundaries which disallows some form of constraint, rather only singularity, where when necessary in establishing conditions for its own conditions of life and self-development, one's own will sets self-limitations as its own boundaries: 'There is a difference', said Stirner, 'in whether a society limits my freedom or my singularity. If the former is the case, then this is a uniting, an accommodation, a union; if my singularity is threatened, *then it is a power in itself, a power over me*'.¹⁰²

In summary, we can say: the concept of individualism is ambiguous, in that it can mean a thoughtless imposition of individualism, as well as the tenacious tendency for forming one's own individuality; it can mean the effort to achieve an imaginary freedom 'without boundaries', but also a freedom for the self-determination of personality. The real core of individualism is, to be sure, the essential premise of the primacy of the individual over against society, so that it is recognised that society itself is the consequence of the being and working together of each individual. Marxism is certainly of this view that it is from the sociation of individuals that society arises, but it does not recognise the notion of an individual for himself apart from society. That is the prime antithesis of Marxism. Yet one need not connote the concepts of the free individual and the free self-determination with that individualistic basic assumption, neither as its prerequisite nor its consequence. Yet most propose the argument that both these directions of individualism, which we have carefully thought through, are only the common understanding of an atomistic individualism, which gives individualism its sole ethical justification. One must in every individual case where the freedom of human beings, of self-determination by the ego, where the freeing of the personality is at issue, first inquire of what kind of individualism is being discussed, and then it can be shown that quite often *the representation of the individual manifests a universal content*, so that the individual

101 Stirner 1892, pp. 194, 198.

102 Stirner 1892, p. 359.

train of thought of the one stressing atomistic individuality is suffering from a lack of conceptual clarity. The height of this confusion is when the person compares individualism to anarchism, and in so doing misrepresents the universalist conception of freedom and individuality as a striving for 'anarchistic' freedom in the sense of setting these concepts up for attack.

We must still engage the question of anarchism further before we close the issue in our discussion. We do not wish to defend the historical understanding of anarchism in its actual contradictory, confusing, and destructive tactics of class warfare. These are to be combated. We can only win this battle, however, by achieving a greater clarity in understanding a series of concepts – the dissolution of the state, the transcending of authority, the removal of coercion, freedom of the individual, and so forth, are in common with both socialism and anarchism. In disentangling the apparent inner connection of these concepts with anarchism, as it has been practiced and understood, and in avoiding the misunderstandings occasioned by Kelsen's critique, which addresses the anarchism of Marx, a misunderstanding that would raise a fatal self-contradiction in Marxism – we must better understand how Marxist socialism handles its 'defence' of anarchism.

Chapter XVI *Apparent Anarchism in Marxism*

1 *The Idea of Liberation*

As we go further into the Kelsen's assertions that there is a fundamental contradiction in Marxism, we can begin where we were in the last chapter with the idea of freedom. For in this idea that plays a great role in Marxist thought, Kelsen sees an anarchist tendency – as Kelsen understands it, a coercion-less organisation of society – that is especially marked. Socialism for Marx and Engels, on the one hand, is an economic development of a system that leads to a highly rational economy, but on the other hand, in the minds of Marx and Engels, it always stresses in its foreground the liberation of the individual. The 'anarchistic' conception of Marx is found as seminal in his early writings, which Kelsen seems to have derived from my essay *The Socialist Idea of Liberation in Karl Marx* [*Die sozialistische Idee der Befreiung bei Karl Marx*].¹⁰³ Kelsen lifts citations out of their context so that the social idea of emancipation with Marx is transformed into 'a principle of dissolution' of 'the individualistic idea of freedom'.¹⁰⁴ It is characteristic of his understanding that in this he saw Marx

103 Max Adler 1918.

104 Kelsen 1920, p. 20.

create a separation of the person from the social development of societal liberation in its political and economic context.¹⁰⁵ For Kelsen, the Marxist condition of freedom is at once anarchy as he sees it merely as a putting aside of both political and economic affiliation. Yet Kelsen mentions in citing Marx's words that for the young Marx this was already a *historical* movement, although he, Kelsen, cannot apply this Marxist insight further in his own argument. Thus, Kelsen does not see that with Marx there is not a development out of a 'general affiliation' to one of complete disaffiliation, rather there is an overcoming of a distinct historical affiliation thorough a new economically prepared societal organisation, *which only in relation to it* can be considered free, because there is no longer a class-based authority.

It is also noteworthy and instructive for the psychology of the inquirer to see here how even the most acute and critical mind can be so enclosed within a certain schema of thought that he simply cannot properly evaluate the most explicit words that do not fit into his schema. Thus Kelsen takes up the meaningful concept of emancipation which plays a significant role in the youthful writings of Marx, in which the social perspective of Marx finds its first ideological expression, viewing this concept of emancipation mistakenly as but a slogan for individual liberation. And this misunderstanding is even more incomprehensible to me as Kelsen had addressed my 1918 essay [*Die sozialistische Idee der Befreiung bei Karl Marx*], which had been devoted in its entirety to explicating the important distinction Marx makes between political and human emancipation. Kelsen in his entire discussion does not enter my construct of this distinction, and we will see how this explains the failure of his polemic against the Marxist concept of the 'political state'. I cannot recreate here the entire argument, but only its theme. The concept of emancipation with Marx is even in his youthful writings not a concept of individual liberation, rather it is an entirely historical-societal category. This understanding is articulated from the premise strongly asserted by him that emancipation is not possible as an individual act of liberation, but rather only upon a societal foundation, and only that 'because a distinct class takes up the universal emancipation of society from its particular situation'. Because of this, emancipation had been heretofore an idea laden with contradictions. In cases where the class seeking emancipation itself harbours elements of social authority and coercion towards other classes, for example, in the emancipatory efforts of the bourgeois, societal emancipation is only partial. Thus, Marx differentiates this emancipation as political, from the more universal human, the latter freeing all of humanity, not merely the bour-

105 Kelsen 1920, p. 21.

geoisie. Human emancipation in its universal sense can only occur through a class whose own conditions of freedom are universal 'from a sphere of society which cannot emancipate itself without free itself from all other spheres of society, and thereby emancipating all other spheres' – in short, from the standpoint of the proletariat. One sees that human emancipation with the young Marx is not an individual longing for liberation; rather it is nothing other than the social revolution, which is more articulated by the mature Marx. And the designation of emancipation as *human* should be understood – certainly under the influence of Feuerbach, who at that time exercised his inspirational effects upon Marx – as a species-concept, that is, as a social idea of freedom, struggle and revolution, whereby already in this instance Marx announced his progress beyond Feuerbach. For in Marx's idea of social action, the species-orientation of Feuerbach, where the human is a philosophical abstraction, becomes a historical, class-oriented context understood in its concrete actuality.

The 'idea of liberation' is consequently with Marx not an individualistic thought, but rather a social-historical process, which grows out of a 'political' ideology, in which it is still a struggle for merely a change in the laws ('Kampf um Menschen und Bürgerrechte' [*'Struggle for human and citizen's rights'*]), to a 'human' ideology in which the change in the forms of social life are then the objects of struggle. Thus, for Marx the political revolution is only a partial emancipation, the human emancipation is the completed form. In both cases there are the societal processes whose essences are involved, in the political where the individual is foremost, but in the latter where the individual is a member of human community of solidarity where his hopes of freedom are to be found.

This strange misunderstanding of the thoroughly social, the individual only within the species-concept of human emancipation, whereby Kelsen turns this into an individualistic conception of liberation, leads Kelsen to an almost grotesque consequence for every Marxist in that in Marx's proposition 'the human essence is the true community of humanity' [*'Das menschliche Wesen ist das wahre Gemeinwesen des Menschen'*] is comprehended as a 'testimony of an extreme individualism, which when applied to the problems of society does not shy away from drawing the audacious consequences of anarchism'.¹⁰⁶ One really does not know what can be said in response to this! It is not difficult to see how the above is completely removed from the Marxist context of thought, so distanced is it from Marx's inner meaning. Evidently, Kelsen identifies in his interpretative thought with the renowned word of Protagoras that the human

106 Kelsen 1920, p. 26.

is the measure of all things. But he has overlooked that his thought, taken from the individualism of the great Sophist, is then translated into the universalism of Feuerbach. Marx's proposition which is branded by Kelsen as anarchistic is genuine Feuerbach, which even among those admirers of Feuerbach, has never once been considered as individualistic, let alone anarchistic. If one does recognise in Marx's proposition Feuerbach's conception, then one sees immediately that the human essence of which Marx speaks is not that of the sovereign ego of the individualist, but rather the *species-being* of being humankind, that is, what Marx later calls his *sociated* [*vergesellschaftetes*] essence: namely, the sociological fundamental fact that the individual in all his 'individual' processes of thought, feeling, and willing is from the onset related to the same type of processes in his fellows, and in their historical appearance these expressions are always societally conditioned. Understood in this vein, it is clear why the human essence of humankind is 'the true community of humanity'. In every state, in every form of community, all social relations are conditioned for the single individual through sociation – determining the one's bases of thought and one's foundations of actual praxis.

2 *Political and Societal Powers: The 'Political State'*

Kelsen, caught in the magic circle of his individualistic bias in comprehending Marx, cannot begin to contribute to Marx's concept of species-essence. It is a dilemma for him, and he is not able to offer insight into Marx's well-known proposition that human emancipation is first fully realised 'when the real individual human ... in his individual work, in his individual conditions becomes a species-being by coming to understand his "forces propres" as a *societal power*, and has organised it, whereby the societal power is no longer to be separated from political power'. Kelsen's understanding is that since the state is nothing other than an organisation of societal powers, the difference between the societal power and the political is only that the latter is merely an organised part of the societal; thus, the separation of the societal from the political power can either be removed, politically organising all societal powers, or that every political organisation of societal power disappears. In the first case, everything societal becomes completely that of a state, in the latter case, the state ends, that is, every coercive organisation of it. The latter is, indeed, what Marx meant, yet his stress, for Kelsen, upon the species-being as he rejected the state is explained in that 'for him the free association of individuals was foremost in his mind'.¹⁰⁷

107 Kelsen 1920, pp. 25–6.

One can see the formalism of Kelsen's concepts at work as in each instance they compel him to pass by the actual meaning of what is addressed. Under political functioning, and as understood under this rubric, political power, Kelsen always comprehends the state as a coercive entity. Therefore the political and state functions are the same for him, and the expression 'political state', which one finds now and then with Marx and Engels, he sees as nonsense.¹⁰⁸ But it is precisely this expression in Marx and Engels he must attend. This nonsense exists only in his thought, but for the Marxist has a definite meaning which brings into view a non-political state. The concept of the political for them is a distinct antithesis to the concept of the societal. For Marx understands under the state, even in his youthful writings, not a coercive organisation as such, rather the bourgeois state, that is, a historical class dominance. In consequence of this, political acts and political powers are *historical* manifestations in which their societal nature as such is veiled behind its actual form, which generates the activities of its state interests. In the bourgeois state, these functions do not appear as societal, indeed they cannot do so, because they are not from the standpoint of society, rather only from the part of it which represents the dominating class. To be sure, the state as Kelsen says is nothing other than a quite distinct organisation of societal powers of individuals, but still not a society, rather an entity where these powers are organised solely upon a class basis, whereby even here the societal powers cannot be understood by the individual as representing his human functions, rather ranged against him as a foreign, objective power.

The concept of the 'political state' can be seen in Marx in the *Deutsch-Französischen Jahrbüchern*, where it is his first yet well-wrought expression for the foundational sociological knowledge that the form of a state is only a historical living form of society, and one in which its inner economic contradictions are masked behind its external form of solidity which assert an apparent universal public interest. In reference to this, Marx says in a well-known exchange of letters that the *Deutsch-Französischen Jahrbüchern* programmatically present the political state as a form of universal interests where 'rationality is realised in all instances', but that 'in every instance the contradictions to its ideal determinations are realised by dint of its actual presumptions'. And here he continues: *From these conflicts of the political state with itself the social truth is developed*.¹⁰⁹ We see here as well that foundational, sociological critique and understanding which will develop as his materialistic historical theory. From

108 Kelsen 1920, p. 44.

109 Marx and Engels 1923, p. 281.

the political form of appearance of societal life, the essential societal structure itself lies, which is disguised by the political form; yet from this actuality arises the inner conflicts: the antitheses between the ideal form of universality with its particular social content. And this contradiction is not accidental, rather must arise as a social form of life. For, as Marx has shown in his penetrating analysis deep into the essence of the bourgeois society, in spite of the pure ideological form 'the completed political state in its essential expression of human species-life is in contradiction with its material life,'¹¹⁰ meaning separated from the actual material conditions of existence of that state in which people live. 'All presumptions of the ego-centred life remain *beyond the sphere of the state* in the bourgeois society, but are nonetheless characteristics of the bourgeois society'. That the bourgeois owner or worker, possessor or one without possessions, the satisfied one or one who hungers, one taken care of in old age or the one without the ability to help himself – these are all private matters, the political state does not concern itself with them, just with 'public interests', not with the 'ego-centred' affairs of the individual state citizens. This noteworthy aspect of social life Marx indicates with the appellation 'political state', which thus is not a pleonasm as Kelsen claims, but rather points to a deep contradiction in the very concept of the state which must be recognised; it is a contradiction that is not juristic, but sociological. And yet for Kelsen the expression 'political state' is a pleonasm because for Marxism this word opens the great historical perspective of politics in the sense of a battle over the political state, that is, over the nature of the administrative solidarity of society. This issue demonstrates anew that in Marxism the same words mean something other than Kelsen asserts, and every critique which does not recognise that it is a lost effort.

In the 'political', the political powers must appear as separated from the societal powers because, firstly, the political form must be understood as only a part of the societal relations, plainly those which serve the authoritative interests, and secondly, the societal interests excluded from the political state, mainly those which engage one's everyday life coping, are thereby solely the sphere of private interests. This profound, critical argument of Marx concerning the double life lived by every citizen within the bourgeois state – of the public citizen and private person – leads to the necessary study of societal relations which Kelsen has left untouched, as I have argued in my lengthy exploration of Kelsen's interpretations of Marx.¹¹¹ Kelsen completely loses the context in which the distinction between the political power on the one side and private

110 Marx and Engels 1923, p. 407.

111 Max Adler 1918, pp. xviff.

interest on the other are brought to bear in Marx's argument. The political power and the private interest are mystifying forms of consciousness that in reality are only to be understood as societal content. This false form of consciousness can only begin to disappear, indeed must then disappear, when the individual person, as Marx says, is actualised as a species-being rather than in his existing circumstances. This can occur only when there is a conscious societal organisation of production and distribution that even each child can understand, embodying an explanation that puts into perspective the existing system of 'individualism' in addressing one's everyday efforts to work and provide for existence which itself is a species bound act – evidence which the economic analysis of *Capital* has illustrated in depicting the contemporary capitalist period with its illusion of isolated agents of production and purely private distribution. Is the capitalist means of production truly explained by the conflict between apparently independent employers and free workers, and the competition among apparently completely autonomous owners of goods in the marketplace, in short 'the subjectivisation' of the material bases of production, so that the illusion of these wholly individual factors give the societal context the appearance of 'an overpowering natural law of individual wills'?

Certainly, the political state, especially in its completed form of democracy, is a form of liberation from the older organisations of the un-political state in which absolutism, feudalism, or indeed theocracy were the societal bonds of its citizens, determining their personal relationships to the whole, achieving what Marx called the advances of human emancipation. Yet human emancipation itself disappears within the subjective character of power in a state based upon individual interests. In such a political state the characteristic contradiction of its official relations to the whole (public interests) with its factual lack of solidarity in its economic structure has not yet been articulated, because the state in all its aspects is the sphere of property of the dominant class, thus has an un-political character throughout. Thus, Marx states: 'The political emancipation is certainly a great advance, *but it is not the last form* of human emancipation, even as it is the last form of human emancipation *within the existing understanding* of the world'.¹¹² Beyond it is the step of complete human emancipation by the transcendence of the political state, that is, through the withering away of the political by the societal powers in a classless and thereby solidified society.

The same misunderstanding of the concept of the political, where the putting aside of the political form is seen by Kelsen as anarchy, clarified by Marx

112 Marx and Engels 1930, p. 409.

in his depiction of the deceptive form of the societal context, is even more severely repeated in his critique, *The Communist Manifesto*. Kelsen sees in this latter writing a proclamation of anarchy. For the conquest of political power by the proletariat, which creates a proletarian state, that is, a proletarian coercive organisation, is in Kelsen's argument only a transition to a classless society. Once this is realised, then 'so believes the "Communist Manifesto" any compulsive organisation of the state can be rejected'. One reads there: 'In the course of the development class differences disappear and all production is concentrated in the hands of associated individuals, thus public power loses its political character'.¹¹³ The expression 'political character of the public power' is, however, a pleonasm. For '*political* is the public power because, and as far, as it is a *public power*, that is a compulsive organisation'. Therefore, the assertion that the public power loses its political power can only mean that it ceases to exist as such. To be sure, it appears that *The Communist Manifesto* understands under political power only class dominance. But, in actuality, it means the cessation of any public power. For the final words of the decisive section state: 'In place of the old bourgeois society with its classes and class contradictions there arises an association within which the free development of each person is the condition for the free development of all'. Though the precise outlines of this society is not clearly articulated in this statement, nonetheless one can recognise what is indicated by the double stress upon freedom in this phrasing, that the goal of socialism means: 'a *free* association in contrast to a *coercive* organisation, that is, in contrast to an organisation of authority, an organisation of public power, in short, to a *state*'.¹¹⁴

Thus, even in the mature Marx of *The Communist Manifesto*, Kelsen finds the same dilemma as earlier, the separation of political power from that of the societal, since the merging of societal power in the state is principally negated, and can only exist inasmuch as all political power is dissolved into freedom, that is, into a lack of compulsion. But we know already how the conceptual

¹¹³ Kelsen 1920, p. 13.

¹¹⁴ Marx and Engels 1930, pp. 16–18. We need proceed no further with this mistaken interpretation of free association by Kelsen. Its entire sociological worthlessness is seen in how Kelsen in the above sentences simply, as if this were self-evident, uses the concepts of compulsive organisation and dominance organisation as having the same meaning, indeed being interchangeable. He documents thereby in a drastic way that he simply does not see the entire theoretical problem of Marxist sociology, namely the *change* in the character of the coercive organisation of society from that of a dominance form to that of a solidarity form, so that Marxism must seem to him full of contradictions; for instead of a Marxist character, it takes on that of a Kelsenist character.

confusion occurs in Kelsen's critique. It belongs to the many equivocations of his conceptual formalism whereby the word 'political' is always the same in meaning with 'of the state' and this word is also identical with 'general interest' or 'public interest'. With Marx, on the other hand, the expression 'political' means exactly the opposite, namely the mechanisms of the class state that are inherent to it, that in its political form is only a partial content of the societal whole, which are contents shared by all, either as those matters of the dominant interests and compelled through the state's laws, or those which are revolutionary, contained in the ideology of the class that strives to be the general interest. For Marx, political interests, political powers and political might are never the common interests or strengths or to be identified with public power. Therefore it is wrong to say, as Kelsen does, that the political character of the public power is a pleonasm. For his formal standpoint that political character, public power, and state are identical concepts and only different expressions for the same empty phrase 'coercive organisation' is not the case. For the sociological standpoint of Marx there arises for the first time a complete, indeed magnificent theory of social development, which shows that through the economic transformation of the foundations of society public power loses its political character, that is, its character as class contradiction with its necessary accompaniment that in the state the public power, that is, the political might, was in reality only a partial power and *against* the public interest. Quite correctly, Kelsen had for a moment a deeper insight when he said that it appeared as if *The Communist Manifesto* under political power understood class dominance. But he immediately lets go of this point of possible understanding. It is not simply 'apparent', but is the case. If Kelsen did not allow himself to be caught up by single expressions, and instead sought to comprehend Marxism as an entire body of thought, he would have known that even before *The Communist Manifesto* Marx had already explained the concepts of free association and the transformation of political power, as I have argued above. Marx said: 'the working class will in the course of its development put in place of the old bourgeois society an association in which the classes and their contradictions are excluded, *and there will be no more actual political power*, because the political power is the official expression of the class contradictions within the bourgeois society'.¹¹⁵ Here Marx elucidates the antithesis of political and social powers on which we have spoken, so that the Marxist use of the word 'political' is once again unmistakeable when we read: 'there is no political movement which is not at the same time a societal one.

115 Marx 1952, p. 163.

Only in an order of things *where there are no classes and no class contradictions* will societal revolutions *cease to be a political revolution*.¹¹⁶

The putting aside of the division between societal powers and political power is not comprehended in Kelsen's dilemma, that is, society either becoming the state or becoming anarchy; rather, for Marx, it means the transition from a condition where there is no societal self-consciousness and therefore no rules for that of a conscious, regulated societal life. And therefore, for Marx, and also for Engels, this new condition would be a condition of freedom, that Engels characterised in his famous expression that it would be the leap from the realm of necessity into that of freedom; not because in this situation there would be no longer a coercive organisation of society, but rather because now all societal connections among individuals would no longer be controlled by an external power that one has not adequately conceptualised [*unbegriffene*], rather through one's own clearly understood insight into the living conditions one consciously created with one's societal comrades. How this freedom is to be understood is other than that anarchism Kelsen suspected in the concept of 'free association'; Marx has explicitly defined it, even for those who needed an additional commentary, in his 'mature' time:

The realm of freedom begins in actuality first there where work that has been defined by want and external expedience ceases; freedom begins on the other side of material production ... the freedom in this area can only exist when the sociated person, the association of producers, regulate the nature of their exchange of materials rationally, bringing it under their community control, instead of allowing their activity to be governed by a blind power; and thus with the minimum of energy and under the worthiest and most adequate conditions of their human nature, complete their work. *On the other side of this fulfillment* begins the development of human strengths that give one the capabilities of self-direction, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can only blossom *upon the realm of necessity, which is its basis*.¹¹⁷

Thus, there exists in the conscious reformation of the human species-being not only no dissolution of a compulsive organisation, but rather the immense change of the sociological character from that of an un-solidarity to that of a solidarity that removes coercion from a domination function to the gen-

¹¹⁶ Marx 1952, p. 164.

¹¹⁷ Marx 1894, p. 355.

eral rule of expedience and in the same proportion limits necessity to a minimum. And in consequence, albeit only within this context, the wholly non-individualistic, indeed magnificent social meaning of the sentence that the human essence is the true common essence of humanity, becomes even more meaningful. But Kelsen sees in this not only individualism, but also the consequences of anarchism. How on earth does he come to that? He finds this in the following sentences of Marx: 'The revolution in general – the overthrow of the existing power and the dissolution of the old relationships – is a political act. Without revolution socialism cannot be carried out. It requires this political act in its destruction and dissolution. Where, however, its organising activity begins, where its own purposes, its soul comes forth is when socialism throws away this shell'. Here Kelsen remarks that the political revolution of Marx, because it employs force, is merely destruction, and that over against that socialism is a constructive, organising activity, because of its ideal of the political means of freeing society from state compulsion.¹¹⁸ Kelsen should have noted in this instance finally that the concept of the political in contradistinction to the societal with Marx had another meaning than that of the antithesis between the state in the sense of a compelling organisation in general and that which is not a state, freed from every compulsion of societal life. The antithesis, which is formulated by Kelsen above, is not that of Marx's thought, not between a political and a societal organisation, rather between revolution and socialism. Of the first, Marx says that it is a political act and destructive, because in every revolution one section of the society is set against the other, with the purpose of bringing the whole society into a form of greater consciousness of its societal essence, into a greater solidarity. The political is here, as everywhere in Marx, that historical form of society in which because of the contradictions of the class-based state only an economic war can manifest the different interests that inhere. And, therefore, socialism can shed its political shell, not because it seeks a nebulous freedom from any form of coercion, but rather because 'its organising activity', a form of societal compulsion in itself, is applied towards the conscious and congruent will of all, building a society freed from its economic contradictions for all its members, and with that the social character of its 'compulsion' – which in a formal sense is still a coercion of those who strive against it – is radically changed.

118 Kelsen 1920, p. 26.

3 *The Shattering of the Machinery of State*

When one appreciates how much damage Kelsen does by his ambiguous use of the concept of the 'state', one realises why Marx and Engels did not relish using it as they explained how socialism sought in its economic development a new basis for society. This reservation was not as Kelsen would have it, because of their tendency to hide the fact that the socialist society cannot emerge without compulsion, and thus was, indeed, a 'state',¹¹⁹ rather because of their intention to communicate the wholly changed character of this coercive organisation. What then is understood by the concept 'state' if one follows Kelsen's reasoning that even socialism will be one through its necessary measures? One must then realise that this will be a quite different state from a class-based state of today, or even the proletarian state of tomorrow. To properly understand this state in its economic, psychological, moral character, and in this regard, how these perspectives are organised in its institutions, one must appreciate that these are realised through justice, a constitution, and laws that institute hierarchical order, organs for the realisation of this order, and certain spheres of authority.

Marx brought the total sociological change of organisation in the societal order to expression when he wrote to Kugelmann 'that no longer will the bureaucratic-military machinery be transferred from one hand to that of the other, rather it will be shattered'.¹²⁰ Kelsen naturally sees in this 'shattering' either a wholly unclear conception or anarchism. He says: 'If one asks what is meant by the image of the shattering of the state machinery, as he says this without any clarifying analogue, then it can mean either in place of the old state order a wholly new content, yet within a state order, or perhaps no order whatsoever, which would then be anarchy, or that in place of the organs of the old order other persons will be the executors, or that with a new state order, that is with a principled change in the norms of state organisation a complete transformation of the state organs will be realised'.¹²¹ Kelsen differentiates four cases which we can order thusly: (1) anarchy; (2) the content, but not the principles of the differing forms of state that have existed; (3) a principled change of the existing state forms with a complete change in the organs of state; (4) mere rearrangement of the existing organs of state. It is clear that, as for Marx's meaning, only case three would be apt. When the class-based state is ended by a revolutionary class through its application of force, neither the existing organisational forms, that is, the state functions that created the

¹¹⁹ Kelsen 1920, p. 40.

¹²⁰ Marx 1901, p. 707.

¹²¹ Kelsen 1920, pp. 32–3.

class relations, nor its organs which exercised class power, will remain. This process Marx terms the shattering of the machinery of the state, even when the new order is not an anarchy, rather its own compelling order needed to realise its own tasks and interests. What is shattered is the machinery of repression and exploitation of one class by another, and thus all this must be understood in a sociological sense. This work of shattering is conducted by the proletarian state, yes, still a 'state' as Marx understood it, a class-based state. It is only indicative of Kelsen's absolutely unfruitful misunderstanding of Marx in his own formal conceptual definition of the state that sees in Marx's assertion of the proletarian state in its decisions that shatter the existing state machinery a contradiction of his premised vision of the lack of such coercion in a future classless society. The proletariat erects a state in the same sense as the Paris Commune created a state, that is, a state under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The great difference between the proletarian state and the capitalist state, which can never be grasped in a formal, juridical conception, but only when both are seen in their sociological functions, fully escapes Kelsen: that the capitalist state is a *permanent form* of societal organisation, while the proletarian state from its beginning is consciously a *transitional form*, and thus its organisational principles and effects have that in mind. And *therefore* Marx and Engels say of the Paris Commune that it was not a genuine state, which does not mean that it did not have a coercive organisation, so that it was an anarchism, rather that it had as its goal a state form of the authority of one class over the other, which was designed to dissolve the class-based society. The political and social opponents of the Commune have also known quite well they were no longer 'a genuine state'. They were so stigmatized even by their adherents as the bourgeois culture was disrupted. 'The Commune', so wrote Marx, 'proclaimed to their opponents, we will abolish all private property, the foundation of all civilization! Yes, gentlemen, the Commune would abolish class-based property, the work of the many that is transformed into the riches of the few. They would make individual property into a truth in which the means of production, the very ground and capital, which are above all the means of enslaving and exploitation of work, are transformed into the mere tools of free and associated work'.¹²²

The jurist sees, however, in all of this willing of the Commune nothing, and is also not interested in it. They see merely the change of form of their beloved coercive organisation, whether it is still there and triumphantly ask: 'What happens now in the Paris Commune, that is, what in Marx's portrayal

122 Marx 1891, pp. 49–50.

are the essential events? They are *totally* comprehended by him in the replacement of the monarchical form of state with certain immediate elements of a democratic-republican constitution and a change in the state organisation ... carried through by the people'.¹²³ Is that a fact? And totally? And in Marx's portrayal, was that really designated as the essential? This appears to me as if someone who was told how a speaker bursting with spirit and life suddenly was struck by a blow and fell to the ground, and then the listener responded, 'well, there has been in the order of the composition of the molecules in the speaker's body nothing wholly changed, even as in place of a living form there have entered certain elements of rigidity consonant with a dead body, which nonetheless maintain the form of order of a body, only with the change that earlier there was a contextual togetherness maintained and now the body aims at decomposition'.

In discussing the 'totality' of the context in Marx's portrayal, Kelsen leaves outside of consideration what he himself quoted, for he is only concerned in continuing his own formal equivocations of Marx, who himself knew that the Paris Commune still was a state in the political sense of the word, calling it '*an extendable political form through and through*, while all earlier governmental forms had been essentially suppressed'. This capability of extension lay in the overcoming of the suppressive character it initially had. For 'its true secret was this: it was essentially a government of the working class, the result of a battle of the emergent class against the appropriating class, the finally discovered political form under which the economic liberation of work could be completed'.¹²⁴ Thus, the essential for Marx is not, as it is seen by Kelsen, that the Commune is also a political form, as Kelsen then adds triumphantly 'a government, a Republic, thus a state',¹²⁵ rather the essential is that *such* a political form can facilitate the economic liberation of work, and thereby the dissolution of the political form of the state it itself has assumed can be completed. This 'residue' of the Marxist portrayal of the commune remains certainly deep within the 'totality' comprehension put forward by Kelsen, but only in that the reality of it disappears in the airy castle Kelsen dwells upon.

One can be spared then going any further in detail with Kelsen's argument concerning the Commune, reiterating only that the Commune was not 'an anarchy', that is, having no form of coercive organisation. The vexing confusion of concepts, such as the expressions 'people's representation', 'parliamentarian-

¹²³ Kelsen 1920, p. 33.

¹²⁴ Marx 1891, pp. 49–50.

¹²⁵ Kelsen 1920, p. 33.

ism', 'bureaucracy', 'police', 'government', etc., are so, because they are applied by Kelsen to always differing social content in their purely formal juridical meaning, making his lectures as annoying as they are unfruitful. Contradicting them here in detail would not bring us to any new ground, and therefore we can go on in our discussion, leaving this topic behind us.

4 *The Withering Away of the State*

Just as Marx's words 'the shattering of the machinery of the state' is not anarchism in the sense of a destruction of the compulsive organisation of social life, but is so only in the sense of the destruction of a domination form, the other image created by Engels of 'the withering away of the state' is not a rejection of a compelling state structure. The image of 'the withering away of the state' does not relate to form of society itself, rather only to the tempo of change within the society, and is *polemically intended against anarchists*, who wish to cast off the state 'with one blow'. Engels's words suggest only the transformation of the compelling order of society from a domination form to one of an administrative form of solidarity, which implies a long historical process in which the old institutions as well as the older persons of the class-based society die out before the new societal form can actually develop its genuine essence. Polemically against the anarchists of his time, as well as against the syndicalists and Bolsheviks of today, it is not quite apt to use the same expression of Engels – 'the withering away of the state' – to the neglect of the Marxist phrase of the shattering of the state machinery. The former choice of terms is not wrong as Kelsen would have it because the state cannot die, rather because these words seem to imply as if the ground-breaking transformation of the class-based state into a classless society can occur in a gradual manner without any powerful interruption whatsoever to its older context, institutions, or forms of consciousness. The idea of the 'withering away' of the state puts in too great a proximity the seductive notion that there can be simply a quiet growing into the socialist society out of its preceding capitalist form. Only the actions of humans that actualize the economic developments required can counter this false belief. Socialism can only grow within the capitalist order in the sense in which the child in the mother's womb as it births must have its umbilical cord cut, and then the state dies just as does the placenta, the new organism torn loose from its matrix. The withering away of one and the growing onwards of the other are both imperfect analogues of these social processes which in actuality are not organic, but social life-processes, and which must proceed in the stage that precedes solidarity of the society in the form of a struggle.

Chapter XVII *The 'Marvel' of the Stateless Organisation*

Kelsen finds the Marxist assertion of the necessary dissolution of the state following the ending of class contradictions not only self-contradictory, but also an arbitrary and unverifiable assumption within the Marxist conception. He opines that the Marxist conclusion that a condition of no class contradictions can exist only where there is no longer a state is untenable – and we know already, for Kelsen that means no compelling organisation. Kelsen states: 'there is no trace of evidence sought which can demonstrate that in the absence of economic exploitation and class contradictions, all those social manifestations will disappear, which quite independent from the support of or the dissolution of class contradictions and the exploitation associated with a coercive organisation, that made a public power or political authority necessary'.¹²⁶ Kelsen asks further: will there be, even in a communist economic order, nothing that stirs people to protest fomenting rebellion? Is there really no other form of protest against the societal order than one based upon class?¹²⁷ But even that aside – will the ending of the exploitation of human nature change so fundamentally that everyone will freely perform the work given to him, even when this will require a centralized work plan that does not always conform with his individual needs or attends to them? Mustn't a societal order that is not a mere economic order protect itself against such potential disturbances with coercive threats? And just so, mustn't this new classless society protect itself against class contradictions? And is an assumption that these dangers would not exist in a communist order not in itself a classic example of unscientific utopianism?¹²⁸ And finally: is it possible that a planful economic order can arise without coercion? 'Isn't it a paradox that the state with its transformation from a bourgeois into a proletarian form of coercive machinery in some unforeseen manner takes on the full powers and competence in a moment where the climactic point of this development is achieved, dissolving what has been in some mysterious way? No, this is a marvel that can only be believed in'.¹²⁹

Yes, here is a marvel, believe me, but not the one that Kelsen asserts, and that he sees as an indulgent fantasy, one that seems to exclude all scientific thought; rather it is, conversely, the too little appreciated marvel of how even the most stringent scientific thought is at times incapable of shaking off the bonds of accustomed concepts and points-of-view, that is, the bonds of a bourgeois class ideology. When one cannot imagine the state and its citizens in a mutual set

¹²⁶ Kelsen 1920, p. 18.

¹²⁷ Kelsen 1920, p. 80.

¹²⁸ Kelsen 1920, p. 18.

¹²⁹ Kelsen 1920, p. 19.

of functional relationships other than in that of the merely changing juristic forms of today's class-based society, then one will not only see the Marxist conception as full of contradictions, but also any other or new form of their social conditions as mere utopian and fairytales for children to ponder.

What Kelsen here discusses as the 'paradox' of Marxism, which leads from a mortal contradiction, namely that which stems from the communist organisation of society with its coercive organisation that is unprecedentedly extended over the existing society, and at the same time speaking of the disappearance of the state, we have already addressed in our earlier discourses. In our discussion of anarchism, we have already sufficiently seen how mistaken it is to conflate the dissolution of the dominance organisation of the state with any compulsive order whatsoever. When now, however, this compulsion is depicted as an inner contradiction to freedom itself, then it is again necessary to point out the typical misrepresentation of the bourgeois ideology of the actual nature of this 'compulsion', looking into it more deeply.

Already in *The Communist Manifesto* it was said that under the next general societal rules which the communists would erect in order to transform the existing order into a new societal order: 'The same compulsion to work applies to all, as well as the constitution of industrial armies'.¹³⁰ This means that in relation to all other measures discussed concerning the centralization of the economy that it would be only a transitional general rule; but not one that will lead to a complete coercion-free, unorganised economy, rather toward a fully transformed manner of production in its people and institutions, emerging from the inadequate hybrid form that became necessary in its transitional processes. In *Capital* Marx describes the transparency of economic conditions in communist society with regard to human relationships, in words that recall Max Stirner: 'Let us imagine, as a change, a union of free human beings who work with an in-common means of production and are conscious of their individual skills as a distributing of societal work'.¹³¹ He sees it as unnecessary to add that this society, although it is not a state, rather a union of free persons, can only work as a society in that the nature of their community production is organised by the natural compulsion of the tasks themselves, and assuredly all who would disturb this work will correspondingly be made harmless by dint of this natural compulsion. Engels reiterated this thought in his attack on the Bakuninists who desired the removal of all authority. In the earlier mentioned article in the 'Plebe', he wrote: 'Independent action of single individuals will be

130 Marx 1930, p. 24.

131 Marx 1930, p. 45.

constrained, making them dependent upon others, through the interactions and combined actions of one another. *Whoever says "combined actions" also says "organisation"*. Is it possible then to have an organisation without having authority?¹³² Engels then illustrates the impossibility with the example of a weaver and the operation of a railroad where the compulsive moment of authority always stems from *the activity-based necessity of cooperative work*. In this sense, he says:

The automatic mechanisms of the large factory are to a great degree tyrannical, just as are the small capitalists who exploit the workers. Insofar as the working hours are concerned, one can write over the portal of the factories: *Lasciate ogni autonomia, voi ch' entrate* (Leave your self-determination behind, all ye who enter). When people, with the help of science and invention put the powers of nature under them, these very powers revenge themselves upon those who exploit them by placing them under a despotism that is independent from social conditions. Authority in the great industries is annulled in that the industry annuls itself, the steam-driven mill destroys in order to return to the distaff.¹³³

Authority and subordination are no longer that of the state, but rather are wielded by the purely technical concepts, that is, the things 'which impose themselves independently of social organisation *as well as creating the material conditions* under which we must produce and disseminate their products'.¹³⁴ Therefore, one can neither deny nor mistake that the socialist societal order will come by necessity from the conditions of societal work and its compulsive factual bases. This is stressed in K. Kautsky's explanation of the Erfurter Programme, namely, that socialist production is not reconcilable 'with the complete freedom of work, that is the freedom of the worker to work when, where, and how he wishes'. For Social Democracy 'cannot put aside the dependence of the workers on the economic enterprise in which they constitute the wheels; *but they can replace the dependence of the workers upon capitalists* whose interests stand inimically opposed to them, with a dependency upon society, *which they as members themselves constitute*, a society of citizens who share equal rights, *who have the same interests*'.¹³⁵

¹³² Engels 1914, p. 37.

¹³³ Engels 1914, p. 39.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Kautsky 1919, pp. 161, 163.

One can hardly see a contradiction to the goals of freedom within socialism in this manner of compulsive order, which is nonetheless seen among those who speak from the point-of-view of the order of the penitentiary or other institution of compulsive work. When such arguments are used in political debates, the point sought can be measured not by a search for truth, but only to discredit one's opponent. But what one must wonder at is just how often such arguments arise in the scientific address of Marxist criticism, those making them taking themselves quite seriously. One can see such a train of thought in the otherwise stimulating writing that addresses the economic motives of Marx by Degenfeld-Schonburg, who states that all Marxist thinkers in relation to the future society have 'an inner conflict' regarding the issue of freedom or authority, which he sees as understandable. For, in his eyes, one cannot deny the compulsive nature of work which embarrasses the presumption of freedom. And so this otherwise prudent author finds it necessary to state that every compulsive order of work is the grave for productive activity, and that 'the compulsion that would be necessary for centrally directing our entire economy must suffer from the unforeseen and repressive difficulties ahead'.¹³⁶

Reading this I must now ask, has one who serves on the railroad or a postal worker every felt repressed by an unbearable coercion – I naturally do not speak of the strenuous work which he must perform nowadays, rather that he must work in strongly centralized enterprise? Does one really believe that the conductor on a train who heretofore has been a member of an independent train association, now a member of a greater concentration of associations as one body, would find himself more oppressed than before? The error in thought expressed here is the same seen in all other critics of a future society. One carries unchanged in these judgements the same categories and conceptions that are of their present as they attempt to comprehend the psychological and economic reality of another milieu. Because today the milieu for the worker in a factory is one in which the owner and other associated interests are against him, one believes this will be the case in the future as well. No, everything that is comprehended by the socialist societal compulsive order will stem from the community of will of all interested parties themselves. And just as today the advisory councils of large capitalist enterprises are being greatly transformed in their function, and, indeed, in their general tone in relation to the workers, so the future workers' contractual rights and responsibilities in large and small will operate within a system of such economic councils. And the order that develops this proceeds from the necessities of production and distribution, its

136 Degenfeld-Schonburg 1920, pp. 197–9.

order established by the very persons who live these necessities, is nonetheless a coercive order. But to name this a penitentiary or to speak of it generally as a 'difficulty' is like saying that the gravity one feels while walking is a repression of one's freedom, persisting as a difficulty with each step one takes.

The question still remains as to what degree will this economic order require the centralization of all the processes entailed by work, or need merely a central located statistical assessment of production and distribution; this is not a matter that can be answered by socialist principles, rather its answer comes from the demands of the necessities and goals of the production process itself. Finally, it must not be forgotten, the 'compulsion of work' both externally and subjectively experienced will appear differently than in today's compulsive work arrangements, if only looking at a factory, for example. For without losing ourselves in the prophetic, which is unnecessary, the changes included within the conception of a shortening of the work day, the improvement of objective and subjective working conditions, and the limiting of worker's duties to several years belong to the essence of the socialist society. Picture a work contract that limits one to the eight-hour day within the conditions of a socialist society, which makes work possible for each person according to his abilities, at least to prevent him working in positions for which he is not competent or which is repugnant to him, further a work limit that guarantees every member of society after ten years of service to be fully free from the responsibility to work after thirty years – who would find such an order 'an unbearable coercion', or would call it a contradiction to freedom only because for a limited period of time he must comply with self-willed mutual goals? One who would merely plays with the words of compulsion and freedom. The great majority of persons in today's misery of work and need thirst after such 'compulsion', after such an 'assassination of freedom'. A vacillation between compulsion and freedom in socialism, thus, cannot be seen as an issue for Marx and Engels or any Marxist. Recall Marx's words on the realm of necessity, on the other side of which the realm of personal freedom can first develop. Degenfeld-Schonburg himself points to Kautsky's words, which he used to formulate the solving formula for this 'problem': 'for work, compulsion, outside of work, freedom'.¹³⁷ But when Degenfeld-Schonburg adds: 'that is naturally only a description of the facts of a completely coercive society',¹³⁸ he gives with these last words only the most

137 Indicated is the sentence in Kautsky's *Ethik und materialistische Geschichtsauffassung*: 'Societal freedom ... through the greatest possible shortening of the necessary time of work: that is the freedom which modern socialism intends' (Kautsky 1906, p. 157).

138 Degenfeld-Schonburg 1920, p. 198.

vulgar and uncritical association of ideas, which are called up by the term coercion/compulsion [*Zwang*]. He thereby avoids enabling one to comprehend the difference between the penitentiary and the minutest regulated cooperative work of a cooperative economic organism, which in its objective manner and its subjective perception is still a compulsive organisation.¹³⁹

Thus, we see as proven that by calling the association of the individual will to its corresponding societal norms a coercion, in the sense understood by Degendorf-Schonburg or Mises, says nothing, and is but an error-prone formula

139 The inappropriateness of this kind of criticism of Marxism as a way to uncover its assumed contradictory character, indeed, the converse where the critics bring themselves into contradiction with each other in that one sees Marxism as anarchy, the other as a penitentiary, is seen in the example of Prof. Ludwig Mises, whose discussion of the inner nature of Marxism contrasts sharply with that of Prof. Kelsen. While the latter sees Marx as an anarchist, the former sees him as extremely authoritarian, as a Prussian. In the concluding chapter of his book *Nation, Staat und Wirtschaft*, entitled 'Socialism and Imperialism', Mises states that while the casual observer would feel that the authoritarian state and socialism are irreconcilable, 'the authoritarian-military spirit of the Prussian authoritarian state finds its counterpart and its augmentation (!) in the ideas of German Social Democracy and German socialism in general' (Mises 1919, p. 145). In Mises's eyes, what has made socialism and Social Democracy so popular are only its democratic-republican propaganda and its opposition. This is what galls the monarchists and Junkers, not the state-economic ideals of socialism. In truth, there exists between socialism and the autocratic-authoritarian state form 'a close set of relations essential to both of them' (Mises 1919, p. 147). 'The socialist ideas are not an overcoming of the Prussian authoritarian state, rather its consequential further development' (Mises 1919, p. 148). – We as Marxists have it really good; we can allow the refutation of our critics to themselves, and see with satisfaction how in each aspect of their arguments they bring forward proof of what is false and what is essential in Marxism, and how they themselves proceed into the absurd. Perhaps this spectacle of Marxist criticism will lead these critics to turn on each other, thus opening up the question of epistemology: 'How is such a critique possible?' Then the answer will emerge that it is only possible because they have preconceived opinions of Marx instead of the real Marx as an object of their criticism, and because out of that mind-set contradictions within his system follow. As for ideas of authoritarianism, state, and authority brought forward in the cited sentences of Mises, when they are studied as formal concepts we can see their equivocal nature, indeed appreciate this critique as a kind of caper by Mises, as he condenses in one breath the authoritarian nature and yet the fascinating democratic effects of socialism. Finally, these critics seem to find themselves even more scientific by dint of their own contradictions. For their work is more scientific as they find 'contradictions' in Marx, and the more contradictions in their own work, the more scientific they feel themselves to be. Here then is the answer observing them: 'Yes, it is quite clear than whenever one of you takes up Marxism, one or another of you will find him anarchistic or imprisoning, authoritarian or democratic'.

because it leaves out of consideration entirely the sociological and psychological structure of the societal connection. Sociologically, it is decisive to understand whether or not the associated individual sees these connections as being of his own will and necessary, indeed furthering for his forms of life and work, and correspondingly, psychologically, whether he is open to this connection or resists it. If he accepts this connection as his own, then the characteristic transformation of 'coercion' into a recognised 'authority' transpires. One can recall how the theorists of anarchy recognised this kind of authority in the nature of things, never denying it; rather, on the contrary, recognising it as the only legitimate authority.¹⁴⁰ And it is but one of the many thoughtless judgements so widely disseminated that authority that stems from a recognised necessity, indeed, even recognised as a path to one's own mastery, is a contradiction of one's freedom, a mere coercion. The recognition of authority in an order is self-evident, because it is effective, self-compelling, or of leadership itself, of one who orders, of a master, and thus is in itself an act of freedom for one who thus recognises it. Very much to the point, George Simmel states in his investigations of social hierarchies that in a sociological analysis it is of the greatest importance to *find to what extent there is spontaneity and cooperativeness of those in the hierarchy*. One must go deeper than the surface definition of roles, discerning the willingness of those involved. What one considers 'authority' depends in the greatest degree on what one considers as freedom for those under authority, even where these persons can be considered by some 'oppressed'; that may not be a coercion, rather a mere 'we-must-so-accommodate ourselves'. An authority in this instance arises where a personality assumes over and above its subjective meaning an objective, supra-individual character, or conversely, a supra-individual potency of state, church, school or family lends to the single personality its meaning. In these cases the supra-individual meaning is taken on by the single individual; in the first instance, seen from the point of view of the individual's choice, certain characteristics of the larger group emerge. 'At the point of the transition where there is a taking upon oneself this supra-individual characteristic, the individual has evidently, more or less with a freely-willed belief, accepted subjection to authority. The transfer that occurs between the supra-individual and the individual, where the individual personality in some degree adds to its rational self-definition this 'plus' of belief in authority, is a sociological event, whereby there is a spontaneous cooperation generated within the subordinated'.¹⁴¹ Max Weber has called this *charismatic* authority, whose con-

140 See here Chapter xv in this text.

141 Simmel 1908, pp. 136–7.

tent is more of love and trust than subjugation, even though the compulsion is no less than would be present if it were merely a subjugation. Thus, we see that one says very little sociologically when one merely says that there cannot be subjugation without coercion.¹⁴²

There is then no reason that in the socialist society, indeed within this elevated level of average education, that everyone in all areas of societal activity see their effectiveness as persons arising from the nature of things in how authority and charismatic associations are generated for them. Thus, the compelling order of things will not be as in the contemporary state; authoritarianism will be replaced by authority, and power will be replaced by charisma. Naturally, those who do not feel the authority or the charisma of the new living and working order will remove themselves from this compulsion, but if they act against it will feel the power of the new order. Yet, even in such instances, they are not compelled by conditions that are outside their own willing, which is always the case in today's society. They themselves call up this power against them by their power, which is set against the solidarity of others.

But quite apart from that: for the Marxists it is not a paradox, and even less a marvel that 'the state' at its peak of power as a 'compelling mechanism' which in the socialist society will be achieved, 'in a mysterious way' as Kelsen opines, is then dissolved into Nothing, because this peak is not the same type as the peak in the contemporary state, which will no longer exist. The 'peak' for the socialist state will be a height of societal organisation in which the class-based society is no longer visible, which has disappeared in the events of history which led to the socialist state.

We can end our unraveling of the critical opposition to Marx here, which we have extended beyond a reasonable length. Yet this discussion was needed: for we have dealt with the misunderstandings, enabling the psychological truth-value that counters it significantly for one's understanding of Marxism. The disentanglement has necessitated more effort than one might expect, yet countering it is necessary. Kelsen's refutation of the Marxist state and societal order has created a strong resonance in its wake: he has tied his vision to the favoured and maintained reproach of the utopian character of all socialism, and brought to these stock-in-trade items his own individualistic-anarchistic interpretation of the Marxist societal understanding in a tight-knit contextual analysis, achieving an 'apparent' scientific rigour thereby. We must conclude this text then with more reflections upon this 'apparent' scientific rigour and its understanding.

142 Weber 1921, pp. 140 ff.

Chapter XVIII *Utopianism in Marx and Engels*

Utopianism! – this last word of the bourgeois critique of the political theory of Marxism must not be neglected here. It is to be seen that this utopian character of socialism for Kelsen arises from his anarchistic interpretation of Marxism. Since the ending of the state in his eyes is the cessation of any compulsive organisation, the new society, as he sees it, will only be possible if humans cease to be passionate, bad, foolish, contrary, or even lazy and neglectful, in short, when all human nature is foundationally changed. ‘However, when something is utopian, that means a trust in the radical changing of human nature.’¹⁴³ Kelsen goes on to assert that Marx, just as Engels, based his view of the future society on such ground, a latent social optimism. He says that Marx spoke of the historical process ‘through which humans are completely transformed, just as the social conditions themselves’, and that Engels hoped for ‘the development of a new species out of the new, free social conditions’, and that ‘all state plunder’ would be ended by them.¹⁴⁴ ‘Understandably, without such a psychological hypothesis the theory of the withering away of the state would disappear into thin air.’¹⁴⁵ Certainly, Kelsen continues, this hypothesis is supported by Marx’s lack of concrete description of the future society, and the paucity of justification he gives that there will be no more exploitation or repression. Does he say also by this generality that humans in such a societal order are not roused to indignation or are instigated to mass protests and uprisings? ‘Will these developments lead to higher and better forms of society in general, and will communism be the final form of an economy?’ And why should these developments be different from what has been, that is, not leading to their own antitheses? ‘Is there really no other opposition within society than one that is class-based ...?’¹⁴⁶

In these passages of Kelsen we hear the two major arguments against socialism that are most often heard in popular assemblies: (1) for socialism, humans must first be angels; (2) socialism is a realm of heaven where the spirit as human no longer exists. From contextual description it follows that not only are humans depicted as angels, but also as devils, and the earth as a vale of tears, and that by a meta-geological necessity, must always remain so, insisting that socialism is a vision for both small and large children, or scientifically stated, a ‘chiliasm’.

143 Kelsen 1920, p. 56.

144 Ibid.

145 Kelsen 1920, p. 57.

146 Kelsen 1920, p. 80.

And how is it actually with socialism? It is exactly the advance in Marxist thought that makes the clearest distinction between scientific and utopian socialism, namely that the goal is nothing other than the product of concrete historical development, which is arrived at and constituted by humans *as they now are*. That does not mean, however, as many of the Marxist critics assume in their strangely deceptive conclusion, that humanity must remain as it is now. It is interesting: in the same breath, how according to one's temperament, one is either enraged by Marxism or sees it as ludicrous, both of which require of these critics the absurdity of an eternal, unchanging final state of society, which is complemented by their view of an eternal, unchanging human nature which if not respected, will bring ineradicable damage to their hopes. But assuming this notorious un-changeability of human nature, this is, in fact, the starting point of Marxist socialism, a theory of society that takes up the existent in all its sinfulness, a society made that way because of its economic development. The Marxist system makes this 'sinfulness' harmless because it limits the necessity of its excesses and the possibilities of its activities. One may invoke Kant here whose idea of a republican constitution was criticized as socialism is today. Kant wrote in response: 'many assert that it [republicanism] must be a state populated by angels, because humans with their self-seeking inclinations would not be capable of living within a constitution of such a sublime form'. Kant answers them:

The problem of constituting a state is indeed as difficult as it sounds, *even for a populace who are devils* (if they have understanding), yet it is solvable, and in this way: a group of rational beings that desire a law to uphold their survival, but which each person in private wants to not participate in, must so order their constitution that although in their private understandings they strive against one another, the one-another must be so formulated for their public behaviour that they cannot express this evil private mind.¹⁴⁷

For socialism in the Marxist sense the new societal order is not in its chief tenets a moral problem, just as for Kant his political problem did not connote 'the moral improvement of humanity', but rather a social, organisational problem, the question as to how far 'the mechanisms of nature' in their human constitution, as they are now, *could be used* in order to bring about a harmonious society. Of course, the socialistic order of society, and even before it is

147 Kant 1881, pp. 31–2.

in place, the socialist propaganda and education will do all it can to awake the moral powers in people, strengthening them and enabling them to spur their ideation. But it is not in an ennoblement of spirit or upon moral bases that socialism founded its inner certainty, *rather that it will diminish the urges towards immorality and criminal behaviour in relation to the contemporary order substantially*. Contemporary society makes it difficult for the poor – and more than ninety percent of contemporary individuals can be seen in this category – to be virtuous, even in the external sense of the word, that means conforming to the demands of morality or living according to the law. The new society will on the contrary make it an exceptional situation that social need would lead to immoral acts contrary to law. Consider for a moment how many persons are lawbreakers and immoral, yet justified by the social conditions in which they live, not because of what is understood today as ‘human nature’, where their acts are considered ‘devilish’, a view that is merely justified by the state of the existing laws. Need, degeneracy, lack of education, alcoholism create almost all the crimes and the immorality which today’s society suffers, and the laws which punish what could be avoided with an improvement of conditions, for example, that of abortion, homosexuality, religious derangement, or vagabondage, and so forth [Cf. Chapter xv, especially section 2]. How little the Marxist society will depend upon the angelic nature of humans I would like to clarify with an analogy. What does one do in a room in which many people go in and out, and have the charming habit of not closing the door behind them? There are some who will say: ‘One should hold up a slate with the demand “please, close the door”’. OK: but that means desiring to improve people, that is, appealing to their kindness, circumspection, even simply their attention to their surroundings, in short, counting upon the ‘angel’ of their nature. And the success proves that it does not work. No, the only means of getting the door closed is – to get a person who does that naturally, and write on a slate attached to the door ‘do not close!’, then the man of good will, as well as those who are negatively inclined or forgetful, have their independence, and lo and behold, the door will always be closed.

And this is the sense in which the socialist societal order is reflected by the nature of the human; the socialist society strives to create institutions that as much as possible exclude a dependence upon the good or selfless will, but, on the other hand, does not create conditions where there is motive to contradict the social order, and in this way establish the grounds of society upon the factual necessities where it functions in a *formally automatic manner*, that is, through the spirit and will of its members who take part in sustaining its economic mechanisms. To be sure, where the spirit and will no longer have an occasion to disturb the mechanism, rather only to further it, because he is not its victim, rather it serves his purposes.

Of course, there will be disturbances even in the communist society that are not rooted within the production or distribution processes, disturbances that can stem from the sexual sphere, or are the affects of anger, jealousy, hate, or from some other pathological ground. But even today, only a minority of criminality in this country stems from such purely personal grounds, with the majority of cases generated by the social conditions in which the perpetrator lives. And it is clear to everyone that the change from today's social milieu to the new organisation of society, aside from the necessary change in the spirit and temperament of the people, that socially-caused disturbances, as well as the exceptions to these that are wholly personal, will diminish. This will be facilitated by the educational influence of the new way of life, the rise in the average level of education, the transformation of the relations between the sexes in the sense of an inner, freer, and externally easier course of resolving differences between them, the development of new norms of morality, community feeling and the becoming accustomed to a new societal ideology in general. The supposition of the kinds of criminality heretofore will be diminished, that social pathology will become an exception, especially those kinds which have stemmed from the struggle for existence and from marked social differences, because these causes have been eliminated – such an assumption is not an unscientific utopianism or naïve chiliasm. On the contrary: this direction of causation of criminality has been the major one since Thomas More – who can be considered the first theoretician of communism; it was he who saw that crime really can only be combated by eliminating its cause. 'One subjects the thief to martyrdom', writes More in his now over 400-year-old, but still timely book. 'Wouldn't it be better to insure that all segments of society were insured an existence that *did not subject anyone to the necessity* of stealing, and thus be taken from life into death'.¹⁴⁸ This way of thinking that leads to a communist society in which there is a smaller, indeed a greatly diminished percent of criminality in relation to what is expected in contemporary society, is not an uncritical belief in a fabulous change in human nature, but rather follows from the very empirical, indeed statistically proven conception that the human individual, as regards criminality, is a product of his conditions. When it has long been known that theft stands in a definite relationship to the level of the price of grain – is it really utopian to believe that this pathological form of theft will disappear as soon as the price of grain disappears? Just in such an instance, indeed in line with Kelsen's thinking, that it actually is 'more prudent' to 'position oneself' in the area of the empirical social sciences – if one would be

148 More 1873, p. 14.

prophetic – not upon dialectical speculation, rather of commonsense experience,¹⁴⁹ if one would presume the disappearance of criminality as a mass social phenomenon and its transformation into exceptional individual instances as a consequence of an assumed social determinism. In fact, if that were not the case, sound common sense would have to conceive the opposite outcome as some sort of unexplainable enigma.

Now we come to the conclusion that this hobby-horse of Kelsen's, and of many other social commentators, namely, their professorial criticism of Marx based upon 'the belief in a change of human nature', is not an accurate assessment of Marx's empirical foundation; rather, they overlook the exact content of his argument, which brings to bear social-pedagogical and social-political measures that are its evident bases. Are we not justified in assuming that with a change in living conditions and changed influences even corrupted natures can be changed, which is the same premise of today's houses of correction, educational homes and alcohol recovery institutes, as well as all institutions who wish to make possible new paths for those who have left the rails of a moral and legal useful societal existence? Yet, in this current societal 'belief', one finds the materialistic-natural scientific conception has been exaggeratedly transformed to a kind of fanaticism in which human nature is no longer recognised as a function of character – indeed, to a denial of the human nature in general; rather human nature becomes in this view a piece of wax which under the influence of certain conditions can take any form whatsoever. Particularly characteristic of this view is that of Robert Owen, when he writes:

Contrary to the view that the character of human beings are the product of external conditions, one has put forward the objection that every person has an in-born moral conscience ... The truth is: that conscience can be fabricated, just as wool or some other product. We can furnish a Hindu with a Hindu conscience, a cannibal with a cannibal conscience, and so on ... If you give me a child and allow me to bring it up in an environ of my choice, I can fabricate of him what I choose, either a Jewish conscience, a Christian conscience, a Hindu conscience, a Mohammedan conscience, whatever.¹⁵⁰

It is just this train of thought that Marxism distances itself from, this naïve belief in the passive plasticity of human nature, which arises from its denial

149 Kelsen 1920, p. 19.

150 Liebknecht 1892, pp. 59–61.

of materialism, and its assertion of a seemingly self-evident reliance on solely psychic laws of individuality. And it is just in this relation that Marx writes of Owen in his *Theses on Feuerbach* the foundational thought of the materialistic historical understanding:

The materialistic principle that humans are the products of their conditions and education, and that changed humans are products of changed conditions and education, forgets that the conditions are changed by human beings, and the educator himself must be educated. From that comes the necessity that society be divided into two parts, one of which is elevated over the whole society [as, for example, with Robert Owen]. The *coincidence* of the change in circumstances and of human activity can only be grasped as *a transformational practice* to be understood rationally.¹⁵¹

For Marx, the change in human nature is not an incomprehensible wonder, but rather the necessary element of a societal process in which this change emerges from the activity of humans, by which, largely unconsciously, they recreate their social milieu, which limits their social situation, but also generates its character. Quite in accord with this, Marx asks, as early as *The Poverty of Philosophy*, in his rejoinder to the point of view that ideas and principles make history, and that every principle has its century, where it was brought to light why a principle in the eleventh or the eighteenth century could not be found in another period of time, answering that in order to understand this insight, one is required 'to investigate how people in the eleventh or eighteenth centuries lived, what were the productive strengths, their means of production, the raw materials of their production, which in the final analysis determined the relationships between persons of this time, out of which all their existential conditions emerged. To explore all these questions ... isn't that to represent these people *as would an author or dramatist in their own drama?*' And in this regard Kelsen cites a sentence by Marx from the mature period of his theory that is in agreement, in which Marx says 'the working class's long struggle to surmount a series of historical processes has wholly changed them *as individuals as well as their conditions*'.¹⁵² But it must appear as an incomprehensible misunderstanding of the Marxist societal theory, when Kelsen underlines the term 'wholly changed' by Marx, but leaves out his underlining of the term 'conditions'; see-

151 Marx 1959, p. 60.

152 Marx 1891, p. 50.

ing this then as 'a wonder'. If there is a mystery here, Marx has solved it in his profound theses concerning Feuerbach when he says: 'Societal life is essentially *practical*. All mysteries which could lead this theory into mysticism find their rational solution in human praxis and in comprehending this praxis'.¹⁵³ One fails to comprehend this when one thinks that in wholly changed social conditions, in their institutions and functions, the psychic habitus of those who live in them, who themselves have emerged from them, have not changed.

Moreover, the entire critique of Kelsen on this issue becomes even more incomprehensible, as it has been conducted solely as a deceptive polemic with skewed arguments made only to strengthen that polemic, when Kelsen offers that the apparent proof of utopianism and a non-critical belief in the miraculous is to be explained by an unlikely sentence cited from Marx that is actually a concession by Kelsen of Marx's understanding: 'Certainly, the communist production of a guaranteed compulsive order after a time as the communist thought and will generates conformity, can be compared to the way in which the state has generated in the flesh and blood of its members respect for capitalism and private property'.¹⁵⁴ If one adds to this that we are not speaking simply of 'customary ways' here, but of an entire ideological system that necessarily reworks and represents the new living conditions in their moral, legal, culturally artistic, and religious purviews, so that the changed human beings of the twenty-first or twenty-second centuries, who will most certainly be different humans from what we have today, different from those in the eleventh century as well, and who will be as different as the differing circumstances of their economic life – having no class warfare, without the need to struggle for their individual existence – such a change as has not occurred in the thousands of years before it.¹⁵⁵

153 Marx, cited in Engels 1888, p. 61.

154 Kelsen 1920, p. 79.

155 In the recent past, because of the actuality of the problem of socialisation, the seeming problem of the irreconcilability of socialism and human nature has become a pet discourse for critics of Marxism, who point to 'how we are and always will be'. This is especially a pet theme in the discussions of Professor Mises, and the book by Degenfeld-Schonburg sails in this direction of the 'problem', that is, to show that the unchanging nature of human beings is not a good fit for the socialist expectations of the means of production, in which either every impulse of personal interest falls away or will be considerably diminished. What makes these discussions so unfruitful for an individual or social psychology – especially the theme of Degenfeld-Schonburg – is the methodological error at its foundation, that is, to speak of the future ability to perform within a societal organisation that will be substantially changed – particularly in its functions of production and distribution – and not recognise that one cannot merely project into it

the old concept of the person, or even worse, the person in his degenerate contemporary form as it is caused by today's conditions. One complains of the optimistic 'prophets' of Marxism, but one pushes only ideas derived from the old soothsayers of the most primitive kind of lazy thinking: 'it has always been so, and so it will always be'. Interpreting the psychic habitus of a period of time according to the measure of oneself is a source of error based upon 'personal perspective', criticised as it has occurred among astronomers. Social sciences have begun to pay attention to this error, although its anthropomorphic biases have been rejected in the sciences, in general, for quite a while. In this vein, it has long been believed that the psychic character of the primitive was not essentially different from our own, but rather only a kind of childishness, an undeveloped stage prior to the more mature level of today. On the contrary, it is now being appreciated that the primitive within himself was completely mature, only of a different character than the contemporary man of culture, so that one cannot construct an experiential bridge between them. One can read of this understanding in the informative expositions of Levy-Brühl 1921, *Das Denken der Naturvölker*, and try to enter the psychic condition of one who sees no difference between living and inanimate things, which we take for granted, as we construct our vision of nature among things which are differentiated from each other. See also from an epistemological viewpoint Dr. Wilhelm Haas's *The Psychic World of Things* (Haas 1921, pp. 8ff.) – I do not want to be misunderstood here, as if I were diminishing the significance of the subjective conditions of production levels and the quality of production in a socialist societal order. I am only addressing the issue of how human nature is comprehended and its affect on understanding socialism, where it is asserted that the productivity of society must diminish because of a view of human nature that reflects this methodological and epistemological error. Even if these critics were right about human nature, this is not an effective criticism of socialism. Socialism is not the most rational form of production, rather it is the form with the least contradictions inherent to it. It does not promise the greatest productivity possible, rather it offers the greatest degree of support for existence and the development of the person, thus it is an advance in relation to the capitalist form of life. The ability to care for all in equal measure, insuring everyone, improving these conditions beyond what is possible today, may be disputed; but this carping reflects an overestimation of one's present understanding, and an underestimation of a future intelligence. What I mean by this is that the people of the future will not be incapable of reflecting upon the weaknesses and errors of their future organisation, and will be able to find ways to solve these problems, so that the boundaries of our contemporary understanding of what is limited for the future will be transcended by that future society in its own development. Leave the future to its own tasks! Do not trouble yourself as to how it will be in future centuries! To so trouble oneself is not a way to avoid the current dilemmas of Marxism; on the contrary, such an evasion only calls us more pointedly to a return to more exact thought regarding our present. Just at that point where Kelsen reminds us that we must not count upon people who are different from how they are today, as our historical and social experience shows them to be (Kelsen 1920, p. 56), we must remember that we must avoid suppositions concerning those who are born and raised in a communist community of the future, of whom we have no historical or soci-

Kelsen would be less astonished concerning the 'wonder' of the changed person of the future if he did not interpret so 'materialistically' the historical materialist conception which is fundamental to every point of Marxist thought, as he most often does. For then he would have had no excuse in not recognising that there is no contradiction in Marxism when it speaks 'materialistically' about the withering away of the state and justifies it by the 'psychological hypothesis' which explains it,¹⁵⁶ seeing then that Marx must complete his conception of a 'stateless' society with a 'psychological factor', namely that of a 'new species', with 'the habits' of a new set of living conditions.¹⁵⁷ The passages of Marx which Kelsen quotes prove how integral this 'psychological factor' is as an element of his historical-materialistic conception. I have already discussed this exhaustively in this book, and will be satisfied in merely touching upon this here.¹⁵⁸

It appears that in Marxism the so-called psychological factor does not emerge first in the future, as Kelsen's meaning asserts: 'one knows nothing certain' about this kind of *deus ex machina* which raises one above need in the 'future state'; rather for Marxist principles one must not quote randomly selected sentences, but see his meaning from the totality of the vision, in which the psychological factor must be fully comprehended in its constant presence. Kelsen does not treat one word of the economic criticism of the past where Marx comprehends the psychological issues that inhere in his historical interpretation. The continual 'thinking with', that is, the activity of thinking individuals, is required to transform the material processes which impel the economic and historical processes. The 'belief' in the 'psychological factor of the future' is nothing other than an admission of this necessary element in social laws in general, whose presence is supposedly overlooked in the historical-materialist conceptions of the past and the present – at least, this is what is chalked up as the chief sin and most appalling ignorance of the Marxist posi-

ological experience, but merely look to today's society, and realise they will be *other* than we are.

156 Kelsen 1920, p. 57.

157 Kelsen 1920, p. 70.

158 When Kelsen occasionally speaks of this 'psychological factor', he means that the most important prerequisite for the development of the new human is according to Marx and Engels their growth in the 'new, *free* societal conditions', and shows with self-satisfaction in Bolshevism the caricature of this free societal set of conditions which communism and the dictatorship of the proletariat has established, thus arguing his case both justifiably and unjustifiably. It must be stressed once more that the Russian conditions are neither a dictatorship of the proletariat nor a communist society in the sense asserted by Marxist theory, which even the leaders of Bolshevism, Lenin and Zinoviev themselves explain.

tion by these critics. Should not that which must be attended in the past and the present as a virtue and a condition of science be indicted as a burden and source of unscientific thought in the future? Our critics should not so badly damage their own case with self-contradiction.

The unscientific and uncritical objection that Marxism in its new societal order with its new species of humans is only a vision that can be held in a naïve belief, and that it runs against any experience that can serve as its basis, I believe we have sufficiently addressed, and need not occupy ourselves with it further. There is another objection raised, however, that in the new society of socialism, all that is imperfect will have disappeared, that is, all development will cease. It is interesting that a mechanistic point-of-view is used here in a scholarly critique against Marxism, one that bears further reflection as to how it works in a contradictory manner against its own thesis. In one breath, it asserts that we do not respect the un-changeability of human nature, but on the other side assume the un-changeability of a new societal order. If we say the new conditions will create new persons, then we are incurable adherents of 'development'; but if we say that the new conditions will be free of class warfare, a condition in which changes occur through self-conscious societal activity, thereby reaching a high degree of solidified stability, then we are denying development.

In reality, Marxists have never asserted that, with the dissolution of the class-based state, development ceases, and that a condition of absolute harmony and a static equilibrium is achieved. *Only the form of social development is changed.* Heretofore, it has been only a struggle between classes, that is, a struggle not only with each other, but between existential milieus that each asserts a dominant authority. Human society exists, but its existence until now has not exhibited a reality of solidarity; rather its historical form has always been fundamentally a strife-filled picture of contradictory life interests, in which the interests of one part attempts to satisfy itself with a societal advantage through combat and power over those interests that oppose it. All advances in the sense of a greater societal feeling, a more comprehensive solidarity, a more complete realisation of the ideal concept of society, with its resources, in short, all social development, has been until now only the unintended results of class warfare: in which every subjugated class in *its* victories removed from the social life it experienced some element of its subjugation, the injustice that was part of the fabric of the irrationality of its conditions. Since the way of life *heretofore* in society was not that of solidarity, but rather of the struggle among the classes with each other, which is still the case, the form of societal development *until now* was and is the class war.¹⁵⁹

159 See here Max Adler 1921b, Ch. VII, and the essay, 'Der soziale Sinn der Lehre von Karl

It does not follow that with the dissolution of the classes a development ensues; we speak here only of the cessation of class war. One need not, as Kelsen does, ask whether with this cessation there is also an end to human agitation and rebellion. On the contrary, there will be plenty of that. For when all the in-common problems of human existence disappear, when there is no longer the animal interest in nourishment, clothing and habitation, the concern for the rearing of and foraging for one's children, that is the larger share of all interests, all thought, all feeling and work of human beings, then for the first time the deeper human sensitivities will mature, and then so much of what has been unbearable, for example, the lack of attention to issues that concern one's 'questions about the world', will be addressed. One realises that then there will develop contradictory positions in the questions that concern metaphysics, religion, and art, with an intensity that cannot be found in our contemporary existence. And it is not wholly true that all development will stop as these contradictions are addressed, only the class contradictions will no longer be necessary. There will be a diversity of understandings which run

Marx', in Grünberg's *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus*, Vol. IV, pp. 1ff. – In relation to the principle that the class war is the existential condition of society, H. Cunow has written, with a polemical misunderstanding, as if Marx's idea of a human society had no other existence than that of the interests of class, in his book *Die Marxsche Geschichts-, Gesellschafts- und Staatstheorie* (Cunow 1920, Vol. II, pp. 80–1). One can see in my entire argument in the essay published in the Grünberg *Archiv* that what is meant by Marx is that in all *heretofore* ways of existence in society, since the more or less mythic origins where primitive communism was said to exist, there has been class warfare. That this will not be the form of thought of a future society is discussed by me in the fifth Chapter of this essay, which elucidates how a solidarity of society emerges from class warfare. 'The older, eternal appearance of the law of class warfare', I say on p. 26, 'impels through its own consequences, through the self-interests of the last and most numerous class of the proletariat the dissolution of all class contradictions, and realises the final constitution of a unity of interests, that of a human society of solidarity'. Naturally – in order not to again split hairs – I mean by a unity of interests that of a unity of economic interests. The author cannot monitor each of his sentences to avoid what may be seen as an unjust assertion. He must really depend upon the theoretical good will of the reader in order to reach the correct understanding, and see a justified critique. Cunow reacts against my use of Kant's view of historical antagonism as a justification of Marx's social dialectic, in that I come to a conclusion whereby out of the necessity of economic processes human nature arises, calling this argument a misunderstanding of Kantian thought. He fully overlooks that it is just in this Kantian antagonism that emerges from the principles of an invariant nature in which the characteristics of human nature arise in their form and functions. More is to be said about this in other contexts. I might refer at this point to my often-quoted first chapter in *Marxistische Probleme*.

the entire scale from mere party organising within an administrative organisation to the participation in large parties which take on major cultural issues, without, however, having these contradictory views jeopardizing or minimizing one's personal existence, which will be insured by the economic order. There will be a social Adiphoron in place of the mad war between classes, so that the community can breathe freely in the open (and not just in one's apartment). Yes, it is conceivable that these differences in worldview could lead to fire and sword; religious wars are proof of this. But one must first consider that there has never been conflicts of worldview that were purely that; for example, religious wars were an ideological form that encompassed economic and political contradictions. The depth and force of these wars were in the final analysis a cover in their religious differences for other contradictions as well, lending the wars their frenzy and cruelty. Secondly, one can find proof in our contemporary situation that the fanaticism that exists in the expression of differences among confessions, beliefs and worldviews, despite the official view of legal and social consciousness, thrives among the masses. One can then imagine a society in which the official lies disappear, and through education, character development, and opportunities for the public exercise of one's views, and above all, through the extinguishing of the economic and political striving for power to express these views, a purer cultural disposition will exist for their expression. Such a change in human spirit is not only possible, but can be seen as realised to a certain degree even in today's capitalist world, indeed even more capable of increasing. But only in a socialist order will it be fully realisable. And for such a prognosis ready-to-hand slogans that mischaracterise it as optimistic and utopian can only be seen as some seemingly fitting name from tradition, but closing one's eyes to what is all around us, and which we, the best of our time, work towards: the lengthy, but not unfruitful effort to raise the level of culture for the broad masses.

The reproach of utopianism directed at Marxism clothes itself in modern garb in that it uses a religious-psychological lens to reveal Marxism as a form of 'chiliasm'. In this vein Dr. Fritz Gerlich has written an entire book with the title *Der Kommunismus als Lehre der tausendjährigen Reich*, which is a collection of sycophantic misconceptions of Marxism and the historical-materialist conception. The lack of theoretical ground Gerlich has in his critique can be summarized in one example, as he sees the main tenet of Marxism in the 'work of salvation and the salvational capability of the proletariat' – referring to the communist Weitling, as he proclaimed the new Messiah in the year 1842.¹⁶⁰ To counter Gerlich's critique here is not necessary, nor is there space

160 Gerlich 1920, p. 18.

to do so. It must only be mentioned in that this esteemed scholar's designation of Marxism as a kind of 'chiliasm' has become quite popular. When one calls socialism, and Marxism in particular, chiliasm, two things are not properly separated that must be, at all costs; socialism and Marxism, as theory and as a movement. If one holds that the followers of Marxist socialism express this adherence with a kind of religious enthusiasm, and that they see the goal of socialism, the class solidarity of human society, with the same fervour as the first Christians who sought the thousand year realm, and as all those who were in need of salvation in the messianic period, one only speaks the truth, which belongs to the psychological character of all great revolutions. However, this critically-clothed social psychology ceases as soon as the characterizing of Marxism begins, where it differentiates Marxism from early chiliastic movements: Marxism is not based upon the hopes of an enthusiast's yearnings, but rather upon rational sociological and national-economic investigations. Marxism is 'chiliastic' only in respect of its coincidence of cold, theoretical analyses with the developmental interests of the proletariat, which Marx did not create, but merely investigated. Marxism is not in itself chiliastic, but it is coupled so in the minds of the proletariat who have understood it, just as primitive chiliasm has been coupled to Dr. Fritz Gerlich's primitive conservatism, which fears every chiliasm as 'the source of overthrow'.¹⁶¹ Socialism as a movement is an active current of praxis, of taking positions and valuing. Idealism must be a leading factor in this conduct. Enthusiastic belief, as well as a dedicated conviction of the greatest hopefulness, are necessary forms in which the movement must psychologically travel, which does not indicate that it is objectively chiliastic, that is, having a goal that is merely a dream. It is one of the most shallow, false conclusions to hold that because Marxist socialism is a mass movement, showing many of the same psychological characteristics of the chiliasm of the past, it is therefore wholly a chiliasm in itself. Indeed, it is the materialistic historical understanding that enables us to understand the chiliasm of past times in their social reality, and so move past the wholly unfruitful conception that these movements were mere enthusiastic expressions of unsupported prophesy, a view of which the self-satisfaction of the bourgeois cannot get enough.

Only in this way can Marxism be designated chiliastic. And if chiliasm is a dream of a thousand year realm, Marxism fulfills with its theory the task of dream interpretation, where the real core of this dream is made evident, and offers thereby the economic realities which underlay the means and goals of this striving for such a proximate future.

¹⁶¹ Gerlich 1920, p. 20.

Another strange opinion related to this misconception of the 'end' of a historical process is the baroque construction of the Marxist theory of the end of class contradictions, and with it the cessation of class warfare. This misconception asserts that Marxism is thus aligned with the cessation of development and social progress in general. Kelsen does not say this directly, but it is implied in his critique. This view is held by many who are sympathetic to Kelsen, and I will take this criticism up for a moment. One can hear nowadays that the historical-materialist conception is full of contradictions in its dependence upon a historical development generated by economic conditions, particularly that of class warfare. If a societal condition were reached without class warfare, then the value of the theory of historical materialism itself would cease. This view identifies the class conflict with the economic conditions of social life exclusively, that is, it identifies the historical structure of the economic foundation of society with the foundation itself. But it is clear that even in a socialist society the economic relations will remain the bases for and the final determining element of their ways of life and cultural forms. Only this much is correct, the economic relationships in the socialist society will no longer have the same fateful meaning, for it will be consciously regulated. But, precisely because of that, a quite different cultural character can be given to the societal order, one of a quite different intellectual and moral structure, in short a changed ideological superstructure. When we realise today how the fabled industrialisation of our production, the fairy-tale quality of our command of time and space has changed the tempo of life for the contemporary person in culture, then it is clear that the powerful changes that socialised persons will generate in a rational societal order of the future will not stem like manna from heaven, but rather from the changed economic relationships in which people live with each other. The historical-materialistic conception remains within the socialistic societal order because it is a sociological theory, not a national-economic theory. The principles of the national economy, which relate to the manifestations of a private economy, lose their validity as soon as there is no longer a private economy. National economic concepts, as Marx always stressed, are historical categories, and national economic thought, despite its abstract methods, is merely a historically-generated science and a passing historical phenomenon. Sociology, on the other hand, is the science of the life of society in general, and as such, it did have a beginning, and will have an end, but as a phenomenon of scientific thought not until all science disappears. In this sense sociological concepts are not historical categories, and its knowledge is not that of historically bounded truths, rather that knowledge enables the prerequisites for all historical forms of social life whatsoever. And the historical-materialist conception, as we have understood in this book, a view constant in our arguments, is a sociological

theory, which comprehends the nature of social life before and after class war, indeed explaining why class war must occur, and how and when it can be overcome. And, therefore, even in the classless society it will remain the theory of societal development. Those more fortunate people who are of the far distant future society will feel less so than we do in their economic relations what Thomas Vischer's beautiful words express: 'the moral is a self-evident truth', which applies as well to the 'economic', which is a truth that does not change as an expression of the sociological law of the historical-materialist conception. We do not normally feel the air around us, nor the laws that end this atmosphere.

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The final chapter of Max Adler's *The Marxist Conception of the State* [*Die Staat-sauffassung des Marxismus*] offers a summative understanding of why a critical eye and voice must think within the intentions of another in order to grasp the core of what is intended. Max Adler continues his critical interaction with Hans Kelsen, the constitutional legal theorist and social scientist, whose *Sozialismus und Staat* of 1920 had castigated the abuse of human freedom and even the utopianism in Marxist ideology and its intended praxis in the forecasted 'classless society' where no 'state' was necessary. Adler focuses upon Kelsen's oversight, inability, or deliberate blindness in neglecting the larger intention of Marxist thought. Kelsen attacked diverse principles of Marxist thought as self-contradictory. Adler will show how these supposedly divergent Marxist principles are tenets of a coherent, logical understanding of past, present, and future society. Adler's argument is critical for comprehending what constitutes a responsible critique of another thinker. Adler stresses that the critic must enter the vision of the thinker as intended by that thinker, and not attack the thought piecemeal from an angle that overlooks the larger intentions, the *Weltanschauung*, that inform each element of thought by that thinker.

This distinction that sets a guide for a responsible critique of any body of thought is made clear in a famous essay by Ernst Cassirer as he considered Martin Heidegger's *Kantbuch* in 1931. Cassirer writes in praise of Heidegger's ability to think within Kant's own problematic (even as Cassirer will diverge from Heidegger's conclusions):

He goes with true inner passion into his subject; he never remains merely by the exposition of words and sentences, rather places us wholly in the living middle of the problems themselves and takes up these problems in their effective power and their intrinsic origin ... Here the matters speak for themselves – and one can do no better justice to an author than merely enabling us to hear his voice.¹⁶²

Max Adler has this passion, even as his own voice is controlled and factually precise. One is lifted as a reader into the issues of Marxism of Adler's time in the book *The Marxist Conception of the State*, where Kelsen himself is interpreted from within – that is Kelsen's bourgeois perspective. With attention to the twists and turns of Kelsen's voice, and the intentionality of a score of Marxist and non-Marxist thinkers, Adler gives us what he will call 'an immanent' understanding of the boundaries and intentions of each mind. We are not

162 Cassirer 1931, p. 25.

merely told about the thought of both thinkers and their critics, but rather an envelope of ideating is generated by attention to their own words. Adler's own singular search for meaning within the currents of his fellow socialists is brought clearly and compellingly to the reader.

In this concluding chapter to *The Marxist Conception of the State*, Adler will make clear why bourgeois society in its normative habits of mind eclipses an adequate treatment, and thus, comprehension of Marxism.



Max Adler 1922, 'Why We Are Not Understood', in *Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus, Marx-Studien*, Volume 4, Part 2, Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, pp. 312–15

If we glance at Hans Kelsen's attempt to give an immanent critique of Marxism's conception of state and society, we see clearly why he has failed in this: he has criticised individual principles of Marx and Engels, but has not grasped immanently the principles; he remains locked outside the meaning of the words, at home in this position. He perceives only, as do many other scholars, merely the party slogans of Social Democracy that present a difference between bourgeois and proletarian science, and he himself is a brilliant example of that distinction. This distinction, which Marx and Engels always stressed, has nothing to do with the diminishment of science to the level of party strife, which a non-immanent critique pursues in its great emphases and moral outrage. When one is able to distance himself from the historical limits of a bourgeois worldview, one is able to make a significant differentiation, namely, a diagnosis of the borders that exist within a supposedly unbiased and un-political science in the consciousness of a thinker. One who thinks in the categories of the bourgeois world believes his categories are the fundamental elements of social life in general. Quite another conception is that other 'science' that sees in all its contemporary forms of living an essential element of historical phenomena that is ineradicable, what is thought, that which he himself lives. That is what many Marxists mean when they speak of Marxism as a worldview. In the most rigorous sense of the word, it is not a worldview, not a philosophy, but rather theory, a sociology. And it is not what Kelsen intimates in its adherents, merely a dependency upon isolated principles realised by the application of individual concepts or maxims. Just as the knowledge of the modern sciences in the spirit of enlightened individuals has been unified into a coherent understanding of the world, creating for us our understanding of nature, so the thought generated by Marxism in Marxists enables a coherent vision of the social world,

enabling him to live within the framework of this general conception of history and society. Thus, it is impossible for a classical person with a wholly different cosmological picture of the world from the conception of nature generated by the modern natural sciences to engage in an immanent critique of it – he would have to leave his classical, spiritual frame of mind and become a modern person – thus, it is impossible for an essentially bourgeois framework of knowing to enter an immanent critique of Marxism. And one cannot say – foreseeing Kelsen's objection – that a theory must be capable of being understood by everyone, and that with the propositions of logic, which are true for everyone, the same criticism can be exercised by everyone. Yes, the logic of thought is the same for everyone, but not the psychology of thought. If logic were the creator of truth, then Kelsen is correct; but it is only a means of producing the truth, as the use of this means is determined by the psychology of the investigation. Thus an investigator will often set limits to his use of logic, which are not necessarily the limits of logic in itself. So, finally, it is not only the personal logic of the investigator that establishes limits, but also, even before that, the choice of problem that is posed. Kelsen, then, is the example of an inquirer who sees both the issues of the law and the state from solely a formal juristic perspective, and is satisfied with a juridical ontology that gives his judgement its positive legal comprehension; this positivism becomes a commandment for the scientific method where all questions must be translated into a concrete legal organisation. Anything that falls outside of that positivistic legal structure is deemed a meta-juridical question. One sees that this cast of mind, which exists before any question is put to it, stems from the bourgeois manner of thinking. Marxism calls this thought orientation bourgeois science, and another proletarian science, not because bourgeois or proletarians conduct the science. For the proletarian at least, this cannot be the case, because this population has had so little opportunity to study; and the bourgeois scientists are not actually bourgeois in many instances. Even less does it mean that the research is conducted either in the interests of the bourgeois or the proletarian populace. Rather, these appellations indicate the mental constructs of the inquirer, whether they have developed constructs that are in line with the existing society in a formal manner, so that one cannot think beyond the categories and boundaries inherent in conceiving this society, so that a quiet, logical thought of issues will be disrupted emotionally with lines of thought that contest these mental structures, or do they think with a scientific consciousness that begins by historically situating the issue in its present and past. And it is only because the social agent of one of these perspectives seems to further the social life of the proletariat, and that the other perspective is that solely of those who are themselves determined by their social situation, only then, in light of the

sociological coincidence of these ways of thinking through and acting within the present society, do Marx and Engels call the one manner of thought proletarian, and the science that emerges, a proletarian science. It would be perhaps better to call the one science a static science, and the other an evolutionary science. The advantage of the other name, however, is that it enables one to see immediately the social determination of the differing forms of science, that is, becoming aware that one is not dealing with a logical division of the sciences, but rather a historical, social-psychological difference.¹⁶³

Thus, in my 1922 book *The Marxist Conception of the State* [*Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus*], the controversies with Kelsen and others can all be seen within the great contradictions of the bourgeois and the proletarian conceptions of society, where each conception addresses an issue within its own theoretical interest, thereby determining the differing boundaries of each respective scope. Taking this critical view of each of the authors we have interacted with in our inquiry, our treatment has led to a result where their own keen critical understandings can be seen in a way that is beyond their own intentions. The fragmentary treatment of the non-Marxist arguments with Marxism has by necessity forced us to bring the totality of Marxist thought to bear in comprehending their positions, and has thereby not only generated a conviction of the inner consistency of Marx's perspective, but also helped us to see that having another opinion regarding the issues than a Marxist is not sufficient to prove his view wrong.

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¹⁶³ Compare here the essays by Marx concerning the limits of bourgeois national economic thought, which prevent this science from a genuine critique of a political economy (Marx 1957).

Max Adler's address of 'belief' is a rare, indeed singular epistemological gain, not only for Marxism, but also for a comprehension of what an attendant concept of belief – that of 'conviction' – means in terms of an attitude or process of consciousness. Epistemologically, this is a Kantian comprehension, but it enables a debate about the concept of 'belief' as a condition of thought by varying schools that take up how our ideation is generated by the laws of consciousness and language. Belief and the maxims of our conviction that secure it in our praxis are informed by our experience in the world. Convictions which are the principles that guide choice are elements of our belief by dint of their having been engendered in the reflective thought that reviews and establishes praxis. 'Belief' is an activity of consciousness in which personal findings become articles for our maxims. Maxims are linguistic elements of human consciousness, which raise to principle the knowledge of experience, and thereby are 'convictions' that give us balance and direction in our everyday choices.

What is most important in the domain of 'belief' and its content of 'convictions' as an epistemological fact of consciousness lies in its operation within a domain that limits deliberations of the past or possible future, where certainty in the consequences of present and future praxis is disallowed as a solely knowledge-based requirement for action. 'Conviction' or an attitude of 'belief' precedes, indeed disallows 'certainty', given the contingent nature of experience, a character of experience that is accommodated by the epistemological functioning of the subjective, a priori category of 'belief' itself. The conscious island of 'belief' with its 'convictions' is established as a function of every human consciousness by attention to how it addresses our mind and attitudes in the everyday. One should act out of the convictions, which fashioned in the process of 'belief' is nonetheless privy to the facts of knowledge which inform this attitude. One can say that a 'probability' of an occurrence is ascertained through previous knowledge of one's circumstances and similar eventualities. The social science of Marxism creates the possibility for the subjective stance of belief in one's convictions regarding society as it is and will be. Nonetheless, the underscoring of this state of circumscribed consciousness is central for Max Adler in the pedagogy of socialism – how we educate others in relation to the social science of Marxism. 'Belief' and one's 'convictions' are not a prayer wheel, but rather the most realistic stance one can take to inform a praxis that steps into the future unknowns. One should create learning environs that inculcate the attitude of belief, and the personal exploration that leads to 'conviction', for the praxis that comes from such an 'existential' stance is the most certain way to generate the socialist realities to come.



Max Adler 1924, 'Belief as an Epistemological Concept', in *Das Soziologische in Kants Erkenntniskritik: Ein Beitrag zur Auseinandersetzung zwischen Naturalismus und Kritizismus* [*The Sociological in Kant's Epistemology: A Contribution to the Controversy between Naturalism and Critical Method*], Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, pp. 226–43

Let us now pursue the indispensable question, broached earlier, of Kant's concept of belief. We have seen how the subjectivity of ourselves in conjunction with our feeling enters into epistemological criticism, and what might initially seem paradoxical is that the concept of belief with Kant is another epistemological concept. The meaning Kant offers is not merely the traditional sense of the pious frame of mind by which in the undefined depths of inner life one loses oneself. It takes its place more as a logical, precise outcome beside the other outcomes of epistemological thought, and designates not so much the frame of mind, but the *noetic character* of religion. *Belief is the way of being of the religious consciousness*, just as it is then the experience of the theoretical or moral command of such a moral consciousness.

In this manner, belief and religion are exchangeable concepts for Kant. And from there, the concept of religion is so changed that it only has the name in common with how it had been understood heretofore. The Kantian religious concept is no longer theoretical, but rather developed completely from the foundation of its psychic activity, which in the individual consciousness is inherent as wish and hope. Inasmuch as all religion is thereby removed decisively from the objectivity of the theoretical, as well as from the moral judgement, the *subjective attitude of our consciousness* is thereby determined. *Religion is thus a variety of our subjectivity*, but one that does not merely occur by the pleasure of one who chooses such; rather, as we will see, one that must emerge out of the totality of our conditions of consciousness, where this totality achieves its inner effectiveness. Nothing other than this *subjective attitude*, which emerges from the nature of the unity of the theoretical and practical comportment, and therefore the claim of universality in its validity which it carries with it, is the meaning of the word *belief* with Kant.

This character of the Kantian concept of belief, which has become indelibly impressed on the consciousness of the modern individual, as soon as one has grasped it, puts aside forever the danger of reactionary misconceptions which will impose themselves as trains of thought instilled by traditional concepts of religion. In these misconceptions, belief is also where the subjective is found,

where there is a continual inner value, a dogma, or a learned principle of some religious cult. It relates always to something that should be believed; and this *matter* of belief comes forth very often with an unconditional demand that it is a healing truth that may be opposed to the mere knowledge of the world. Belief with Kant, however, *is not a concept of content*; he does not take up what should be believed, but rather focuses on the fact of belief itself, which he takes up as a particular, originating mental direction of the activity of human consciousness. Therefore, for Kant, there are not enough penetrating words for the style, or better lack of style, by which the dogmatic belief is to be differentiated from the critical concept of belief; he calls the dogmatic belief a 'compulsory and remunerated belief', which is dictated by the church, a 'priesthood' which controls it. [See here the following commentary]. Always he comes back to the fact that the belief imperative, the soul of the dogma, is quite different from his concept. 'A belief which is commanded is an absurdity', it states in the *Critique of Practical Reason*,¹⁶⁴ in direct opposition to statutory belief, and in the *Critique of Judgement* there is a direct opposition to statutory belief. The idea towards which the Kantian belief is directed he calls there a matter of belief, immediately adding: 'matters of belief are not therefore *articles of belief*, when one understands by the latter those matters of belief that one feels compelled by (in an inner or outer manner)'. Matters of belief, in the Kantian sense, are more 'a freely holding for the truth, and as such capable of being unified with the morality of the subject'.¹⁶⁵ And in his religious philosophy, in his concluding essay within *The Conflict of the Faculties*, it states once more with greater precision: 'Under principles of belief, one should not understand what should be believed (for belief does not institute an imperative), rather what in the practical (moral) view is possible to presume and is goal-oriented, whether it is capable of being proven or not, but within the practical (moral) conditions can be believed'.¹⁶⁶

164 [Adler in 1924 uses the Reclam edition of Kant's works, edited by Kehrbach and Raymund Schmitt. After 1924 he begins to use *Kants Werke*, edited by Ernst Cassirer, and published by Bruno Cassirer, between 1922–4. I will use the Cassirer edition throughout this and other writings of the Austro-Marxists, because it is more accessible in English-speaking libraries. See Kant 1922, *Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft*, p. 156; and the English translation in Kant 1956, p. 149].

165 See Kant 1922, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, p. 551, note; see the English translation in Kant 1952, p. 143, n. 1].

166 See Kant 1922, *Der Streit der Fakultäten*, p. 352; and the English translation in Kant 1979, p. 43.

Belief with Kant is thus really quite different from the positive belief of religion, and in its critical construction something new, and even today hardly known within the scholars of our time as an authoritative means of thought.¹⁶⁷ Therefore, it is impermissible to lose from sight, even for a moment, in taking up this foundational concept of Kant's religious philosophy what the word 'belief' connotes, particularly not in any way involving Christian religion as a belief system. It is not, thus, an insight into a world beyond, rather more a formal recognition of how our spiritual world communicates; only a formal insight, but one of the greatest importance in relation to the one-sided and narrow view of naturalism, which likes to characterise itself as free-thinking, without noticing how unfreely it relates to the problem of belief, that is, when it backs away frightened from the mere sound of the word 'belief', as did the pious Christ before the crucifix! When all that relates to belief simply belongs to the good tone of the modern standpoint, where it is relegated as a disreputable party [*partie honteuse*] of the human spirit by the principles of an 'enlightened' thinking, then this profound application which Kant gave to the concept of belief, placing it under the mantel of *critical* thought, would not have been used. Still more: now it is at the same time clear of the real, irrefutable position established in combating church belief, since it now puts to rest the dangerous objection that Kant's concept simply bypasses the psychic reality of the phenomenon of belief. And truly: if one would read Kant's writings as much as one argues against it, so one would know that the modern 'free-spiritedness' could derive its weightiest arguments against belief in the sense of the church from the religious-philosophical writings of Kant.¹⁶⁸

167 Kant himself finds it necessary, in avoiding misunderstandings, to warn that caution should be exercised 'with such an *uncustomary* [*so ungewohnten*] concept, as that of a pure practical reason' (Kant 1922, *Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft*, p. 155; and Kant 1956, p. 149).

168 At this point it is perhaps appropriate to discuss what Kant brought against the church belief, which had so brutally affected him, not only the accusations against him, but also the characterisations of him that live on in cultural memory; by dwelling upon these issues, perhaps we can destroy the view that Kant's practical philosophy was seen by him as a service to church belief. For Kant the essence of religion could be realised only upon the foundation of a concept of belief, but he had to take the most trenchant opposition to religion which saw itself as based upon a dogmatic, imperative belief, not wanting or allowing any other, as that which was commanded or, as it says in the language of this kind of religion, was revealed. Again and again Kant brought out in that writing that dealt with the historical existence of religion, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, the pure moral belief 'is that alone in church belief that creates what is really religion'. 'The belief of a religion of divine worship is a servile and mercenary faith (*fides mercenaria, servilis*) and

cannot be regarded as saving because it is not moral' (Kant 1922, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, p. 261; Kant 1934, p. 106). When Kant mentions the activity of cults 'which operate only through fear or hope, by compelled actions, which even an evil person can exercise, to make God amenable to them'. For that reason Kant cannot stress sufficiently how 'all the rubbish of pious, compelled observances' are neither the essence of belief, nor belong to religion, since moral religion 'is not articulated in principles and observances, rather in the orientation of the heart to observe all human duties as God has commanded' (Kant 1934, p. 167). This differentiates religion from a service to fetishes or service through one's backside [*Afterdienst*]; see Kant 1922, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, p. 329; Kant 1934, p. 167. For 'all that is beyond the change of life of humans for the good in order to please God is but merely religious madness and the serving of God with one's backside [*Afterdienst*]' (Kant 1922, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, p. 320; Kant 1934, p. 158). Under the authority of such principles 'the priesthood' necessarily 'rules by the constitution of the church, compelling a service to the fetish' (Kant 1922, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, p. 329; Kant 1934, p. 167), which is neither more nor less than fetishism itself. This is no more than a religion of paganism, because the form of the observance is not less multi-faceted and crude as it was in earlier times. When 'there is the imposition of submission to precepts as compulsory service, not free worship, these imposed observations, even if a few, are enough to declare that this is a belief in fetishes, governed by a group of people, through obedience under a church (not a religion), where one's moral freedom is taken away' (Kant 1922, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, p. 330; Kant 1934, p. 168). 'Whether the devotee betakes himself to church according to rule or whether he undertakes a pilgrimage to the sanctuaries in Loretto or in Palestine; whether he brings his formulas of prayer to the court of heaven with his *lips*, or by means of a *prayer-wheel*, like the Tibetan ... whatever is substituted for the moral service of God is all one and all equal in value' (Kant 1922, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, pp. 322–3; Kant 1934, p. 161). And, in fact, the service to the fetish reaches for Kant from the despised worshipper of gods to the pope who vainly sits on God's seat of judgement. For 'we can indeed recognise a tremendous difference in *manner*, but not in *principle*, between a *shaman* of the Tunguses and a European *prelate* ruling over church and state alike, or (if we wish to consider not the heads and leaders but merely the adherents of the faith, according to their own mode of representation) between the wholly sensuous *Wogulite* who in the morning places the paw of a bearskin upon his head with the short prayer, "Strike me not dead!" and the sublimated *Puritan* and Independent in Connecticut: for although there is a great difference in *manner*, insofar as the *principle* of their belief they are the same' (Kant 1922, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, p. 326; Kant 1934, p. 164). Thus, the historical church can neither realise the true religion nor be the true church, since the latter is a moral concept. The essential properties are lacking, the integrity, 'the union under no motivating forces other than moral ones (purified of the *stupidity* of superstition and the *madness* of fanaticism)' (Kant, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, p. 246; Kant 1934, p. 93).

Belief, then, which follows Kant, the moral belief or one can say also the pure rational belief, as he names it at different times, is truly not suitable to bring into proximity to the historical-dogmatic religions, as one can find even today in the representatives of the Catholic as well as the Protestant orthodoxy. When the modern Protestant theology integrates its thought with that of Kant, indeed energetically, it should not be overlooked to what degree the historic-dogmatic concept of Christianity already had been moving in this Protestant direction already, where it sought to generate out of its historical and traditional forms a new formulation which derived from its foundations of piety as well as of propaganda, wishing to preserve the historical connectedness to its older form, so that it would not neglect its identification with Christianity. All this is still in a fluctuating movement: but one can see in the writings of Eucken or Troeltsch or Kalthoff, to mention only a few of the leading names, indeed one cannot miss how the religious consciousness of the present is at work to create a new expression of faith informed by the foundations of modern spiritual development. And as this effort links itself directly to Kant, even as it hews its own singularly chosen paths, the historical reality of the revolutionary thought turn taken by Kant in his philosophy of religion, must be appreciated.¹⁶⁹

169 In recent time the connection between Protestantism and Kant has been raised quite often, not always in a justified sense, rather quite often with a mere slogan intended to show that his significance can be discounted because 'he was merely' a philosopher of the bourgeoisie. I must come back to these slogans. However, since the trenchant investigations of Paulsen, *Kant der Philosoph des Protestantismus*, and Bruno Bauch's *Luther und Kant*, everyone who had not yet been convinced from their own reading of Kant that the connection between Kant's religious philosophy and Protestantism was finally only a spiritual direction of mind, having nothing to do with the church, can rest assured that this was indeed the case. It is not within a dogmatic sense that a line of connection between Luther and Kant can be established, rather only in the history of thought in which Luther began a new internality and subjective self-determination in the conception of religion, no matter to what degree Luther was limited in his dogma. Paulsen has only reflected and found meaning in this foundational tendency as the essence of Protestantism, otherwise there is hardly a connection to Kant in other areas of his thought. But we are not concerned here merely with the individual Luther and his historic work. The Protestantism that is the issue is that which even Goethe saw as yet effective in its revolutionary value for all mental and spiritual life, when he said to Eckermann: 'We do not know everything which we have to thank Luther and the Reformation for. We are free of the shackles of narrow-mindedness, and in consequence of the constantly emergent culture, we have become capable of returning to the fount and grasping Christianity in its purity. We have again the courage to stand firmly on the ground of God's earth, and to feel our God-given human nature'. Certainly, this freedom was not an immediate

product of Protestantism, but science and art could achieve this because individuals moved in their thought and feeling with greater freedom, as that germ in its relation to the oppressive dogma, enabled it to grow, even as in external life these individuals still might be unable to shatter the chains of, nor hinder, Protestantism as it built its new church. With justification, therefore, Bauch states: 'One can separate the Protestant church from Kant by chasms, indeed worlds – nonetheless, the Protestant idea which Luther imparted to the world leads to Kant'. Certainly, Kant himself emphasised, one can be Protestant without belonging to a Protestant church (Kant 1922, *Der Streit der Fakultäten*, pp. 333–4). And in fact: Kant stood opposed to a church-based Protestantism as much as he did with scorn and mocking to the Catholicism or any other type of 'church belief'. Where he took issue with observances, belief in miracles, or other means of external piety, he does not differentiate between the schools of Christianity in his criticism. He does speak directly against Protestantism as a church in his critique of religion. Thus, he says at one point (in *Der Streit der Fakultäten*, in response to the brutal treatment he received from church censors, the morally, deeply injured philosopher gave a profound settling of accounts with the spiritual spokesmen of all confessions, these 'business people' of religion, and in spite of his age, took them on with a youthful fire in his criticism allowing them to feel his piercing wit) that church belief can be compared to paganism 'not implying thereby that such instruction is God's revelation', and that as soon as these teachings depart from moral content, rather without any reference to these are to be considered of value solely because of these revelations, such terms of abuse apply. If such church authority calls something holy or damns it, solely because of such beliefs, we must call them a 'priesthood', and thus even 'those who call themselves Protestant' with this honourable name not excepted, if the essentials of their belief lies in the principles of observances 'from which nothing of reason is expressed' belong (Kant 1922, *Der Streit der Fakultäten*, p. 362). He also mocks in another place the intolerance of the Protestant church towards Catholicism in its presumption of universality for its church doctrines 'as if they would not claim this if they could; and, if there are laudable examples to be given of protesting Catholics, there are also more striking examples of fundamentally Catholic Protestants; the first are examples of a broadening manner of thought (whether for the benefit of their church or not), while the latter with their narrowing manner of thought, which does not speak well for them' (Kant 1922, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, p. 254). In conclusion, one can only agree with Dr. H. Staeps, who writes the superior essay over 'Das Christusbild bei Kant', in the recent publication of the twelfth volume of *Kantstudien*, where he says: 'If one understands under Protestantism all the movements that arose in the Reformation as churches, then Kant cannot be included within this designation. If one means, however, the expression of religious independence, self-knowledge of the spirit, freed from every external authority and solely grounded upon one's own self-knowledge, researched, won, and lived as a religious conviction of belief, then Kant is through and through a protestant philosopher, who has put Protestantism upon a philosophical foundation within the autonomy of the moral personality' (Staeps 1907, p. 113). If one counters that this kind of Protestantism is quite different than that of the Church, one is correct, but the juxtaposition of these two positions only has importance

From what we have shown as the character of Kant's concept of belief, there arises another moment that must be attended that differentiates it from all the nightmarish elements that have arisen in relation to his concept, threatening to darken the light of knowing for which it strives. This is the circumstance in which the tension between belief and knowing dissolves. Belief and knowing are with Kant not antitheses: that is the great rehabilitation which in the midst of a generation that believes solely in reason, an entire – and perhaps more profound – side of our human consciousness has been experienced, that shows how belief and knowing, religion and naturalistic experience are absolutely different from one another, but do not oppose one another. They coexist, side by side, as it were, as they belong in the same consciousness; they do not oppose one another, *because belief is also an experience*, only on a different plane of our spiritual life than that of our natural experience.¹⁷⁰

If religion, as we have already remarked and more clearly will illustrate, represents that subjectivity of our spirit in which the totality of all its directions is sensed, as one seeks to grasp it in its unity, must it not then in its emergent

in its indication of a historical development we must be aware of, whose direction can be determined from Catholicism through Luther. It has just as little to do with a genetic connection between the Church and Kantian Protestantism, as it does by locating its core within the further development of the religious Reformation, rather is what can be seen in Ernst Troeltsch's *Das Historische in Kants Religionsphilosophie*, that Kant stood in opposition to Protestantism as well as Catholicism, in that in the eighteenth century a new generation of religion was sensed, a religion with statutes, that was in its very beginnings (Troeltsch 1904, p. 39). The great consciousness of reforming which is expressed in the Copernicus comparison was pervasive in this time, and contributed to his own spiritual development. It was not an extravagant state-of-mind in which Franz Mehring once said while one sought to place Kant in a line with Socrates, Christ and Luther, one might see this argument justifiably as how one is made aware of the real development of the religious consciousness.

- 170 Thus, the objection is disposed of which one readily cultivates when one discusses the division between knowing and belief. If belief is excluded from the realm that can be reached by scientific experience, are we not then thrust back into the fog of theology or mysticism? This danger only exists within an uncritical meaning of the term knowledge. For when belief necessarily is beyond experience [*Erfahrung*], it is not in the Kantian sense *outside of our lived experience* [*Erleben*]. It merely has no place within our natural existence. But we ourselves are more than nature, we are above all spirit, mentality, of which the entirety of nature is only a conceptual side, carried by it. Belief is an *inner* experience [*Erfahrung*], because it is never a part of the world of appearance, never can be external experience. And in this fact is one of the most profound parts of Kant's philosophy, which has taught us most deeply that life-experience and natural experience are not to be held as one and the same.

sensations of soul, which is belief, require differing representations and concepts, rather than be a mere endless row of experiential given-nesses that occur without a perspective or overview, as an unwinding spool of merely potential knowledge, due solely to our one-sided, limited interest? How should it be that such a separation in standpoints, in the ends, indeed in the areas themselves, where belief strives to encompass the entirety of the external and inner universes, that knowing is satisfied when it only addresses what is measurable and can be weighed under its aegis – how should then belief disturb this circle of knowledge? How can knowing err then in knowing belief, let alone in eradicating it? Knowing and belief fail to meet, although both constitute the mind and heart of living persons, the former lending the person power and the latter his confident expectation.

One guards this relationship between belief and knowing in the shallow manner that assures misunderstanding, which one could characterise as a double bookkeeping. One who conceives the separation of these two spheres of spiritual life in this manner has not comprehended Kant's meaning in his concept of belief. This 'double bookkeeping' which is so often encountered, where naturalistic consciousness wishes all within its compass, but cannot avoid addressing the demands of conscience with an uncritical child's belief, fostered by its customary attitude, piety, and uncertainty, putting out of its mind what might really be true of its presence – is quite other than Kant, who takes up with a lively, life-affirming 'Yes' the two particular spiritual directions. Kant's view is quite different from that sluggishness of thought, the emptiness of any sensational life, the torpor, indeed fear, of drawing any consequences by addressing the presence of belief. Kant's perspective means more than the allowance of a 'sphere of belief' beside what can be known 'scientifically' – such an expression is really an admission of incompetence by one's reason, where it exhibits a powerless or cynical denial of all problems which fall beyond its existent capability, and yet the deepest interest of human life speaks to the need for having a decision. Belief, when so shunted to the side as a presence, is then merely an inner being-possessed-by, a presence that emerges from the depth of the nature of our self, which holds profound answers to eternal questions, questions which serve to form how humanity understands its fate. To be sure, it is no longer then belief, rather a knowing, but a knowing that is irresolute and laughable, which one does not trust oneself, and whose maxim states: 'Science knows nothing about it, but – one cannot know, "whether"'. This kind of belief has nothing in common with the Kantian; it is above all not of a practical nature, rather in spite of all its weakness and self-shame a theoretical model: it is a *problematic* knowing, that is slipped into an argument beside the proud assertoric, indeed apodeictic science. And it should be seen as closer to the

religious side of consciousness, since we know that religion in its historical, that is, not purely developed form, always is strongly overlaid by theoretical elements. Yes, this knowledge is a problematic *knowing* of God's truths, that is, a view where its representations and concepts are not scientifically demonstrable, but are represented as real values nonetheless, which we cannot follow to their final grounds and essences in our knowing, yet still insisting that we have a critical point-of-view, even as this is but a vain hollowness and thoughtlessness. In such a view, genuine belief does not press beyond the boundaries of science, or seek to smuggle itself through any openings that might be found. This is the traditional view of belief, which has been taken up theoretically by many in modern science, who give it its circumscribed legitimacy on a distinct level, unfortunately one that it opposes to actual scientific understanding. This theoretical element, however, removes belief's character: for what I know, I do not need to believe. Belief has its place *only where nothing more can be known*, and then, one need not know it, because it is no longer a matter of knowledge, but of a willing. I know what I have available from my experience by dint of the lawfulness of my theoretical consciousness, I believe in that life *content that I cannot do without* by dint of the lawfulness of my practical consciousness.

This conception of belief as a mere problematic or circumscribed, critical knowing is a harmful misunderstanding, just as it is a confusion with its dogmatic manner of assigning meaning. We have spoken of a double bookkeeping, but not completely in the sense of this term, because we are dealing here with the effort to set two similar spheres beside each other, though mutually exclusive, without troubling ourselves further with this strange coexistence. For the Kantian division exists just in the fact that the spheres are not the same. The problematic knowing may stand with justification beside the evidential knowing in the 'double bookkeeping' understanding (although this disregards the philosopher Kant who eschews such a surface solution); the Kantian belief *does not exist beside knowing*, it comes beside it in consciousness only, for example, as the aesthetic sense is juxtaposed to knowing. That aside, belief is not a standpoint beside knowing, rather *another standpoint*, and only with the proof of its results do we know whether we are with this standpoint at the same level as knowing, or perhaps lower or higher than that of science. It is not 'double bookkeeping' that is before us, rather quite another kind of book has been opened. Perhaps the book of natural experience is the rough notebook of our life and the book of belief the main text, in which for the first time the entire commencement and departure of life are able to be seen.

When the concept of belief with Kant is just as little a dogma as a mere hypothetical knowing, when one first attends that the value of a theoretical certainty or probability has nothing to do with its true value, then it becomes

clearer what the new sense of the Kantian concept entails, where the concept of belief is nothing other than a special kind of holding some content as true. In this determination one sees most conspicuously the merely formal, epistemological nature of this concept, which in his critiques Kant always returns to.

The pointing to 'a special kind of holding-for-true' [*fürwahrhaltens*] one finds at the beginning of the critical work in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which he repeats in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, as well as in *Critique of Judgement*, where it is developed in its maturity. It revolves upon the little attention that has been given to the subjective a priori, which is taken up in the *Critique of Judgement* in its relation to his entire epistemology. In my estimation, the emphasis that Kant gives to 'this special kind of holding-for-true', has not been noticed, in that it is not merely an incidental or subordinate relation, rather a quite specific noetic category. The expression 'a special kind of holding-for-true' designates *in fact nothing other than the subjective a priori*, that Kant only later in his career critically analysed as a special area, where the observer, so to say, has a pure representation, the aesthetic, but which he had earlier so precisely characterised in his clearly developed concept of a special kind of holding-for-true, lacking at that time only its ordering as a fact under an epistemological concept. When he did not fulfill this fully in his *Critique of Judgement*, where the expression of a special kind of holding-for-true was still separated beside the illustration of the singular character of aesthetic subjectivity, even though its universality remained a premise, one must not forget that Kant had not advanced to a systematic application of this new a priori which appears in his Aesthetic as a practical concept, even when, as we have seen, he has already explained it in substance.

With the designation of belief as a special kind of holding-for-true, Kant has removed this concept from the objective side of knowing into the subjective side of conviction [*Überzeugungsseite*] of our consciousness. With that one does not say as one does in the manner of speech so often used that this mocks itself without knowing it because belief is here 'only' a conviction. Rather, belief wins thereby its subjective justification with knowing *as simply another kind of 'holding-for-true'*. For the subjective is for every kind of knowing a 'holding-for-true', and demands, when it is not solely something learned through instruction – which would be 'persuasion' [*Überredung*] as Kant names it – rather, its conviction.¹⁷¹

171 [Adler adds a footnote here that cites a passage in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and a long quote from Kant's *Critique of Judgement*. I reproduce this here in the translated sources. The German original is in Kant 1922, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Zweiter Teil, *Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft*, p. 543 (Par. 90)].

Belief differentiates itself then not by small increments of subjective truth value from knowing, but rather wholly by the kind of knowing in which conviction emerges its subject matter. With knowing, *the objectivity* of its object is established, as that is *external* experience. On the other hand, it is just the subjectivity of our inner life that gives belief its content. Here one not only does not need objectivity in order to form a conviction, but also objectivity cannot even enter the issue. The conviction of belief, which is a kind of 'holding-for-true', lies alone in the manner by which consciousness functions, which, even though its results remain completely subjective, corresponds to a universal spiritual disposition, whereby every claim of individual consciousness to a universal validity necessarily must arise. That does not change the fact that his condition is not brought to full development everywhere, as can be shown in the way in which idealistic or culture-bound thinking exhibits its pure 'positivism'. By that is meant only that belief evidences itself as a type functioning where it is accessible to the mind, even when not as a specific religious kind of thought; for belief in a historical advance, which we will see in our later discussion, can be a conviction, which as soon as science no longer supports it, indeed as is often the case, too quickly, with science, can still be a genuine belief in Kant's sense. A disbelief, however, need not be that which is combated by the religious form of belief, but rather in its failure of belief can be a hope for the human future and human fate in general, and thus is as little a counter-evidence of universal validity in the laws of consciousness that support belief, as the failing of scientific interest would be a testimony against the universal validity of the scientific consciousness.

In order to fully see into the nature of the a priori of belief, we have been able to establish these chief hallmarks: its subjectivity and practical character, which can no longer be seen as separate perspectives, but as an alternating concept.



See 'The Canon of Pure Reason', Section 3, Opining, Knowing, and Believing, in Kant 1965, pp. 645–6 [A 821–2, B 849–50]. In the *Critique of Judgement*: 'Whether a proof is derived from immediate empirical presentation of what is to be proved, as in the case of proof by observation of the object or by experiment, or whether it is derived a priori by reason from principles, what is primarily required of it is that it should not *persuade*, but *convince*, or at least tend to convince. The argument or inference, in other words, should not be simply a subjective, or aesthetic, ground of assent – a mere semblance – but should be objectively valid and a logical source of knowledge. If it is not this, intelligence is taken in, not won over' (see Kant 1952, pp. 132–3 [Par. 29 (90)]).

Belief, then, is based on the known, on scientific consciousness – a basis formed through critical inquiry. Ethics, then, is the same. We act towards ‘what is’ and that ‘which can be’ given ‘what has been’ as also a future possible. Diremptions and what Ortega y Gasset called the failure to be what we are exist. The following discourse on Ethics by Max Adler enables us to see why education was so important to him throughout his career of thought. Adler states in the essay that follows the key reality, which is the basis of Ethics:

We name as Good not only that which is, rather what we really want, that which we hold as worthwhile, or should be worthwhile. While at first appearance it seems that the ethical differentiation is a characteristic that we bring to our attention, with a closer understanding, we see that it is not the being of a thing to which we refer, rather the characteristic to which we point is of another kind of being, one that does not exist, something that as such should be. When I say: ‘Noble is man, helpful and good!’, it is clear that in this instance I speak of a reality, which ought to be. If I say, however: ‘You did that quite well, you are a noble individual!’, it might seem as if here an actual fact is praised, acknowledged, found as good. But that would be a mistake. The action is praised, not insofar as it happened, but because it was, at the same time, what should have occurred. It was not just dealt with; it was dealt with *correctly*. There is a correct expression for that in language, when one says in such a case: ‘You had your heart in the right place!’



Max Adler 1924, ‘The Given in Ethics’, in *Das Soziologische in Kants Erkenntniskritik: Ein Beitrag zur Auseinandersetzung zwischen Naturalismus und Kritizismus* [*The Sociological in Kant’s Epistemology: A Contribution to the Controversy between Naturalism and Critical Method*], Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, pp. 17–39

The problem of ethics is the differentiation of Good and Evil, the investigation of that ‘secret regulator of human behaviour, the moral law’,¹⁷² by which we are instructed how to strive for the Good and to avoid Evil. But the task of Ethics

¹⁷² Kautsky 1906, p. 2 [this text is available in reprint from Kessinger Publishing Legacy Reprints: <https://www.kessinger.net>].

is not specifically determined in this. For the facts of a moral differentiation can become the object of psychology, sociology, indeed, in certain instances, physiology. We will come to the determination that in the differentiation of Good and Evil, we indicate not only the characteristics of certain objects – for the moment, we will not consider which objects receive this designation. Rather, we will also indicate with the predicate Good or Evil something beyond things and what they are, as when we say something is round or large or heavy; rather, the properties of the ethical expression exist in that we demand either the realisation or the rejection of their presences, even though these are only actualities that are somehow admitted or rejected. We name as Good not only that which is, rather what we really want, that which we hold as worthwhile, or should be worthwhile. While at first appearance it seems that the ethical differentiation is a characteristic that we bring to our attention, with a closer understanding, we see that it is not the being of a thing to which we refer, rather the characteristic to which we point is of another kind of being, one that does not exist, something that as such should be. When I say: 'Noble is man, helpful and good!', it is clear that in this instance I speak of a reality, which ought to be. If I say, however: 'You did that quite well, you are a noble individual!', it might seem as if here an actual fact is praised, acknowledged, found as good. But that would be a mistake. The action is praised, not insofar as it happened, but because it was, at the same time, what should have occurred. It was not just dealt with; it was dealt with *correctly*. There is a correct expression for that in language, when one says in such a case: 'You had your heart in the right place!'

Thus, it is not merely the being of something or its occurrence that is grasped by the ethical differentiation; rather it concerns quite another actuality, that which is not, but rather ought to be. And we gain thereby the first and most important specific determination of the *ethical* differentiation, that is always related to a Should. Certainly, one must understand and keep in mind that it does not therefore turn on some definite *should* with pre-existent content, *but rather the should* as a *form* of reflection, that is, that form in which the content must always enter in order for it be perceived as an ethical command. The relation of the action, in respect to the will, which is based on a should constitutes the difference between good and evil in an ethical sense. There is no other definition of the good derived from the concept of such a differentiation other than: good is that what one should.¹⁷³ With that the real problem of ethics is shown to be *the problem of the ought*.

173 It would be premature to assert that with that too little has been said. For in this 'should' is the lawfulness of the *practical comportment* of our nature, brought to a clear concept as the 'cannot-be-otherwise' of the lawfulness of the causal occurrence. With such a causal

In ethics we never have anything to do with a being or an occurrence, also not what is especially to be attended, with a being or occurrence of the good, rather the ethical problem first arises when we venture that in this being or occurrence in which we partake, a demand is raised that its actuality should be in some way *different* from how it really is. This demand increases in its strangeness when, moreover, we have recognised that things, as they are, *necessarily* within the original givenness of their material characteristics and in their causal connectedness, *must be as they are*.

Thus, we will have arrived at that point where the given is at the greatest distance from the should, and we will in that ethical experience begin to investigate the given! It is in fact this objection that is usually raised from the standpoint of the natural sciences, but even there one can see the characteristic of the ethical problem wrongly at play: that, namely, with the concept of the should one leaves the ground of the given, because the should is not, but merely should be. Certainly, this is what Kautsky had in mind when he employs Schopenhauer's famous criticism of Kant, attacking Kant's 'not exceptional' writing on the foundations of morals, in which Schopenhauer quotes Kant's dictum: 'In a practical philosophy, one does not give the reasons why what has occurred, rather the law of that which should occur, even if that never happens', adding mockingly: 'Who told you there are laws that actions should be placed under? Who told you what should occur that never occurs? – What right do you have beforehand to suppose and subsequently that an ethic in a legislative-imperative form as the only possible law is at-hand? I say in opposition to Kant that the ethicist, as well as the philosopher must simply be satisfied with an explanation of what actually exists, that is the real being or occurring, in order to reach an understanding that has been reached by others for thousands of years'.¹⁷⁴ In this vein we see Kautsky attack Kant's ethics, which through the categorical imperative of the moral law seeks to establish another kind of causal connectedness. The moral law, however, which he refers to on page 40 of his work,¹⁷⁵ 'falls in to the realm of experience, and can be recognised as the necessary effect of a cause – and only as that can one know it as an object for scientific study'. In asserting that Kant ignored this path, he is saying that Kant did not offer a scientific understanding of ethics, but rather barricaded all paths to such a scientific understanding of ethics. Or – as Schopenhauer expressed it, the German

necessity and ethical acknowledgement in how the definition of the good is classified, the thought is most efficiently secured by the first area, which then can be located upon the ground of the second.

174 Schopenhauer 1891, p. 500.

175 Kautsky 1906, p. 40.

language is not capable of delineating the entire perversity of ethics, in that, instead of dealing with what is, it takes its departure from that which should be – and here lies the disturbing *petitio principii*, ‘the false onset’ (próodos pseúdos).

Only then, if we are to use the Greek expression, we see where the ‘false onset’ really lies. Or, more clearly articulated: is there a more fateful error than that one does not see from the beginning *what really is given as an ethical phenomenon?*

Certainly, we will proceed from the given. But what is the given in ethics? Does not one see immediately an immense derailment when thought begins by seeing the given as nothing other than what is and occurs, also, natural existence? The question is not raised whether in the realm of human experience still other elements are given which can be differentiated from natural elements, that these appear as more than the matter that carries them, as they strive to be formed according to a value point-of-view. Valuing appears from this perspective immediately as a primary given just as causal thought. Schopenhauer proceeds quite naively and dogmatically, as do others who follow in this train, when he commits a *petitio principii* by deeming the correct path of thought to be that the given of the moral area has the same quality in the moment as the natural occurrence. This take on the specified quality is to be denied. It is not the ‘imperative’ ethic that takes it legislative form ‘prior’, rather the converse: with an investigation that begins with the natural experience, *before all proof* is established, to say that the ethical is the same kind of given as the natural – that is, *the not-ethical* – is to keep the grounds unclear as to what the differentiation of the ethical really means.

But is there really no other given besides that of nature? Are being and occurrence the only external realities, yet is not the Should real? I mean: is not the should a given in our experience, *a being*, only that it is not an element of natural experience, rather of ethical experience? Schopenhauer – and he serves here as before as a type – begins his establishment of ethics as a science with a great error, in not seeing how it is also a being, not of existence in its contents, but rather as a Should. There is not only a being of the existent and what occurs, rather with *the same determination* one can know the being of the Should. Whoever finds a difficulty here suffers under the frequent confusion of the Should with its content, the Should-Be. It is the destiny of the Should that it only has reality as a command, but the fulfillment of the command does not necessarily establish what was commanded. The being of the Should does not guarantee the being of the Should-Be. Because of that the Should is not less a reality, a living presence perceived in its actuality by the manner in which my entire internality reacts to its demands, whether in joy, in a pained obedience,

in a spiteful denial or cynical disobedience. Even when the Should-Be really was not, because it proved itself beyond all human strength – Kant had doubted whether a genuine moral act was empirically possible – this does not take away the reality of the Should, does not detract from the being of the Should an atom of its existence. For it is the being of the *Should*, not the occurrence, that we have before us. And the lacking differentiation of these two kinds of being, of the one essence found in its existence, the essence of the other in the existence as a Should, has until the present generated in its wake a methodological confusion and nadir of ethical knowledge. So long as one does not clearly recognise that I need not bring to the givenness of the ethical a single *actual* moral act, if I have nonetheless an idea of it, then one does not know what a genuine ethical problem is. For to believe that the idea of an ethical act is to be taken from an actual ethical act is approximately similar to the smart aleck who says that the round shape of the earth is proven by any globe. So, the brusque outcry, ‘Who told you that should occur which never does?’, wards off the concept of the Should from the onset of the ethical investigation, and in that there is not only no prevention of a *petitio principii*, rather the converse, the barricading against any *initium principii*.

That becomes fully clear when one attempts with particular diligence to conceptually distinguish the several parts of his experience, and so for the first time indelibly recognises how the given of the Should enters into the context of our experience in its singular manner. So long as one considers the given only as that which is real and which occurs, one does not respect that one has only indicated a part of experience, namely, natural experience, or, as this is completed in our knowledge of nature, the *theoretical* experience. But we exist not only as theoreticians, we are not only knowing beings, and are not this primarily; rather we are above all those who take positions, and from this position-taking, we are acting beings. As such we have our own experience, which relates in every instance to our will and goals, which is not directed so much to knowing as to action, and therefore the theoretical makes way for the *practical* experience. These two areas of experience are not to be conceived of in *one* characteristic. They are really two worlds, and if ethics as a knowledge of the right will and action has its place in the practical world, it is clear here that its problem from the natural scientific point of view, whether it is Marx or Darwin who brings this to the high point of knowledge, does not suffice in this question.

Natural experience grasps being and occurrence, its becoming and transpiring in the world accessible to our entirety of knowing. Our knowing in this relation is completely objective, that is, its conceptions are not influenced by the subjective condition of the observer, nor are they in any way altered in

the forms of its actuality. The ego withdraws here behind the objective context of natural occurrences, so one can say that in consequentially carried out, fully developed systems of natural knowledge the ego is not present, rather the entirety of the causal context *is immediately known*. This dissolution of the subject effects the substantial, objective character of the natural experience, but the effect is that of a lack of soul, of which I spoke earlier.

What is essential is then not solely the standpoint of the lifeless or animal nature, rather that of all that is human and of the living together of persons in society.¹⁷⁶ Every human activity, in all its reason and madness, in all its pleasure and pain, striving and coping, in all its power of will as well as torpor – is in terms of space and time the transpiring of a natural occurrence, but only to be comprehended in its particular emanation as a social occurrence, even as it is not entirely conceptually different from a natural occurrence. So understood, as the silent, inexorable process of natural law, as well as the great repose and even temper that is possibly concomitant with it, Goethe referred to Spinoza's well-known words: 'The affective life, as hate, anger, envy, when considered as coming with the same necessity and power of nature ... I will consider then nature and the powers of affect and power by the same laws, and deal with them with the same methodology ... and consider human actions and desires as if they were lines, surfaces, or bodies'. In the realm of the animate, which must be taken up by laws, just as the inanimate, one meets the affects and the will in an appearance whose manner of inner experience is singular. But when the naturalistic outlook confronts something that goes beyond its organic experience, it doesn't change essentially the nature of its object. Where human will enters its processes, the naturalistic outlook considers it as it does an inanimate process conceptually, namely, under the concept of causal law, only here in its special form as a motivational occurrence. The will fulfills itself according to the characteristic process of a natural law, which robs it of its

176 Social experience is thus raised into view as a particular kind of experience that differs from natural experience, something not heretofore attended sufficiently, namely, that area which I have designated as the transcendental-social relation of the contents, which is the relation of knowing in which the human psychic comportment *is within the individual person* necessarily through the categories of universal validity, whose concomitant boundaries lawfully constitute the relation to every other who enters the experience of the knowing subject. However, this characteristic – and that is the decisive factor for the establishment of the concept of the social, and for the social science that is derived from it – does not go beyond the area of the theoretical experience, and thus cannot be further developed in this discussion. See in this regard my *Kausalität und Teleologie im Streite der Wissenschaft* (Adler 1904, p. 369).

subjective content, removes its soul, and makes it into a thing. Just that which constitutes its singular character, its spontaneity, the self-consciousness of its being activated, is all lost necessarily to this theory of motivation, which the determination of the processes of will through its motives requires. If one holds fast, rigorously, to the actuality of the will as spontaneity, one must say: in the content of natural appearances, *from the standpoint of theoretical experience, there is actually no will*; there is only causality and motivation, that is, an unconscious process of causality within consciousness in general.

The phenomenon of the will takes us beyond the mere naturalistic reflection. There is another kind of reflection that addresses *the same object*, but grasps it in a wholly different manner from naturalistic reflection. Now, all that is and occurs is observed not in its character, rather *in relation to the observer himself*; and now, the subject appears. No longer is it a matter of the objective context of the things in their relation to each other; rather the particular subjective relations which form the actuality of the subjects among each other is the concern. And there are the two great directions which divide the two sides of the actuality into its relations. If we cleave immediately to our sensations, we have to make do with the aesthetic reflection, whereby it can be the only point-of-view considered. But if our relation is to the wills established, we are considering the natural occurrence as it is within the consciousnesses involved, of *its originators* who participate in this occurrence, and thus we have *the practical* point-of-view, in this sharper, but not mistaken, meaning that stands beside the theoretical viewpoint.

Here, first, is the will in its appearance. And it is a vulgar-empirical prejudice to understand the will as nothing other than a power, similar to gravity. The will is not a blind power, rather a direction of consciousness; it is not a power of nature, rather a power that resists nature. For it is that direction of consciousness in which the subject of a part of a natural occurrence relates to it as its only originator, so that he places himself in it as its beginning; this is a conception which is contrary to any naturalistic standpoint, in both meanings of the word. The will in this specific sense – *is also a given* – from which one cannot escape, because it is the practical reality which makes one oneself, as we experience it in every action anew. However, it is a given that one can only correctly understand when one carefully separates its boundaries from all naturalism.

Thus, there is here an important insight, especially regarding Kautsky's attempt to resolve the ethical problem, that is, the Darwinian-oriented ethics, where what is the essential moment is the instinct or drive – called desire – has nothing to do with the will in a practical sense in which it first constitutes a specific – as we will see – ethical problem. One must understand this before one

can be disabused forever of the opinion voiced by the command of Solomon: 'Go among the ants and learn!', seeing then that ethics has its own problems with their own meaning.

Certainly, one must not be led into error by the carelessness of everyday speech, which often brings actions of instinct and drive under the name of actions of the will. One can see in jurisprudence this recognition, where quite markedly a differentiation is made that separates what is willed from what is clearly a drive or compelling desire, which create inexorable compulsion. One who does something instinctively knows nothing of will, and one who feels driven has no will. This is first recognised where consciousness as an effecting agent is recognised, where we – as one has so well expressed it – are the doer of our deeds. And in that we arrive at a third determination of what is given in the practical area: *the feeling of freedom* is inseparable from the will as a practical phenomenon. No penetrating knowledge of a pervasive motivation can set aside the consciousness of the freedom of the will; what cannot be overlooked here is that Kautsky must also concede this, as from his standpoint of causal explanation – from which no freedom can really exist – he says: 'For one's actions the feeling of freedom is an unavoidable psychological pre-requisite, which no knowledge can obviate'.¹⁷⁷

We will return to this 'feeling of freedom'. In conjunction with this, the following remark is necessary. The feeling of freedom is not, as Kautsky means, merely a psychological phenomenon, that 'stems from the unknowingness of the future, and the necessity to effect it actively'. It is there even if I have quite definitely ascertained what will be. Even if our knowledge was sufficient to determine what I could do on the 24 July 1907, at 12:45 pm, and I could calculate the results of that action exactly, I would have had *first to will* at some point what had been *premeditated*. For the calculation – the knowledgeable understanding – determines for me merely my knowledge of willing, but not the willing itself. *Calculation does not replace the will*. And in this act of will,

177 [Kautsky 1906, p. 37. Kautsky's text makes clear his Darwinian difference from Adler's transcendental epistemology, based as it is upon the essential character of human consciousness, as he writes further that this 'unavoidable psychological prerequisite' is 'not a monopoly of the human, rather is the same for animals. These also possess freedom of the will in the sense, just as the human, of a subjective, unavoidable feeling of freedom that stems from the unknowingness of the future, and the necessity to effect it actively' (see Kautsky 1906, p. 37). This naturalistic standpoint has no need for the *subjective a priori*, the laws of mind that govern the processes of intention, will, deliberation, empathy, and other *subjective processes* of knowing and acting included within the Kantian perspective of the laws of consciousness].

which I have calculated to the minute before its onset, I will experience again as the originator of my decision, and perhaps even hesitate as to whether I should carry out my design, or in the wake of it, experience a remorse, wanting to have willed otherwise. Thus, in this point it is quite clear how the given of the will by dint of consciousness exercises a spontaneity that falls beyond the naturalistic perspective, and that the causal and the practical are really of two different worlds, even if they are found in one and the same milieu.

When the ominous word of freedom of the will is once articulated, one must guard carefully against misunderstandings. Therefore, it is certainly not superfluous to remark that I have not yet expressed in this context a complete perspective concerning the freedom of the will. I have not come out either for or against its possibility, but rather have only spoken of the consciousness of this freedom, whether it is a reality or appearance *in its givenness*, which nonetheless must be acknowledged if one seriously wishes to derive an ethics from the given.

And that is still wholly not the case, as long as those, such as Kautsky, consider the freedom of the will as merely a psychological phenomenon. The antithesis of the realm of freedom and necessity was neither designated by his realms of the past and the future, nor through nature and society, since both the future and society are realms of necessity, and basing freedom upon our ignorance of both would be to create a genuine Asylum ignorantiae. And has not Engels shown with some justification that greater knowledge of society means the spring out of the realm of necessity into that of freedom? Indeed, in a certain sense the antitheses of cause and ends, of occurrence and action, lead to the antithesis of necessity and freedom.¹⁷⁸ But then consequently, one must be aware that the theoretical deliberation has moved over *into a quite different area*, namely, that of the practical.

So we see as well: beside the given of natural existence and occurrence one can see – aside from the aesthetic – still another given *that does not occur* in natural experience, and therefore can be easily denied. It encompasses all that is not through knowing, but through willing and relation to all that is given thereby, creating a border of actuality for our consciousness that separates the realm of static causal connectedness with the realm of volitional freedom. And only from and within this contextual character is the Should possible. For a Should within the thorough determination of a causal context is without sense.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸ Kautsky 1906, p. 37.

¹⁷⁹ One can call it the characteristic illusion that the individual *experiences* the causal determination in itself. But then one has left the sphere of the merely natural givenness and takes

For the correctness of this alternative there is a classical witness, whose statement is even the more important as he is our principle opponent; I mean none other than Schopenhauer himself. And I would like to go more deeply into this witness not only because it will give us a more effective view, but also because I have already remarked how Schopenhauer here represents a type of how the naturalistic establishment of ethics functions, a quite valuable type, since his naturalism is exercised in a thorough critique of the greatest opponent, Kant, with arguments which have been taken up since then by empiricists as well as relativists.¹⁸⁰

In one section of the aforementioned critique of Kant's ethics, Schopenhauer once more explains his thesis of the programme of naturalistic ethics, namely, the ethicist must begin with the given in the following way, which becomes almost the lead phrase for later materialistic, historical, or biological derivations of ethics. It says there, following another energetic rejection of the opinion that ethics has anything to do with the Should:

Against that I will explain the idea of an ethics of ends [*Zweck*], which in a moral perspective intimates highly different ways of acting among humans, taking our discussion to this causal foundation. Thereby, we will

up experience as an element, which belongs to that context in which natural existence is conceived of by us *as something other*, in this instance as an illusion – we will not argue with that now – and one has also conceded at the same time that in order to specifically comprehend the Should, one must go beyond natural existence.

180 It is no accident that Schopenhauer, who has been considered a Kantian, because he called himself one, but did not study him in depth, is in ethics an outspoken opponent of Kant, so that he treats his practical philosophy continually with disparagement. This really is occasioned by his lack of understanding of the theoretical philosophy of Kant. Of this he had only that of the popular parts, of space and time, with regard to his grasp of the transcendental aesthetic, but otherwise his understanding of Kant was debilitated by an absence of the transcendental logic and its role in causality, turning his own thinking of causality into that of the cloak of Maja. Thus, he could arrive at a world of illusion instead of a world of appearance, and from the greatest dissolution of metaphysics, creating a new one which seemed a necessary consequence in destroying the old. One has frequently demonstrated that Schopenhauer's philosophy together with its metaphysics of will is fundamentally more an agnostic, critically-draped materialism or monism, than an epistemological idealism, but here we need not take up this issue. It is enough to point out how Schopenhauer can be understood in his naturalistic ethics, and how this philosopher, because of the wide dissemination of his writings, contributed to the misunderstandings of the vulgar conceptions of Kant that are still being created, and that we still must take up.

see that the discovery of the fundamentals of ethics has no other path than the empirical, namely, to investigate whether there are any actions which can be recognised as *having a genuine moral value* ... These are to be considered as a given phenomenon, which we explain correctly, that is deriving the ethical from its actual grounds, within which each characteristic motive is indicated, which move persons to act in this or that specifically distinct manner.¹⁸¹

This thesis is notable for its dogmatic-uncritical manner in which naturalism enters into the ethical problem. He slips it in quite naïvely and without examination in a few small words, giving no attention to how these words, which are grounded in natural experience, overthrow the moral conception. It is the small word 'genuine' [*echt*]. Does Schopenhauer desire that one must first investigate everything which has been considered moral, in order to derive what has 'genuine value'? What does 'genuine value' mean within the context of reflection that Schopenhauer suggests? If I begin from *the given*, isn't one given the same as any other? What would be for me the 'genuine value'? And in order to speak in the manner of Schopenhauer, may we now ask: What is that for a shameless *petitio principii*? Who says to you that there is a genuine value, and where does one get the freedom, within all that has been found to be moral, to pick out something as that which has a genuine value, and then with a charlatan's estimation cry: only here is the genuine value to be found?

It is certainly clear by now what the naturalistic programme in its acute break has been indebted to: that which has genuine value is plainly what should be. The small word 'genuine' merely disguises the despised 'Should'. And Schopenhauer, who wishes to remain consequential as an ethical investigator, must *volens nolens* remain within the specific character of the ethical problem; as we will see later, that will be the same fate that Kautsky fulfills in a rather similar form. For in the same moment in which Schopenhauer cleaves to his foundational principle, that which really is and occurs, in order to single out what is good or bad, he goes immediately from the maxim in which he alone finds what is appropriate for an ethical investigation, which is that it should be called good or bad, that is, have genuine value, if it *deserves* to be called so. The consequences of this empirical standpoint are immediately present. All actions designated as good presume *the givenness of the good*, and must be explained as such, just as empiricists and relativists do, only that this then is no longer an ethical problem, rather one of psychology or cultural history.

181 Schopenhauer 1891, p. 576.

In beginning an ethical investigation one must protect oneself from the occasion of committing a *próodos pseúdos*, a false beginning, in order to avoid a grievous error: as in the history of human thought, unfortunately there often occurs this confusion and misuse of differing kinds of conception where particular standpoints run in and out of each other. When one does not take care how one sets the moral perspective upon a quite different ground as that which is taken by the naturalistic point-of-view, one's investigation into the object of the ethical problem will be then solely within the realm of natural knowing with its methodologies, thereby never escaping the dilemma of an investigation which reaches unserviceable results with unserviceable methods; this does not remain unpunished in the history of thought, rather for centuries its enduring confusion will be penalised, so that the powerful effects of Kant, first now, after more than one hundred years, begins to shed a little light.

The Should stands in an antithetical relation to being; that is the starting point which must be taken as the fixed point if we will have named the real focus of the ethical problem. It then *is not the differentiation of good and evil in itself* that is the real problem; rather that lies wholly in *the formal character of willing*, which the Should indicates as a kind of will which is without contradiction and universally valid. Now the question gains another meaning, that of moral law. For now it is from the beginning clear that the moral law validates only *moral experience*, because it is only the lawfulness of *this* experience. This experience, as we already know, is not within what occurs, rather in that which relates to the will, and so it is self-evident that we cannot find the lawfulness of ethical appearances in the area of causality. Moral laws can only relate to us as willing subjects. And – even though this is not free from objections, but will serve for the time as it is expressed – while the Must (cannot-be-other-than-it-is) has the lawful form of the occurrence, the Should has the lawful form of the will.

Again, it is characteristic of the naturalistic misunderstanding of ethics when Schopenhauer in his attack of the 'imperative' form of moral law states that there is only one a priori law for the will, and this is the law of motivation. We have already shown how this characteristic of the lawfulness of will can be eliminated. In actuality, we have here only a phenomenon. Quite the contrary, without doubt when one first knows the will in its ethical meaning, insofar as the question of what evidence of the laws of will can be established, it is not that motivation. For in asking this I will not know what law determines its appearance as a natural phenomenon, which because we have experienced it in the actuality of its process have named as a process of will, rather whether there is a law by which this actuality, this experience-of living-itself-as-real [*Sich-selbst-als-wirkend-erleben*], is necessary and universal in its manner of

functioning, and what kind of determination is it. First, with *this* concept of a law of willing itself is the self-determination fulfilled that concerns the whole scope of the moral givenness, and only then does one understand the essence of the practical conception in its internal content, and only then is an ethics possible that has a certain object in view.

It is thus not surprising that one must see a *petitio principii* in the naturalistic concept of the givenness of the ethical, since the moral lawfulness must be presumed as different from that of the causal. Its objections to this indicate only its limitations. And one sees now why within the *ethical* discussion the different directions of the naturalistic ethic are all unfruitful, whether from the standpoint of utilitarianism or eudaimonism, or as the doctrine of social instincts or rational evolutionism. The argumentation of naturalism is always insufficient in its posing of the problem of the object which can be dealt with in an ethical discussion: in that it dissolves every Should into some type of Must, failing to recognise how it removes the ethical and conducts its argument solely in the realm of the theoretical, which finds the moral mistakenly in cultural history.¹⁸²

To avoid another misunderstanding it should be remarked that the biological-genetic and historical-economic reflections upon ethical phenomena have complete justice in their assertions, and within that realm should exclude with all decisiveness any other causal explanations. For they do not operate within the realm of the essence of ethical values; rather their representations are of historical constructions and historical transformations, that is, with a being or an occurrence. In their realms all that appears as a Should, which is to be derived from its natural determinations, are already facts of the Should of which they wish to show the cause of their changing content, not, however, of

182 I do not intend here to confuse my point with that made by R. Stammler. Stammler has now, in the second edition of his book *Wirtschaft und Recht*, striven with great energy to substantiate the differentiation between the causal and the teleological laws, without, however, fundamentally making clear the antithesis of the theoretical and the practical conceptions. In that he still holds that the practical is the social, but also identifying this social with the Social in general, whereby he arrives at the strongest position that the practical is an epistemological condition of the social, and creates thereby a social science whose essence exists not theoretically, rather merely from a practical standpoint, and not, therefore, seeking 'a truth', but solely for communicating the objectively correct. By this limitation, all specific concepts of theory and practice, science and ethics, are baselessly intermingled, and the result of Stammler's very meaningful, indeed epoch-making work, transmits also the greatest confusion as a critical foundation for the social sciences. What can be discussed point-by-point here must go unsaid, but I hope to address this in another place.

the enduring form. The causal question here is: why do I hold this or that to be good? How has it come to be that the ethical differentiation arises in regard to these contents, so that I perceive this or that as a *Should*? The critical-ethical question, on the other hand, is this: What is this *Should*, this for-good-holding in itself, which is always its own content? Should I hold *Sollen* [*the Should*] to be that, or is it more an instinct and drive, the customary and inherited, something taught and of class-consciousness? The ethical question is thus chiefly not *what* is to be distinguished as good or evil, but rather in what does this differentiation of essence itself lie, and – which is the most salient point – how do we establish this differentiation upon each step of its historical development, confronting thereby all oppositional points-of-view, as we claim its universal validity in each moment we connect it to the laws of willing in themselves? With justification Kautsky has designated, in his quite trenchant address of the ethical problem, as we will see below, the phenomenon of *duty* as the cardinal problem of ethics. For in the concept of duty one can find the consciousness of the universal validity in its demand for that which is perceived as duty.

Here Kautsky believed he could carry out his causal explanation. And his efforts for the clarification of the ethical problem are of more value, not only because of the richness of his observations for a historical understanding of ethical appearance, but also because he consciously, and with complete justification, represents the most modern standpoint here of the possibility of a causal explanation. Yet, as we have shown, the principle opposition to the ethical problem from the standpoint of causal knowledge must founder, as we will more fully amplify below.

Otto Bauer

Otto Bauer's address of 'national character' synthesised several philosophical, social-scientific, and natural-scientific perspectives that emerged from the late nineteenth century into the decade in which he wrote the most significant book of his career, *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy* [*Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*] (1907). His approach to 'nation' is from the fulcrum of 'national character'. And, for Bauer, national character is a complex cognitive foundation that generates a praxis, which integrates many levels of individual, family, community, and societal historical legacies and self-representations. This complex cognitive foundation, which is the amalgam of 'national character', is found in every judgement and judgement-based behaviour of an individual. The individual, through his or her comprehension of a state of affairs, directs his or her will towards a certain kind of engagement with others that has a certain horizon of possibility and meaning. The 'national character', which the person inherits from his or her upbringing and education, determines the contours of this comprehension, and thereby the person's praxis.

What is remarkable about Bauer's treatment of this complex cognitive basis of judging and praxis is the detailed menu for further research into the role of a cultural nation upon the thought and praxis of the individual. The individual for Bauer is always an interdependent being, who may or may not fully realise his or her embeddness in the cultural milieu of others. Interdependence is a Marxist understanding; indeed, Marx was the first to fully comprehend the gravity of this interdependence, and how vital the concept was for social scientific inquiry. Bauer's concept of 'national character' shows how a Marxist can augment Marx's own conceptual direction, particularly in the problems posed by the inheritance of cultural differences if an interdependent cooperation among humankind is to be realised. Bauer wrote this work before World War I, and since that time global organisations have begun the attempt to facilitate the factual economic and environmental interdependence so significant for our contemporary world. Bauer formulates 'national character' as a complex amalgam of beliefs, a 'life world' that sets the stage for certain horizons of understanding and possible directions of judgement and action. Yet this national character is not a static entity, even as many who act within their understandings of culture see its horizons as enduring. National character is laden with constraints to the openness to others who are not of the same cultural inheritance and who obstruct interdependence. Bauer helps his readers to see that this obstruction, which bourgeois societies of particular nations do

not recognise in themselves, can be changed through the reorientation of education and praxis. National character is never constant, its development is upon a ceaselessly changing cultural ground, and thus the very ground upon which its constraints on societal interdependence can be addressed. By focusing upon the 'direction of willing' insofar as how states-of-affairs were situated in the belief systems of an individual, Bauer was able to peel away, and display, the horizon of the person's 'life world' in its embeddedness in the practices of his or her milieu. As a Marxist, Bauer saw clearly the changing cultural bases of persons who carried the complex intentions of cultural inheritance, as well as the constant augmentations to this inheritance, generated by the immediacies of a changing political, social, and technological world. The many differing levels of personal, family, and societal memberships are given by Bauer *a concept* for their individual separation for being studied – that is, the 'character of the willed object', or, as the philosophers of Bauer's age began to call it, 'the intentional object' that guided choice and behaviour.

In this central conception of the 'willed object' that informed the praxis of individuals in its differing perspectives, Bauer was indebted to Max Adler's *Causality and Teleology in Conflict Over Science* [*Kausalität und Teleologie im Streite Um Die Wissenschaft*] (1904).¹ Adler's discussion of the 'social will', which is understood in the Kantian perspective as a category of consciousness that is overlaid with cultural content in its direction of expression, is translated in this anthology in his 1924 discussion of the concept in 'The Social Character of Mental Life' and 'The Will to Advance', in *The Sociological in Kant's Epistemology*. Bauer used the concept of the 'social will' in a complexity of layers with specific historical differentiations that Max Adler did not pursue, as Adler's concern was a clarification of the epistemological understanding of this concept. Moreover, Bauer foresaw by a generation the call for research into cultural-historical differentiations of a social will that the great Austrian phenomenological philosopher, Edmund Husserl, would call for in 1934–5. It is worthwhile to quote Husserl's entire passage, as one can see it fulfilled theoretically, and for its time with factual content, in the 1907 work by Bauer:

The multiplicity of cultures are differentiated from each other by the particularity of their categories of goal-orientations. We speak of the unity of the German, the French, etc. cultures. Again, of the European culture.

¹ See especially Max Adler 1904, pp. 140–1, for Adler's concept of 'Zweckwollen', or the 'willed goal-orientation', which is noted as having historical boundaries as it changes over time in cultures.

In the unity of the national there is a historical personality, expressed in one's personal associations and communities of interest, but these are not merely known side-by-side with one another in their separate goals, rather as included within the nation in its national goal-orientations; the nation is a closed (a comprehensive) personality, and thus all the included personalities ordered within it (the sub-associations) are synthesised by its contextual ends.

Within a national history the special cultures have their history. The question is how precisely can we determine the cultural sphere as a closed as well as historical culture.

There are further, more differentiated questions in the face of this problem.

We have the problem of what the nation is in a pregnant sense, that is defining its personality as a higher-ordering concept, as well as what would be super-national, that is a regional or cosmopolitan identity, in that it functions as such simultaneously. Between individuals there is an agreement for a time [*zeitweise*] of a personal union. This agreement, understood as a living community, extends in its intentions over a 'life-time', constituting in its implied relations, as does a marriage, an enduring personality of a higher order. The people of the nations of Europe came into warfare with each other (despite living 'beside each other', although sharing the same spiritual space of Europe with and towards each other, mutually motivating each other thereby); the 'European war' ended in a peace, in a unity, a transient agreement.

How is it now with a national and international culture?

Are all the particular cultures of a national culture within its unity? The nation is naturally as such interested in the extension of its labour within a national territory, for the extension of its agriculture, its transportation, etc., nationally. Is this the case, as well, for its fine arts, its sciences, its religious culture? – and what is the situation with its military culture, its weapons, its arsenals, etc?²

What is remarkable about this projected phenomenological sociology by Husserl is that it was already the conscious project of several Austrian Marxists as he wrote, most notably the pre-World War I Otto Bauer. Bauer in his social scientific studies, and Max Adler in his neo-Kantian conceptual augmentation of Marx and Engels, are 'phenomenological sociologists' in their focus upon

2 Husserl 1950, pp. 58–9.

the 'intentional objects' of the will of individuals and groups, with an articulate understanding that what they examine is 'of a time' [*zeitweise*].



Otto Bauer 1907, 'The Concept of Nation', in *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy*, Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, pp. 109–38

We have seen as we began our investigation of nation that it is a community of character [*Charaktergemeinschaft*]. We can now determine more closely the essence of this community of character.

We have tentatively defined the totality of a nation in its unity of peoples as having a difference from other nations that can be recognised in their physical and spiritual characteristics. These differences are not to be seen among themselves as equal in weight.

National character is also to be found in the different ways *its will* is determined. The will expresses itself in every process of knowing as a kind of *attention* [*Aufmerksamkeit*], which selects from the mass of things experienced, only certain apperceptions: when a German and an Englishman make the same trip, they will each return home with a quite different gain; when a German and an English scholar research the same matter, the investigatory method and the results of the research will be very different. The will expresses itself immediately in each *decision*: a German and an Englishman will proceed differently in each situation; they will take up the same task differently; even when they will enjoy themselves, differing pleasures will be chosen; when they wish to feel well, different manners of life will be preferred, differing needs satisfied, and so we see the essence of national character.

It is certain that different nations possess differing constellations of conception: they have differing ideas of right and wrong, differing views of what is moral or immoral, of that which is proper or improper, of the beautiful and the ugly, different religions and even differing approaches to science. But these differences in knowing are not merely to be put side by side with differences in willing; rather they determine the differences in willing, and they explain the differences among the wills. Because every Englishman is educated differently, has learned different things, and stands under different cultural influences, the same impetus will affect him differently as the German. The possession of differing conceptions are to the differences in the direction of willing not an accompanying order, but rather stand in a relation of cause and effect.

There is a similarity in this respect to that of *physical differences*. Different skull structures can be of interest to anthropologists, but also historians, social theoreticians, and politicians, as long as they do not suppose that differing physical types are accompanied by differing psychic characteristics. Experientially, differences in physical structure are accompanied either immediately by a difference in decision-making under the same conditions, or with a difference in the ability to know, and how something is known, which in turn creates a difference in the decision-making generated by the will. Even the anti-Semite would not concern himself with the nose of a Jew, if he did not have the accompanying opinion that with the physical type of the Jew there was a concomitant psychic characteristic. We must note that the difference in anthropological characteristics from psychic characteristics is always accompanied, immediately or indirectly, by differences in the characteristics of willing – even if we are not able to find the corresponding cause between the physical body and the direction of the will – we still will find the physical characteristics of an anthropological type interesting. Again, we must point out that the differences of physical characteristics are not aligned side by side with differences in the direction of will; rather they are in a functional association behind which a deeper relationship is hidden.

And so we arrive at a *narrower concept of national character*. It does not imply the totality of all physical and spiritual characteristics which are singular to a nation, rather merely the differences *in the direction of willing*, the fact that the same impetus releases differing movement, the same external situation calls forth differing decisions. This differentiation in the direction of willing is causally determined by the inherited conceptions of a nation or the physical characteristics cultivated in the nation's struggle for existence [*Daseinskampfe*].³ We have asked how such a community of character arises, and have answered the question by pointing to the same causes that have

3 Harry Graf Kessler fixes the concept of national character even more narrowly. He also separates the ability of differing positions towards the same external circumstances to create differing conceptions. But he sees the characteristic that differentiates nations only in the quickness of a reaction to some external stimulus; national character for him is a kind of 'tempo of the spirit' (Kessler 1906). Now, the different movements of the will is certainly a characteristic that we can include under the concept of the direction of the will, and can be understood under national character in a narrower sense; the easy movement of the French; the heavy movement of the Dutch, are well-known. But it is not how quickly an external circumstance releases an impetus in us that determines the direction of movement, and the strength of it. Kessler grasps the concept of national character too narrowly.

generated the sameness of character. Thus, we have called the nation a '*community of destiny*' [*Schicksalsgemeinschaft*].

But we now have to focus more sharply on the concept of the 'community of destiny'. A *community does not mean merely being the same*. For example, Germany in the nineteenth century had a capitalistic development, as did England. The same influences were the same upon the character of these peoples. Yet the Germans have not become Englishmen. For a '*community of destiny*' *does not mean that everyone is subjected to the same destiny, rather a life in common within the same destiny* in one's continual intercourse, and mutual relations with one another. The English and the Germans have lived through a capitalist development: but in different times, in different places, and in a looser relationship with one another. And even though the same impelling forces impinge upon them all, more so than they had previously, still these forces do not make them into one people. It is the same fate which is at work, to be sure, but it is how one lives through and suffers of this destiny in common, the destiny of fate, whereby the nation is created. Community, according to Kant, is the 'thorough-going mutual interaction' (Third Analogy of Experience: Foundations of Community).⁴ Only the lived processes of mutual interaction of a continuing character establish a nation.

Now, since a nation is not merely generated by the similarity of a common destiny, but rather is only of a nation, a community of character, by dint of the constant mutual, lived relationships, *a community of destiny can be differentiated from every other community of destiny*. One such community of character, for example, is that of *class*. Proletarians of all lands have the same characteristics. Even within all differences there is the same class character in the German and the English, the French and the Russian, the American and the Australian workers: the same joy of battle, the same revolutionary disposition, the same morality of class, the same political will. But here we speak not of a community of destiny, but of a common destiny that the community of character has created. For relationships of commerce and trade exist between the English and the German: to be sure, much looser than those between the English worker and the English bourgeoisie, since the latter live in the same city, have the same placard on the wall, read the same newspapers, and take part in the same sporting events, interacting among themselves, or both with the same person on occasion – the differing middle-men between the worker and the bourgeoisie. The language is the tool of the intercourse. If there were more associations of communication between the English and the

4 [See Kant 1965, p. 233, n. [B 237]].

German workers, then the German worker and the English worker would have a common language, not that of the English worker and the English bourgeoisie. That is because among the members of a nation there is a communicative community, a continual reciprocity with one another directly and indirectly which differentiates the nation from the community of character of class. One might say that the effective influence of the way of life determines the similarity of destiny among the workers of differing nations, rather than the different classes within the same nation, and that therefore the character of the workers of different lands is much more similar than that of the bourgeoisie and the worker of the same nation. But that nonetheless divides the community of character of a nation from that of a class, whose community of destiny comes solely from the uniformity of destiny.

The nation can be defined not as that of the uniformity of destiny, but rather as *from out of the community of destiny comes the emergent community of character*. That is also the importance of *the language* of the nation. With those whom I have the closest communication, I mutually create a common language; and with those persons I have a language in common, I have closest communication.

We have learned two means to effect the causes of the conditions of the human struggle for existence which bind people to a national community of destiny.

The one way is that of *natural inheritance*. The conditions essential for life of the ancestors give to their descendants a genetic connection that is its qualitative determination, and natural selection decides which characteristics are inherited and which are excluded. The conditions essential for life of the ancestors thereby determine the inherited characteristics of their physical progeny. Their nation in this sense is the parentage community: it is brought together in a common blood, as the people say, through the community of genetics, as science instructs. But the people united through a common parentage only remain a nation as long as they remain in communication with one another, as long as mutual marriage maintains this blood community. If the sexual connection of the people ends, there emerge tendencies for new connections for differing communities of character from what had been a unified people. Then, there is not only a blood community from a community of descent, but if the nation as a natural community is to continue, there must be a continual mixing of blood.

Yet the character of the individual is never merely the totality of inherited characteristics, it is also determined through the inherited, effective culture which he experiences: through the education he enjoys, the law under whose authority he lives, the morality which he lives, the perceptions of God and the

world within which he lives, of the moral and immoral, of the beautiful and the ugly that he inherits, through the religion and philosophy, science, art, and politics that effect him – above all, by that which determines the appearance of all these, that is, the way in which his fellows conduct their struggle for existence, the way he acquires his living sustenance. Thus, we arrive at the second means by which the struggle for existence of the individual is determined: the inheritance of the products of culture, as it is transmitted by word of mouth. The nation is never merely nature, but always at the same time a cultural community. This is also the story of past races that determined the individual: the child is under the effective influences of an existing society, in its economic life, in its laws, and spiritual culture into which it is born. One sees here the continuing communicative community of the community of character. The great tool of this communication is *language*: it is the tool of education, the tool of all economic and spiritual intercourse. As the possibility of mutual understanding by language extends, so too extends the effective realm of culture. Only as far as the community of language extends is the community of communication close. The community of communication and language condition one another reciprocally: language is the condition of all close communication and because of that it creates the necessity of communication in the same language, just as, conversely, the destruction of a community of people gradually creates a differentiation of language. I can certainly learn a foreign language, but I cannot become a member of those people by doing that, because the foreign language does not subject me in the same way to the cultural influences of it as a mother tongue: my childhood, the years of my greatest receptivity, has been influenced through the culture transmitted through one's mother tongue; it is then when my character was first formed; all later impressions, inasmuch as they are taken up, only accommodate my existing individuality, and are changed somewhat in the process of their being taken up in that process of accommodation. Thus, a foreign language only rarely becomes a complete possession of the individual in the way the mother tongue is experienced, since the most nuanced, inner effects are lost, for the most part: English or French works of art do not have the same effect upon even the cultured German as does his own art. It is inconceivable that a nation can continue a community of culture without the community of language, this most essential tool of human communication. On the other hand, a community of language is still not a guarantee of national unity: the Danes and Norwegians, in spite of a common language community, have differing cultures, the Catholic Croats and the Greek Serbians are prone to differing cultural influences in spite of a common language community. However, to the extent that the cultural-separating effects of religion disappear, the Croats and the Serbs have a communication community by dint

of the sameness of their language, and are of one nation by dint of their cultural influences. A national meaning is lent by the victory of a unified language over its dialects: the necessity of a closer communication is created by a unified language, subjecting all to the same governing cultural influences. The mutual interactions within this language determine the cultural community. The relation of cultural differentiation within a language community is clearly evident with the Dutch: they are a people of three differing German strands, yet are no longer part of the German people; the difference in the histories of the Dutch and German political economies has led to wholly different cultures; economically and culturally separated from the German, the Dutch have severed their communication community from their German roots: the connection which bound them as one people was too narrow, the connection with other German peoples too loose; thus, they created their own language as a tool for their own culture, and because of this self-unification they have no longer any part in the German nation.

Natural community and cultural community can coincide: the fate of an ancestry can be transmitted to the grandchildren, on the one hand, through the inheritance of its characteristics, and on the other, through inheritance of the culture it developed. But a natural and a cultural community do not necessarily coincide: the *natural grandchildren* and the *cultural grandchildren* are not always the same. For in a natural community only persons of the same descent are unified, while the cultural community binds together all those who are in continual mutual interaction within the same cultural influences. The stronger this cultural influence is, the more the individual takes on the entire wealth of culture of a people, and thereby is determined by these characteristics, thus becoming a member of that nation, participating in its national character, even though he may not belong to its natural community. Thus, it is possible to choose a nation other than that of one's birth. Chamisso says, in this vein, of himself: 'I became a German through language, science, and religion'.

If humanity is separated into nations in this manner, can it be that each individual of a nation cannot be a member of other nations? The merely natural connection of humans to two nations through descent does not change despite the marked differentiation of these nations to one another. On borderlands, where two nations abut each other, people are often intermixed, so that the blood of each nation flows in differentiated ways in the veins of each. In spite of this, as a rule there is not a melding of the two nations. *Here lies the differentiation of cultural communities, which divides the nations sharply despite the mixing of bloods.* One example of this is the nationality struggles of Austria. Whoever sees a racial struggle between the Germans and the Czechs only gives evidence of his historical ignorance. Farmers may not have preserved the pure

blood of Germans or Czechs, but the levels of society who conduct a national war, and who are the objects of that national war – the intelligentsia, the petty bourgeoisie, the workers – have for hundreds of years mixed their blood through reciprocal marriages, so that neither a German nor a Czech nation of a natural community can be considered. In spite of that, the nations are in no way blended. The difference, which is furthered by the medium of language, is that of independent, strongly separated nations. It is quite different when an individual participates in the culture of two or more nations to the same, or almost the same, extent. There are such individuals in boundary areas, areas where nationals dwell beside one another in large numbers. They speak the language of two nations from childhood: they are influenced almost equally by the fates of these two nations, through the cultural characteristics of these two nations, and thus they become in their character members of both nations, or, if one will, individuals who belong wholly to no nation. For the individual who is affected by the culture of two or more nations, whose character is strongly influenced by these differing national cultures, unifies not only the character traits of these two nations, but possesses a new character in itself, as the chemical compound evidences a different characteristic than each of its elements. This is also the deeper reason why the individual who is culturally the child of more than one nation, is in disfavour, is suspected, in times of national struggle, a traitor, and scorned as an apostate: the mixture of cultural elements creates a new character, giving one who is a mixture of both nations the appearance of a foreigner. Yet even when the disinclination towards the *cultural hybrid* is understandable, one should not be led into error by it. These are often the greatest individuals in which the culture of two or more nations is effective. In the men of our science, among our greatest artists, one can see quite often several national cultures at work in equal strength. In a man like Karl Marx, one can see the history of four great nations – the Jews, the Germans, the French, and the English – congealed in their characteristics, and thus in his personal work the history of all the great nations of our time enters; indeed, the history of no cultural nation in the last decades is comprehensible without his work.

The cultural influence of more than one national culture upon the same individual does not arise solely individually, but can also arise as a *mass phenomenon*. Without a doubt, the German culture has determined the entire Czech nation in an essential manner. It is not wholly incorrect to say that the Czechs are Czech-speaking Germans, which naturally – in the mouth of a German – is not a censure, rather the highest praise. However, the mass acceptance of foreign cultural elements by an entire nation is never a complete assimilation of its national character, rather at best a diminishment of the differences. For

the foreign elements never have a full effect upon individuals in the strength of one's original culture: they are never taken up unchanged; there is always some alteration of them in the process of assimilation, an accommodation to the existing national culture. That is known to us as the phenomenon of *national apperception*.

These effective causes of the conditions of the human struggle for existence, namely, the two differing means employed that create these conditions – on the one hand, the inheritance of the practices of cultivating the characteristics of the physical descendants, on the other hand, the transmission of the human cultural values and other cultural products through the language and communicative community to the persons who comprise the nation – give the nation that appearance of its intricate variation which makes it so difficult to recognise the unity of its effective causes: we have nations where the natural and cultural communities coincide, where there are physical descendants who have inherited the historical culture; then we have hybrids who belong solely to the cultural circles; then again, persons of a physical national descent whose character, however, is formed from two or more national cultures; finally, nationals who have no physically inherited community, and are only bound into a unity through the community of culture. *On the other hand, persons who may have a common physical inheritance, yet do not belong to any cultural community, are not a nation*; there is no nation without the reciprocal effects of the people upon one another, which is only possible through the instrument of a common language, through the inheritance of the same cultural practices. A mere natural community without a cultural community may interest anthropologists as a race, but it does not constitute a nation. The conditions of the human struggle for existence can also be realised through the means of a natural community, but must in every case, always, be created by means of the cultural community of the nation.

Our investigation has shown us that under differing social frames of mind the constituting actualities of the common culture of a nation are quite different. *There are essentially three types of a national cultural community*, which we have come to know in this discussion.

The first type in our historical delineation are the Germans from the time of tribal communism, where a nation is the whole people who are bound by blood, as well as by the inherited culture of their ancestors. We have repeatedly mentioned that this national unity disappears with the transition to a settled existence: the inherited characteristics become differentiated when the mutuality of marriage ceases between those who are distanced in their territorial jurisdictions, having then differing conditions among their family branches in their struggle for existence; and the inherited common culture will also

differ as the common family stems develop further, as the seeds of dissolution of the nation are carried within these physical changes.

The second type of nation is based upon the differences in the social classes of the society. The masses of the people are subjected to the processes of differentiation that are well known to us. Without a sexual traffic among these classes, the physical characteristics become always more diverse; not bound by any communication, they develop differing dialects out of what had been a common language; they are exposed to differing conditions in their struggle for existence, developing different cultures, which in turn generate a difference of character. The masses of the people thereby lose their national unity the more their original community loses its traditional characteristics over the course of centuries, the more its original common culture takes on the later emergent, wholly different cultural elements that conceal and replace what had been. *What holds the nation together then is no longer its unity of blood and culture shared by the masses, but rather the cultural unity of the ruling class who are situated above the masses, living upon their work.* They and their dependents are, by their sexual intercourse and cultural intercourse, bound together in every way: thus, the knights of the Middle Ages or later, the educated of the modern built a nation. The broad masses, however, whose hands sustained the nation – the farmers, artisans, workers – are but the tenants of the nation.

A third type, finally, is represented by the socialist society of the future, where all the people are within an autonomous national unity. Here one does not find a common, physical descent, rather a community of education, of work, of cultural gratification, which comprehends a nation. In this, the nation is no longer threatened by dissolution, but because of education, mutual participation in the cultural practices, in the close unity of the common existence, and in their societal work, the nation offers the security of a national unity.

The nation is no longer a static entity, rather a process of becoming, determined in its essence by the conditions within which the people struggle for their livelihood and maintain their art of sustenance. No nation to this point has come to be where the people seek their subsistence, not through their own work, but merely by taking ownership rather than founding occupations where the products have no master. Where the people are at a stage that enables them to get what is needed from nature by their own work, a nation can arise. The particular character of a nation is conditioned by *how its work is done*, by its means of work, by which it serves its needs, through the *powers of production*, which it commands, through the relationships which hold among its productive capacities. The emergence of the nation, every nation, is to be understood as

an element of the struggle of humanity with nature – that is the great task whose solution the historical method of Karl Marx has made us capable of realising.

For those who hold to the concept of a *national materialism*, the nation is a piece of singular material substance, which has the mysterious power to create a national community of character. Because of it, the history of humanity becomes a history of the struggles and intermixtures of persisting, unchanging racial substances, and inherited substances. This unscientific way of looking at things that has emerged in the last decade – especially under the influence of Gobineau – has experienced a rebirth, even as Darwinism has countered it. Even among those who place a greater significance upon inherited racial characteristics, the view is growing ‘that it is not sufficient to ascertain the differences among races, one must also seek to explain these differences’.⁵ If one takes this proviso seriously, then race becomes nothing more than a means of developing insight into the conditions of the struggle for existence in its actualities, that is, through the means of production that have served humans in their struggle with nature to construct communities of character.

For those who hold to the concept of a *national spiritualism*, the nation is a mystical spirit of the people, the history of the nation that of a development of this spirit of the people, and world history a battle of national spirits, whose character generates friends and foes. Lamprecht, however, when placing the development of a national consciousness in the centre of his history of the nation, believing to have found a general law for the development of the people’s spirit, explains the changes in national consciousness in the developments of the people’s spirit from the symbolic generations. Nonetheless, until its challenges within the economy of its people, the development of the people’s spirit for him is no longer the impelling force of its spirit, but rather the results of the changes in the manner of work of the people. When, in spite of that, he is not satisfied to explain the nation in its development out of the human productive forces, understanding the changes in the human productive relationships under laws, when he, moreover, finds the development of a national consciousness, the spirit of the people, within a general law of his own articulation, one which cannot be verified by any historical actuality, but merely used as a descriptive means of tracking the general development of this consciousness, then it is no longer to be considered a law, rather as Simmel opines, the ‘preparation of a law’, a ‘tentative summary of typical phenomena of history, the first orientation to a mass of historical facts’.⁶ Darwinism

5 Schallmayer 1903, p. 174.

6 Simmel 1905, pp. 84 ff.

prepares one for such a lawful understanding, having overcome national materialism, and historical inquiry into economic conditions can also replace such a mystical people's spirit in its explanations of how a nation is determined. The historical-materialist concept of nation describes it as the never completed product of a continual, ongoing process whose ultimate impetus is the condition of the struggle of humans with nature, the transformation of human productive capabilities, and the changes of human working conditions. This conception makes the nation into *that which is historical in us*. Darwinism has taught us to read these signs, that the history of organic life is hidden in our living bodies: in Bölsche's stimulating conversations one may read how our own organs tell the history of our animal ancestry.⁷ In a similar manner we learn to discern our national character. In the individual peculiarities that the individual shares with other individuals of his people, which weld him into a communion with these individuals, one sees the history of his (physical and cultural) ancestry; *his character is solidified history*. As these personal characteristics of each person have been taken on as the legacy of the struggle for existence of past communities, one understands from that how a national community of character arises.

If we conceive of national character as a piece of transpired history, then we can understand why historical science is able to contradict the opinion that national character is unchanging, held to be constant. The history of a nation is in no moment ever complete. The changing destiny is subdued in its character, which is a consequence of past destiny, by its continual transformations. What binds the people of a nation in a generation is the community of character; what binds the people of a nation together over generations is not the similarity of character, rather the fact that these times succeed each other, effect each other, that the fates of the earlier generations determine the character of the later, not that the earlier agree completely with the succeeding generations. The relationship is depicted in the history of language.⁸ Contemporaries who are joined in a communicative community stand in a language community that is not one of the earlier sequence. The descendants are determined in their character by the earlier, but they are not the likeness of the earlier.

7 See Bölsche 1894–6.

8 Fichte justly says: 'Let us admit that after several centuries the descendants of the language of that time cannot understand their predecessors, because the transitional nuances have been lost; nevertheless, from the beginning there is a continual transition, without a break, always unnoticed in the present and only noticed when one makes a new transition, which appears as a break. There is never a point in time where contemporaries cease to understand each other' (Fichte 1869, p. 53).

In that we see the emergence of the community of character from the community of destiny, the meaning of the community of character is first wholly comprehensible. We have proceeded in our investigation from the immediacy of the empirical manner of appearance: from the sameness of the character of the people, that is, how the average German is different from the average Englishman, and how every other average German is the same. But that is a principle of relative generality: doesn't every German know in themselves national characteristics that are different from that? If we proceed, however, from the empirical sameness of the community of destiny, from which the community of character emerges, then we arrive at another, *deeper concept of the community of character* in contrast to a mere sameness of character.

The individual character is a result of different forces: among them we find in each individual the effective influence of the national community of destiny; beside that, however, a series of other, individually different character-forming powers. Only insofar as the strength of these forces are not too great will the effects of the national community of destiny generate similar individual characteristics; if, however, a particular power is quite strong in its effect upon the individual in a way that differs from that of his fellow nationals, then the outcome for the individual will be essentially different for him, even though he has been formed within the national community of destiny, he is not the same as his national compatriots. Nonetheless, he is a member of the national community of character: for even though he is not the same as his national compatriots, he is united with them as some of the powers that have shaped him are the same as those which have created all others within the same nation; he is a child of his nation, even though he has become something different, when he has experienced the same forces, although the blood and the tradition of another nation may have shaped him. And thus we arrive at another, deeper concept of the community of character: it means to us no longer that the individuals of the same nation are similar, but rather that the same forces have been operative on the character of each individual – even when other operative forces side-by-side with these may be different. Now, the concept of a community of character is first justified, while mere experience may only enable us to recognise a relative similarity of character. While the similarity of character can be observed only in the majority of the people of a nation, it is the community of character, the actuality, that is, the creation of one and the same effective force, that makes us without exception an in-common. *It is the historical in us, the national in us, which forges us together.*

If we understand the national in our character as the historical in us, then we can grasp the nation more deeply as a social phenomenon, as a *phenomenon of*

sociated persons [*des vergesellschafteten Menschen*].⁹ For the individualist, the person is an atom, and the atoms are held together externally only by laws. For us, however, the person is not an atom, but rather the creation of society; Robinson Crusoe who struggles for existence alone on his island can only conduct that struggle because he is an inheritor of his ancestry, a product of his education which has given him his societal capabilities, as Marx said, 'the societal strengths' which he possesses.¹⁰ Thus, for us the nation is not a number of individuals, somehow externally conjoined; rather that nation exists in every individual as a piece of his individual character, as his nationality.¹¹ The national mark of character only appears as a characteristic in the individual, but it is societally created: it is the product of inherited characteristics and traditionally transmitted cultural processes, which the ancestors of every people in a continual mutual interaction with other societal comrades have

9 [Bauer here uses Max Adler's term of 'vergesellschaftung' [*sociation*], first coined – although taken from Karl Marx who used it in a less formalised sense – by Adler in his *Kausalität und Teleologie im Streite um die Wissenschaft* (Adler 1904, p. 180). See the discussion of Adler's use of this concept in the translation of his 'The New Concept of Sociation', in *Lehrbuch der Materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung* (Adler 1930, pp. 220–9)].

10 Marx 1903, p. 711.

11 [Note in this sentence that Bauer is silent as to the a priori consciousness as the foundational cause upon which a national characteristic finds its form, although he uses Max Adler's a priori concept of 'sociation' several sentences before. Marx's Robinson Crusoe analogue was used by Max Adler to stress the social a priori nature of consciousness. Bauer emphasises only an a posteriori social causation. Max Adler would allow the historical experience of a community of destiny to provide the content and opportunity for the historical shaping of character, a shape that might be moral, immoral, or misconceived, progressive, reactionary, or arbitrary in light of empirical realities; but Adler would see the form of character itself as having its possible design by dint of the a priori structure of self among others. This is the crux of the difference in the epistemology of the two thinkers, a difference that will be seen in their divergent understandings of policy and praxis. Bauer will be inclined to an understanding of an immediate plan or action that is derived from actions and thoughts of his contemporaries in his and their ordinary understandings. Max Adler will cleave to his self-wrought principles, which have been formed in the light of external actions among others, but within the chrysalis of the a priori imperatives operative in these social actions, which he, as a Kantian epistemological arbiter, assesses. Bauer criticises this philosophically-based penchant in Adler, from this point of view, in his *Kampf* article 'Antwort an Max Adler' (Bauer 1929, pp. 217–18). Bauer answers an article in the same issue by Max Adler, 'Zur Diskussion über das Sozialdemokratische Wehrproblem' (Max Adler 1929, pp. 210–16). See the translation of Bauer's reply in Volume I of this text].

created, it is itself a societal product. And what the individuals, who belong to a nation, integrate with one another is the creation by the same effective forces, of the same society. This society is exhibited in their individual, inherited characteristics whereby the selected effects of the struggle for existence of a past community of living persons is carried over by them. And in that their individual character is the same in their struggle for existence as the culture of the human community that has informed their existence. Therefore, it is not through some external law that a nation becomes a social phenomenon. The nation is not a sum of individuals; rather every individual is the product of a nation; that everyone is the product of the same society makes them into a community. That the characteristics that are only the character of the individual in its appearance are a societal creation, and throughout all levels of society of one and the same society – this unifies the individual to the nation. Thus, the nation does not exist by strength of external law, rather it is – logically, not historically – before all law in existence.¹² Yet certainly if persons who will construct a community come together with the desire to cooperate, they need a language for such a task. Language is the most important tool for human communication: the workers in the bible could not complete the Tower of Babel when God confused their speech. Therefore, not all who speak a language can build a nation, but no nation is possible without a common language. The language is nothing other than a ‘primitive convention’,¹³ which exists by dint of ‘external regulation’ – if we can take this concept in its widest sense which Rudolf Stammler introduced to science. It is not as if it arose by law, from some lawgiver or was created by a societal contract, yet its validity still rests only upon external regulation. For with a concept we articulate a distinct word, with the conception of a thing, we bind the concept with a certain set of sound symbols, all of which exist by convention. It is an instance of this important principle that the child learns from the lips of the mother. Stammler does err when he finds in external regulation the constituting characteristic of social phenomena; the nation shows us clearly that the substrate of all social phenomena is the *community*, that is, the fact that the characteristic of the individual is also the characteristic of all others who belong to that community, because the character of every individual is in constant reciprocity with all other individuals. Individual character is the creation of the same societal forces, but it is only through external regulation that this community of united individuals can first work together as a society, thus preserving their

12 Cf. Max Adler 1904, pp. 369 ff.

13 Stammler 1896, p. 103.

community, and being able to create new communities. External regulation is the form of the societal cooperation realised by the community of united individuals.¹⁴

The differentiation in national character is an empirical fact, which can only be denied by a doctrinaire who sees what he wishes to see, and thus does not see what everyone else sees. In spite of that, one has always sought to deny the differences in national character, and asserts that nations are only differentiated by their language. This opinion is found with many theoreticians who stand upon the teaching of *Catholic* doctrine. This view has been taken over by the humanist philosophers of the *bourgeois Enlightenment*. This has also been the inheritance of many socialists, who wish to employ it to support the idea of proletarian cosmopolitanism, who, as we will see, depict the first and most primitive position of the working class in their taking up of the national struggle with the bourgeois world. This presumed insight into the lack of substance of the nation lives on in contemporary Austria in the language usage of the Social-Democratic press, who love to speak of comrades of the German and Czech 'tongue', instead of speaking of German and Czech comrades. The view that national differences are nothing other than differences in language rests upon the atomistic-individualistic conception of society, seeing society merely as a sum of externally bound individuals, and thereby the nation too as a mere external sum, namely, through language, of associated people. Whoever holds this view repeats Stammmler's error that in external regulation, in laws and conventions, the constitutive characteristics of social phenomena are to be found. For us, the nation is not a sum of individuals who come together merely within the relation of a common language, rather the individual is himself the creation of the nation; his individual character is nothing other than

14 I use the concepts of *community* and *society* in a different sense from that of Tönnies in his significant work *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* [*Community and Society*]. I see the essence of society in the cooperation of persons under the same external laws; the essence of community lies in the physical and spiritual essence created through the innumerable mutual interactions among individuals, which create that community of allied persons, giving them each their individual character, which is the form of community character. Community can only arise under the condition, the external law of language – at least, as Stammmler instructs us – which gives us society at the same time; on the other hand, society presupposes community, at least as Max Adler has shown, the community of 'consciousness in general'. The state finally is only one of the forms of society, as an external power, supported by law, is only one of the kinds of standing rules. More narrow still is the concept of the modern state, which arises by dint of the production of goods, and disappears with that as well.

what has emerged in the continual mutual interaction with other individuals, as the character of these others are formed in their mutual interactions. This intercourse has determined the character of each of them, and through this interaction the individuals have formed a community of character. The nation enters as a phenomenon in the nationality of the individual person, that is, in the fact that the character of every fellow national is determined in the community, in the continual mutual interaction of a lived destiny shared by all his compatriots. Language is nothing but a means of facilitating this mutual interaction, certainly everywhere an indispensable means, just as external regulation in general is the form of working together which binds individuals to a community. One who does not trust his eyes that see the differentiations of national character day in and day out, must yet believe the theoretical consideration, which has enabled him to understand from the beginning that from the differences to be found in the continual communication of a community living their destiny, a necessarily different community of character must result.

Our insight into the essence of nation not only makes impossible an individual denial of the reality of national character, but also obviates the dangerous misuse of this concept. National character is nothing other than the determination of the direction of will of individual members of a nation within the community of destiny shared with their compatriots. Once arisen, national character appears as an independent, historical power. The differentiations of national character mean also the differences in the directions of will. Every nation, under the same external conditions, will behave otherwise than other nations. Thus, the development of capitalism with the English, French, and Germans was very similar, but in details evidenced differing movements as it brought capitalism about. National character appears as well as a historical potency. When one recognises theory as the creation of history, one sees the experience of the everyday as a creative force determined by history. When one learns to understand theory as the outcome of the relations among persons, then one sees much more how immediate experience is determined, regulated, by these relationships. *That is the fetishism of national character.* Our theory banishes this spook with one blow. Since national character is apparently the willing and acting determined by each member of a nation, there is nothing hidden any more, when we recognise that each such member is a creation of his nation, and national character is nothing other than each determined direction of will which the community of destiny elicits in the individual character of every one of its members. And national character no longer appears as an independent power as soon as we see it as the result of the history of a nation. Now we understand that in the apparently independent historical effect of national character there is nothing hidden other than the fact that the history of one's

ancestors, the conditions of their struggle for existence, the productive capacities which they employed, the relationships of production which they entered, determine the comportment of the natural and cultural inheritors. When we earlier came to understand natural inheritance and the transmission of cultural values and processes as the means by which the destiny of earlier generations determined the character of their descendants, we now see that national character in itself is merely the means by which the history of one's ancestry affects the life of its descendants in their thought, feeling, willing, and praxis. We see in all this the reality of national character, knowing the apparent independence of it as a mere means for the effectiveness of other forces. By this recognition, national character loses its *substantial character*, that is, the illusion that in its manifestation it is an enduring, inert alignment of expression. It is nothing but an outcome of history, changing with every hour, with every new event that the nation experiences, changeable as what occurs, what it mirrors. Immersed in the events of the world, it is no longer a persisting entity, rather something that continually becomes and passes away.

We come finally in our attempt to determine the essence of the nation to other theories that have sought this understanding, basing our own argument upon a ground seen in contradistinction to these theories.¹⁵ Of the *metaphysical* theories of nation – that of national spiritualism and national materialism – we have already spoken. Of the psychological theories of nation, those that consider nation either in the consciousness of belonging or in the will to belong, we will speak in a later context. Here we need only address several elements that are central to the constituting of a nation which are discussed, as well, in other theories. Italian sociologists list these elements as follows:

1. Common area of residence
2. Common descent
3. Common language
4. Common moral and customs
5. Common experiences, common historical past
6. Common laws and common religion¹⁶

It is clear now that this theory puts together a number of characteristics that cannot simply be set side-by-side, but rather must be considered in their

15 A collection of differing definitions of nation is given by Fr. J. Neumann in *Volk und Nation* (Neumann 1888).

16 [Neumann 1888, p. 54].

mutual dependence. When we look down the list from the first, it is the fifth that strikes our eye, the common history. This is what determines and creates the others. A history in common gives the in-common descent its determining content, in that this determines which characteristics are inherited and which are discarded. An in-common history creates in-common morals and customs, the in-common laws and in-common religion, and also – to remain within our way of speaking about this – the community of cultural traditions. The common descent as well as the common culture are merely the instruments which give the common history its effects, whose activity serves to construct the national character. The third element, the common language, cannot be ordered on an equal plane with the others; it is rather a secondary means. For if a common culture is the means by which the common history is effective for the formation of national character, it is the common language that is the means for the effectiveness of the common culture, the tool by which it shapes the cultural community and sustains it, as the external regulation of the form of societal interactions that build a community of creative individuals.¹⁷

Thus, we impart a system to the mere account of the elements of a nation; in-common history is the effective cause, common culture and common descent the means of its effectiveness, common language the medium of the common culture, yet at the same time its creation as well as creator. Now we understand the relations among these elements. For what has until now given the theoreticians of nation the greatest difficulties are that these elements can appear in differing connections with one another, at one time now this or that element is lacking. This can now be understood. If a common descent and common culture as means are the effective factor, then it is not decisive in the concept of nation that both are operative; therefore, a nation can exist because of its community of descent, yet only as a race, never as the construction of a nation. Then we look at how the differing elements of the culture community relate to one another: common laws are the most important means of building a community of character, but the community of character can exist, indeed arise, without them, if the effectiveness of the other elements are sufficiently strong to bring individuals into a cultural community. Differences in religion can make

17 Language is not only a means of transmitting cultural values and processes, but such a cultural entity in itself. The French are thus not only different from the Germans because their respective languages transmit differing cultural values and processes, but also because the language itself is a transmitted cultural entity for them, which in its singularities determines their speech, their thought, and their character. If French rhetoric is different from the German art of speech, their separate languages play a role in these differences.

two nations out of a people who speak the same language, where differences in religion hinder a cultural community, a common religion can be the foundation of a common culture, as we see with the Croatians and the Serbs; yet the Germans remain a people in spite of their religious dissensions because the confessional division could not hinder the emergence and stability of a general German cultural community. Finally, we understand the relation of the language to the other elements of the nation: without a community of language there is no community of culture, and thus also no nation.¹⁸

But the community of a language does not create a nation where there are differences in other respects – for example, the differences in religion between the Croatians and the Serbs, or the differences in descent, in the social and political relationships, we see between the Spanish and Spanish-speaking South America – differences that hinder this language community from becoming a cultural community.

In addition, it is sufficient now to consider the first ‘element’ of the nation, the *common area of living*. We have repeatedly spoken of how a territorial separation tears apart a unified nation. The nation as a natural community is gradually destroyed by a national separation, because the differing conditions of the struggle for existence in differing parts of the nation generate different characteristics, and these differences cannot be offset by a mixing of blood. The nation as a cultural community will also be destroyed by the separation of place, because differing geographical sites of a nation, which have been separated, generate differences in their struggle for existence, and from what was originally shared in a national unity of culture, there is disintegration into a number of differing cultures. This occurs as well in the differentiation of what had been a common language into several languages in the wake of the looser bonds of communication between the geographically separated parts of the originally unified nation. Torn asunder by the geographical differences, the commonality of the living site is without a doubt one of the conditions of the existence of nation: but *only insofar as it is the condition of a community of destiny*. If in spite of the geographical division, the cultural community, and conceivably, if the natural community can be sustained, the geographical separation is not a hindrance to the national character. The German, who remains influenced by German culture in America – whether this

18 If one speaks of a Swiss nation, that rests upon either – if one has in mind the belongingness of the Swiss to a state – the confusion of the people of a state and a nation, or on the other hand, a community of character among the German, French, Italian, and Romanisch Swiss is asserted, in the mistaken opinion that every community of character is also a nation.

is only through a German book or German newspaper – gives his children a German education, and remains in spite of all geographical division a German. *Only insofar as the commonality of ground is the condition of the community of culture is it the condition of existence of a nation.* In the generations of publishing, of the mail and the telegraph, of the railroads and steam ships, this truth is not as essential as it was in earlier cases. If one does not conceive of the commonality of residence as an ‘element’ of nation at the same level as the other elements, but rather as a condition of the effectiveness of the other elements, then one will see the limits to the oft-cited phrase that the commonality of living place is the condition of the existence of a nation. This recognition is no small gain: for then our conception of the relation of the nation to its geography is a recognition of the relationships of the nation to its most important corporate area, the state. We must come back to this question and give an answer with several examples to illustrate it. Here what matters is only to show how our theory of the nation conceives of the elements of the nation, which the other theories set side-by-side without connection, in an effective system which demonstrates the mutual dependence of these factors in their mutual interaction.

But our theory still has the task of establishing as true, on the basis of what has already been discussed, the essentials that determine the nation, which the other theories have failed to do. What matters here is the separation of the concept of nation from *the narrower geographical and ancestral communities within the nation*. Certainly, the community of destiny has knit the Germans into a community of character. Yet is this not the case with the Bavarians and Saxons? Of the Tirolians and those of Steier: indeed, of all the inhabitants of the Alpine valleys? Have not the differing fates of the ancestry, the differences in where they have settled and how they have divided the land, in the fruitfulness of the land and the acclimatising to mountain valleys and passes, to the vineyard areas or the high plateaus, developed marked differences in communities of character? Where is the boundary between each community of character so that one might be called an independent nation? On the contrary, where do we see only narrow associations within a nation?

Here we must recall that we have already learned that these narrow communities of character are *disintegrative products of the communities of descent of existing nations*. Since the descendants of the German tribes became separated geographically from each other, and chained by agriculture to a certain soil, without intercourse with each other, without the exchange of marriage, and thus leading a life of separateness, they become increasingly different from one another. They stemmed from a common natural and cultural community,

but on their way they each became independent, building different natural and cultural communities. There is a tendency for these narrower associations of *one* nation to form their own nations. The difficulty of separating the concept of these narrower communities of character from that of the nation lies in the fact that these communities are themselves stages in the development of the greater nation.

This tendency towards national dissolution generates the counter-tendency, as we already know, for the nation to strive for a tighter hold upon unity. Yet this counter-tendency is viable only for the governing classes. It unified the knightly class of the Middle Ages, the educated class of the early capitalist period into a sharply divided nation, separated from all other cultural communities, but in a close economic, political, and socially active intercourse with one another, creating for all of them a unified language, enabling a common spiritual culture, and the same moral code. This close-knit cultural community brought together the ruling classes into a nation. No one can be in any doubt as to whether an educated person is a German or Dutchman, Slovene or Croat: the national education, the national unity of language creates the boundary between even those nations who are closely related sharply from one another. Whether, on the other hand, a farmer from a village is still Low German or a Netherlander, still Slovene or still a Croat, can only be determined arbitrarily. Sharply bounded as a national entity are only the circle of national compatriots, not the circle of the small farmers and tenants of the nation.

Modern capitalism gradually creates boundaries among the lower classes of nation that separate them from the other classes, for they also gain a participation with the national education, the cultural life of their nation, and the national unity of language. The unifying tendency seizes the working masses as well. But the socialist society will only help them to victory in these areas. It will offer the entire population through the differentiation of a national education and customs the sharp demarcation that only the educated classes of the differing nations have over against each other now. To be sure, there will be even within the socialist nation narrower communities of character; but within their midst no independent cultural community will be possible, since every geographical community will stand under the influences of the culture of the entire nation, in its cultural intercourse, within the exchange of concepts shared by the entire nation.

Thus we arrive for the first time at a complete conceptual determination of nation. *The nation is everyone in a community of destiny integrated as individuals into a community of character.* Through *the community of destiny*: this characteristic separates it from an international generality of character based upon vocation, class, or merely being members of a state, that is, upon the

sameness of a destiny, not on a community of destiny. All who are associates of character: this separates them from the narrower communities of character within the nation, who have never developed a self-determining, through a personal destiny determined, natural and cultural community, rather stand in a close intercourse with the entire nation, and have their fate determined in this way. In this way, the nation was circumscribed sharply in the time of primitive communism: everyone who was descended from the tribes on the Baltic Sea, and whose spiritual essence was determined by its natural inheritance and cultural traditions because of the destiny of that tribe, was considered at that time a nation. In this way the nation will be circumscribed in the socialist society: everyone who will receive a national education, enjoy national culture and whose character thereby will be formed in its content by the destiny of the nation, will be a nation. In *the special possession of the means of work* of an existing society, the governing classes are formed – once the knightly class, today the educated – they are the nation, the entirety of those who have the same education because of the nation's history, by means of a unified language and a national education, which brings forth their unity of character. The broad masses of the people, however, do not form a nation – *no longer*, because the ancient community of descent is no longer sufficiently narrow to include everyone, *not yet* because the emergent educational community does not yet comprehend them completely. The difficulty in finding a satisfactory conceptual definition of the nation, a difficulty on which all previous attempts have foundered, is in its historical determination. One has sought to discover the nation in our class-based society, in which the old, rigorously circumscribed ancestral communities have disintegrated into a countless number of geographical and ancestral groups, and in which the new, emergent educational community has not yet been able to unify these small groups into a national whole.

Our search reveals the essence of the nation as a grand, historical picture. In the beginning – in the generations of primitive communism and nomadic agriculture – the unified nation was a community of descent. Then, since the transition to a sedentary agriculture and the development of private property, the division of the old nation into the cultural community of the ruling classes on the one hand, and the small farmers and tenants of the nation on the other – these housed in closed, narrow geographical sites, the disintegrative product of the older nation. Further, since the development of societal production in a capitalist form, there is an expansion of the national cultural community – the working and exploited classes remaining still the hinter elements of the nation, but there is a tendency to a national unity upon the basis of a national education, which grows gradually stronger as the particularistic tendency towards

disintegration of the old, descent community of the nation divides itself into increasingly less cohesive geographical groups. Finally, when the society sheds the capitalist shell of its societal production, the re-emergence of a unified nation as the education, work, and culture community will occur. The development of the nation mirrors the history of the means of production and individual production, and from this arises once more cooperative production upon the foundation of societal property; thus, we have seen the unified nation dividing itself into national compatriots and those of the 'hinter', thus splitting itself up into small geographical circles, which since the development of societal production, again approach one another in order to finally enter the unity of the socialist nation of the future. The national compatriots and those of the 'hinter' of the nation, separated, in numerous small geographical groups of a divided nation, of the age of private property and individual production can be seen as the disintegrative product of the communist nation of the past, and the material of the socialist nation of the future.

In a double sense, the nation evidences itself as a historical phenomenon. It is the *material determination* in its historical appearance, since in every person the living, effective national character is the outcome of a historical development, in the nationality of the individual member of the nation the history of the society is mirrored, whose result is the individual. And in its *formal connection* it is a historical manifestation, since the differing stages of historical development of differing broad circles through differing means in differing ways have been integrated into a nation. The history of a society is decided not only by which concrete attributes of the national members build a national character; much more, it is the form in which the historically effective forces bring forth a community of character that is historically conditioned.

The national historical conception, which in the wars between nations is seen as the impelling power of events, strives according to a mechanic of nations. Nations appear in this view as elements that bear no further dissolution, as static bodies, which collide with each other in space, working upon each other through push and shove. We dissolve the nation itself into a process. We do not see a mirrored-image of the history of the wars of nations; rather the nation appears to us as a mirror-image of historical struggles. For the nation only appears as a national character, in *the nationality of the individual*; and the nationality of the individual is nothing other than *a side of his determination through the history of society*, his determination through the development of the processes of work and working conditions.



In the following year, 1908, Bauer writes an article for *Die Neue Zeit*, which addresses Karl Kautsky's objections to his nationality theory, particularly the idea of a 'community of character' that may differ in some degree from the common plight of the international proletariat. Bauer makes clear that the process of development in a 'community of character' is constant, and comprehends traditional as well as foreign elements in its 'cultural mixture'; and the productive relations shared among all workers in a civilisation are integrated as well, albeit through the particular filters of norms within the interdependent attitudes and customs of a society. The filters are the 'mediating links' that channel individuals into cooperative or conflictual relations within a particular 'community of character'. Bauer will call such a study a 'formal sociology', for not only will societal differences be seen, but also a theoretical overview of kinds of 'mediating links' within interdependencies within a society can be formulated. It is in this article that he apologises that he will not have the time to study the 'mediating links' of differing societies in more depth – thus opening up a seminal idea to even us, a 'formal sociology' of interdependent forms of cooperation and conflict.



Otto Bauer 1908, 'Remarks on the Question of Nationalities', *Die Neue Zeit*, xxv, pp. 792 ff.

My studies of the nationality question, which my honoured teacher Karl Kautsky has so thoroughly taken up in the first Supplement to the *Neue Zeit*, has two roots to follow: in one respect, a taking up of several problems of the historical-materialist conception, and in another the practical need to attain a comprehensively founded position to the problems of nationality which dominate the public life of Austria, and achieve increasing meaning within the political struggles of other states.

Marx and his students have only been able to investigate a few areas in their historical-materialist inquiry. Primarily, they turned to the history of the social and political combats, the changes in the order of states and their laws in their connections with their economic development. Here the contextual connection of these bases and the ideological superstructure has not been given in its mediations; there is required, in this regard, more than a short discussion of Marx's relevance for this issue, rather a content-rich extrapolation of the principles of Marx's historical method in this area. We have had some exploration from this perspective, since Marx, of parts of this development of science and philosophy, poetry, art, and religion – that is, the mediations between the

economic-political-social bases and the ideological superstructure, but as long as we are satisfied merely to entertain these areas of human consciousness in our thought, neglecting the formal elements in them and their thought-content in their hidden dispositional- and feeling-content, occasionally having some opinions towards these matters, we will remain in need of a systematic self-consciousness concerning the relation of the fundamental principles of the historical-materialist conception in its concepts and connections to these issues. Yet as important and seminal as this work would be, we must not be satisfied solely in these superstructural areas, but must study all manifestations of human consciousness in their content, with regard to the dispositions and feeling that inform them, and not only the content in this regard, but also the particular forms in which this content is manifested, placing it within the totality of the context which the Marxist method of historical inquiry has taught us to employ for uncovering the dynamical relationships of history. We will not need to add a new, foreign element to the historical-materialist conception in order to do this; rather, we must only set forth what is within the Marxist method that will enable these augmentations in cultural analysis. Thus, we will need a formal sociology, that is, an exact differentiation of the differing form of social association and social institutions. This social theory of forms will then as a methodology guide the concrete investigation of the material-historical contents of consciousness, in that we will learn, on the one hand, how the differing forms of social groups emerge from the change in the powers of production and relationships generated by production, and, on the other hand, set forth how each of these innumerable social groups determined the individualities of their membership, in the singularity of thought, feeling, and willing of each of them, as well as the differences between the individuals of these groups and other groups, and yet what connected all these individuals to each other. Thus, this theory of social forms is nothing other than a theory of mediating links [*Lehre von der Mittelgliedern*], which integrate the development of working processes and working conditions to the concrete individual manifestations of consciousness in history.

Such a formal sociology will enable us to differentiate between two kinds of social phenomena, instructing us at the same time about their lawful dependence upon one another. The individual can be connected to a group in such a manner that each individual is affected by the same power, the same manner of existence, or the same destiny, which has had or continues to have an effecting influence (where one must differentiate whether it is the same or only a similar manner of living and undergoing). The connection which integrates the group is not a rule that connects the individuals from the outside, but rather a force which binds them together internally: there is in fact, in each

individual's thought and praxis, side-by-side with other abilities, a determining agency which lives not only in that individual, but also in all who belong to that group. What is mine is also that of every other member of the group. I name such groups 'communities'. On the other hand, persons are also connected by external rules: through rules of behaviour (moral laws), through rules that connect one's representations (science), through rules of association of representations through their articulation (language) and so forth (whereby it must further be differentiated whether there are laws which necessarily come to the fore gradually in historical development, which emanate from the deeply rooted laws of human consciousness, or whether these are arbitrary rules which are only valid for certain groups).¹⁹ The subjection to the same rule connects individuals to a group. I name such a group 'society'. Differentiating the differing forms of community and society from each other will be our task.

My investigation of the essence of nation has proceeded from such a study. But its planned continuation has been disrupted by the needs called up in me by political struggles. The Austrian Social Democrats have seen for many years their struggle made more difficult by the devastating power battles among the nations, and there are events that allow us to fear that the working classes will be dragged into these, and the unity and decisiveness of the proletarian army could be destroyed by these national contradictions. Under these conditions, I saw it as my duty to publish the tentative results of my studies of the nationality question, although I was fully conscious of the inadequacies and incompleteness of the materials with which I worked. Under such conditions, I did not see fit to burden my book with difficult methodological investigations, so as not to make difficulty for its immediate political efficacy. Therefore, I had to publish my theory of nations without the thought sequence which established its foundations: without my intended sketch of the doctrine of social forms,

19 [Bauer in this sentence gives evidence of his non-comprehension of Max Adler's Kantian understanding of the a priori laws of consciousness that provide the possibility of certain conscious formulations. These a priori laws would be an internal presence, and thus a dimension of how consciousness generates a 'community' of a certain character, not the 'external' law which Bauer seems to associate with a cultural phenomenon that appears gradually in historical development. He will call the result of such an 'external' effect a dimension of 'society', in contradistinction to 'community'. Thus, his allowing an 'either-or' of the necessary or the arbitrary in relation to an individual construction of consciousness seems to reflect his own uncertainty over his own epistemological position. Historical causation for Bauer is really not given its formal boundaries as a social manifestation by the a priori range of forms potential in any 'I-we' relationship, determined consciousness in its range of such formal connections].

which contained the seminal principles of the historical-materialist conception of social groups – of the mediating links between the productive forces and living individuals.

The author of this book should concern himself over the developmental history of his conceptions; but, in this case, I must give an account of the history of my book, in order to illumine the difference between Kautsky's conception and my conception of the essence of nations. Kautsky sees the decisive failing in my book as that which can explain almost all or most other errors, in that I reject the notion 'that the connection or more, the strongest of all the connections which unite the nation, must be recognised that is most evident before us: the language'. He quotes a pair of sentences from the chapter of my book in which I introduce the fact that differing peoples have the same language, while, on the other hand, Jews have no language in common, and still are a nation, adding: 'That is all Bauer has to say about these matters'.

This representation of my work is not correct. The first paragraph of my book contains nothing but the introductory, prefatory remarks in which I indicate the problems in demonstrating the essence of the nation, certainly without attempting to solve them. I then turn to the factual material from which such a solution must be worked out in making visible the German history. Here I show the changes in language as a consequence, but also as an instrument in these variations in the ways of existing within the nation: in the transition to a settled agriculture, the development of the separate ownership of property and land, the division of the nation into close geographical circles of a farming-domestic existence, which no longer had social intercourse with other areas, tracing the differentiation of language into countless dialects, so that today the upper Frank farmer and the lower Frank farmer, although descendants of a common tribe, who once had *one* language, can only understand each other through a foreign, school-experienced language, namely in the new high German written language.²⁰

20 Kautsky denies the suppositions that the German tribes stemmed themselves from one people, and that the German dialects arose from one language. I hold these hypotheses as neither disproven nor necessary. But when Kautsky will not give them credibility, still he cannot deny that the individual tribes, in their dialects, morals, conventions of living, and physical constitution, are very different members of the German peoples through a differentiating process quite apparent in the light of history, which has led to the individual German tribes. What powerful differentiations have, for example, the Franks and the Saxons undergone? I think on those parts of the tribes that have become members of foreign nations, rather on the hardly less advanced differentiations within the frame of the German nation. For my theory of the nation this reflection upon the facts is sufficient.

From a different perspective, German history teaches us how the communicative relations among the ruling classes – once the knightly class, later the educated – the tendency to create a unified language arises, and how first through the complete change within social relations – under the authority of modern capitalism, later of socialism – the unified language becomes the mother tongue of the entire people. Upon this empirical ground I then develop my conception of the relationships between nation and language; one cannot simply look at the first paragraph division of my book, but must seek further in the tenth paragraph division.²¹ In this division I have thoroughly and repeatedly shown how and why the nation is necessarily a community of language – thus, there is no conflict here between Kautsky and myself. But with the conclusion that a nation needs a language in common, I cannot be satisfied. I ask myself then why it is that just these and not a wider or narrower circle of people are served by the same language. The question as to what force draws the boundaries for a language leads us to the concept of the community of intercourse; and if we seek the boundaries of the community of intercourse, we achieve, finally, the concept of a community of culture. Thus, a common language appears to me, to be sure, a characteristic of a nation, but *a medium of secondary importance*: ‘The common history as the effective cause, the common culture and common descent the means of its effectiveness, the common language again the mediator of the common culture, at the same time its product and creator’. I do not deny that the nation is a community of language, but I seek behind the language that which creates it, that which brings forth its transformations, the boundaries that determine its validity. Just as Marx sought behind the ‘apparent movement’ of competition the ‘actual, but not sensuously perceivable movement’ of the ‘inner nature’, ‘the real relationship’ behind the mere ‘forms of appearance’ of economic events, so to me the community of language, that which, as Kautsky said, ‘is most evident before us’, is a ‘form of appearance’ of a complicated social image, which, as Marx would say, ‘lies behind it’, ‘coming to appearance’ within it, enabling us to comprehend it.

My analysis of the concept of nation discovers behind the community of language the community of culture. Here in the period of the individual possession of property one sees a two-fold movement: on the one hand, the gradual disintegration of a unified national culture – whether this culture is of the German tribes or of a Frankish tribal origin does not matter – into numerous close-knit cultural circles roughly separated from one another, on the other hand, however, the gradual reuniting of these close-knit circles into a unified

21 [Translated as ‘The Concept of Nation’ in the present text].

national culture. This process of the re-emergence of cultural (and therefore linguistic) unity of the nation must be investigated if one is to understand how the modern nations came to be. I have tracked the forces which have led to the reintegration of those separated segments, the disintegrative products of the older communities of descent and noble communism [*Gentilkommunismus*] that were a nation, and have found that their operational reality in the feudal and the capitalist societies was limited to the ruling classes; only these classes were the community of culture, who used a common language as an instrument for a unified, rigorously circumscribed national community, while the working classes of the people remained in geographical separation as well as from any common experience, that is, they were excluded from the common language of the nation. From an analysis of the emergence process of the modern nation, from the investigation of the forces which bound together their counter-striving divisions, the knowledge arises that upon a certain developmental phase, only the ruling classes integrated themselves into a national community, that is, only they were 'national compatriots', while the working divisions of the people comprised only the lesser peoples of the nation [*Hintersassen*]. Against this view, Kautsky contends that the farmer was always the truest preserver of the national characteristics. But the fact that the farmer could not be alienated from his nationality rests upon the fact that he lived within a narrow circle of culture and was not privy to any wider community of intercourse: thus he protected his local way of being from the culture and language of those distanced from him, but by that process was himself excluded from any large movement beyond him which welded together the smaller, geographical communities into a unified modern nation. That the farmer maintained his particularities, which did develop in a long differentiation process which grew out of the unified nation of the past, does not contradict the fact that he remained excluded from the developmental stages of the unification process of the nation for centuries, in which the unified nation of the present and future emerged. Therefore, I term him 'of the lesser people' [*Hintersassen*] of the nation.

First, the social transformations under the rule of modern capitalism enabled the processes of cultural unification of the nation to be established, or better, to be re-established, coming to include the working people. This movement proceeded in two forms, however: with the historical nations, the ruling and ruled classes were comprehended, which meant that the working segments of the people were able to achieve participation in the existing national culture; with the nations without a history, however, which comprised only ruled and exploited classes, they did not maintain their traditions or ancient cultural elements, but arose in their present form only under the influence

of living and progressing national cultures, which were not theirs. With both of these kinds of modern nation, the class war of the proletariat has differing national contents, in each of the these two kinds, the proletariat has a different function to fulfill in relation to the emergence of the modern nation. These are an essential distinction for my theory of the nation that Kautsky has completely overlooked. I have designated the class war of the proletariat that of an evolutionary-national politics, in order to say that the working class of the historical nations, by being in a class war, gain for the first time a participation in the living national culture of their people; and Kautsky contends against this view that the Slovenes have no sense of such a purpose – but the Slovenes are a nation without a history, in whose development of the emergence of the lower classes finds a quite different function from the development of the lower classes in historical nations.

Yet Kautsky's decisive objection to my valuing of the national content of each class war is in another direction: he opines that the proletariat fight for the possession of an international culture, not the culture of a particular national community, and that an essential error of my book lies in the fact that I do not divide the national and international cultural elements from each other, considering culture only as a national product, not giving sufficient worth to its international character.

Kautsky arrives at his criticism in the following manner: he sees the culture of differing nations as one whole, and divides the cultural elements of it into two groups. The first group comprehends those cultural elements which all or most nations have in common – the international culture, the second group of particular cultural elements of the individual nations – are their special culture. I can say, in this regard, that the international cultural elements comprise the greater part of any common culture, and that the working class strives to attain them just as they do those elements of their national cultural characteristics.

My thought process, however, proceeds not from a conceptual differentiation of cultural elements in regard to the circle of their validity, but rather from a historical representation of their relations to the differing national cultures. In the historical sections of my book – the sections over the feudal, the early capitalist, and the socialist society – I have shown how a nation takes up cultural elements which have first developed on the soil of other nations; in my theoretical summation I then described this process of the 'material assimilation of cultural contents', representing, as well, the most extreme cases where the integration of several strongly effective cultures are comprised by one culture, that is the case of the 'cultural mixture'; finally, I have devoted special sections, paragraph divisions 12 and 23 of my book, to the proof that this intrusion of foreign cultural elements, internationalisation of the culture, for

example, should not be fought against. The reproach that I do not give sufficient respect to the international character of modern culture is not valid. However, I have not simply been satisfied with the logical division of a national and an international content of consciousness; rather I have sought to describe the process of taking up foreign cultural elements psychologically. It could not escape me that the ideologies of each nation are not only spatially active, in that other nations take them up, but that they progress temporally as well, inasmuch as the development of the ideology of a nation determines its future. If the higher developmental stages of the society generate new conceptions and means of evaluating, the inherited contents of consciousness of the nation must be brought into a relation to these new elements, often in a struggle with them, and become transformed in this conflict and relation; if several nations take up these cultural elements, it will enter the conscious contents of each nation in a differing relation, so that each nation gains in its historical struggles a particular ideology, and these elements give a particular tone to this ideology. The knowledge that comes from countless observations is merely, in a nation, a particular phenomenal form of the universal laws of the continuity of human consciousness, which the national apperception, as I describe, exhibits as a particular form of the universal laws of psychology. One must not overlook the actuality of this psychological process, if one is to truly understand the differences between national cultures: for example, the way of life, the poetry and art, the politics, even the cultural elements that Kautsky considers as the technical culture, indeed, capitalism and socialism, in spite of their relative sameness as effective forces today among the English or French necessarily take on differing forms than with the Germans; from differentiations of language Kautsky cannot explain these differences. In spite of the same effects of the capitalist means of production in each country, there are differences in the formation of the national ideologies, because the same forces of capitalism in each country cultivate different psychic material, whose differences are grounded within the singularities of the historical development of each nation, and are to be explained by this – this understanding makes the concrete manifestations of their spiritual life comprehensible, it frees us from the illusion of an incomprehensible national character, from the mystique of a people's soul. It shows us as well that the international culture of the theoreticians is nothing but an abstraction from that which the many particular national cultures actually evidence, and that nowhere is such internationalism an independent existence, but rather can only appear within the national culture as a phenomenon. National cultures are the vessels within which the international culture, that is, the cultural elements common to all or most of the nations, are contained. Just as conscious-

ness in general can only be manifested in the consciousness of the individual, so the international culture is only expressed within the national culture. Theoreticians can separate cultural elements according to their spheres of validity, and can arrive in this manner at a differentiation of national and international culture; but through the conceptual rendering of all or most of the several nation's in-common cultural elements, the fact cannot be dismissed that there is nowhere anything but a national culture, and that an international culture cannot be other than the common elements contained by differing national cultures. One cannot remove the differences of the national cultures, because what has transpired in the history of the nations cannot be undone. Therefore, the class war of the proletariat is for the possession of the national culture.

In the conflict over the concept of a national culture we miss, painfully, in the process of argumentation the thought process of the historical-materialist conception. Such a theory of forms would show how the resulting ideological manifestations could be explained solely from the connection to the new relations of production as they formed the conscious contents of persons, in comparison to the productive relations of earlier times in their rooted, inherited cultural elements. This would provide the general theoretical bases of our system of national apperception, which in itself is the basis of our theory of the function of the proletariat class war in the becoming of nations.

Even more clearly we see the lack of a theory of social forms when we move from the concept of a community of culture to the next higher concept of the community of destiny. If Kautsky means to contradict my definition of nation by correlating it to the community of destiny being not only a nation, but also a local community, the state, the guild, the party, the corporation, then he does so by not attending to what I have intended with the words 'community of destiny'. For the social representations mentioned by Kautsky are in my terminology not communities, but societal manifestations, thus they are not communities of destiny in my sense. There are, to be sure, smaller communities of destiny within the nation; yet, I have shown in Paragraph 10 of my book that the difficulty of circumscribing these narrower communities of destiny conceptually in their separateness from nation rests largely on their role as stages in themselves in the development of the nation, and thus the many 'hinterland' associations must be included in that development of a unity. These smaller communities are 'the disintegrative products of the communist nation of the past, and the material of the socialist nation of the future'. If the national unification process has not taken them up, then these smaller communities of destiny within the nation must become independent nations in themselves.

We have moved from a language community to a cultural community to a community of destiny; we now go upon this path of a community of destiny back to the cultural community, and arrive then, on the one hand, at the language society, which gives rise to the cultural community, and on the other, however, at the community of character, since the sameness of destiny brings forth the relatedness of character.

Kautsky will contradict my definition of nation as a community of character empirically, in that he indicates the great differences of individual character within every modern nation. But he can only undertake this effort because he limits his grasp of my concept to what I briefly sketched in Paragraph 1 of my book, and not the more developed and final sense offered in Paragraph 10. For in the latter chapter division, community of character is no longer based on the empirical similarities of individual character, but rather on the fact that in their development a common force is at work, even as there may be other, differing forces at play among other individual expressions within the community. The individual character is the result of many components; one of these components – that being the national destiny, the national culture – has created the individual singularity of all the national compatriots; where the other components are similar, similar character arises, where the other components are different, from their interaction among themselves, the resultant individual character can be quite different. But the community established by the one – the national component – completely integrates empirically all the differing individualities in its community of character.

Now one can certainly ask whether such an unaccustomed concept, so different from the vulgar concept of a community of character that Kautsky offers, is of use. The answer to this question can give us, for the first time, the theory of social forms whose concepts enable my theory of the nation. It will show that the thought and feeling, the willing and praxis of the individual, which is the immediate content of all social occurrences, and therefore the inception point of all historical inquiry, can be related to the development of the powers of production and the productive relations in no other way than isolating the individual, grasping him from every side in the lawful determination of his being as he is ordered within the community of character, in his human struggle with nature. From the differing self-protective relationships of these differing communities of character, the differences among individuals arise. That is why the search for these communities of character is the greatest task of history as a science.

Kautsky's community of language is a society; my community of character is a community. That societies must be related to communities, and that the former can only be understood conceptually by the latter, will be proven by

my theory of social forms. I hope to offer the foundational thoughts of this theory to the public in the near future.²² Until this time I must put off my decisive argument with Kautsky. However, the fact that Kautsky's criticism leads back to the very concepts and sequences of thought that are the bases of my entire theory, which could not be developed fully in my book, evidences the substantiality of Kautsky's criticism as well the correctness of my system: he seizes me precisely where for external and accidental reasons my position is not yet fully defended, which I hope to rectify in the future.

The State

The contrast between my theory and that of Kautsky regarding nation also determines our opposition in the conception of the relations between the nation and the state. As Kautsky reduces nation to a community of language, he derives the nationality principle from the language difficulties of the nationality state. The nationality state cannot exist because of the difficulty of mutual comprehension among its members, being less able to cooperate in its operative processes. I do not know of one instance in which a nationality state has run aground upon anything other than the difficulty of mutual comprehension; and it is just that severe language war in Austria that has taught me that within a language war there comes to expression more deeply-lying contradictions; if one only dealt with the technical questions of mutual comprehension, the language conflict could be easily solved, for the performance issues in common could be easily remedied. The intensity of the language wars and the difficulty of their solution is rooted, however, in the fact the nation is more than its community of language.

It is incomprehensible to me, then, how Kautsky can assert that I estimate the strength of the nationality principle less than he does. The image of the political divisions of a socialist Europe that I present in Paragraph 30 of my book is no different in any point from that which Kautsky presents in the conclusion of his essay. I have only gone further in this direction, and have sought more

22 [No further development of Bauer's theory of a community of character as nation was ever completed. But, in the spirit of Simmel, who Bauer quoted in his chapter 'The Concept of Nation', in his book *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy* (Bauer 1907 p. 122), Bauer's work was indeed 'a preliminary sketch of the principles' [*Vorbereitungen auf Gesetze*] of the complex task which even now must be fully taken up and developed, particularly in the effort to define the 'mediating forms' [*Mittelgliedern*] by which the forms of production and productive relations within a national – and now global – populace create a common cultural character].

fully to prove which tendencies still within the capitalist society can make intelligible the disintegration of the older nationality states. I would be quite astonished if one found in my investigations, which must have appeared as a sacrilege to every Black-Yellow [i.e. Austrian conservative nationalist], even a trace of this special *love* of the nationality state which Kautsky accuses me of harbouring.

But there must be an unpleasurable, yet therefore even more necessary, investigation of the likelihood of the destruction of Austria within its capitalist society, which could occur in consequence of an imperialistic transformation of the world, which the proletariat of all nations do not wish for, and which would disrupt their own political calculations. For Austrian Social Democracy, then, the duty for the near future is to fight for the regulation of the national conditions of law, so that they can correspond best to the class interests and class ideology of the workers. Concerning this goal of struggle, Kautsky and I are of the same mind. Kautsky points merely to the limits of capability posed by the autonomy of nationalities within one state, and he seeks to disrupt our belief that the cooperation we further is viable.

Kautsky stresses that national autonomy cannot solve all the national problems. That the national problem cannot be finally settled in the capitalist society, I have repeatedly stressed as well. However, whether the limits of national autonomy are not broader in scope than a cursory reflection can show, is being discussed vigorously in *Der Kampf* presently.²³ I need only point to that discussion here.

Kautsky fights further against the conception that the hindrances to a national autonomy within the Austrian state can be removed in such a way that the practical economic and social-political successes of the proletariat can be facilitated. Whoever reads the final chapter of my book, in which I have ruthlessly described which limitations to such successes are placed by the highest stage of capitalist development, cannot believe that I need instruction in this regard. But Kautsky does not himself counsel us to reject the struggle for national autonomy for these reasons. And national autonomy will remove the

23 [Bauer refers to a host of articles, particularly those written by him and Karl Renner, published in *Der Kampf*, in 1907–8. Among them are Otto Bauer, 'Die soziale Gliederung der österreichischen Nationen', *Der Kampf* (October 1907), pp. 30–8; 'Unser Nationalitätenprogramm und unsere Taktik', *Der Kampf* (February 1908), pp. 204–10; 'Massenpsyche und Sprachenrecht', *Der Kampf* (April 1908), pp. 304–9; and Karl Renner, 'Das Nationale Problem in der Verwaltung', *Der Kampf* (October 1907), pp. 23–30; 'Löst die nationale Autonomie die Amtssprachenfrage?', *Der Kampf* (November 1907), pp. 53–60; 'Nationale Minoritätsgemeinden', *Der Kampf* (May 1908), pp. 356–61].

most dire consequence for the proletariat: the jeopardising of the unity of the proletarian army because of nationality struggles among themselves.

Finally, Kautsky doubts whether the autonomy of local administrations can be the foundation for a national autonomy, in a struggle against the resistance of the bureaucracy and bourgeois. The most important thing that can be said in this regard I have presented in the fifth issue of *Der Kampf*.²⁴ Here Kautsky underestimates the difficulties of the nationality state: a difficult ten year crisis in the state has taught to those in power that they cannot give over the inner administration fully, but that they must, nonetheless, enable autonomous state bodies of organised nationals to participate in power, in order to insure the blunt facts of existence. As long as our administration is not placed upon a fully new foundation, the state will not be certain of its everyday life; every bureaucratic reform of administration fails because of nationality contradictions; the state necessity of a new construction of administration must be united with the democratic ideas of autonomous local administration, in order to overcome the hindrances of the nationality contradictions. That the decades long conflict over the autonomy of German Bohemia can only be ended in this manner, even the very influential bureaucratic circles have recognised – not because bureaucracy is *blessed by God* [*gottbegnadet*] in a special way, but because the misery of the state affects its own dialectics. The strength of the principle of nationalities is so great that an iron necessity is impelled by the nationality state to address its actuality; national autonomy is, however, nothing other than the principle of internal nationalities.

But however one may think about these questions in the future, it is important enough for me, inasmuch as our claims can affect the practical results of my book in the present, to be in concord with Kautsky. Yet perhaps our differences of opinion in an essentially tactical problem have a deeper ground. We both fight for unified and decisive tactics for the proletariat of all nations. Kautsky believes that this goal can most quickly be furthered when he stresses the international character of modern culture, reducing the nation to a mere language community, and complaining that the language differences are a hindrance to the mutual comprehension and single-minded action of the classes and peoples. I believe, however, that we can only defeat the bourgeois nationalism which also deludes many of our comrades, when we bring to light the national content of our international class war in its meaning for the international proletarian struggle in its development and widening of our national

24 'Unser Nationalitätenprogramm und unsere Taktik', *Der Kampf* (February 1908), pp. 204–10.

cultural community, and show to everyone that it is on this battlefield, where the classes measure their strength, as well as their weal and woe in relation to the external great powers, and the inner wealth of nations, where all is to be decided. Thus, we seize nationalism and place it upon our own ground. Not, thereby, avoiding our enemy, but rather carrying the war into our own land, so the art of war instructs us. Hegel, the master of masters, in his contesting of nationalism, teaches that these words must precede any great confutation: 'The true confutation must go into the power of the opponent, and place itself within the compass of his strength; to fight him where he is not does not further the matter'.

Kautsky's Reply to Bauer's Essay

Bauer develops in his response a wholly new thought, the idea of a *formal sociology*, which poses a differentiation between society and community, without which his theory of nationalities cannot be understood. In the search for the *community of character* he sees 'the highest task of history as a science'. His intimations, however, unfortunately do not extend to a proof of this *theory of social forms*. It seems to me, therefore, advisable to continue this discussion over Bauer's concept of nationality with the appearance of his *theory of forms*.

I am able to say that in practical nationality politics there exists only unimportant differences between us. Only, I must repeat that I do not really expect that the Austrian bureaucracy will resign themselves to the 'democratic thoughts of local administrative autonomy because the misery of the state affects its own dialectics'.

The state is not a goal in itself for any class; for every class it is a means to an end. No one denies themselves power in the state with free will merely in order to preserve the state. One sees evidence of that today in the Russian bureaucracy, which would rather see the state destroyed than give it up as one of their instruments of power.

No class intercedes for the state, only for a definite form of state. The state, for whose preservation the bureaucracy fights, whose misery affects their own dialectics, is the bureaucratic state, not the democratic state. They offer to all the preservation of the bureaucratic state, which means avoiding the democratic one.

And that is all that can be said about the differences of opinion between Bauer and myself. I think our comrades in Austria would do well to take to heart Hegel's principle, above all in relation to their bureaucracy.

Otto Bauer's 1906 article in *Die Neue Zeit* on Marxism and ethics reveals the neo-Kantian influence that Max Adler exercised in his thought at that time. Yet one can also see the presence of his dialectical thinking that stresses the variable of a materialist environmental conditioning of what might be formulated as a Kantian categorical imperative in a specific cultural time and place. Bauer's thought sees differentiated possibilities of categorical ethical truth even in the in-common leaven of a future socialist society. In that, we will see that Max Adler does not join his judgement – Adler's sense of the future being the 'solidarity society' in which differences are minimal. Bauer will counter Karl Kautsky's ethical perspective that is derived from the materialist environmental political-social reality – which will not make the same present or future differentiations as Bauer. Bauer's concept of differing national characters is undergirded by the thought one sees here of differing integrities to be considered as any one integrity formulates his or her categorical imperative.

Interesting in this essay is Bauer's own uncertainty about the categorical imperative that a worker might formulate towards his striking comrades and the Party given certain private issues in his family. As I will formulate in an endnote in more detail, in a 1910 essay on 'Intervals in History' that follows this translation, Bauer's own deep involvement in his own parental household not only instructed him in differing integrities, but also strained his ability to decide in favour of x or y in pressing situations. This will carry over to his tactical failures.



Otto Bauer 1906, 'Marxism and Ethics', *Die Neue Zeit*, XXIII: 485–99

1 *Life and Science*

My friend x. is a poor devil; for months he has had no employment, one of his children has been very ill for weeks, his wife and the other children are increasingly wan, the grocer and the landlord pressure him to pay his debt, even during these months of affliction. Today a message arrived for him from an employer whose working-site has been the centre of a strike, inviting x. to come, offering him a job. This offer is seductive for him; it would provide his child with care, provide nourishment for his wife and other children, and could avoid the danger of having his landlord turn him, his wife, and his children out onto the street. But x. cannot with an easy heart decide to become a strikebreaker; in fact, he himself stood before a judge a few years before because he insulted those who 'were ready for work' in such a manner. Unable to make a decision, he comes to me and asks: What should I do? Should I be a strikebreaker or not?

Naturally, I give him advice. I try to show him conceptually that he acts against his own interests when he takes the job that is offered to him. His colleagues would despise him, insult him, perhaps even abuse him, and that at the end of the wage dispute, he would be let go. But all of this appears meaningless to him in the face of the pressing danger that the landlord throws him into the streets in the middle of winter.

So I try to make my case differently. I remind him that the worker who goes behind the back of his struggling comrades, acts against the interests of his class, which is really his own actual interest, as well as the interest of his children. But x. will not hear of this. What does the interest of class mean to him just now? He has fought their fight with conviction that the interest of class is also the interest of each worker, even his own particular interest; today, however, these interests are in conflict with his own immediate interest. What should determine his decision, the interests of serving class, and thereby giving up his individual interest?

I could not demonstrate to him that being a strikebreaker self-evidently countered his own interest, as he expressed it; so I went on – with a distinct lack of comfort – to make it conceptually clear to him how he was immoral. I instructed him how from the position of the working class in the capitalist production process, the consciousness of solidarity of all workers arises in its battle against capital; how the struggling working class can necessarily tear asunder this band of solidarity if it betrays it in its way of considering and acting; how, therefore, the breaking of a strike is necessarily immoral. But x. listens to me impatiently. ‘What does all that mean?’ he asks. ‘I know, of course, that every class has a new ethic, new conceptions of what is moral and immoral which they create; I understand that the proletariat will consider strikebreaking necessarily as immoral in its practice, as the feudal lord once saw the violation of the oath of fealty. Yes, I am also a child of my time, of my class; even to my consciousness, strikebreaking must appear immoral. But I harm not only a worker, rather the worker x; if the societal position of class to which I belong seems to me through strikebreaking immoral, on the other hand, my individual situation would be immoral to me if I deny the necessary care for my sick child, make my poor wife go hungry, and allow my family to be put into the street. The idea that the breaking of the strike is immoral arises necessarily in me because I am a worker; but the idea that it is now my duty to be a strikebreaker must also necessarily arise, because I am a proletarian without work, and because my children are cold and hungry. What should I do? I do not expect a lecture from you on how the ideas of the moral arise, how they are conditioned by the processes of production; I only want an answer from you to the question “What should I do?”’

'You should not be a strikebreaker', I say. 'What is at issue here is the conflict of social impulse with the impulse of self-preservation and its furtherance. Even with certain animal species one's societal bearing is a weapon in the struggle for existence. The struggle for existence cultivates in that manner a social impulse which grows with many species and among their individuals into an astonishing power of comportment, even eclipsing the impulse of self-preservation and its furtherance, if the latter come into conflict with the former.²⁵ The social impulse in itself can be different within differing circumstances of life, but a series of impulses create the precondition of the spread of any kind of society. And above all of these impulses is, naturally, that of *selflessness*, giving oneself to the community. Then, there is *courage* in the defence of common interests; *fidelity* in relation to the community; subsuming oneself to the will of the whole, as well as obedience or discipline ... finally, *ambition*, one's receptivity to praise and censure by the community. These are all social impulses, which one can find imprinted on animal societies, in some to a great degree. These social impulses are nothing other than the most elevated virtues that one finds in moral law.²⁶ These animal impulses one finds, as well, with humankind. In human history, one finds, however, the contradictions of class arising. Class differences take us into the monstrous and endless, and social contradictions only grow within them. In the proportion that this development of class contradiction continues, with the society being more and more divided, the class struggle becomes the most noble, universal, and durational form of the individual struggle for existence in human society; in the same proportion as such a development emerges, whereby the social impulse in its relation to the whole society loses its strength, the will within a class becomes an aim known to individuals as identical to the welfare of everyone, in that the well-being of all individuals is within this new self-realisation. This commonality is of the exploited, oppressed, upwards striving classes, in whose class struggle the social impulse and virtues are strengthened'.²⁷ 'That is all very interesting, and, undoubtedly right', said my friend, 'but it is not an answer to my question. If I had decided to sacrifice my particular interests to the interests and the ideology of my class, and if it was now the time to explain this decision, revealing its causes, then you have solved what I must say. But you haven't yet told me how it is causally justified in making my individual decision, rather you simply have told me what decision to make'.

25 Kautsky 1906, p. 61.

26 Kautsky 1906, p. 62.

27 Kautsky 1906, p. 119.

'The ethics of the proletariat', I answered, 'judges strikebreaking. To the proletariat belongs the future. This will be, and is not open to a doubting scientific investigation, which unavoidably fights to protect the dominant societal order, and in its victory will replace that order with its own. This powerful overthrow is causally necessary and unavoidable. Science is always concerned with knowing what is necessary in relation to action. It can, indeed, prescribe what should be done, but this may only be the consequence of insight into what is necessarily the case.'²⁸ Science teaches us that the future belongs to the working class, that their unavoidable class war is just as unavoidable as their victory in its conduct. From that follows that you, who are a worker, should fight alongside the working class, and that you must not attack it from behind'.

'No', he said, 'that appears to me to me a precipitate conclusion. When you establish that socialism will be necessary, so that it is for me, the worker, a very favourable understanding insofar as the interests of the working class are my interests. But today I seek advice for my particular case, where my particular interests do not coincide with class interests. In this case your lecture on the necessary causes of socialism says nothing. Is then what will be, also that what must be? And when I know that socialism will be, must I therefore fight so that it will be? Does it follow from your knowledge that if the proletariat must be certain of its victory, I must actually obey the proletarian ethic, and not that maxim which flows from my individual circumstances? Why should that be a law for me which stems from my belonging to the working class, and not that which stems from the fact that I am a man who eats, has a wife who should not go hungry, and children who shouldn't freeze?'

'The social impulse', I began again. But X. would no longer listen to me. Silent, he turned to the door, and left the room. It was clear to me then that it is something quite different *in making a moral phenomenon into an object for science* that can be investigated in its determinable moral content, as it must necessarily arise in certain natural and social conditions, and answering it as *a moral question of simply living*, an impassioned question which my poor friend sought an answer for; 'What should I do?'

For Hegel, all that is, is not only necessary, but also rational. For him the development of nature and society is the movement of the spirit itself, in which, even though in an endless process, makes that which is that which should be. But even though we thank Hegel for this understanding, which is sufficiently rich for us even today, we can also see in this doctrine today how we need no longer be his students. Nature is no longer that which is 'other' than

²⁸ Kautsky 1906, p. 141.

spirit; rather we understand spirit only as consciousness and consciousness as a manifestation of nature. Whoever discards Hegel's panlogism is no longer justified to include the question of the 'Should' in that of 'Becoming'. Only science is involved in this question of what was and is and will be; to value or to determine morally is not its task. There is no science of the 'Should'. From this it follows not only that science involves itself solely with being and becoming, but also that it has no more to offer than establishing a necessary law from each concrete manifestation in its singularity; it may not 'value' or judge morally, rather its knowledge is that which arises from necessity, a necessity of being, offering no law that treats our willing in the form of an imperative.

There is a twofold way in which the moral becomes a problem, in the face of this limitation of science. On the one hand, we must make the manifestation of the moral an object of science in some way. We must set forth the moral manifestation in a manner that reveals its natural and social conditions. This is an important task for historical materialism. I am in agreement with Karl Kautsky in seeing the changing conceptions of the moral as a scientific task of the historical-materialist conception. Of course, not every illustrative position by Kautsky in his new work *Ethics and the Materialist Historical Conception* [*Ethik und materialistische Geschichtsauffassung*] can be considered correctly observed and judged; but in its principle that the moral as well as all other social phenomena can only be understood when we see their connection to the processes of production, it is without question.²⁹

Kautsky will limit the scope by which the historical-materialist conception can give us a scientific purview of the ethical; he will not allow us to generate maxims that treat the ethical value of a behaviour that come from any posing of a question that is not of the necessity that stems from the historical-materialist conception. Yet within this understanding, we cannot answer one ethical question about life. Even if I understand how the moral conceptions of the working class necessarily arose: what does that say to him who fails to

29 Kautsky's preference for considering all ethical phenomena in its connection to animal life can be a dangerous premise. The task we face is to examine to what extent the laws of conscious goal orientation can be traced to the hierarchy of living beings, even though we may track the laws of human experience to their existence in animals (which does not alleviate us from studying the formal lawfulness of consciousness independently no matter where its origins lie). Goethe said with justification: 'The human never grasps just how anthropomorphic he is'. The danger of depicting other kinds of existence upon the model of the human avoids the task of correctly comprehending the animal in its behaviour, just as difficult in its way as attempting to conceive what might be a more than human existence.

see in the face of some contingency his denial of his class, and undisturbed within this ignorance chooses a path independently? What do we say to such a worker in relation to a question of life that seems separate from the duty to a proletarian ethic, which is grounded in his individual (or vocational, local, or national) existence? How has insight into the causal necessity of the proletarian ethic helped my friend x, who is near to becoming a strikebreaker? It may be that the duty of the proletarian ethic has shown him the correct path; when I show that to him, however, it is not sufficient that I show him it is a proletarian ethic, rather I must show him that the proletarian ethic is correct. Is that possible? If there is no moral command which is always valid everywhere, rather only the fact that each class creates its own moral conceptions, and that the ethics of each class changes over the course of history, how can one then articulate from such a process an imperative that is correct in a universal manner? This problem is solved by Kant inasmuch as he separates an ethical imperative from a mere maxim – not in its content, but in its formal expression as a law that harbours the imperative in its capacity for becoming a universal law.

2 *Kant's Ethics*

Kant did not investigate how experience *arose*, rather of what it consists.

What is *experience*? Experience is given by the countless experiences in the life of each person. But the concrete individual experience of each person is only a transient moment; human consciousness immediately proceeds to confront *this* experience with all others, comparing them, seeking to set aside contradictions in comprehension of it, the single experience is ordered within the sequence of all other experiences, connected with them. Science emerges in this manner, which is nothing other than the ordered context of individual experiences, clarified by this process of thought. The presence of a science is seminal in every individual experience, for the lawfulness of consciousness is the same in every naively knowing person as that which is present in Marx and Darwin. Thus, whoever seeks the components of experience must find them where they develop: in science. Hermann Cohen has contributed to the understanding of Kant when he teaches us that we should think of Newton when Kant speaks of experience. That the judgement 'all changes occur according to the law of the connection of cause and effect', which makes experience possible, could only have been achieved by the critical separation of the components by science. Whoever has learned this from Newton can then easily see how causality as the rule of connecting conceptions as the basis of the conditions of experience is an age-old truth which mathematical natural science has never perceived.

Of what does experience consist, then, and how is it articulated in the science of a particular age? Kant differentiates between material and form. What the material of experience is depends upon what experiences humans make, which are naturally and socially conditioned. Here a task is given to historians who have studied the history of human knowing; here lies too the governing authority of the historical-materialist conception. However, Kant does not turn towards the material content, but rather to the form of the experience. He does not investigate how the experience arises historically and psychologically; what interests him is not what consciousness takes up in its experiencing; rather, he seeks in the experience that which connects it as experience, what are the grounds of its possible unity as experience. The conditions of all possible experience Kant calls the *a priori*, and the questioning of its conditions, *the transcendental method*. The *a priori* character of space does not mean that the newborn brings the conception of space with it; rather it means that whoever wishes to comprehend what humans call experience must develop a concept of space, which is always the material of his experience that give him the sensations of that material. And this conception is of a quite definite space whose laws are contained in geometry. Thus, the principles of geometry are universal and necessary, so that one need never fear that they will be contradicted by experience, because these principles are the laws of space which condition all possible experience. 'The pure forms of intuition and thought are not *a priori* because they are valid as innate, rather they are valid as innate because they are *a priori*, that is, make possible experience' (Cohen) – innate, once more, only in the sense that experience must arise by dint of it, which then is also the content of experience.

It is evident that the transcendental method is historically conditioned, and that critical philosophy could have only emerged in a particular time. Only a *bourgeois* period could have produced a Kant. In order for Kant to have accomplished his works, much had to precede it. The emergence of modern science: without a Newton, no Kant. The human spirit had to be liberated from its bonds of traditional ideology, a longing for a new picture of the world, which in itself is the effect of a massive economic upheaval. The founders of the new speculative philosophy were: without Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, no Kant. Preceding his work, there had to be advances in the empirical methods of inquiry, which necessitated finally that human experience itself become an object of experience for science; if human experience then was conceived of as something that develops in its historical-psychological contingencies, the world of experience conceived as a world of appearances, then unavoidably it must seem, as one first studies it, merely an illusory presence; empiricism concludes in skepticism: without Bacon, Locke, and Hume, no Kant. Preced-

ing all this finally there must be a great upheaval in all social conditions, which free humans from the bonds of all inherited morality, raising new ethical problems and thus the question of the relationship of science to ethics, of that which is to that which should be, the history of human culture making the ethical imperative a pressing issue: without Rousseau, no Kant. But the fact that human consciousness could only under certain historical prerequisites arrive at the critical question of what is experience does not say whether Kant's answer was correct. It seems to us that the transcendental method is an enduring conquest of the human spirit, which appears first under certain historical conditions in the history of human knowing, but it has as little chance of disappearing as the great achievements of the bourgeois age in its new mathematical natural sciences or its great inventions of modern technology, whose products may have first been generated under the impulsion of the capitalist profit drive, but nonetheless are the inheritance of every future societal order.

But Kant's philosophy is also historically conditioned in another sense. Kant was not only interested in the critical question of the conditions of the possibility of experience; other questions lay close to his heart. Thus, in his life work with the transcendental method, there are questions that have ceased to be significant to us which were mingled within his solutions to the problem. He himself often conflated the transcendental *a priori* with psychological or metaphysical matters. He, who was the first to describe the boundaries of experience, had himself striven for an illusory knowledge that surpassed these boundaries, a knowledge of something that was not real, for only 'what is connected to the material conditions of experience (what is sensed) is real';³⁰ a knowledge of something, what is given to us, for what is given is 'related to experience'; we cannot think of that which is not capable of being thought, and we have no other means of thinking than the categories, and with these we can only think of the objects of experience.³¹

For us, then, Kant's work of the transcendental method must be separated entirely from other questions that he took up. But this has been done only in the last decade; earlier both friends and enemies of Kant allowed the main thrust of the question of the conditions of experience to be completely lost in a confusion of psychological and metaphysical problems. Thus, it was a markedly vulgar Kantianism that was defended and fought against, what was essential

30 Kant 1965, p. 203 [A 168–B 210].

31 I do not assert that the transcendental method of Kant excludes practical rational beliefs; I deny, however, that it furthers them.

appearing to be what Kant had in common with his contemporaries, and the new in Kant was not even seen, the new question, how experience, how science is possible, the conception of the *a priori* not as an innate element, not as a foundation of the mind, not as a form in which the content of experience is poured, rather as a method – certainly not for some chosen goal, rather for what is unavoidable. It is above all the achievement of Hermann Cohen that we have again learned to conceive of the pure forms of intuition as a mathematical method, and the pure forms of thought as mechanical methods.³²

Unfortunately, Kautsky's critique of Kant is directed in an incomplete manner against this vulgar Kantianism. Kant appears to Kautsky as a skeptic who has no other intention than convincing us that we only experience an illusion of things, not things in themselves. But Kant laboured to show precisely that we can be sure of our experience in the face of doubts that appear necessary to the skeptic of empiricism. It is the unconscious presupposition of skepticism when he compares our experience with other possible thoughts of experience, since he holds that what our experience may have generated could be thought as being but an illusion if thought of in a different way. Kant shows us that such a process of self-judgement is nonsensical, that what is actual is that which is within the context of our sensations, and the skeptic thus thinks uncritically when he complains that our knowledge of the actual may be insecure; Kant shows that reality is nothing other than our categories, and thus avoids the complaint of the skeptic that we can know nothing of the truly real; Kant shows the object as a rule of our conceptual connections, disposing thereby of the uncritical question of the skeptic as to how it is that the objects we judge, which are separate from our experience of them, are created. 'What appears to me as a colour', says Kautsky, 'is brought forward by certain lengths of light that meet my eye'. That is, however, precisely what interests Kant: that the human consciousness is not satisfied until it has disturbed this colourful world, finally relating it to certain quantitative relationships, which optics has established with mechanics, not settling for green, red, and blue being given by the sensation of 'air waves of a certain length'. What is sought is not several ways to account for such an experience, but rather the unavoidable method of the mathematical natural sciences: that is Kant's *a priori*. And since this *a priori* is assured in the face of all doubt because it makes all experience initially possible, and thus making the question of another reality as our experience

32 Naturally, I speak here only of Cohen's interpretation of the transcendental method. His original interpretation of the Kantian concept of freedom I do not judge here, as I do not judge his own philosophical doctrine that he has constructed upon a Kantian ground.

nonsense, that is, contradictory in its very assertion as it departs from what is sensed: that is the great theme of Kant's critique of reason. This assurance calls to mind Newton's experience with the skeptics, which is especially relevant for us as Marxists; for the man who took up in his mind for the first time that human consciousness was also a piece of human history was Karl Marx.

This thought, however, cannot be pursued here in depth, no more than we can further follow Kautsky's critique of Kant's doctrine of experience. We have only succeeded in placing Kant's concept of the *a priori* as the condition of possible experience in opposition to Kautsky's conception in his contest with vulgar Kantianism; and having accomplished that, we have done what we must to speak further of Kant's ethics.

For even when Kant speaks no further of the experience of being, rather of Being as the Should, he takes the same path. He is not seeking to *invent* an ethical law; rather he aims at *discovering* the lawfulness of an ethical willing. In the ethical he also divides material from form. Here too the material is given empirically. There is not a single inhering ethical principle in the content that can be valid everywhere and always. When Dietzgen asserts that the arrogance of the moralists exists in the fact that they make a particular ethic absolute, that is spoken in Kant's sense. The material of the imperative is a thing of inquiry for historians, and here the historical-materialist conception is the guiding thread for such inquiry. Kant turns here once more to the *formal lawfulness* of the moral. His task is quite different from that of the historian, and since he moves in a different area, he need not come into conflict at any point with the historical-materialist conception. For Kant it is required to discover the formal lawfulness of all 'Should', no matter what its material content.

There exists here a difficulty, however. The criticism of experience must adhere to the experience as it develops, as it then is clarified in its thought as science; it discovers the *a priori* in which the conditions of the possibility of such experience can be demonstrated. The critique of pure will, however, has no such object as with Newton's *Principia mathematica*; rather nothing more is given it as an object of study than an indefinite number of commands which contradict one another, seemingly refuting the character of the ethical. Kant strove to give a systematic cohesion to ethical knowledge, that is, 'such a system in which the idea of the whole is derived methodically from the parts', and asks then how such a system of imperatives is possible. He then arrived at his practical foundational law: 'Act so that the maxims of your will can be at the same time a principle of universal legislation.' This law makes every concrete imperative first possible. Thereby, the maxims attain the capability of being a principle of universal legislation, achieving the criterion that makes possible a

separation of the concrete ethical imperative from a mere individual maxim, the latter not being empowered to be in the conceived system of commands.³³

Kant seeks the formal lawfulness of the *Should*; he does not wish to invent 'a surprisingly new' ethical law. His task has nothing to do with inquiry into the materiality of a concrete imperative, and also nothing to do with the historical-materialist conception. For Kant's taking up of the problem it is completely meaningless where human consciousness has received the formal lawfulness – whether through 'the revelation of an intelligible world' or through the development of human consciousness from the animal. Kant does not research how the ethical imperative arose, rather wherein does the ethical reside. Kautsky's argument does not really address Kant in his intention; rather it only addresses certain expressions of vulgar Kantianism, which both friends and enemies of Kant have constructed over the years, to which Kant himself greatly contributed in the area of ethics (because of his own time-bound use of the imperative, as suggested above).

The basic law of practical reason is therefore in no way a 'philosophy of reconciliation'. The imperative can in one case offer conflict, and in another reconciliation, because as such it is an imperative 'form', rather than a mere maxim. Kant arrives at this practical foundational principle in the light of thinking through what a systematic unity of imperatives can be. But that does not mean the reconciliation of antithetical maxims; rather it means the struggle against that command which would like to have the character of an ethical imperative, but is revealed to be a mere maxim when we recognise that it cannot order a systematic unity, that it lacks the capability of universal legislation.

Who experiences, who will pursue science, needs not to have studied Kant's critique of experience. For it does not say: So should you do when you will have unity from the manifold of experience; rather, it says to us that the person by the strength of the laws of his consciousness unavoidably will create such a unity, no matter what the material of his experience may be, because that is the condition of experience itself. One takes apart the experience according to its parts, but there is no guide to the creation of the experience. Where is the value then? In averting skepticism, on the one hand, and a dialectical misuse, on the other. That our world is a world of appearance empiricism has also

33 Kautsky, in line with Schopenhauer, questions the formal character of the practical law, seeking to demonstrate the empirical elements of its claim. In contradistinction, see Max Adler 1904, Volume 1, p. 380f. – Such errors in understanding, as with Kautsky and Schopenhauer, are caused by many Kantians themselves, who would like to find the 'natural law' of the eighteenth century in the mere form of the universal law.

known. But empiricism suspects Kant of constructing another reality beyond its appearance, as they respond to the 'rumour of the thing in itself' (Cohen); so they prematurely decide that when the world is only a world of appearance, it is a vain illusion. Kant has secured our experience against this doubt when he shows that for us there can be no other reality than that which appears, the reality, object, indeed, even the ego are mere rules of our connection of representations, and therefore have no meaning outside of our experience, that the thought of another reality as that which appearance indicates is uncritical because the reality is nothing other than a category of our consciousness. The assurance of Newton in opposition to Hume, of science in contradistinction to skepticism: that is the task of the critique of experience.³⁴

These reflections are quite pertinent to the area of ethics. When we would judge ethically, we are not required to know Kant's formulation of the practical foundations of such judgement. But when ethical skepticism enters our considerations, asserting that the content of the ethical willing is changeable, that no content of an ethical judgement is the same everywhere and in all times, that no definite ethic is absolute, prematurely concluding thereby that there is no point in comparing maxims in order to privilege one as an imperative, disclosing the other as a mere maxim: then, Kant's critique shows us where the concrete ethical imperative can be differentiated from mere maxims: in its capability for a universal legislation. We live now in a time where this set of issues is pertinent. The ruling and possessing classes generate maxims that flow from their class position, just as the proletariat generate their maxims; the individual is instructed in its pressing need to act in accord with its class membership; the historical-materialist conception enables us to understand all these counter-vailing maxims in their necessity. But this would all necessarily end in an ethical skepticism, where the ethics of the bourgeoisie (read: the bourgeoisie which is at the highest level of capitalist development, not that of 1789!) would be held just as valuable as one might value the ethics of the proletariat, placing the ethics of strikebreakers on the same plane as those among the Russian proletariat who dedicate their lives to their class, considering the maxims of the intellectuals who sell their convictions to the Judas wage of the rulers and judge equally warranted those men who offer their personalities as the means of struggle to the upwards-striving working class, attesting to the skeptical knowledge that

34 When, on the one hand, the formal lawfulness of our consciousness is shown to create experience, in opposition to skepticism's challenge of that ability, on the other, the right of our pure concepts of understanding to complete this project is limited in that it cannot make claims beyond what is experienced, which makes all metaphysics an impossibility. But we cannot go further here as it falls beyond our immediate interests.

all these actions can be deemed necessary. Yet the criteria of the capability of a universal legislation would enable us, in contrast to such thinking, to evaluate these necessary actions differently, discarding the seductive maxims of one group, and allowing us to follow the categorical imperatives of the other.

One who is able to take claims at face value, and is not prone to the doubts of skeptics in their judgements, does not even need Kant's critique of pure reason; the lawfulness of his consciousness guides him surely in his way. One who can ingenuously value, who is not led into error by skepticism, does not need Kant's analysis of the Should, for within him the effective law itself will enable him to choose between maxims and imperatives which call to him on all sides, if he will only choose correctly, and be sufficiently strong to make that correct choice. But for one who has allowed skepticism to enter into their thoughts, and will resist it, Kant is a strong support. He assures him that his knowledge is not mere illusion; he assures him in his ethical will against relativism, because science conceives of everything as necessary, and can distinguish all that is of value or without value, and gives us the capability of showing us the path for differentiating what we should choose, rejecting that relativism which may satisfy some individuals as a way of comprehending the world, a way which will never satisfy him in his willing, acting, and living.

3 *The Establishment of Socialism*

When Kautsky criticises the foundations of Kant's ethics, what guides him is the intention to confront those who as moral preachers reveal the capitalistic developmental tendencies in their immorality, replacing it with the morality of socialism, and thus to travel the path from science to utopia, but in the process sacrificing Marx's great work. Whether socialism is really threatened in this way by Kant will now be examined.

For those who see the socialist societal order as not necessarily generated by the working class in their unavoidable class war, realising through their striving finally this fought-for order of society, but rather only as one possibly conceived societal order, whose evaluation is to be made from an ethical purview, thereby characterise only its judicial character in the legal provisions of its societal property as a means of production. For in this purview one finds that society is that of the owners who control the means of production, and thus direct production. Such a society can have very different character.

Private ownership of the means of production meant initially that everyone is protected in what he owns and thus enjoys that which is the product of his work; later it meant that the person who was given the trust to lead production had the power to rule over others, to order and disallow, to take a portion of the worker's production for themselves; finally, it meant that at the highest levels of

development of private ownership over the means of production, there was a class, which did not even have a direct function in the processes of production, and by dint of the historically inherited facts of their wealth and position, could exploit the other classes of the population. The unchanged norm – for the normalcy of property is in all cases the same – had changed private property completely in its economic function, turning it into its opposite: from the protection of the worker in possession of the product of their work into the protection of the exploiter in his claim to work that was not his own! Karner³⁵ calls this manifestation a lack of function in the private law.

These variations in private property can also be seen in societal property. The societal ownership of the means of production can vary; it can exist in the paradisaical form, which the great Utopians have depicted, but also in those unhappy utopias in which the socialist society is depicted as a confinement to barracks or a prison. Even when we think of democratic socialism, the socialist societal order is characterised not only through its societal ownership of the means of production, but also through a distinct development of the societal general will, can generate quite differing operations of societal property.

Democratic socialism removes class differences, but it does not thereby do away with all the contradictions that exist in the competing interests of the society. When society governs the means of work, which is not allowed to the owners, taking it upon itself once more, then there arise new tasks, and consequently new battles. Today, for example, there are no battles over where a new shoe factory will be built; in the socialist society, on the other hand, the selection of a new place of production will occasion strong conflicts. One party will argue that it should be built in an area that has a concentration of coal and iron so that unnecessary transportation in materials is realised, and the society in their need of shoes can be satisfied with less expense; others will look towards the character of its situation – perhaps within the beautiful environ of a forest, by a lake – so that those who work in the factory have a more pleasant life than in an area of coal and iron. The entire interest of society is in conflict with the interests of the working people of the shoe industry, the economists and technicians deciding differently from those who are hygienicists and pedagogues. Will economic interests of the whole decide? Will the particular interests of those in the shoe industry be strong enough to carry the day? Can an adequate compromise be reached?

35 [Bauer refers to Karl Renner's *Die Rechtsintitute des Privatrechts und ihre Soziale Funktion*, 1965. The book appeared initially in 1904 under the pseudonym Josef Karner as 'Die soziale Funktion des Rechtsintitute', in *Marx-Studien*, Volume 1, pp. 63–192].

Societal property can operate quite differently; every optimistic utopia can be set against a pessimistic one. Who will assert that in a socialist society there will no longer be instances when a person or a group are treated not as ends, but as means? Or will our ethicists use the method of statistics in order to prove that this occurs more often in contemporary society than will be the case in the socialist society? Utopian socialism founders on the fact that this order of laws may include quite differing functions within the legal systems, making it impossible to prove that any one system can better realise the moral law.

If we will establish socialism, we can take no other path than that which Marx has shown us. Marx has shown that in the capitalist society the proletariat who want socialism must seek, above all, how to escape being exploited; it can reach this goal because the concentration of capital makes possible the transfer of the means of work into the property of society; the working classes will reach this goal, because they are becoming increasingly the majority of the population. That is the entirety of what science can perform for us in terms of certainties. In that science enables us to see existence in its necessity, we can disclose what will become. To evaluate it morally is not our task. But science must precede moral evaluation. It puts before us the great question of our time. That is, in that it shows us how in our society there is necessarily the struggle of the working class for socialism, and just as necessarily the resistance that arises of the threatened, possessing classes, generating the question as to which of the two great armed camps will constitute society.

We no longer stand before the question of which societal order can more quickly realise Kant's practical foundational law, but rather before the question that emerges from the concrete reality of our society: will it be the socialism of the proletariat or the capitalism of the possessing classes?

Science places us before this question, but it alone cannot give us an answer. For the knowledge that socialism will be, still does not make me a fighter for that reality. It is not at this point a question of science, but rather a question that can only be answered as a practical one, insofar as my position towards it is concerned; the social question is without doubt a moral question. Only, science must precede it before we can actually pose a concrete moral question.

Must we then teach the person who hesitates, who is at a loss, the formal lawfulness of willing so that they can be capable of deciding which of the warring classes he will join? In the greater majority of cases, certainly not. We must only make it comprehensible to him that the proletariat fights necessarily against exploitation, and that the unavoidable development of the capitalist society makes the war against exploitation necessarily into a struggle for the socialist manner of production, giving him thereby the material for making a decision: the decision itself will then be correctly arrived at by dint of the

lawfulness of his willing in its very processes. He will immediately see the value of the maxims that stem from the class interests of the proletariat in their relation to the maxims of the classes who defend property, without having to hear of the categorical imperative of Kant; he will see the maxims of the latter as immoral, those which must be used to defend a class order which can only exist if the overwhelming majority of the members of society are suppressed either by force or by means of a deceitful ideology which hides its true interests, and thus will see in the maxims of the former a universal validity which must necessarily be fought for, which is not yet a realisation of the moral law – such a society is not yet in existence – but this makes possible that in every case in which the general will of the society stands before a decision, they can fight for the correct decision. One must only learn the developmental tendencies of the capitalist society, as Marx has taught us to understand them; the criterion of being able to legislate universally through the maxims of class will be evident in itself, without needing to have heard of the practical foundational law. He will do naturally what science is said to do, he will create a unity of the manifold of experience by means of the pure forms of intuition and thought; just give him the opportunity to see, to hear, to learn, for no consciousness is at rest until it has generated a unity, thus, just let the lawfulness of consciousness do its work!

So why is Kant's doctrine of use? Practically, is it not quite dispensable? Not wholly. It is the last stanchion that we can reference as long as ethical skepticism hinders the ingenuous moral evaluation, which arises from the scientifically determined class maxims. That actually occurs quite often today. The bourgeoisie, no longer hoping that their maxims can be proven as imperatives, disseminate through their theories – 'the historical school' in economics and jurisprudence – as well as in their political practice – the cult of 'Realpolitik' – an ethical relativism, that sense of things where a maxim is justified to be believed when one understands it as the result of a historical development. The historical-materialistic conception sees quite easily that they must be concerned with this activity of the business of the enemies of the working class, just as they must be equally concerned with the Darwinists of today, if they would give themselves the right to comprehend all maxims scientifically, and rigorous to separate it from the question of which conflicting maxims should guide us. Those who are led astray by ethical skepticism now opine that there are no norms in their choice, because one must comprehend the willing of all classes in their respective necessity; in contrast to this, we teach them then to recall the formal lawfulness of willing, we give to them the criterion that enables them to differentiate between the willing of the working class and that of the bourgeoisie, in their respective values, and thus guide them into the camp of the struggling workers.

Hopefully, my investigation will not be confused with the attempt of several revisionists to introduce Kant's practical foundational law into the establishment of socialism. For their attempt was based upon a continuing confusion of the theoretical and the practical viewpoints, the worst of sins that one can commit in taking up Kantian philosophy, for nothing lay closer to Kant's heart than the task to demarcate the realm of practical reason from that of experience.

By making socialism the object of science, we are asking about the developmental tendencies of the capitalist society, and in that case, ethics must be in this discussion. The driving force of the class war is not only the interests of the classes, but also their singular, accordant with their particular class bases, resultant ideology – that is, it is not the foundational law of Kant that lies at the basis of all ethics, but rather the content-determined class ethic of the proletariat. Anyone who will study moral conceptions as the impetus of the struggle of the working class need not study Kant, and instead study the proletariat; this inquirer will not use the methodology of the critique of practical reason – for this never leads to the material of the will; rather, he will show how from the social conditions of existence of the proletariat, from their position within the processes of production, within the State, within a national cultural community of a certain kind, certain manifestations are to be evaluated, in how they arose, and how a specific proletarian ethic operates within the class war, influencing its goals, means, and forms.

When we then no longer view socialism as a question of science, but rather as the question of life, when we seek then an answer which we can give to those who are uncertain in their willing, those who ask whether or not he should be a socialist, then we can use, if needed, Kant's ethics. But before we can take up the differing maxims of class in our judgement, we must recognise the following maxims. The discovery of the capitalist developmental tendencies must precede any practical positioning towards capitalism. Because of that one generates only a vexing confusion when one contends that one might replace even one line of Marx's works with a categorical imperative.

The immediate occasion of Kautsky's writing was the recognised conflict with the earlier majority who sat on the editorial board of the 'Vorwärts'. It was Kautsky's task to prove that the 'historical materialist' and not the 'ethical-aesthetic' method was needed when we educated socialists. We are not to preach morals, but rather investigate the developmental tendencies of the capitalist means of production, and disseminate the results. In this practical question I am of one mind with Kautsky. Those who would teach a science must make the material of experience available to the students, not merely lectures on the conditions of possible experience. One must also come to know how to teach the people of the contemporary societal order, if they

would disseminate socialism. Lectures over the formal lawfulness of all moral willing are not sufficient. We need economic and social science, not moral lectures – and that is my opinion as well as Kautsky's. What distinguishes me from Kautsky, however, is the conviction that we cannot do without Kant's critique of reason, as it can be used to defend ourselves from the skepticism unleashed by the enemies of the working class. It is a secure dam against the intrusion of skepticism which would make our knowledge vain illusion, and make our will into a play of blind, general supposition: critical philosophy preserves us from this.

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The social-scientific concept which governs Bauer's 1910 essay 'Intervals in History' [*Ruhepausen in der Geschichte*] expresses, in an overdetermined manner, Bauer's theoretical antecedents, his own logic of dialectical thinking, as well as his own personal problems which interfere with the rational praxis of his keen theoretical abilities. He will use the concept of 'equilibrium' among political-social-economic forces for the first time in this essay, but the essay's title 'Ruhepausen' – which serves as a related consequence of 'equilibrium' – expresses his own psychological state in 1910, and over the next several years.

Otto Bauer probably took up the social-scientific term 'equilibrium' [*Gleichgewicht*] from Max Adler's use of it in his 1903 *The Beginnings of Mercantilistic Vocational Politics in Austria* [*Die Anfänge der Merkantilistischen Gewerbepolitik in Österreich*].³⁶ Adler used the term to characterise the power standoff between the emergent mercantilistic state politics of employment and the traditional guild-based economic politics in the decades after the Peace of Westphalia. I have discussed above how the social-scientific term 'Gleichgewicht' was derived from Friedrich Engels, but as a term to be seen in socialist literature by 1900 in the writing of Plekhanov. Max Adler almost certainly knew of Plekhanov's use of the concept. Yet it is quite likely that Adler, in his own historical inquiry into the emergence of mercantilism, took the term from Joseph von Sonnenfels's study of the mercantilistic economy of his time in the late eighteenth century. In his *Politische Abhandlungen*, Sonnenfels discusses the 'Gleichgewicht der Geschlechter', 'the equilibrium between the sexes', where he argues that there must be a demographic equilibrium among the sexes if population is to increase; war, he says, disturbs this equilibrium to the detriment of a growing population, and thus a growing economy.³⁷ Interestingly, Bauer will take up the argument of population growth to enhance the power of the proletariat in these pre-World War I years. 'Equilibrium' becomes a variable that is a measure of a population's effect upon national wealth at a certain stage, as well as class strength of the proletariat in relation to the bourgeois classes.³⁸ As Sonnenfels argued, an expanding birth rate must bring with it economic and social power. Sonnenfels saw the social power as national, of course, rather than class-based. Bauer uses the term 'Gleichgewicht' [*'equilibrium'*] in a marked manner in describing the standoff between the proletariat class in relation to the power of the bourgeois classes in his post-World War I essay

36 Max Adler 1903, p. 2.

37 Sonnenfels 1964, pp. 236–7.

38 See Bauer 1914, 'Volksvermehrung und soziale Entwicklung', *Der Kampf*, 7 (April), pp. 322–9.

'Das Gleichgewicht der Klassenkräfte' [*The Equilibrium of Class Strength*], in *Der Kampf*, Volume 17 (January 1924); see translation in this text.

Max Adler and then Bauer must have been impressed by Joseph von Sonnenfels, not only because of his effectiveness as a minister of state under both Maria Theresa and Joseph II, as well as his well-written national-economic deliberations, but also because he was Jewish, and in that his political success could be seen as a model for their own Austrian political aspirations. Yet there is another reason as to why this concept of 'equilibrium' became so vital to Otto Bauer. It will inform his own hesitations to act until a statistical advantage of the proletariat's population is at hand, but will also be in his mind as he criticises the vacillation of other populations who refuse to see the weight of conflict between parties that must be resolved. That reason was based upon his own psychic relation to the world around him, a psychological disposition of both 'mediator' and 'a learned inability to generate solutions' that was fostered by his parental home.³⁹ Bauer saw his parental home as a site of 'equilibrium' between struggling parents where from day to day the balance changed, and he was always called upon to take sides or encourage some form of compromise. This became a concept for interpreting the world around him. A historical interpreter of grammatical expression can look at the sentences that follow the statement of 'Gleichgewicht' in the following 1910 essay, and see the interpersonal image engendered by his own experience in the parental home: 'the condition of a national equilibrium [*nationalen Gleichgewichts*], which we have named the *negative autonomy* of the nations of Austria: the fact that the government and the Parliament cannot move the national problem without the danger of generating, thereby, obstruction. In a condition in which the nationality demands grow, become due, overdue, without being fulfilled, must awake for all nationalities a hypersensitivity, must strengthen national hatreds. The way to peace is completely barricaded because of this'. One need only read Sigmund Freud's case of Dora (who was Otto Bauer's sister), and the relationship of Bauer's parents, as well as the demands placed upon the children, to see the justification of this inference.⁴⁰ Bauer writes of his own mental paralysis in 1910, due to migraine headaches, in a communication with Karl Kautsky.⁴¹ In 1913, he writes with similar semantics to Kautsky of the 'complete breakdown of the internal and external

39 See Blum 1985, pp. 70–1, 72–8.

40 Blum 1985, pp. 72–4, and notes 1–11 especially.

41 Bauer 1910; see Blum 1985, p. 86.

political scene which saps the courage of the people' – an overdetermined metaphor for his extreme problems with his father in that year that 'robs me of my time'.⁴²



Otto Bauer 1910, 'Intervals in History', *Der Kampf*, 3(11): 481–5

The great English Revolution ended with the restoration of the Stuarts. The great French Revolution placed Napoleon upon the Emperor's throne. The Revolution of 1848 was followed by a ten-year reactionary period throughout Europe. Every revolutionary victory is followed by the contrary blows of reaction; the reactionary powers must be defeated for a second time, before the people can enjoy the fruits of their revolution in quiet development.

Europe experienced an epoch of rapid development in the first few years of the twentieth century. In England, the dominance of the Conservatives was broken; petit bourgeois radicalism spread, supported by broad masses of people, essentially different from the older Liberalism out of which it emerged, and it conquered state power. In France, anti-clerical radicalism steered the state with a firm hand. In Russia, the revolution triumphed over Czarist despotism. In Austria, the strongholds of privilege were taken down. In Hungary, the government of the king gave way to universal suffrage. Only Germany was untouched by the wave of democracy.

This picture has fully changed in the last two years. In Germany, the democratic flood is rising. In other states, however, the reaction with its counter-measures is being conducted with strength and success. In England, the last election has prepared the greater bourgeois imperialism to administer to petit-bourgeois radicalism an onerous defeat. In France, the democrats of yesterday are preparing for the business of social reaction. The Russian Revolution has drowned in a sea of blood. In Austria, emerging from the democratic Parliament and its ministries a period has begun where the bureaucracy dominates, and the recurrent coalition of historical nations, since 1848, who oppose all those without a history, is once more its support. In Hungary, the monarchy has again made peace with its feudal class.

Under the mighty impression of the Russian Revolution, the Hungarian crisis, and the victorious struggle for universal suffrage in Austria in 1907, we have accomplished our own victory at the polls.

42 Bauer 1913; see Blum 1985, p. 86.

Then we still hoped that the Russian Revolution would arise again soon. There had been the democratisation of the giant Slavic realm, the freeing of Poland from its terrible fetters, the awaking of the Ukraine from centuries of continuing sleep, in this light we hoped for Austria the impelling forces of an inner transformation. Today we know that Russia has not been spared its decade of counter-revolution. Czarism has triumphed, the Russian Duma has been humbled as the instrument of bloodstained reaction, Poland and the Ukraine are in chains, Finland undergoes the lashes of counter-revolution.

The battle between the King of Hungary and the Magyar feudal class was not over then. We still hoped that out of this conflict of both powers the democratisation of Hungary might emerge, that the unchaining of the dominated classes and the repressed nations of Hungary would lead to a total revolution in the state structure of the old Donau monarchy. Today we know that the Magyar feudal class has submitted to the King of Hungary, so that the monarchical power could not call to democracy for help. They have betrayed their national demands so that they need not participate in power with the bourgeois, farmers and workers, with the Germans, Slovaks, Romanians and Serbs. The victory of Khuen and Tisza means that the King of Hungary no longer needs the help of democracy.

We still hoped then that the first democratic Upper House in Austria would again take up the threads that had been taken from them by the Lower House in the revolutionary year of 1849. A constituency, an assembly provided by a Constitution, would be a new Parliament. We hoped for that to be sufficiently strong to be able to govern the eight national bourgeoisies; we believed that the bourgeoisies were the condition of an enduring national peace that would be aligned against us. Today we know that we erred. The regime of Bienerth proves that the social opposition of the working class is not yet strong enough, so that only a part of the bourgeoisie is sufficient to keep it in check. Even the need of a majority which could support a government, a broadening of our ranks if realised by us, still would not make us so strong – strong enough to compel those who are governing now through a revolutionary act to reconstruct our constitution in a way that could become the conditions of an enduring national peace among the eight national bourgeoisies as they align against us. The new Parliament is not a constituency, the struggle among the nations continues, the conflict among the bourgeoisie themselves testifies to the power of the bureaucracy and those who carry out their projects.

When our foreign office announced the building of the Sandschak railway, the democrats all over Europe applauded: that Austria ventured to be strong once more in the Balkans proved that democracy had been strengthened in

the realm of the Donau, in proportion to the weakening of Russian absolutism there. Today we know what this rejuvenated foreign policy by the monarchy has brought about: dependence upon the capitalist powers; the annexation of Bosnia with its repressive effects; the increase and acceleration of re-armament by land and sea; the heightening of the tax burden; and the strengthening of the influence of the Court and military circles upon our domestic politics. And since similar outcomes have been realised within the intrigues of Czarism, which hides behind the mask of Pan-Slavism, and whose seductions spread to the Austrian Slavs, the growth of mistrust and aversion for those in Austrian authority towards the Slavic nations only further sharpens the nationality struggles within the Empire.

Thus we see a quite different picture from what we saw in 1907, against our expectations. Certainly, this episode of reaction will also pass, just as all that preceded it has passed. But it can only be conquered if great historical events unleash a new movement of the masses of people in Europe. But for the time being, we must reckon that political stagnation will continue for some time.

For Austria, this means an interval in history, above all the continuation of the national struggles. It is not improbable that the wish for a tax treasury that could finance Dreadnoughts, and pass a new defence law, which a Parliament capable of doing its job might provide, will lead to the reconstruction of a ministry and diminish the Parliamentary nationality struggles for a time. But every coalition of national bourgeoisies will also fall because of the nationality conflicts, as long as the conditions for a national peace are not forthcoming. Every ministry without this solution will be disrupted by the innumerable, unsolved national problems. These national problems are unsolvable presently. An example: why couldn't Parliament enable the development of an Italian faculty at the University of Vienna, even though it would have solved most difficult necessities of our foreign policy, and did not threaten any nationality within Austria! The political stagnation in Europe means for Austria the condition of a national equilibrium [*nationalen Gleichgewichts*],⁴³ which we have named the *negative autonomy* of the nations of Austria: the fact that the government and the Parliament cannot move the national problem without the danger of thereby generating obstruction. A condition in which the nationality demands grow, become due, overdue, without being fulfilled, must awake for all nationalities a hyper-sensitivity, must strengthen national hatreds. The way to peace

43 [See headnote to this translation for the overdetermined importance of this first use of the term 'Gleichgewicht' as a social-scientific concept by Bauer].

is completely barricaded because of this. And even if the bourgeoisie in Parliament seeks a way to peace as they become tired of this fruitless warfare, the way will become impassable for them too since nationalism nourishes itself beyond Parliament, a nationalism that delivers the most powerful weapon against the working class.

The heightening of national conflict is for the working class of Austria a serious danger. It takes away not only the hope of the working classes to realise effective laws that contribute to their advantage from Parliament, not only weakening them in their ability to recruit for Social Democracy, it also undermines the structure of the organisation of the proletariat in itself. For the working class is also vulnerable to the influence of its environment; what moves the entirety of public life cannot leave the consciousness of the proletarian masses untouched. Thus nationalism comes into our members as well. If today in the unions, in the cooperatives, in the party, there are earnest conflicts between the German and Czech comrades, the common cause of all these actualities is the fact that we have not been strong enough to keep the influence of the nationalist battles and their ideologies completely free from our work with the proletarian masses. From the swamp of political stagnation a poisonous vapor comes into our midst. Internal struggles within the active parties were always an accompanying phenomenon of the periods of reaction.

The nationality struggle in the party itself appears within the conflict over the content and form of our programme. Many comrades believe that we can overcome our internal conflicts if we come to a unity concerning the counter-vailing demands, and the result of such a unity can be nationality programme for the party. When only our nationality programme expressed the general will of the party concerning the problem of national minority schools or the problem of the language of railroad signs could become clear, lacking ambiguities, then, in the opinion of many comrades, the unity of the workers movement in Austria would be secured. Now, the working towards an agreement, which generates a nationality programme for us, is without doubt valuable and necessary; no one will deny the witness for this provided by our journal. But we must not overestimate the value of such an agreement. For the contradictions within the party are less programmatic in nature, instead arising from tactical considerations. Let us take, for example, a case in which the opinion concerning the demand for nationality minority schools was completely unified among both Czech and Austrian Social Democrats, still the conflict over the resolution of Herr Staněk, who so excited everyone with it, would still have been offered for the Czech comrades, this demand seems to be so important that they demonstrate for it, not only for it as an issue, but also to further excite nationalist

fervour by it, regardless of the outcome of their demand for this specific issue; the German Social Democrats, on the other hand, would throw their weight in the scale for this proposal when the hour had come for its realisation, but would fuel ineffective demonstrations for a national struggle because they are aware of the damage that they could create for the interests of the entire proletariat. Even a complete agreement for a programme when concluded would not exclude individual demands from differing value positions on the issues of nationality. Therefore, we do not believe that a complete and indisputable nationality programme in itself can lead to a continual agreement of Social Democrats of all nations over all questions in the daily struggle among the nations.

The workers of historical nations (German, Polish, Italian) want more than anything *national peace*, which will create the best conditions of the class struggle of the proletariat. The workers of the nations without history (Czechs, Slovenians, Ruthenians) demand above all *national rights*, that they as nations without history be given what the historical nations already enjoy. In the hour of decision, we will be capable of being one, and hopefully, we will be one: the workers of the historical nations can use the power to establish the rights of the nations without history, because only the securing of these rights can guarantee a lasting peace. Today, however, the political stagnation in Europe, as well as in Austria, makes such a revolutionary deed impossible, one that could bring us freedom and law at once; the continual demands of the nations without a history appear to the workers of the historical nations only as a disturbance of the peace which they require, while the workers of the nations without history believe that these demands, because of their content, must be supported. This conflict cannot eliminate the possibility of a complete nationality programme forever; yet, unless the political stagnation that makes a decisive attack upon the problems of the nationality conditions of justice impossible is overcome, we must count upon the divergences of opinion in regard to the nationality programme as unavoidable and remaining. Whoever demands that the unity of the Austrian workers movement depends upon our realising a final, complete agreement concerning nationality questions, brings our unity into jeopardy; if it is truly felt by them, then they must actually work for maintaining a unity in the economic and political liberation of the working classes, even if their national fighting force has differing opinions over individual national questions.

In the Czech Social Democracy, there are undoubtedly comrades whose goal is the complete separation of the Czech workers movement. They continually raise the cry for complete 'independence' of the Czech workers movement, and maintain that any work in common with their German comrades is

but a remaining demand of 'German despotism', which would presume to be concerned with Czech matters, but only to destroy their relation to the international unions and cooperatives, and even split off their connection to the International representative body. They are separatists by principle. They take a different direction from the unity desired by the entire Austrian workers movement. These comrades wish with some justification that a complete agreement concerning the nationality questions could be found between the German and Czech comrades; but they go too far in their enthusiasm, holding an international unity as being without value if a complete agreement in every national question cannot be realised, and ceaselessly threaten the destruction of a unified party if this is not achieved. And since continual differences of opinion over individual nationality questions are the norm, all efforts to realise a complete unity of party are frustrated, and they do nothing other than constantly threaten separation.

This is the way in which those who support Šmeral act, even against their will, playing into the hands of those around Steiner – disappointed internationalism ceases, against their very intentions, replaced by a fundamental separatism. We are kept from this mistaken course only by the knowledge that the world of today is one of an interval in history, in an epoch of political stagnation in Europe and a negative autonomy in Austria; thus, it is unavoidable that within the Austrian workers movement different views of the nationality question remain. International Social Democracy, which sees such differences of opinion as lesser questions of only local meaning, as these are of interest to only a small part of the working class internationally, will not impede its own activities towards international unity because of such questions. As the leading thought of our nationality programme belongs the sentence: the economic and political struggle of the working class is unified and not to be separated; decisions concerning the nationality question remain, if and so long as different opinions regarding such questions exist, and thus the national divisions of the Austrian international should be autonomous. Only in this way can we keep our troops unified in the time of transition, so that in the day of decision we can fight as a unity and win.

I have struggled for a long time against this conclusion. I maintain even today that this national autonomy within the party is inimical and a dangerous remedy. Yet all those who have not been infected by Parliamentary cretinism will see this position as a necessary evil, that is, their rejection of a few resolutions is no more important than their having voted for them; both German and Czech Social Democrats must view their voting in relation to each other as a huge waste of energy over foolish questions regarding the work, knowledge, and intelligence that could be brought to better use, marshalling this passion-

ate concern within the party press, in the organisation of national sensitivities throughout working people. Of all the damage that can be done by the national struggle, the worst is the overwhelming concern forced upon the working class continually by the bickering over the language question; we cannot fight this damage when even our party press, as well as our organisation, and our representative body in Parliament are ceaselessly occupied with the nationality question.

We know that today we have other truly important tasks. There is a whole row of important questions that concern worker compensation and safety that have emerged in the parliamentary deliberations of recent years. It is of the greatest importance today to keep these issues alive to be deliberated in our daily business! In the national conference of our party and at the union congress we must establish a *social-political action programme*, which includes the eight-hour day for all uninterrupted enterprise, as well as for mining, a ten-hour maximum for all vocational occupations, the protective law for bakers, Sundays off for mill-workers, accident insurance for miners, and the abolition of the rule book for workers [*Arbeitsbuch*]. These demands and the relation of the bourgeois parties to them must be clarified in a pamphlet that is distributed throughout Austria. Then Parliamentary assemblies must act upon these issues. It is not impossible that such actions could have immediate results; but if they remain without results, then it is only because the parties themselves have hindered the fulfillment of these demands and can be seen by the proletariat public as having abdicated their responsibility. If we take up these issues with the traditional ability we have evidenced in our struggles, the working class will have real results to work with. We have enough to do without being solely concerned with the language on railway placards.

The deepening of a socialist recognition by the proletarian masses, and the struggle to realise the proletarian agenda in its conflict with the bourgeois world – that should set the boundaries of our activity today. The hour of the historical deed, which will build a new state structure upon the shards of the old Austria, is not yet here; that it is not here is the deepest cause of our difficulties, of our internal conflicts. It will come. In England, imperialism undermines the entire basis of English politics. In France, the armies of the possessors and the workers organise for battle. In Russia, the fire of revolution flows under the blood-spattered ashes. In Albania and Macedonia, the Young Turk military governance can extinguish the conflagration only with difficulty, and in tiny Crete, even the cleverest European diplomacy is unable to master the problem there. In the Far East, the people stir. Above all, in Germany, the proletarian flood rises around the rock of the established capitalist state ever higher. The

clouds gather. The storm nears. It will rage through the nations, then our hour will come. We may in these futile days, in the interval of history, squabble; in the hour of the deed, we will be one.



Bauer's use of the social-scientific concept of 'equilibrium' [*Gleichgewicht*] becomes more pronounced after World War I. There was justification given the split in the Austrian electorate in the 1920s, but as will become clearer in our volume on Austro-Marxist praxis – its tactics – in the 1920s and early 1930s, Bauer's vacillations and hesitations that affected his leadership in its decisiveness and timeliness can be seen as a psychobiographical overdetermination of the concept. Nonetheless, Bauer's dialectical logic finds justification for the objective value of the concept in past periods of history. The notion of a phasal transition between one hegemonic class and another in Western political history has value as a perspective – even when it can be seen as serving diverse functions in Bauer's everyday thought.



**Otto Bauer 1924, 'The Equilibrium of Class Strengths', *Der Kampf*,
17(January): 57–67**

In my history of the Austrian revolution, I have shown that the result of the revolution was one in which neither the bourgeoisie nor the proletariat could control the state, both had to divide the power between them. The state was thereby in a developmental phase where neither the governing organisation of the bourgeoisie, nor that of the proletariat, could exist as an exclusive one.

Professor Kelsen will, nonetheless, prove:

1. That this conclusion contradicts Marx's conceptions, in that Marx's conception of the state could never be anything other than the dominance of a class;
2. That in the power relations between classes there are only quantitative changes, not qualitative changes, and that the actualities that I establish can lead only to a recognition that the state, even before its fall, is not merely a organisation dominated by the bourgeois, and that in the future it cannot be merely an organisation that must be dominated by the proletariat.

Holding off for the time being my response to other objections by Kelsen to my work 'The Austrian Revolution', I will now take up the above assertions by Kelsen, and subject them to a thorough critique. For the discussion gives me a welcome opportunity, aside from addressing Kelsen, to present the problems of what seem to be of the highest importance which confront the self-understanding of the tasks and perspectives of the working class in the contemporary historical epoch.

The state in the Middle Ages was a governing organisation that bore the characteristics in its fundamentals of those who were born to aristocracy, that is, the feudal bonds of an integrated manorial class.

Within this feudal state, the bourgeoisie developed. Only after centuries of continual development did the bourgeoisie become strong enough to reach an equilibrium in its economic and social strength with the manorial class. In the degree that this condition of equilibrium was arrived at by the class strengths, the feudal state finally disintegrated. In its place there arose two differing forms of state:

1. 'Modern historical writing', wrote Marx in 1847, 'has proven how absolute monarchy appeared in the transition period where the old feudal stations disappeared and the medieval bourgeoisie developed themselves into the modern bourgeois class, without either of the conflicting parties resolving their issues finally with the other'.⁴⁴

That developmental phase in the battle of the bourgeoisie against the societal order of the feudal manorial class in which none of 'the conflicting parties resolving their issues finally with the other', in which the forces of both classes in relation to each other was that of an equilibrium, according to Marx, led to the emergence of absolute monarchy.

The fact to which Marx points here is the following: with the development of the bourgeoisie, its vocations, its commerce, and its manufacturing, a natural economy was suppressed in place of a monetary economy. Only with this development of a monetary economy was the development of monetary taxes and state indebtedness in greater magnitude possible. Then, it became possible to have a class of paid soldiers in place of an army of knights who had their authority within the vassalage relationship. Then, it became possible to have an administration of paid officials in place of an administration organised by the feudal relationships within the manorial class. These means of power, the paid army and the bureaucracy, served the princes in their subjugation of the manorial class, transforming the feudal aristocracy into subjects, and with that the political centralisation which first became diffused widely in its necessity and possibility with the money economy. In this struggle with the feudal class, the princes relied upon the cities: and since the strengthening of the princely power was based upon the development of the money economy, that is, dependent upon bourgeois vocations and commerce, as well as bourgeois manufacturing, the princes furthered the development of these bourgeois economic enterprises. Thus, the bour-

44 Marx 1902a, p. 463.

geoisie were a 'counter-weight' against the aristocratic stations, and in the absolute monarchy the foundational element of the great monarchies themselves.⁴⁵

In this way, the stations of society changed in their essence. The feudal state was the dominating organisation of *one* class, the manorial class, who held down the other classes, that of the bourgeoisie and the farmers. The absolute monarchy, on the other hand, which had arisen on the basis of the equilibrium of the strengths of the manorial class and the bourgeoisie, was not an organisation of domination over either of these classes. Its independence was based upon the power of the state over both the other classes. The absolute monarchy came to a self-understanding of how state power could subjugate both of these other classes. This is the period when the monarchical power used the bourgeoisie as an instrument against the aristocracy, thereby transforming the aristocracy into another station in order to keep them in check.⁴⁶ It is the period when 'the combating classes held each other in equilibrium, when the state power as an apparent mediator had a certain independent relation to each of these classes'.⁴⁷ Kelsen clings to Engels's statement that the mediation is only 'apparent'. In fact: the absolute monarchy had under pretext 'mediated' between the classes – that is the 'Suum cuique' [*'to each his own'*] of the Hohenzollerns! – in reality, both classes were subjugated and used for the monarchy's purpose. But insofar as it is 'apparent', Engels points out only the assumed mediation between the classes; he does not indicate the emergence of a state power because the strengths of the classes to one another were in equilibrium and such a power could not be independently realised, could not be the dominating principle of a class, but rather could only govern all classes.

2. In that, the equilibrium of the class strengths of the manorial class and the bourgeoisie did not lead everywhere to these two classes being subjugated by the absolute monarchy; in some cases, both classes shared state power. This accords with Marx's description of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Marx called this revolution, at times, a 'bourgeois revolution',⁴⁸ but the result of this revolution was not everywhere a domination by the bourgeoisie, but rather a division of state power between the manorial class and the bourgeoisie. 'The British Constitution', wrote Marx in 1855, 'is in fact only a dated, outlived, decrepit compromise between the not official, but factual in all decisive spheres, of the bourgeois societal domination, and the official, governing manorial aristocracy.

45 Marx and Engels 1930, p. 17.

46 Engels 1901, p. 170.

47 Engels 1900, p. 180.

48 Marx 1922, p. 365.

Originally, after the “Glorious Revolution of 1688”, only one section of the bourgeoisie – its finance aristocracy – had concluded this compromise. The Reform Bill of 1831 allowed another section into this compromise over state power, the Mill-ocracy, as the English called them, that is, the great carriers of the industrial bourgeoisie.⁴⁹ The governmental power remained in the hands of the manorial aristocracy; but one of the two aristocratic parties, who combated each other, the Whigs, stepped forward as representatives of the interests of the bourgeoisie (similarly in the period from 1867 to 1897 when this occurred in ‘Constitutionally true manorial classes’ [*Verfassungstreue Grossgrundbesitz*] in Austria). Marx wrote in 1852:

The Whigs are, just as the Tories, part of the manorial class of Great Britain. The oldest, richest, and most arrogant land owners of England constitute the actual core of the Whig party. What then differentiates them from the Tories? The Whigs are the aristocratic representatives of the bourgeoisie, of the industrial and commercial middle-classes. Under the condition that the bourgeoisie allow them as an oligarchy to have a monopoly on governmental power and the exclusive possession of all bureaucratic offices, they gave concessions to the middle-class, and helped them, thereby, in their struggle, which the social and political course of events has shown to be unavoidable and non-stoppable ... in fact, as soon as the movement of the bourgeoisie became so strong that it was irresistible, as soon as they were seen as the surest means to drive the Tories from their offices, the Whigs stepped forward and plundered this victory, inasmuch as they then controlled the government.⁵⁰

This condition of the division of power between the manorial aristocracy and the bourgeoisie is described by Marx as the result of the equilibrium of powers of both classes. ‘As the English’, wrote Marx in 1855, ‘allowed a Hollander to cross the sea, and become a king over them, this new dynasty ushered in a new era – the era of the marriage of the manorial society and the finance aristocracy. Since that time we find the privilege of blood and the privilege of gold in a constitutional equilibrium until this very day’.⁵¹ It was a condition of equilibrium in which the bourgeoisie were not yet strong enough or did not yet venture to take the instruments of governance themselves, but the governing

49 Marx 1917, p. 166.

50 Marx 1902b, p. 4.

51 Marx 1917, p. 164.

fraction of the aristocracy could only govern as 'aristocratic representatives of the bourgeoisie'. The state was here nothing more than a mere organisation of domination for the manorial aristocracy, but not yet an organisation of authority controlled by the bourgeoisie; it was the result of a division of power between the two classes, whose struggle for power provided the content of history for that era.

Only when the bourgeoisie became so strong that they could wrest the governance of the state for themselves was the basis for the equilibrium of the class forces, which had given a certain character to the state, overcome. On the Continent, this shift out of equilibrium occurred during the bourgeois revolution, which meant: through a series of sequential revolutions the bourgeoisie conquered the absolute monarchy, and set itself up as the power of the state. In England, this occurred through developments after 1846, in the course of which the aristocratic leadership of the two leading parties was gradually eliminated, and from aristocratic Whigs and Tories gradually bourgeois liberals and conservatives replaced them. The final outcome here as there was the class-based state of the bourgeoisie.

According to Marx's own presentation, the development of the state came about in the following manner during the historical period of when the bourgeoisie came to power: in the beginning of this era, the state was merely the instrument of governance for the manorial aristocracy, but at its end it became the governing organisation for the bourgeoisie. Between the feudal state and the bourgeois state there existed a period of equilibrium of class strengths in which both classes either were under the authority of a force that subjugated both of them, or shared governance with one another.

Can we make an analogy for the development of the state when considering the coming to power of the proletariat, on the one hand, alongside the state's development with the coming to power of the bourgeoisie, on the other? May we also assume that between the capitalist class-based state, and the state as it will be when it is an instrument of governance controlled by the proletariat, there will be a transitional period of equilibrium in which both classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, or either will be under the dominance of some independent authority of state power or that each must share power with the other?

In his 'The Class War in France', Marx depicts the development of the French revolution of 1848 in the following manner:

On 25 February, the Parisian proletariat took the decisive power for itself. 'When Paris ruled because of the centralisation of France, the proletariat had that power for a moment in the midst of the revolutionary earthquake in

Paris'. The proletariat compelled through the threat of its strength of arms the proclamation of the Republic. It compelled the announcement of the Republic 'as a Republic comprised of social institutions'. It compelled in the initial days of the Republic the proclamation of the 'right to work', the establishment of the Luxembourg commission, and the placing of socialists at its head. 'The proletariat', said Marx, 'justly considered themselves as the victors of February, and had the proud demands of victors'. The first days of the Republic were *the days of the ascendancy of the working class*.

As soon as the bourgeoisie had recovered from the fright of the struggle across the barricades, as soon as they found a support in the face of the emergence of the proletariat who threatened their petit-bourgeois masses, as soon as they could cast the proletariat from their constructed garden, they established an equilibrium insofar as power with the proletariat was concerned. From March until May, there existed this condition *of the equilibrium of class strengths* in Paris. It was mirrored in the context of the government. 'The provisional government', said Marx, 'mirrors necessarily in its context the differing parties which divided the victory. It could be nothing other than a compromise of differing classes who had thrown over the July monarchy in tandem, whose interests, however, were antithetical to each other'. The Republic during these weeks of March until May – it was not a Republic of the proletariat, but nor was it a Republic of the bourgeoisie – was one in which the power of the state was shared between them.

'From the 4th of May, not from the 25th of February, the bourgeois Republic gets its recognised date'. On 4 May, the National Assembly convened. 'In the National Assembly the whole of France sat in judgement over the Parisian proletariat. They destroyed immediately the social illusions of the February revolution, they proclaimed the bourgeois Republic as nothing other than the bourgeois Republic'. With that they called the proletariat to battle. This battle began on 22 June. The proletariat were conquered. Their bloody defeat meant *the restoration of the bourgeoisie*.

Ascendancy of the proletariat, the equilibrium of class strengths, the restoration of the bourgeoisie – these were the chapter headings of my history of the Austrian revolution. One sees the analogy between my portrayal of the Austrian revolution from 1918 through 1922, and Marx's portrayal of the French revolution of 1848.

But one also sees the differences, which have emerged from these phases, those, for instance, of the Austrian proletariat in 1918 in their numbers, class consciousness, organisation and experience, being far advanced from the French proletariat of 1848. In Paris in 1848, the ascendancy of the proletariat lasted only a few days; in German Austria from 1918 to 1919, for a full year. In

Paris, the period of equilibrium between the classes lasted only a few weeks; in German Austria between 1919 and 1922, three years. In Paris, it was a time of chaotic confusion without a result; in German Austria, it was a time in which the proletariat wrested accomplishments that continue. In Paris, it was a time of the illusion of 'fraternity', the brotherhood of all classes; in Austria, the proletariat stepped forward without illusions, in full recognition that the temporary cooperation among the classes was not the means of overcoming the differences between the classes, but rather only a result of the temporary equilibrium of strengths, not a means for overcoming the class war itself. It was only a means for a temporary stabilisation of the results of the upheaval. In France, the period of equilibrium of class strengths ended with the complete overthrow by force of the proletariat; in Austria, only with an economic and social act of power which in itself could not return the bourgeoisie completely to class dominance.

But these differences change nothing in Marx's depiction of the developmental phase of the revolution where equilibrium in class strengths emerges, and classes are set against each other. In such a phase, the Republic is neither one of the bourgeoisie nor the proletariat, and thus is not an instrument of power for either; rather it is the result of a temporary compromise of a passing division of power between the classes that are counter-posed to each other.

The dominance of the bourgeoisie that emerged from the June battle did not last. The bourgeoisie, now freed from the threat of the proletariat, fell into conflict with each other in competing political parties. The petit bourgeois and the masses of farmers began to rebel against the dominance of the bourgeois, and to rally around the re-emergent proletariat. The condition of equilibrium of the classes was re-established. 'While the proletariat could not rule France, neither could the Bourgeoisie'. This equilibrium of the classes could not find its political expression after the June battle in a division of state power; rather it was maintained by an independent state power that emerged and subjugated both of the antagonistic classes. This subjugation was realised by Louis Napoleon on 2 December 1851. 'The battle was so decided that all classes were equally without power and equally silent as they knelt before the mace'.⁵²

I sought in this vein to show in the last chapter of *Österreichischen Revolution* that since the Geneva Accord the restoration of the bourgeoisie did not last long. In fact, the proletariat are again in a position to reconstitute an equilibrium between the classes, as they fight for a 'right of co-determination', in order to realise an 'organic democracy', that is, the ending of the bourgeois class domination. Here, however, where no violent subjection of the proletariat has

52 Marx 1907, p. 98.

preceded this situation, the reconstitution of an equilibrium does not require the intervention of a third force; a division of power by these classes is now possible which would lead to the equilibrium where the proletariat are not yet sufficiently strong to govern by themselves, but the bourgeoisie are not able to dictate to the proletariat, but rather must find accord with them.⁵³

Kelsen believes that my recognition of the fact that Austria, until the Fall of 1922, was neither a class-based state dominated by the bourgeoisie, nor a class-based state of the proletariat, contradicts Marx's conception of the state, according to which the state is never anything other than an instrument of class dominance. In reality, Marx had said this in 1850 in his analysis of the French Revolution of 1848. He had shown then that the course of the revolution could be an equilibrium between the classes for a time. And he had recognised by 1852 that such a social equilibrium situation could find its political expression in two differing forms of state: either in the temporary division of state power between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (as in March and April 1845 in France), or in the subjugation of both classes through Caesarism (as in 1851 in France). My account has in no way contradicted Marx in this; rather it establishes Marx's depiction as valid within this new historical experience. How can one explain how Kelsen has so fundamentally misunderstood Marx's conception of the state that he cannot see its confirmation in contemporary events?

All science creates facts in thought. But no science can completely represent what is there; from what is there, it must simplify, typify, and make symbolic. The understandings of every science, even the 'exact' sciences, can only approach the facts in their representations. The degree of this approximation that satisfies the researcher is dependent upon the practical goal of the research. 'If we', says Mach, 'represent the facts in thought, we never constitute these facts completely in themselves, rather only from that point of view that is important to us. We have a goal thereby which is either immediate or

53 Such an equilibrium does not necessarily mean that there must be a coalition government. One should not confuse the social condition of the equilibrium with the political form! A real division of state power between the classes can exist under a coalition government (as in Austria in the Fall of 1919 until the Fall of 1920), but also under a bourgeois government (as in Austria under the governments of Mayr and Schober) or under socialist governments (as in Sweden under Branting or perhaps in England under a workers government). On the other hand, we have seen coalition governments that are not the expression of a real equilibrium of class strengths, for example, the second government of Stresemann in Germany or the contemporary coalition government in Czechoslovakia.

mediate which grows from our practical interest'.⁵⁴ Marx's great historical conception is set down in his economic and historical investigations. In these individual investigations he achieved a high level of accuracy in his approach to the facts. But Marx grasped most often the most important aspects for his practical interests, offering general principles for the practical goals of his time's most important events as the fruit of his individual investigations – we can name these guiding principles. These 'general principles' could not wholly convey the facts in the way that a concrete individual investigation could. The more general, the more abstract such a principle is, therefore, the less complete, thus it is less refined in its approach to the facts.

Such a principle, for example, is that of the *Communist Manifesto*: 'Modern state power is only an excrescence [*Ausschuss*] which administers the common business of the entire bourgeois class'. Is this principle true or false?

In the time in which Marx wrote this principle, the state power in Europe was in no place or no degree a mere excrescence for the conduct of affairs for the entirety of the bourgeois class. In France, the entire bourgeoisie under Louis Philippe did not reign, only the finance aristocracy, in England, not yet the bourgeoisie, only the manorial aristocracy who only shared this authority with some levels of the bourgeoisie, in Central and Eastern Europe the absolute monarchy still prevailed. Marx's principle does not therefore describe an actual condition, but a developmental tendency. This he does quite correctly: in the subsequent decades, the state power in most countries in fact approached more and more proximately that condition which could be described as an excrescence for the conduct of business for the whole bourgeois class.

Yet only approaching that. In his historical individual investigations, Marx was not satisfied with an incomplete representation of the facts; there he showed how the individual aspects of state power departed from the general principle articulated in the *Communist Manifesto*. Thus, he did not characterise the English state power of the 1850s as an excrescence for the conduct of business of the entire bourgeois class; rather, he characterised it conversely, in that the entire structure of English state power 'was one in which the governing caste is not at one with the dominating class'.⁵⁵ And in this vein Marx characterises the Empire of Napoleon III not as a business-conducting excrescence of the entire bourgeois class, but rather as one supported by the farmers, which subjugated the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, both of which were independent powers in opposition to the executive authority; Engels represented

54 Mach 1908, p. 523.

55 Marx 1917, 'Parteien und Cliquen', p. 129.

the Prussian-German Empire as an authoritarian organisation of an alliance of finance aristocracy and heavy industry which was made possible by the anti-thetical roles of the bourgeois and proletariat, which permitted their authority over the masses of both these classes.⁵⁶ One sees that the general principle of the *Communist Manifesto* is not there exactly in these cases, and that in Marx's individual studies it undergoes an essential modification. Is it then false? 'The entire process', says Mach, who considers an analogous situation in the natural sciences, 'has solely a meaning established with an economy of utterance. We begin the representation of the facts with stabilising, common, and easily comprehended complexes, and add subsequently the unconventional as correctives'.⁵⁷

In the *Communist Manifesto*, where Marx must represent in a few pages world history over centuries, he could not include the individualising modifications; he satisfied himself with a general principle that represented the general tendency of development of state power. That in itself was important for this representation: where it sufficed to awaken the working masses to a class-consciousness, bringing them for the first time into a struggle for the conquest of state authority, there he was satisfied to offer 'the stabilising, common, and easily comprehended complexes', which would teach them to understand that state power as a rule is the business-conducting excrescence of their immediate class enemy, or it will be. Where one turned to the masses, one could satisfy oneself with an approximation of the facts, the more complete approximation coming with the modifications to this general rule accomplished in individual studies, reserved for later, which did not necessarily permeate the masses.

In the permeation of the masses with Marxist principles, to be sure, vulgar Marxism has developed, which does not embrace the individualising, modifying individual investigations, but rather only holds to the most general principles, that is, only the most unrefined approximations of the facts, which are torn out of their historical and systematic context, facts simply placed side by side and made dogmatic in their presentation.⁵⁸

56 'Or are they "the corrupted Prussian German Junkers" a third class?', asks Kelsen. That is my opinion! One need not make an analysis of the Prussian-German authoritarian state from the position of a Marxist school in order to pose such a question.

57 Mach 1908, p. 524.

58 That is the process conducted by Lenin in his brochure *Staat und Revolution*, from which Kelsen takes his Marxist conception of the state. A valuable critique of this work by Lenin is offered by Julius Martov, to be found in his posthumous writings (Martov 1923) – I presented a depiction of Vulgar Marxism with a view similar to that of Martov in 1907, in my article 'Die Geschichte eines Buches', *Neue Zeit*, xxvi(1).

The usual critique of Marxism knows and criticises only this vulgar Marxism. Kelsen's experience of it is typical: Kelsen knows Marx only in the way that vulgar Marxism knows Marx: that Marx has characterised the state as a dominating organisation of the bourgeoisie. Of the varying modifications of this general principle, of the more proximate characterisation of the facts which Marx himself achieved in his individual studies, Kelsen knows nothing or he gives scant attention to. And when he bumps into one of these modifications in our writing, then he maintains it is a departure from Marx, incongruent with Marx!

For us, however, every general principal of Marx, which alone is put forward by vulgar Marxism, and which alone is the object of academic Marxist criticism, is insufficient. An approximation of the facts which in the time of the first beginnings of the class struggle of the proletariat was sufficient, are not sufficient for our practical interests today. Other aspects of events of a time are important for us today, offering more insightful theoretical standpoints for our contemporary practical interests. Many things that Marx indicated in passing must today become the chief object of our investigations.

The upheavals that have been brought about by the war have in many countries led to the equilibrium of class forces. But this social condition has many differing political forms of expression:

1. In many countries a condition has emerged in which neither the worker's party nor the bourgeois parties can govern the state by themselves in a parliamentary form. This has led to formal coalition governments of the workers and bourgeois parties, where one or another of these classes with silent assent, but under strict control of its class enemy, can govern, but which soon leads to a functional incapacity of parliament that puts into question the authority of the executive. The general crisis of traditional parliamentarianism is the expressive form of the equilibrium of the class strengths.
2. In other countries the equilibrium of class strengths has led to armed parties who seize state power and subjugate other classes to their dictatorship. This occurs principally in two forms:
 - (a) In Italy, it was Fascism that took up this task. Italian Fascism of 1922 is the counterpart of French Bonapartism of 1851. In both instances, an adventurer, supported by a band of armed adventurers, chased out a bourgeois parliament in order to overthrow the political dominance of the bourgeoisie and establish a dictatorship over all the classes, because the bourgeoisie themselves abdicated their political representation, sacrificed their own class authority in order to somehow save

their proletariat-threatened property, thereby throwing themselves into the arms of those who usurped their authority.⁵⁹

- (b) In Russia Bolshevism, in the beginning there was a dictatorship of the proletariat, but under the pressure of economic necessities it has become something quite different. Today it is quite similar to Fascism, a dictatorship that is a governing caste over the classes, which in its praxis must balance the interests of the workers, the farmers, and the NEP-men, that is, the new bourgeoisie, against each other: the stability of its dominance rests upon the fact that each of these classes must be preserved, and that is an expression of the equilibrium of strength between the three classes.

The principle of the *Communist Manifesto*, namely that state power is only the business-occupying excrescence of the bourgeois class, was in 1847 the expression of a future development, which for today for many countries is still a description of a past or previous historical period. But the class-based state of the bourgeoisie has not been followed by a dictatorship of the proletariat, but rather by a condition of the equilibrium of class strengths, which politically has been expressed in many different forms of state. This experience makes it probable that between the period in which the state was a class organisation of the bourgeoisie and the period in which it will be a class organisation of the proletariat, there will be a transitional period in which the strengths of the classes in relation to each other are in equilibrium. The theoretical analysis of this social situation and its many political forms of expression is of the highest practical importance. Therefore, we can no longer merely be satisfied, as was Marx, to indicate in passing such a condition of equilibrium; we must in our investigations reveal new experiential facts with a Marxist methodology in our analyses or in presenting our results. In this sense, I have made my inquiry into the history of the Austrian revolution, revealing understandings that Marx could not yet have achieved.

And this is a condition of state in which no class can control the other, the power having to be shared, a passing *phase* in the development of the state. Kelsen, on the other hand, considers this as a normal situation of the state.

59 Fascism is not a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, just as little as this was the case with Bonapartism. Yet, contrary to this, the events in the last few months in Germany can be called a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The difference between a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and Fascism is the difference between that of the government of Wilhelm Marx and that (attempted) by Hitler and Ludendorff, or between Bethlen and Horthy-Gömbös.

Therefore, he seeks to erase the difference between the developmental phase of the state and the previous phase of the bourgeois class state. The proletariat, he opines, was even before 1918 not without power; the revolution only brought it an increase in power. This is only a quantitative difference; if the state is not an organ of class domination now, it was not one before either.

In the society of the thirteenth century, there were already many capitalist elements; in spite of that we have no reservations in considering society of that time, in its predominant character, a feudal society. In the society of the nineteenth century, there were many significant remnants of feudal society; in spite of that we call this society, in accord with its predominant characteristics, capitalist. The difference between the society of the thirteenth and the nineteenth centuries can, if one will, be called quantitative, that is, the difference of a mixture of conditions composed of feudal and capitalist elements; but this quantitative displacement was the cause and result of the powerful economic, social, political, and spiritual revolutions! They were then the 'change' of quantity into quality.

Similarly in our instance. Certainly, the proletariat was not without power before 1918. But this power was measured by the power possessed by the ruling classes of that time, and so little that for theoretical and practical purposes one can say that the actuality of that time can be described as a class dominance of the bourgeoisie and the manorial aristocracy. The revolutions of the immediate past brought the proletariat an increase in power that made this description of things no longer adequate. Now, if one would not skew the facts, the first revolutionary year can be described as a predominance of the working class, the next three years as an equilibrium of class strengths. And even here the quantitative displacement meant a qualitative change in the entire operations of the state!

An example! The power of the banking magnates does not rest upon their number, but rather upon the function of the banks in the state economy, and above that the function of providing credit, and the need for credit by the state which is dependent upon the former. Thus, a small number of bankers can control the state because of their economic function. This is a *functional oligarchy*. The revolution has brought about a contravening phenomenon. Since the state no longer possesses the means to subjugate the worker, it must find accord with the workers' organisations in all its decisions; for if it had not done that, it would have been wholly defenceless against the refusal of the workers to perform their function in society. This is now the governing method of *functional democracy*. In the transition from the functional oligarchy to functional democracy, the predominance of the working class imposed itself in 1918–19 – just as the contrary has occurred since 1922 in the regression from functional democracy to

functional oligarchy, the expression of the restoration of the bourgeoisie. Functional democracy was the expression of the specific form of the exercise of power of the working class. And Kelsen misunderstands my characterisation of this exercise of class power so completely that he contends that my principal of functional democracy is a product wholly irreconcilable with the organic constitution of the state according to the theory of class struggle!

In this transition to functional democracy, the fact emerges that the revolutionary government no longer holds down the masses with force, rather can only lead with spiritual means. Kelsen answers this determination with the banality that at all times, everywhere, the spiritual is effected by force, and force with the spiritual. But can he deny that nowhere, before, during, or after has a government with so little repressive force, so overwhelmingly with its attempts to convince and lead the masses with persuasion, been attempted as that of the Austrian revolutionary government?⁶⁰

In fact, the revolution in the entire operation of the state in Austria was for that reason so thorough, because not only was it a displacement of power within its existence, it was also actually the founding of an entirely new state essence. Kelsen seeks to diminish this difference between the pre- and post-revolutionary state. In order to show that my views have changed since the revolution, he introduces several sentences from my polemic against Renner during the war.⁶¹ But what a misconception underlies this choice of my remarks! What I said has nothing to do with the relation to the state in general, rather to the Austrian-Hungarian state form, of which we were convinced that it could not be conquered by us, but rather must disintegrate from within before democracy could be realised on its ground!

Kelsen's whole critique denies the essential difference between the pre- and post-revolutionary state. He recognises no essential change from the past in the

60 I have occasionally depicted how we have worked 'to prevent the newly-won freedoms from being eroded by the un-reigned acts of violence of the masses, who have been coarsened by the four years of war'. Kelsen holds that for a confession that we have prevented a revolution; in reality, I spoke about preventing the violent acts of individuals and small groups! Against such excesses every revolution must protect itself, as Kelsen could convince himself by the study of revolutionary history. The difference to which I point exists only in that we can prevent such excesses with purely spiritual means, which in other revolutions necessitated martial law. I leave it to Kelsen to answer that martial law works through the spirit!

61 I have, naturally, changed many of my views. Only someone who has not been able to learn from the wealth of new experiences, from the powerful 'conceptual instruction of history', cannot comprehend this.

state, because he wishes to unsettle any belief in essential changes in the future. He does not admit that until 1918 the state was an organisation of domination for the bourgeoisie because he will not recognise that it must become one for the proletariat in the future. If the power of the state is divided between classes, Kelsen opines, why can't such a condition continue, why should the state be transformed into an organisation of domination for the working class?

The answer is given by the entire history of the last few years. Everywhere and at all times where the state power has been divided between classes, the equilibrium of class strengths has been very fluid. The bourgeoisie becomes bitter, vexed at the state, inimical towards the state, when they have lost sole authority of it; the proletariat becomes unsatisfied because in the condition which is emphasised by Kelsen, the way production is regulated prevents revolution, and thus their political authority is at odds with their subjugated role in production. Each of the two classes, thus, awaits the opportunity to generate power in their own favour, biding their time, as it were, in the time when power was necessarily shared, just as Marx described of the conditions in France in March and April 1848: 'it was a period of apparent harmony of the whole society, but of profound estrangement among its elements'.⁶² And since the economic process itself widened the cleavage between the classes, the moment of the ending of the condition of equilibrium would finally come necessarily; then, only the choice remained of a regression to the class dominance of the bourgeoisie or the conquering of political power by the proletariat. Just as the bourgeoisie had to withstand a period of equilibrium between the manorial aristocracy and the bourgeoisie before they could conquer state power, and accommodate the entire organisation of law to capitalism, so the proletariat must endure the period of equilibrium between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in order to finally conquer state power and realise the socialist order of society.



62 Marx 1907, p. 13.

Otto Bauer's 1927–8 writings on the long-term strategy that governed policy and practice in the existing 'transition' phase towards socialism was written in the wake of the Linz Programme. There was a working accord in the major definitions and principles among Austro-Marxists in these few years as to the course of historical development. Bauer stresses, however, the differentiated character of eventual socialisation, and thereby the recognition of certain economic forms that must be respected as private ownership, even under socialism. Farms and small businesses could not be socialised. Moreover, even consumers' unions and cooperatives that sociated these private owners in a collective effort had to respect the collective needs of other groups. Max Adler, Friedrich Adler, Rudolf Hilferding, and Otto Neurath did not speak of such invariant conditions in farming or small business, although all but Max Adler probably shared this view, especially Hilferding and Neurath. Karl Renner, who accommodated this view in practice after World War II, nonetheless, did not state such a premise in his writings – remaining descriptive of the collective aspects of consumers' unions and cooperatives that had such implicit, private enterprise foundations.

Bauer's fine eye for differing integrities, schooled in his own contentious environ of a dysfunctional family, found its first voice in his theory of national 'communities of character'. This ability to see differing interests, even within the model of a prospective democratic socialism, is clearly seen in this 1927–8 set of reflections upon what is, and what is becoming. Most significant throughout this essay, besides the awareness of the differing milieus in the productive forces of the society, is the concept Bauer took up from Max Adler, that is, the fundamental significance of 'sociation' [*Vergesellschaftung*] for the present development of future socialist forms. Bauer understood this term somewhat differently from Max Adler. For Bauer, 'sociation' was a cooperative knitting together of efforts and aims. Max Adler understood 'sociation' as any form of totalisation of society – that which was hegemonic and non-democratic, as well as the more ideal model with regard to human nature – socialism. 'Sociation' must begin within the current capitalist system, fostered in its cooperative interdependencies by unions, workers councils, cooperatives, and consumer unions – guided by the policies of Austrian Social Democracy. Bauer will focus on 'sociative' efforts in every branch of the Austrian society, and by analogue Western society, as it can engender the cooperative bases and values for socialisation. As he states below, 'Socialism can only occur where the work done under the command of capitalism has already been sociated'.

Bauer will address the compelled expropriation of large industries and state functions that are better managed by those engaged in the work, but he will offer a differentiated model of kinds of compensation for expropriation, as well

as allowing that capitalist managers and owners are required in some industries to continue until the workers can manifest the acumen and skills to move into these roles.



Otto Bauer 1927–8, 'The Transition from the Capitalist to the Socialist Society', in *Einführung in die Volkswirtschaftslehre, Werkausgabe*, Volume 4, pp. 844–77

The Economic and Societal Prerequisites of Socialism

Socialism has arisen as the contrast between the poor and the wealthy became quite evident. In this period, people dreamed of a societal organisation in which the means of production were not property of individuals, but rather in the possession of the entire society, and that there be a just division of all that was generated through their work. This kind of socialist society is largely only a dream image. The socialism that exhausts itself in such dream-like representations, one calls utopian socialism.

The historical meaning of the work of Karl Marx persists in his contribution that took socialism out of this dream, demonstrating that there was evidence in capitalism itself of tendencies that would effectively enable society to overcome it as a system, and make possible a socialist society. Socialism is no longer a dream image, but rather something realisable: the result of capitalist development. The socialist order of society does not arise automatically, however; rather, it must be fought for by humankind. Three essential factors which lead to this result were put forward by Marx. The first is *the concentration of capital*: production develops initially in many small work-sites through hand labour. The development of this industry leads to production being concentrated increasingly in large factories. This is the first manifestation of the displacement of the small operation by the large one. The large operation becomes united as a combine or trust, or organised in the form of a cartel. The trusts and cartels fall more and more under the control of the large banks. The real governors of the whole system finally are several large banks; a few financial people, who have authority in these banks, become the masters of industry.

The resulting development from this state-of-affairs leads to a *sociation* [*Vergesellschaftung*] of work as well as the means of work. Let us compare the workplace of the master craftsman to that of the contemporary large industrial operation. Where do the differences lie? A hundred years ago, the centre of gravity of industrial production was in the small work-sites. Today, capitalism

brings hundreds of workers together in the factories; an owner who possesses several large operations commands thousands of workers; in a cartel, ten thousand workers who work in only a few sites are controlled; in a great trust, hundreds of thousands of individuals are under the command of only a few capitalists. In that is the sociation of work.

In a certain sense the means of work are also sociated [*vergesellschaftet*]. A hundred years ago, there were countless small commercial and industrial enterprises, and between them free competition held sway. Now a trust or cartel has authority over all the means of work, which they must employ for their purposes. The accumulated capital begins to be gathered in the hands of the banks. Before, every enterprise had control of its own capital to do with it however pleased the ownership; today the bank decides what will happen with the capital. The financial and loan institutions determine the fate of industrial enterprises, and in that the future of thousands of workers and employees. In this manner, the entire societal production process is subjected to a unified leadership. The anarchy of capitalism is gradually itself overcome through the concentration of capital. In place of fully, self-willed individual decisions, leadership in these decisions is taken over by an organisation; but this organisation is not controlled by society. The people are organised under the control of just a few capitalists who direct and guide the entirety of the production processes. The process of sociation nonetheless begins within this manifestation of capitalism – to be sure, under the command of capitalism. That is one of the greatest facts to which Marx has pointed; the concentration of capital is the first developmental law of a capitalist society.

The second law of development that Marx has established is that of *the growth of the proletariat*. While on the side of the capitalists, capital becomes more and more conglomerated as a consequence of its concentration, and the production process more organised, on the other side the workers and employees increase in number. One hundred years ago, the majority of the population were farmers. Now it is quite different. During the subsequent societal development, those who made their living as wage workers and employees grew, while the population of farmers remained relatively unchanged. The farmer, as a rule, can only give his homestead to *one* child; the other children wander to industry and move into the city. The children of farmers become industrial workers. There is a continual stream from the land to the city, a continual increase in the proletariat.

How is it then with self-employed craftsman? In some branches of industry they have almost disappeared, their children having become wage-workers. In other industrial branches where there is still craft labour, craftsmen have nonetheless become dependent upon capital, and are not really independent.

Trade licenses and master titles are deceptive in light of the true working situation. Many craftsmen only work at home under the authority of the owner of the industrial operation.

While the number of farmers has remained unchanged, the number of agricultural workers has diminished somewhat, losing economic independence as a manual worker and becoming a member of the proletariat. The number of wage labourers rises quickly in their relation to the population as a whole. Even more quickly than the manual labourers, employees increase in size within the capitalist society. The sons and daughters of small independent business owners must become employees. In addition, industry needs industrial employees more and more.

The small enterprise owner needs only manual workers; he manages his business himself. The large enterprise, on the other hand, transfers the function of guidance in his business to employees. This phenomenon one finds in industry can also be seen in large commercial enterprises. Here also the number of employees grows continually. In this manner public corporations also need more employees than they did previously. In the past liberal era, the state did not concern itself with the economy. One did not wish the state to intervene in the economy. The development of modern economic and social politics increases the tasks of the state, and thereby the need for employees grows. Even in the professions of medicine and law, there is a transformation. Physicians were always independent earlier. With the establishment of hospitals and health insurance institutes, physicians have become employees in increasing numbers. It is similar with lawyers. Large banks and other large enterprises hire lawyers. The number of people who must sell their skills to capital grows. Workers on wage are the majority of persons in the developed countries. That is the second law of development established by Marx.

The third law is that of *the increasing dominance of capital* that subjects traditional industry as its servant. The situation of the broad masses of people becomes worse because of this. Initially workers and employees become dependent in this manner, then in increasing masses, however, those who had been independent business owners and small farmers. They feel, finally, that their fate is determined by the large banks and cartels. Every change in interest rates, wages and prices teaches them that. It is even clearer when the capitalist crises subordinate the very politics of the state, and when capitalism enters as a phase of imperialism, and the entire foreign policy is made in the service of capitalist special interests, which often leads to war.

Against this monstrous power of capital the masses finally rebel. The dissatisfaction will intensify as soon as it is shown that capitalism is not capable of insuring economic stability. The economy is subjected to continual

shift between crisis and prosperity. In times of prosperity the condition of the masses improves, but at the same time they come into conflict with capital. During the prosperity the labour unions are strengthened. The small conflicts are settled through huge strikes and lockouts. Then comes the crisis, the time in which the masses are without work, wages fall, and the power of the business owner increases. Now there arises in another form a contradiction between the wage earner and capital, a growing contradiction between the situation of the proletariat and capital, a contradiction which soon expresses itself in massive struggles, expressing itself in the resistance to wage reduction and loss of employment.

From these sketched developmental contradictions, there are consequences to be recognised that will inform future political events. The greater the power of capital becomes, the more clearly people begin to feel that the sociation of work and the means of production make capitalism pointless and expendable.

The capitalist has lost his original function. He was the leader of production and exercised thereby a necessary societal function. However, this function is lost more and more over the course of development. The capitalist transforms into a mere stockholder; the leadership goes over to the employees. The capitalists remain in control of the surplus value, and he remains in power, but only the most powerful remain; the small capitalists have lost their power. The masses of capitalists are merely drawers of dividends, and thereby no longer have a societal function. Thus, in the same proportion as they realise the completion of the capitalist process, the capitalists themselves become irrelevant.

The conception that one can eliminate the capitalists is strengthened by another development. The work comes more and more to the conviction that the capitalists as owners of enterprises are not necessary, because they themselves are capable of performing the work of that enterprise. That is based upon the growth of their organisations and the increasing insight into the conditions of production. One hundred years ago, the worker commanded no knowledge of the industrial process; he came into the factory in order to perform purely mechanical work. Over the course of time, the working class has taken on a greater degree of operational culture. They stand in this knowledge much higher than one hundred years before. The working classes begin to bring forward industrial leaders from their own number who are capable of exercising all the function of an industrial enterprise, and able thereby to make economic decisions. That makes the industrial owner unnecessary.

The gradual closing of the gap between the work and the employee that has existed between them is a plus. In the beginning, the worker and employee stood as strangers and enemies to each other, because they came from different social strata. The employee was, for the most part, a child of the bourgeoisie.

They had differing conventions of everyday life, different clothing, a separate kind of education, and different perspectives on living. These contrasts were sharpened through the roles within which the employees functioned. There were often representatives of the business owners; they commanded the workers in his name. The employees, indeed, seemed to be nothing other than representatives of the ownership. Thus, they came into conflict with the workers. In the course of time, this gulf was increasingly bridged, and in its place there arose a joint position against the owner: both had the same interest vis-à-vis the owner. The more the employees unionised themselves, the stronger the connection between worker and employee grew.

This situation has a great meaning for the increasing expendability of the owner. The worker has acquired a new ally who has a factual and experiential education. It is an illusion to believe that the complicated production machinery and its processes could be operated without such knowledge to guide one. If the workers can bring forth from their own number such a staff of representatives who have insight into the production process itself, and if, on the other hand, the majority of employees can be brought over to be allies of the workers, and the masses themselves have sufficient maturity, then it appears that the time has come to eliminate the capitalists without endangering production. Every impairment of the economic process would be an endangering of the worker.

If one gains oversight into the situation, one sees the following: in the train of capitalist development a sociation of production results: at first under the command of the capitalists. In the course of this development, the proletariat class grows, ever more in contradiction to the command of the capitalists, and aligned against them. As soon as the proletariat have achieved the necessary mental abilities and technical knowledge, and have acquired from the employees the factual prowess, then it will be possible to eliminate the capitalists. The development of capitalism creates a loss of function for the capitalists themselves; a condition arises which makes evident that leaving the means of production in the hands of a few capitalists is unacceptable. The people finally say enough: if a central direction of the economy is to be successful, then it is not proper for a few persons to make the decisions; rather the entire people must be engaged. The time has come to remove capitalist property from the means of production and to transfer it to the ownership of the people as a whole. If socialism was originally a dream of a better society, one recognises now the tendencies that are at work in the capitalist society which make necessary societal development beyond capitalism. What was once a dream becomes reality.

That is the great thought of Marxist socialism. One may not overlook that the writings of Karl Marx are several decades old. Much of what was the case

in 1867, as the first volume of *Das Kapital* appeared, was a bold prophecy, which in the meantime has become reality. One who speaks today of the concentration of capital knows quite well what he means: one thinks of Ford, Stinnes, Krupp, and so forth, and with this theory has become praxis. One has today concrete instances of the concentration process of capital, just as Marx prophesied.

Karl Marx wrote in the first volume of *Das Kapital*:

This expropriation is completed through the play of immanent laws of capitalist production itself, through the centralisation of capital. Every capitalist slays many others. Hand in hand with this centralisation or, as one can put it, the expropriation of many capitalists by a few, the cooperative form of the means of work grows apace stage by stage; there follows the realisation of the conscious technical application of science, the planful utilisation of resources, the transformation of all means of work into means that are always in common, the bringing into the economy the entire means of production in its sociated form that combines all the relevant functions of society, the unifying of all peoples of all societies through the network of the world market, employing for this end the international character of capitalist regimes. With the continual reduction in the number of capitalist magnates, who seek to usurp for themselves the advantages of these transformational processes, monopolising them, there grows the increasing misery of the masses, the oppression, the servitude, the degeneration, the expropriation, but also the rage which rises steadily, teaching those that suffer through the mechanism of the capitalist production processes themselves to unify and organise. The capitalist monopoly becomes the fetters which retard the production process, fetters that only increase and grow stronger under this capitalist monopoly. The centralisation of the production process and the sociation of work reaches its high point when this capitalist binding becomes unbearable. The fetters are then broken. The hour of capitalist property tolls its ending. The expropriators become expropriated.

Marx had at that time, in his observation of economic processes, drawn these conclusions, which had gradually begun to be noticeable in their small beginnings. Today these manifestations have grown incomparably. It is no longer sufficient to say that the hour of private ownership has heard its toll. Today one must begin to develop more exact conceptions concerning the pace of expropriation. Marx could only see in 1867 the broad lines of development; we have more to accomplish today. First, because the capitalist development

drives the concentration of capital to its conclusion; second, because we have experienced certain historical events, we have been taught to know how this concentration transpires, and how it should transpire. Above all, we have been taught that by the experiences of the great Russian Revolution of 1917. It is not sufficient to remain at the same point where Marx stood. We must go from that point towards a clear vision of how the proletariat will make its transition to a socialist society.

Forms of the Transition to a Socialist Society

The transition is essentially a process of expropriation. Control of the means of production, and then the large banks, must pass over into the hands of the community of the people. Through that process, what should be expropriated will be answered. Evidently, the large enterprises that are *ripe*, insofar as the work in them has been sufficiently socialized. These enterprises can be immediately transformed into the property of the society. In those places where the capitalists have lost their function, it will be easy. The small enterprises, in which the owner is still the leader, will not be expropriated. That would make no sense. Expropriation will take place only where the capitalists are only stockholders, exercising no function in the enterprise. On the other hand, wherever the pressure of capital appears unbearable, it will be necessary to intervene.

One will, therefore, expropriate initially finance capital, the banks and the heavy industries that command thousands of workers; one will confiscate the rental properties, also expropriating the mines and large agricultural enterprises. One will only, however, expropriate where it is necessary and possible.

In a nation where the large banks control the entire industry of that country, it is sufficient to transform them into a property of the entire people in order to also control the entirety of industry. In another land, perhaps it would be more essential to expropriate only several important branches of production. In Brazil the coffee, in England the coal, in Sweden perhaps the wood and the great lumber mills, in Hungary the large agricultural properties.

It is not a matter, then, of immediately expropriating everything in a nation. To expropriate everything would mean that the working class would be burdened with things they could not handle quickly enough to solve the issues-at-hand. They would be compelled to organise everything anew, and they would lack the necessary personnel. One can read that cautionary lesson in the Russian Revolution or the history of the Hungarian Revolution.

In the beginning, Lenin did not wish to expropriate; he was compelled by the armed workers to drive out the owners. Finally, there was no one in an enterprise who could continue production. One must in any case socialise; but one should not want to socialise everything. If one does so, he takes on

an unsolvable task. In Hungary, the process of expropriation was in this way greatly over-exercised. One expropriated everything, even the barbershops. This was pure madness; one cannot organise an entire society anew in a few months. The task can only be to socialise a few significant branches of production. And that will transpire differently in every differing nation. In Germany and the United States, one will begin with the large banks. One should consider carefully in Austria if that is the right step to begin with. In that consideration, political factors will play a large role. The new society will not be a socialist one immediately. Many of the branches of production will remain in the hands of the capitalists, in the hands of the farmers or those who run the businesses, and several that are already in the hands of the state. Capitalist and socialist enterprises will co-exist with each other. In the Russian Revolution, one wanted to take one leap from the capitalist to the socialist world. In the Fall of 1917, Lenin said: 'Within six months in Russia and within one year in Europe the socialist society will become a reality'. In the form of such 'elementary' events no society has ever arisen; indeed, it cannot arise. Every societal order is the consequence of a long developmental process. The preparation of the socialist society is completed within the capitalist society. The conquest of state power is only a quickening of this process.

At first, the capitalist and socialist elements will co-exist. The further development will be completed in a manner whereby the socialist elements step-by-step win more ground. We will never come out of a capitalist into a socialist society with one great leap. The transition process will be a lengthy one. Revolution can quicken the process, but no more is to be expected of it. The Russians began too quickly. By 1921, they found it necessary to begin the New Economic Policy, and today Russia consists of both capitalist and socialist elements side by side. The working forces of other lands must learn from this. We must be satisfied to socialise what is possible, and where it is not possible, because of the power relationships, leave capitalism undisturbed. We must, therefore, limit ourselves. If one disturbs the existing conditions of production without putting something in its place, famine is the outcome. We can only reach our goals progressively. The difficulty in every revolutionary situation arises from the dilemma of not knowing how far one could and should go. That is one of the difficult questions of the psychology of revolution. If one goes past the possible, then inevitably comes the reversal. In order to avoid that, we must only socialise where the conditions are at hand. What else is to be done will come later.

The transition to socialism is chiefly a process of expropriation. Certain branches of production, the large banks, the concentrated industries, the large

agricultural lands, and diverse segments of the commercial world must be taken over by the state that is controlled by the working classes. That is first. The next question to be addressed is: what will one do with these means of production, how will one organise production?

People answer this in different ways. One direction can be called state socialism. This is the view that it is sufficient to bring all means of production into the hands of the state. When the state steps into the place of the capitalists then everything is good. The state is the entirety of the people. There are many socialist intellectuals who see things this way, but there are few workers who share this view. Such a *state socialism* would hardly satisfy a worker; to be sure, the people would be masters of the means of production, but the worker would be but a civil servant of the community, subjugated in the same sense as he is today by the capitalist.

A second direction is based upon the fundamental principles of syndicalism. For this group, socialism means that the railroads belong to those who run them, that the mines belong to the miners, the streetcars to those who ride them, the large agricultural lands to those who work them. In this conception, the *syndicate* is the master of the respective branch of industry. The union of railroad workers should control the railroads; what freight fees would the rest of the population have to pay in such a circumstance? The railroad workers would address such a question with the best intentions, but the costs would have to be borne by the other professions. It is evident that this cannot be the solution. Syndicalism although it comes quite close to a proletarian conception could not satisfy the needs of society.

There is a third conception concerning the future organisation of the means of production that is the property of the community: co-operative socialism. This view has found widespread acceptance in England. In this perspective, the consumer associations enlarge their own productive capacities, and finally its members become the owners of their own means of production; the consumer associations enter into heavy industry and even come to own mines, administering these enterprises. Nonetheless, it is questionable as to whether such a form of socialisation would satisfy the workers. This conception is like state socialism. In place of the state is the large consumer society represented by their civil servants.

All these aforementioned forms of organisation are one-sided. It is always essential that an enterprise does not come fully into the hands of any one segment of the working class. It must be guarded against that any one special group of workers profit at the expense of the entirety of the citizens of the state. Moreover, enterprises must not come fully into the hands of consumers, as this will create a disadvantage for the worker. The enterprises should also be kept

fully out of the hands of the state because the worker will then be controlled by the state's civil servants. It is quite questionable as to the competence of the state as an administrator.

One must seek other combinations. One combination that has been tried in Austria is that of the form of *in-common economic institutes* [*Gemeinwirtschaftlicher Anstalten*]. The characteristics of this approach are: both consumers and producers are represented, the organisational function is itself controlled by the state; the body does not direct any enterprise. An administrative body is given to every enterprise reflecting these interests. There is an advisory council for every enterprise as well as representation from the unions; the influence of the consumer unions is also involved in this directive body. The state is the arbitrator as a member of these groups. The interests are thus unified within this body. This structure alone makes possible that the workers and employees can participate in the administration and not jeopardise the enterprise by their own self-interest.

The contemporary search for the most effective means of developing organisational forms has been pursued in many different countries. Apparently a socialist society can have no single type of industrial organisation; rather each branch of industry will have its own manner of organising. There will surely be enterprises where it is most appropriate to organise them as 'in-common economic institutes'. Besides these, there will be, without doubt, state-run enterprises, while others are taken over by the consumer unions or production co-operatives run by the workers themselves (*guild socialism*). One must combine all these forms.

For example, the Viennese community construction activity allows practical experiments that combine all these forms. Housing of the Viennese community has been given to a production co-operative of workers [*Grundstein*]; the wood delivered by an in-common economic institute, the Woodworks. In a straightforward manner, a combination of means was chosen. The socialist society itself must combine its forms; a standardised form will not be practicable.

A socialist society will have to develop better forms. The diversity will depend upon the maturity of the workers and employees. Where they are mature and conscious of their responsibility, society can give them a greater degree of co-direction. The workers must be conscious of their responsibility. In Russia, there must be a dictatorship instituted in the enterprises because the workers, in the majority of cases, have too little experience to make them capable of self-administration. In Austria, on the other hand, the railroad workers who have authority in one of the oldest and best organisations, have assured themselves power within the administration of the country's railroads, and

they have never abused this authority. The railroad workers have long had the work of union organisation that generated in them maturity and a consciousness of their vocational responsibility. In accord with the degree of maturity of the worker, every organisational form of the economy will differ; there cannot be therefore one unified plan. The only certainty is that the freer human beings are, the more co-administration must be given to them.

Expropriation with or without Compensation

How the expropriation of differing means of production will proceed, whether the enterprises will be taken over without compensation or if the capitalists should be given compensation will depend upon the circumstances. Where the large landowner who has been expropriated goes over to the counter-revolution, he will not be compensated; rather he will be dealt with as a perpetrator of high treason. One does not reward high treason; one punishes it.

The principle of the communists, expropriating without compensating, was never the conception of Marx and Engels. In the first edition of the *Communist Manifesto* (1847), which later was published under the title of the *Foundational Principles of Communism*, they speak of the question of expropriation. Engels said that one should compensate the capitalists, but one should pay the compensation in assignats. That means paper money that is devalued. There is the possibility in such a form that one must redeem it at inflationary value, and it is questionable whether that is desirable. Later, Engels had written of the large land parcels and had taken up Marx's conception that one will do better if one 'buys the entire lot outright'.

Both men's conceptions included the possibility that expropriation would occur without compensation. An expropriation without compensation has political drawbacks: it can instigate a strong resistance. For example, one does not affect only the one who expropriated. If one expropriates the large landowner without compensation, one also affects the mortgage bank and its customers, which include most likely many small individual clients. If one expropriates industries without compensation, the small stockholders will be affected. In this way, the masses are provoked to rise against you. In America, the majority of stocks belong to the workers. It does not go well when the workers are against you.

One proceeds most effectively in compensation when money is not directly given, but rather takes the form of obligatory notes and state-backed promissory notes that carry a fixed interest. What the capitalist loses in this transaction, above all, is his position of power. He has nothing more to do with the enterprise. Instead of dividends, he receives a fixed interest payment. This can have significant meaning in a time when profits increase within an economy:

interest remains the same. The increases in land rent (in instances of mining operations) come to the populace as a whole, no more to solely the capitalist.

The cost of paying interest and settling outstanding debts of state-owned notes will come from taxes – such as those upon the total value of one's wealth and upon inheritance. If this way of financing is chosen, the capitalist class as a whole will pay for what has been taken away from some of them. That is the just way.

The expropriation process will not affect the economy at one stroke; it will proceed in phases. It would injure everyone's sense of justice if some capitalists lose their property, while others are allowed to maintain theirs. Thus, all owners are to be affected in each phase. That occurs because the expropriated individual receives a compensation that is derived from the progressive taxes levied upon total wealth or inheritance, which are assessed upon all other capitalists. The process eventually realises the intended result: step-by-step there is a complete expropriation of all capitalists. The taxing policy is thus a very important means in the transformation of the capitalist society to a socialist one.

Another very important consideration justifies this method. One cannot overlook the fact that today, in order to meet the needs of capitalists, an inestimable amount of people work. The owner who commands a large income is a consumer of luxuries. If the process of accumulating surplus value is put aside, then the workers who produce jewels and furs for the capitalist will be without work. What will happen then to the workers who are in this position? In the long run, it will be unavoidable that they find places in new branches of industry that appeal to the mass of consumers. But this transfer of occupations is not so simple. One cannot make a mason out of a jeweller overnight. The son of the jeweller, however, can with little difficulty pursue a different occupation. The regrouping of the workforce cannot be realised in one swoop, rather in the course of a generation.

If one would expropriate without compensation, then every worker who is within the luxury consumer industry would be without work overnight. One cannot take them into an alternative branch of industry immediately. If one cannot subject the workforce to an overnight regrouping, then it is clear that expropriation is a step-by-step process. Therefore, it is better to compensate expropriation, but a compensation that is derived from the taxes paid upon wealth and inheritance. Luxury consumption will gradually be reduced. The luxury industry will take on fewer apprentices, so that the amount of workers will be accommodated to the degree of luxury consumption. Expropriation without compensation would make social transformation exceedingly difficult.

Social transformation is unavoidable, but it must proceed gradually. When one says that the *Breitner tax plan* on luxuries⁶³ produced fewer waiters in taverns and more people on the dole, one can only answer: that is good and it is socialist.

To want the communist perspective, to will expropriation without compensation, is completely wrong. In a country in which capitalism is strongly developed and has a strong luxury industry, that is not possible. Finally one must still consider that a country that relies on its international connections will suffer great resistance from these relationships if it expropriates without compensation. One must attend to this consequence. Expropriating without compensation can only be considered in a country that cannot be affected by foreign powers. Perhaps that could occur today in the United States, where expropriation would not affect foreign capitalists. In Mexico, on the other, it would be quite different.

The expropriation with compensation would be most suitable in European nations. In reality, that means that the expropriation process can be carried out in the same manner as one without compensation, but in this case over a longer period of time. One initially takes power away from the capitalist, and then also takes away his surplus value in phases. The rental protection in Austria is an expropriation without compensation. This expropriation was only possible because of the devaluation of money in the aftermath of the war. If there had been no devaluation, the rental protection would have affected the customers of savings and loan banks. The owners of the rental properties would then have had to borrow a great deal of money from the banks, and when they were expropriated of the rents, they would not have been able to pay back the banks. The banks in their relations with those who placed their savings in them and other depositors would have been in arrears, but through the devaluation the depositors could come away with their money, and the rental owners could still be expropriated.

It is thus established what can be expropriated, how one can organise expropriated enterprises, and how one can expropriate with compensation rather than without it.

The passage from the capitalist to the socialist society is, indeed, a quite complicated process. A new societal organisation arises only in the course of an entire period of history. We must count on a long transitional time; the emergence of a new society is an organic process, for one cannot realise it

63 [Hugo Breitner (1873–1946) was the Social Democratic minister of finance for Vienna from 1922 to 1932].

by decree. It will be as Lenin once said: at first, one must expropriate the authorities who give commands. He meant by that those places from which the authorities issue decrees that affect the whole economy.

The Working Conditions in the Sociated Enterprises

I contend: only the *places of authoritative decree* will at first be expropriated. There will be enterprises that are socialised in some form, and other enterprises that will still be operated as capitalist. The goal of socialist politics will consist in gradually enabling the socialist enterprises to spread and develop at the cost of the capitalist enterprises.

The decision over whether to conduct enterprises as capitalist or socialist will be decided by the people. We stand before similar problems today in Vienna: should the community, in order to maintain the rental laws, construct new housing, or should it leave that to private capital? In other countries, there are arguments over whether the state should run the railroads or private capital. There will always be differences of opinion over what one should socialise, and there will even be competition between socialised enterprises. One example: the gas works in Vienna was built by a chemical company. In addition, there is a capitalist chemical company, and there is a competition between this company and the gas works. Thus it is in a phase of transition.

Who wins this competition, the capitalist or the socialist company? One thing is sure: the result will not depend upon theory. People are not so constructed that in every instance they want the socialist company to win. The population is much more inclined to make decisions in accord with practical considerations. When individuals find that the socialised enterprises satisfy their needs, they will decide in favour of these enterprises. Better means in this instance: produce more cheaply. Let us suppose that we had to decide whether the Viennese bread factories should be socialised or run by capitalists. If socialisation led to higher prices for bread, people would quickly turn to the capitalist companies. The population will prefer socialist companies only when, at a minimum, they produce as cheaply and effectively as the capitalists. That is the decisive task. Besides that, however, there is the significant question of how work is organised, that is, the working conditions in the enterprise. If we can demonstrate that the socialist company produces its products at no higher cost than the capitalist, but that its working conditions are better, then people must choose the socialist enterprise. If these advantages cannot be demonstrated, then socialism in its contest with capitalism will not progress.

How then can the socialised enterprise deliver cheaper and qualitatively better products, and at the same time generate better working conditions?

The superiority of the socialist enterprise can emerge from the very facts of socialisation itself. In many instances it can succeed merely by avoiding superfluous production and distribution costs, operating more economically. Let us continue with the example of the Viennese bread factories. These compete with each other today. In every Viennese street one sees a bread truck from a different factory. A socialised bread factory will divide its delivery areas; every plant will have a certain amount of streets in which it sends its trucks. The transportation costs will be greatly diminished with this system. This is an example how socialism can directly produce more at a lesser cost.

Another example: if one is a smoker and goes to Germany, he or she can immediately be aware of the great role that advertising plays in the costs of the tobacco companies. The tobacco is miserable, but the packaging is beautiful. Every street exhibits advertisements of the tobacco companies. We are spared these costs. Our state has a tobacco monopoly. We do not necessitate beautiful packaging as a means of competition; we need no advertisements, and fewer tobacco shops as the cigarette industry in Germany, where every tobacco firm has its own stores. When socialisation comes to the German tobacco industry, immediate savings will result. Tobacco can be cheaper or better. In Austria, the state has a good business in tobacco. The profit reate of the Austrian tobacco industry is about twenty percent. The German tobacco firms do not reach a twenty percent profit, but the tobacco is not cheaper than ours. Here the superiority of state production is evidenced.

To be sure, this point alone cannot justify the prominence of a socialist means of production; there must be other cost-savings inherent in this system – for example, in the manner of large purchases of raw and auxiliary materials. In the question of whether the community builds more cheaply than the individual contractor, the purchase of building materials plays a great role. It is noteworthy that the business owner who most challenges the building activity of Vienna is the one who delivers them supplies. Those individual contractors are livid that they can only supply the community at prices that disallow high profits. The city councillor Breitner holds down the profit rates whenever he steps in as buyer. The large-scale buyer has the position of power that was once occupied by the many individual contractors who compete among themselves. The socialisation of the public housing means a buying monopoly in building materials. The community of Vienna is almost the only buyer now of bricks, mortar and like materials. They have therefore an enormous power of purchasing.

Study of the grain trade monopoly in Switzerland has shown that the state monopoly in grain allows much greater purchasing than in other nations. As far as that has relevance for tobacco, it is certain that the Austrian tobacco author-

ity can sell much more advantageously than the individual, small tobacco firms. Naturally, a buyer who makes a profit from a cheap purchase can put it in his pocket (corruption). But whoever aims for a profit can be sure that the tobacco authority buys more cheaply because it is a large purchaser.

There are many instances in which the socialist enterprise is superior to the capitalist, but it would be foolish to believe that the socialist enterprise is better and cheaper in its work than the capitalist in every case. One must not overlook that in socialisation certain dangers inhere. It can occur that the leadership of socialist enterprises is not as effective, or does not have as much boldness or decisiveness in technical innovation as the leaders of capitalist enterprises. This danger can be met, perhaps, by a goal-oriented organisation of enterprise leaders. The working conditions of employees, particularly those at higher ranks, could be regulated with more diligence. An enormous anger would greet the bureaucratisation of the higher echelons of leadership. It must not come to be that the employees *serve their six hours of time* [*abbüßen*], and are happy to have withstood another day. The leader of the enterprise will only be effective if he exhibits the same eagerness, energy, initiative, and decisiveness that the effective leader of a capitalist concern must have. The state in former times was not as active in the economy, but rather had limited itself to the so-called ministry administration; in order to do so, it created a bureaucratic apparatus. If this form of administration would be transferred to industry, industry would petrify. The idea that the leadership and direction of socialist enterprises can order itself by a hierarchical system of classes is absurd.

The translation of the state form of administration to the economy would be quite dangerous. If one had to wait for action in acquiring every new machine, a business would go to pot. An example of such administration mismanagement has been offered in the present by the national railroads.

The state or whoever controls the socialist enterprises must therefore develop wholly other kinds of administration than that of the bureaucratic. The organisational form of capitalism is much more of a model to be emulated than that of the state. A public-legal form of administration must be found that operates without the bureaucratic difficulties that are presented to businesses. A movement for the commercialisation of state enterprises has arisen because of this need. We must find appropriate forms to administer the socialist enterprises that insure a rational operation.

These problems are resolvable. Good employees who today stand ready with trust and competence will also serve in a socialist enterprise.

The workforce must understand the necessity of a purposeful direction for the enterprise. When the workers make every self-directed decision impossible for the director, when the workers councils must decide over technical issues

which cannot be overlooked – things we have experienced in the present – then workplace democracy from this point-of-view can become troubled. If someone is called upon to lead, he must be able to bear the responsibility, yet one must make it possible for him to manage. The leader of the enterprise must have the necessary freedom of decision-making, and be interested in the enterprise's prospering. It would not be right to say that the director should receive the same wage as the mechanic. If one works well, he should have his wages raised to square with that competence, even as that is not the essential consideration for the leader of the enterprise.

The supposition that the organisers of industries work solely for money, and that the degree of compensation is decisive is certainly false. The function of the leader of an enterprise is a satisfaction in itself for one who has been schooled commercially and technically: satisfaction in leadership, satisfaction in performance, and satisfaction in success. When something grows and becomes greater, when the enterprise is admired, this gives greater satisfaction to the leaders of the enterprise than money. One cannot look at these matters from the one-dimensional perspective of the manual labourer. For that reason, the socialist society must insure that the satisfaction of such leaders is furthered. One must find the ways and means to insure this. In small ways this happens already: with the opening of a public housing project in Vienna, the architect who directed it is always proclaimed. Due recognition is given to him, and that has an effect upon professionals in that field. They strive then to accomplish something. The most appropriate solution to this problem remains open. One must come to see that the workers of an enterprise are not poorly managed because of the antipathies and envy that exist within it.

The second major problem is the organisation of working conditions for those who are employed. There is an even more difficult problem than that of socialisation.

Let us suppose that we socialise the bread factories in Vienna, and the community takes over the factories. The populace would soon argue that the community administration is social-democratic, and the bakers are well organised. The community administration allows the desires of the bakers to be fulfilled. If, thereby, the wages are significantly increased for those who work in the bread factories, then the bread will be more expensive. Should one socialise in order to get expensive bread? In such a case, it is better to leave the bread-making to the capitalists.

If a socialist administration of the workers in socialist enterprises thinks it is better than those who work in non-socialist enterprises, then a serious danger may arise for socialisation. Signs of that are already noticeable. In England and Switzerland, wage issues in the communalisation of monetary policies have

played a dominant role. Community administration is too pliant an employer, and, in particular, a socialist community administration will be inclined to give the workers all they desire. This willingness to meet all needs will be exploited. The opponents of socialism will use the instances of the too-willing compliance towards workers as an argument against it.

One must avoid two dangers. The first is that which holds that the socialist community must prove how thrifty it administers, and therefore refrains from paying workers at the level of compensation offered by capitalist owners. If one takes this position, the mass of workers will lose interest in socialisation. The opposite danger is that the worker and employee think that the socialist enterprise under their own supervision is there only to meet their own needs. They must not try to achieve a high living standard at the cost of the community. The socialist enterprise would in such a case become too expensive in its products, and the consequence would be the hindering of further socialist measures.

What is at issue is to be able to improve the conditions of the socialist enterprises without crossing certain boundaries. Growth of the socialist enterprises must not be jeopardised by an improvement reached at the expense of others. In order to improve conditions, surplus value that no longer goes to capitalists is available. But that in itself will not suffice. The problem is only solvable if the working conditions in socialist enterprises are differentiated not only by monetary compensation, but also in the work that is performed.

If the worker in the socialist enterprise sees that he works for the people as a whole, he must then draw two conclusions: he can conclude that he can manage this enterprise better than the capitalist, but in such a way that it is different from a capitalist enterprise. In capitalist enterprises, he is there as a class enemy; he works only as much as he must, and the owner pays him therefore only as much as is absolutely necessary. In the socialist enterprise, the relationship must be different. It is not a business removed from his ownership, but rather one that is in common with him; the worker will be dealt with differently, but he must also work differently. If he does that, he does so both for himself and for the people as a whole.

There will be a relationship established where the leader of the enterprise and the worker stand in relation to each other quite differently than in a capitalist enterprise.

To realise that the following must be considered: the strike is an indispensable weapon against the capitalist enterprise; in the socialist society the strike is not supportable. A strike in a socialist society would mean that the worker in a business vital to everyday life raises himself above those who depend upon him in order to better his own needs. Thus an inequality of living conditions would arise which was dependent upon one's place of employment.

The development of socialism has not only expropriation and the creation of new operational organisation as basic premises, but it also desires a completely changed attitude of worker and employee.

Such a mental attitude cannot possibly be achieved through decision and decrees. It can only be the product of a gradual spiritual change instilled by the education of the worker. This education is not an instruction through lectures or articles; rather the workplace itself must be capable of bringing the worker to a new understanding of his work circumstances. The worker must not see work as something foreign to his interests, something that is an enemy, but rather as his work-site in which his greatest interest is expressed.

Here is the decisive point of workplace democracy. The relation will only change when the worker is no longer a subject who one commands, but rather is part of a community which he himself administers. Workplace democracy is the definitive form of co-administration by the worker. One cannot just turn over the enterprise to the workers themselves to administer; but the leaders of the enterprise may not be the sole authorities. One must find a combined form. One can hardly figure this out theoretically; it must reveal itself practically out of experience.

Towards this end in Austria there are beginnings within the works councils. One prominent form of this development is that of organised, in-common management. With such a form, the works councils are in a stronger position than in capitalist enterprises. The works councils of these enterprises are organised as directing committees. Even in independent economic enterprises one finds this new form of business operations.

These things must first develop through experience. There is no schema for their absolute form. With the railroads, which stretched from border to border in the federation of states, one must create a different variety of forms from those in a socialist factory. The development of workplace democracy is nonetheless a decisive element, and must be the goal to be realised by the co-administration and responsibility of the worker and employee.

Thus, the spiritual relation between the leader of the enterprise and the workers and employees will gradually change. The worker will soon no longer stand over against the leadership of the enterprise as a class enemy, but rather work with the leadership; they will cooperate to enable the enterprise to develop.

Whether socialism finally is victorious in the transitional time is not only a question of the power possessed by the worker; it is also a question of whether one succeeds in developing more efficient forms of organisation for the socialist enterprise. The organisation of the higher echelons of leadership within the enterprise may not become bureaucratised, and the organisation of

the relations among the workers and employees of the enterprise must be so that the enterprise does not come to be seen as the exploitative mechanism of a small group of persons. Naturally, there are countless difficulties in realising such an effective system of relations. There are no pre-existing models.

During the Russian Revolution, one socialised without adequate preparations. The workers had no experience in the direction of enterprises; they were not mature in this regard. One did not understand that one needs leadership, and drove out those who had professional competence. The organisation of democratic work discipline was overlooked. So it was only natural that the competent leaders of an enterprise was called back, and work discipline reorganised. But this did not occur without an exercise of force. There were actually executions; the authority of those who now lead the enterprises became a power without limits. It is foolish, nonetheless, if one waxes with fury over the despotic measures that ensued in Russian factories. Only through the overcoming of anarchy in the factories could a complete breakdown be avoided in Russia in the wake of the productivity cessation. Despotic governance only comes when the workers do not see the extent of the problem; work-site democracy becomes possible in the place of despotic authority only when the workers place themselves with free will within the disciplines of an effective hierarchy. The processes of work are otherwise not possible.

Moreover, work-site democracy enables the possibility of the natural talents of workers to organise and lead to be recognised.

It is also important to generate a new relationship between the worker and the employee. If they stand across from each other as enemies, nothing good can happen. It was a tragedy that in Russia the worker turned against employees, driving them out. The entire problem of realising work-site democracy can be solved when workers and employees approach each other. As soon as the worker sees the employee not as an enemy, but as a fellow worker, the strengths of the employees can be placed in the service of the worker. If the employees happen to be socialists, then they will put themselves into the service of the enterprise with enthusiasm.

It is important for us to recognise that humankind does not advance into socialism in one step. In the transition we will only remain successful in our movement if we are able to successfully organise and conduct socialist enterprises: the productive processes must be guided on rational paths, effectively and non-bureaucratically organised; the relationship of the worker to the enterprise must be fully turned around. In place of the current autocratic system, which set the interests within the enterprise against one another, a process must be instituted that gradually leads to workplace democracy. This will require a complete transformation of thought and praxis. A generation that has

been schooled in capitalism will need a lengthy time for this transformation. We should not deceive ourselves as to the difficulty that confronts us.

Marx once wrote that one must tell the workers that the path to freedom must go through a sequence of revolutionary processes in the course of which not only the conditions, but they themselves must change. Marx had considered what today is our immediate problem. If one is a Marxist, one must remain free of the error in believing that one can create a new condition for life and work merely through sermonising. One can reach the goal only by actually changing the conditions within which people live. Only when people have changed will the conditions themselves change. The problem posed here is that of reciprocity: generations will be needed until one has adequately solved the problem.

Through schooling and other forms of education of the working population, something can be achieved. It can be made clear to workers that making the socialist enterprises different in all respects from the capitalist enterprises constitutes their most important task. If the worker knows that he works for the entirety of his class in its interests, he will behave differently than when he merely creates for the profit of the capitalist. But one must be clear that with clear explanations alone, nothing is ever done.

What Cannot be Socialised?

Socialism can only occur where the work done under the command of capitalism has already been socialised. There are branches of industry within the frame of capitalist society, however, that have not yet reached this stage: they are found in agriculture and small businesses. Here the previously discussed forms of socialisation are not possible. No reasonable person can think that socialists after their assumption of power can expropriate all farming land transferring it to the people as a whole. The workforce will merely experience defeat after defeat. Moreover, the working class would attempt to take upon itself irresolvable administrative problems. It is not difficult to take over a farmstead. The manager of the farm would work for the state just as he had before worked for the private owner. Yet how can one centralise the production of all farms? Can one place an administrator on each farm? Can one re-establish the farmer as the head of his farm immediately after expropriating it? Where the work is still done by individuals, one cannot socialise.

Thus it is clear: socialisation will be realised with large land-holdings, mines and banks, not, however, with farming lands and small businesses. The utopians have not thought through how to transfer all the means of production to the ownership of the people. We must say that as regards Austria, two-thirds of the farming land should not be socialised. Can one then speak of socialism?

For purely theoretical reasons it is often useful to present a conception of a society as having only two societal classes with polar interests. I can, for example, depict the model of a feudal society in which there are only masters of the land and their duty-bound [*robotpflichtige*] farmers. That would be the ideal type of a feudal society. In reality, there has never been such a *simplified* society; for in that very time, there were also cities and artisans, and on the land free farmers, and in the communities the vestiges of many older, traditional economic forms. We call this society feudal, nonetheless, because the feudal forms were dominant.

We can also think of the ideal type of a capitalist society in which there are only capitalists and workers for wages. All the means of production are in the hands of the capitalists; all other persons are hired out as workers for wages. This conception is not possible; in reality, one sees the capitalist society otherwise. Besides capitalists and workers there are artisans, tradesmen, and many, many farmers. There has never been anywhere a purely capitalist society. In spite of that, we name our contemporary societal order capitalistic. Capitalism is dominant. The significance of the agricultural society has diminished in the last hundred years, but capitalism has not eliminated the farmer. Farmers are neither the capitalist class, nor the feudal class. They stand between these two forms. The farmer lives in the capitalist society where they have been oppressed and exploited. While the farmer does not work for a wage, the capitalist society has found the means to exploit the farmer through the forms of mortgage and commercial capital.

The ideal type of a socialist society would be an economic order in which property is common property, in which all the means of production are socialised. There will never be a socialist society in this sense, no more than there was an ideal type of feudalism in the past, or in the present there is such a capitalist society.

The socialist society of the future will not be an ideal type; the socialist form, however, will dominate. The dominant powers of the economy, industry, the large agricultural businesses, large-scale commercial concerns, and the banking industry will all be societally organised. Beside them there will be artisans and millions of farmers. The situation of these independent manual workers and farmers will be completely different as soon as the decisive means of production are entirely in their hands. The workers in agriculture will leave it as a pursuit as soon as the living conditions improve for the industrial workers, and there is no more unemployment in the cities. The farmer who employs labour will have to improve their conditions. This improvement is not simple. The farmer will only be able to improve the conditions of his fellow workers if he farms more efficiently. Therefore, a transformation of agricultural

production must precede the steps for improving the working conditions. Agricultural science education is to be improved, and the cooperative must be developed further. The individual farmer will not be in the position to take up the needed transformations in the agricultural economy, but the cooperative movement will be capable of making these changes.

In Upper Bavaria, for example, the agricultural cooperatives hire skilled employees to go from farm to farm advising the owners on how they can improve their farming. They teach the farmers the proper application of fertilisers and the use of machinery; they experiment with the soil and recommend the most effective crop rotation. There, in the truest sense of the word, is science put into the hands of the farmers. The individual farmer cannot employ an educated advisor; only the cooperative can do that.

What other advantages does the cooperative organisation offer? The example of the dairy cooperative gives an easy demonstration of these. Earlier, every farmer had churned butter in his own home; in place of these butter churns, the modern cooperative centrifuge has emerged. To be competitive with a higher yield, the farmer will be compelled to develop more and more cooperatives. The agricultural production will come increasingly under the influence of the cooperatives because of these developments.

Then, the role of mortgage debt must be considered. The deeper cause of this debt lies in the high cost of the land. The farmer pays more for the land because he wishes to remain independent at any price. He does not want to become a worker for wages, since the wage-worker is oppressed, exploited, and threatened by unemployment by capitalism. He wants to remain his own master, and therefore he is prepared to pay more for the land. One can comprehend this higher cost as a *premium for independence*.

The socialist society will improve the lot of the wage-worker in an essential manner. They will have the right of co-administration, receive higher wages, not be threatened by unemployment, and they will be assured a pension. When the situation of the wage-worker improves in these ways, who will choose to pay more to remain in agriculture in order to live an *independent* meager existence? It is clear: the overpayment for land results in the present from the fear of living a proletarian existence. Improve the condition of the worker, then no one will be prepared to pay more for the land. The overvaluation of land, which has contributed to the enslaving of the farmer, will disappear. In consequence, the exploitation of the farmer through mortgage capital will cease. The socialisation that frees the worker from exploitation improves the economy and social condition of the farmer at the same time.

Summing up: the socialist society of the future will look different from how it has been described by utopians. There will not be an ideal type of a social-

ist society. The greater part of agricultural land will still belong to farmers. Just as the capitalist society has not succeeded in displacing farmers, so the socialist society will not drive farmers from their land. The capitalist economy has transformed the essence of agricultural production completely, but the socialist society will transform it again in equal measure. The greater demands of the agricultural worker will lead to an improvement of the agricultural economy. The necessity of agricultural improvements will generate an unexpected development of agricultural cooperatives. With the diminishing of fear of becoming proletarian, the basis for the overvaluation of land disappears. With the cessation of the overvaluation of land, the indebtedness and the exploitation of the farmer through mortgage capital ends. The condition of the farmer in the socialist society will be different from and better than how it was in the capitalist society.

The bourgeois often says that socialism will founder because the farmer does not want it. Albert Schaeffle (1831–1903) formulated the principle: ‘Socialism will break against the anti-collective skull of the farmer’. In reality, socialism is possible even as the farmers remain seated in their farmyards. The farmer remains, but he will need to accommodate a new environment; he will feel the coming of socialism as his paid labourers run from the land. He will be quick in coming to know, however, that socialism, in truth, improves his situation.

These are the immediate developmental goals. In order to achieve them, much time will be required. The expropriation can be completed quickly. The accommodation of the economy to the new societal order is something that apparently will take several generations. Capitalism itself arose over a long period. Its beginnings can be traced from the thirteenth century. It has only reached its full maturity in the present. Anyone who believes that socialism can be realised with several acts of violence has no more insight than the utopian who desired that Metternich might introduce socialism.⁶⁴

What can be accomplished now are these first steps in creating the initial elements of the socialist society. The rest will be gradually developed, just as everything human is developed, through mistakes, errors and conflicts. There may be confusion and backsliding occasionally, but the goal will never be lost. The power that capital has taken upon itself will be torn from it, and given into the hands of the social whole, who will then gradually and progressively build

64 [Bauer refers here to Robert Owen (1771–1858) who approached Metternich, the leader of European reaction in the years before 1848, hoping that he could win him over to his socialist ideas].

a new world. A world in which such power as heretofore possessed by capital cannot arise will allow the people as a whole to be masters of their own destiny for the first time.

International Requirements for Socialisation

The transition of the capitalist to the socialist form of economy will only be completed gradually; and it will not be possible in only one country on the European continent, rather it can only be fulfilled internationally. To be sure, this does not mean that the workers in one nation can do nothing while other nations remain passive in this regard; the progress which is to be realised can be influenced by the one nation, for example, in how expropriation is carried out. A country that is subject to foreign credit, because its money supply is thereby dependent, cannot expropriate at will. The foreign capital will threaten to leave and thus severely affect the living standards of the nation. Without credit one cannot import the goods that one heretofore has brought into the economy. Thus dependence upon foreign credit proves itself a hindrance to expropriation.

Russia is the only country that has chosen complete expropriation, but since that decision it must do without the help of foreign credit. Foreign capitalists who have lost their capital once in Russia will not leave their capital there again. The development of Russian industry, which needs long-term credit desperately, is thereby constrained. A smaller, weaker country would do even worse with such a disadvantage.

Russia still has the advantage of a large market, which foreigners would happily service. Austria, on the other hand, is not such an important market, and every act of expropriation would inevitably result in a boycott by foreign capital. The process of expropriation depends as well upon the international situation. An individual land must be careful as long as the other countries are still controlled by capitalism. Large countries can do more than is permitted in this regard than small and weak nations. It will depend upon the conditions of economic strength whether one can venture to expropriate so long as other countries are dominated by capitalism. If socialism is on the march abroad, then the weaker countries can expropriate without difficulty.

Let us suppose that one country socialises the key positions within its domestic economy, while the other countries remain capitalistic. *One* step will have been made thereby in the right direction, not more. The essence of the capitalist society is anarchy, the lack of economic planning. This planless society reveals itself in unregulated production. No one knows if the goods produced can be sold. In the socialist society, work will be distributed in accord with planning. In the capitalist society, no one regulates production; thereby,

the constant rise and fall of market prices, the crises with their stoppages and other states of distress. An individual country cannot conquer this anarchy when it socialises. The differing branches of production are not centralised in one country, but rather in different countries. The distribution of labour is spread over the entire world. Socialisation in one country does not make a planned production and distribution process possible.

Think of Russia! Russia must export a portion of its products and import another portion. The Russian government cannot control the price of the imported and exported goods, however. That means: the essential step – the overcoming of anarchy, the creation of a planned economy, the planful distribution of people to the different branches of industry – cannot be realised. The continual fluctuation of market prices does not stop, nor does the shifting between the booms and the crises of the economy. Socialisation in one land cannot undertake a planned economy; it is only to be realised as a consequence of international socialisation.

How little can be achieved through individual action is illustrated especially in this regard: the insecurity of existence is the worst aspect of the worker's fate. This insecurity comes from the continual changes in the course of business. In times of prosperity, the capitalists draw upon the industrial reserves – in times of depression, these same persons are again without work. The mere socialisation of industry does not yet secure the workers existence. The shifts between prosperity and crisis must be brought to a halt. For example, if one socialises the Viennese metal industry, one can still not guarantee steady employment for those who work there. There can be a crisis, and workers will have to be let go. Secure work sets as a precondition a planned economy. This step cannot be realised as an isolated phenomenon in one country; a planned economy presupposes an international socialisation. That does mean the whole world must be socialised; however, it must have a secure footing as a movement in the most significant countries.

The future that the worker desires has to be evidenced through the securing of the workplaces. Manual labourers wish to have the same steady employment and some form of pension for their retirement as state employees.

The security of existence is in all conditions more important than the level of steady income. It is that which first frees the individual from the constant fear of being unemployed and falling into dire circumstances. As soon as the branches of production come into the hands of the state, the workers immediately demand the securing of the workplace. A proof of that is the desire of the state forestry worker for secure employment. The state cannot guarantee him that today. The lumber market, for example, is continually under the pressure of competition, and the amount of wood that can be estimated for sale changes

constantly. There are times in which, because of crises, smaller amounts of wood are sold, and then woodcutters must be let go. Then one needs fewer workers, and one can guarantee at most a smaller number of those who have continual employment. In a socialist society, which cooperates internationally, the situation will be different; a socialist society will be able to put an end to economic crises, and with that solve the question of existence for the worker and the employee.

One will be able to do the most important thing for the worker, that is, the freeing him from the fear of unemployment first when the planned economy has progressed to its fullest.

Socialism will naturally never arise in a manner that one day all nations will begin to be socialised at the same time in the same way. Each land will proceed in its socialisation in accordance with the strength of its workforce. In each case it will differ.

One can expropriate to a certain degree in a single nation. How far this goes depends upon the situation of the nation. The more independent it is from foreign capital, the more it can do. The socialisation process will proceed for each country quickly, yet not in the same measure. The goal of socialisation is the overcoming of capitalist anarchy, the establishment of a planned economy, the distribution of workers among the differing branches of industry. That occurs as soon as the nations are drawn together into a world economy, not to be solved in a single country, but rather only internationally. This culmination of the entire project of socialisation cannot be realised in a narrow framework. The planning does not occur with the inception of socialism, but instead takes place with its conclusion, its goal. When that occurs, for the first time every individual will have a secured existence.

The international cartels seem to perform an important function, from the viewpoint of socialism. We can see in them the germ cells of future international economic bureaus. The cartels are nowadays naturally only there for capitalist purposes; as soon as the workforce is strong enough, however, they can contribute to the quickening of international socialisation. The people of the nations will say: these international cartels are good organisations; they should, however, not be in the control of capitalists. We will attempt to use them for our own purposes. When the working class comes to power in Germany, France and Belgium, and succeeds in socialising the iron industry in these three lands, the path to socialism will not lead through the dissolution of the international iron cartels, rather instead of the capitalists being in control of them, the representatives of the nations will be.

In this manner arise international economic authorities. The international organisation of capitalism is transformed in this manner to an international

organ of a democratic national community. To the degree that an international directory creates a planned economy production branch by production branch, the entire world economy can be planfully organised and anarchy overcome. First with that outcome can the worker have an enduring, insured existence.

These hard-won understandings, for several reasons, have a special meaning: it would be dangerous to give into illusions concerning the tempo of historical development. The transition to socialism cannot be the work of a few days, even of several years. The development will last for decades as the work of an entire period of history. The conquest of political power can occur overnight; however, that alone does not suffice to create a socialist societal order. The assumption of power is only the first prerequisite for socialism. The other conditions are to be created during the time of transition. In the period of transition, the economy must continue to function. One can only live when one produces. If one is not able to socialise production, one must not bring capitalist production to a halt. As long as one cannot produce socialistically, it must still occur according to the way and means of capitalism. The Social Democratic Party must therefore see as its task to acquire the decisive positions of power, yet leave capitalist production undisturbed, as long as it cannot be socialised. The socialist positions are to be planfully developed, nonetheless; and step-by-step the socialist elements of the economy are to be strengthened at the cost of the capitalist sectors.

This task will be more quickly successful the more the workers think and feel socialistically. This does not depend upon political power; the worker must also have the moral and mental abilities to be able to make use of this power. In the socialised parts of the economy, the highest work discipline and leadership is necessary in order to make possible further advances of the socialist elements. The worker in the socialist enterprises must recognise: the more they perform, the better and cheaper they can produce; in that way they create the requirements for their own economic improvement, and the more quickly will they conquer the capitalist enterprises. The struggle for socialism, which is chiefly conducted through the struggle for political power, must have a higher stage of economic competition added, which is the only means by which socialist enterprises can achieve their highest performance.

The entire coming to grips with these issues requires the international cooperation of the exploited classes. Socialism is only to be developed in an international framework. The consideration of international conditions does not necessitate a completely passive relation within individual nations. Where it is appropriate one will recognise how far one can go; nonetheless, one must

always keep in mind the international situation. That is particularly true for small, weak nations. What is possible in Russia must not come into question in Austria.

For all countries it stands that: progressing into socialism is finally an international reality. The individual country can only establish it to a certain degree. The overcoming of economic anarchy, and the enduring security of a worker's existence, are only achievable internationally, only through the socialisation in all the decisive countries.

With that all expositions are concluded. It is needful that all speculations in these matters are ended as to how a socialist society should look. It is established: there will never be a day that it can be said that socialism is now realised and its development is a finished thing. It cannot be the case that the socialist society becomes an ideal type. There are elements in contemporary society that will enter this new form. The reality that we confront will be strongly differentiated from the utopian constructions that have preceded us. What will mark this new society is that the key decisions will be in the hands of the whole people.

To think over these matters is important for every person who will be a socialist. Many of those who call themselves socialists are not yet socialists; they are at best class warriors who feel to be on our side. A real socialist is only the person who sees the great goal of socialist society in front of him: the overcoming of capitalist exploitation and capitalist anarchy. Who really carries this idea in the heart is a socialist. The class war is only the means to reach this end. The first period represents the acquisition of political power; the second, more difficult, requires the inner transformation of the workers, which then can lead to victory in the struggles of this period. This victory is not achieved by smiting our enemies; rather that we best our opponent by working more effectively. One must also be inspired, if it can be said, through the day-to-day arduous work of leading the socialist enterprise to victory.

Karl Renner

Renner was ‘Lockean’ in his thought. Both Locke and Renner believed that conceptual clarity could redirect praxis with real pragmatic effect. Renner, more than Locke, held to the viability of tradition. Renner’s efforts were not to create ‘Neue Menschen’ as Max Adler wished; rather, he sought to create a democratic ground for the existing values of the German cultural heritage, as articulated by its greatest thinkers. Renner, who matured in the midst of Bohemian Czech and German interactions, had respect for the integrity of the differing national purviews, even as he had more respect for the German. Locke’s ‘determined’ concept with Renner finds its ‘determination’ within the realities of the Austrian-Hungarian multinational state. Conceptual clarity is guided by the format of legal conceptions – a training Renner loved, taking it more seriously than his fellow Austro-Marxists. His legal thinking was not as strongly determined by the positivist school of Austrian law as it was by the realities Renner perceived around him. Positive law did become a lexicon for formulating ‘solutions’ to the problems he saw in his environment, problems that changed over the decades.

The legal concept of ‘nationality’ was seen in its ‘indeterminate’ character in positive law, and Renner sought to show how ‘nationality’ is voiced by the people themselves, with that view then formulated properly into law. Renner does not seek a conceptual determination as Max Adler would, within a system of concepts, à la Kant, striving for their architectonic congruities. Thus, Renner will not stray from the chief pragmatic realities he confronts decade to decade before and after World War I. In the pre-war era, he will be involved in the struggle for a coherent unity among nationalities within Austrian Social Democracy, and beyond that in the state itself. His legal theory harks back to Charlemagne and the ‘personality principle’, seeking to gain through the legal processes of the state a determined ‘personality’ in law for each nationality. After World War I, when the nationality issue is not a matter of concern – given the hard fact of the delimited Austrian nation to its Germanic majority (with some irredenta issues) – he will be deeply involved in its pragmatic issues: the economic hardships of the post-war Austrian society. With his conceptual pragmatic brilliance, Renner will take leadership of the cooperative movement, seeking to find ways to marshal the resources and processes of Austrians in the cities and on the lands to improve their effective economies. In the cooperative movement, within the world of producers and consumers, is the daily reality in which he seeks to find the ‘determined’ forms that thereby can be adequately addressed with pragmatic praxis.

Renner's *Staat und Nation* (1899) was conceived and written in the period that saw the Brünn Conference held by Austrian Social Democrats later that year. The formal policy of the leaders of Austrian Social Democracy (all Germans) reflected Renner's approach. Each nationality had a cultural personality, as Renner held, an idea that would be reinforced when Otto Bauer wrote of the 'communities of character' in his book on the nationalities in 1906.



Karl Renner (Synopticus) 1899, *State and Nation: A Constitutional Investigation of the Possible Principles of a Solution and the Juridical Prerequisites of a Law of Nationalities*, Vienna, Josef Dietl

Foreword

This lecture, which was held on 9 February 1899, and which I now publish, gave me the occasion to incite those who heard me. For I well knew: that for the political person – especially the Austrian – it would to be too theoretical, and for the Austrian theoretician, it would be too political. For us these vocational branches and ways to earn a living are miles apart. We differentiate ourselves not only from Plato's *Politics*, we construct its opposite: we make not only the philosophers into politicians, but principally also those who are not philosophers. To consider the science of the state and the art of the state synoptically is to incite suspicion from both guilds that we create merely a sordid competition, a vexed situation that subdues scientific politics, and silences political science. Only in the historical pause when the cards are mixed afresh has such kibitzing authority. Once several have called, however, then I venture my wager.

The principle that now stands was presented by Dr. von Herrnritt to the judicial society in a lecture 'Nationality as a Concept of Justice'. The title made me highly interested. For that is also my theme: How can the nationalities, as a sum of individuals, on the one hand, and as an ethnic-psychological character, on the other, be conceived *by law*? What is the nation in the state in the laws? What role vindicates the existence of national parties? How is the political slogan of nation expressed as a juridical concept? How can these turbulent battles for power by translated into peaceful, lawful relationships?

I was disappointed as I perused a summary of the aforementioned scientific opinions, perceiving the existing situation of law for the question of nationalities in the state to be one reduced merely to the question of the validity of a language in public law. That was how it had been, and what was now the case, formally, as well. But what were the material interests that were the background

of this condition? What were the political strivings for power of the national parties? Bohemian state rights? German intervention? Is it the case that only the equality of language is what is fought for?

Is not the equality of language, although it is a foundational principle of law, juristically a laughably wrong-headed concept? In any conceivable system of laws, can the *language* have a right or be an object of the law? Even the right of the person to speak his mother tongue is a juristically meaningless excretion of the general law of personal freedom. There can only be meaning insofar as it is a duty of the state to hear everyone in their own language. And does such a duty serve the concept of a Nation? Would the Czechs be satisfied by the following principle of law: 'State bureaus must be exercised only under the competence of Germans, but the language of the land so administered must be that of common usage?'

Happily, it is the opinion of this lecturer that the necessity is clearly evidenced that national identity should have a fixed public-juridical status finally, if it is to be a foundation for law.

The article by Kramář in the *Zukunft* occurred between my lecture and this publication. In it he gave up the idea of territorial autonomy, arguing rather for a national autonomy. How to measure the meaning of this expression is offered to the reader in the argument that follows. When what I write is not merely theoretical, but intended as political as well, and in that well-received by the party of Kramář, then *the chief points of this attempt at mutual understanding* have been realised, then my depictions have more effect than I could have hoped for, then can one, indeed, hope for peace. Yet I fear that this message will not be believed.

The Author

The Text

Inter Arma Silent Leges. With the noise of the weapons, the law is silenced. Not only is the existing legal order destroyed by war, but also the development of future laws as well, the theoretical and codified treatment of the questions of the time is made impossible as long as they are issues of power. Now, after two years of bitter fighting, a short quietude has arisen, in place of the passionate enthusiasms and not meaningless sobering has emerged on both sides. We have the Königgrätz of our internal politics behind us: a Königgrätz without victors, yet with great mutual damage, which in a short time, by dint of Par. 14, will liquidate Hungary. The defeat of the idea is sealed. For Austria to rule – in that one nation is ruled by another, one ethnicity [*eine Rasse*] by another – is over. The question of power is decided by the equality of powerlessness. Only

compromise remains. One asks now only for a formula for understanding, for principles according to which the national spheres can be bounded.

Until today the struggle was in no way one of principles. One fought at the beginning over Cilli, over Weckelsdorf, over this or that privy councillor position, over this school or that office, and finally over all the offices in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. The Czech bureaucracy fought for a more or less exclusive right to hold these offices. The German bourgeoisie in Austria, which until recent generations placed bureaucratic personnel of the German nation in all these offices throughout the Habsburg lands and through the entire Holy Roman Empire, saw themselves as being driven out of Hungary, out of Galicia, finally out of all the lands of the crown of Wenceslaus, and also from the Slavic parts of the Alps, limited to but a small circle of the old inherited lands. The material meaning of this fact explains the heatedness of the defensiveness of the Germans. The nationality principle, the idea of a unified state, the postulates of equality and autonomy, were the flags under which the basic material interests were gathered. During this entire struggle these principles, however, were hardly discussed, and a legal formulation of them was not attempted, public policy expressions of this kind were simply ignored. The question of power would have more integrity for all involved if dealt with in this manner, nonetheless.

Today, after the adjournment of parliament, where now the sword is removed from the hands of all combatants, it seems finally the right time to bring up the issues of principle and law, and from the conceived principles to seek a possible, indeed necessary solution, and establish legal prerequisites under which a solution can be realised.

This attempt can be as complex as the result itself. The Austrian problem, because of its complexity and unprecedented conditions, is perhaps the most difficult of all modern problems of state. Here the application of moderate means and small measures would be difficult. That is the result of the differences in the individual national questions from which the nationality question as a whole has emerged, where no solution can be made in one act, and in the near future any language law that could satisfy the nationalities throughout the monarchy does not appear to be conceivable. For every legal order is an order for peace. It is either the result of a compromise in the wake of the previous undecided struggles, or the dictate of the victor, *Sic volo*. The German-Czech conflict has reached its apex. A compromise seems possible here. On the other hand, the German-Slovene, Italian-German, Italian-Slavic, and especially the Polish-Ruthenian questions will not offer compromise for an extended time: here the parties will battle, here one hopes for a victory over the other, while the other finds the status quo unbearable, and takes up the battle.

In these cases the belief in a free-willed reconciliation of the disputed issues is utopian, in these cases the *Sic volo* of a powerful third party can decisively end the conflicts, or achieve an armistice *ad hoc*.

If the issue of a language law comes to the fore to be decided, barring an imposed solution by the Emperor [*oktroyierung*], only a partial provisory is to be had, indeed an advance from one provisory to another provisory, until we finally achieve a form of solution. This in itself, the conclusion of the development, is today not possible. Nevertheless, we must know where we must direct our efforts; we cannot take a path without a goal. Therefore, it is necessary to ask under which provisos a peaceful life together among several ethnicities can be realised. First, from these guiding perspectives can we make a judgement concerning our next actions, achieving an understanding of how effective these immediate acts might be. If all our provisos are not in the direction of a final solution, then we are barring ourselves from the way to the goal.

Therefore, nothing is more pertinent now than the utopian end result we can project, however distant and barely discerned. Without clear insight into the problem, there is no practical proposal possible. Nothing is more necessary than the final principles that regulate the nationality question by law, and the legislation that scientifically proceeds towards this. It appears that this can hardly be attempted: yet just such an effort is the task of these lines that I write. One shouldn't see this as a practical proposal, but rather as a necessary means to provide the inescapable preamble for such an effort.

With this task, the principle of equality of the nationalities, as comfortable a political slogan as it is, nonetheless leaves us in the lurch. Par. 5 of the imposed [*oktroyiert*] constitution of 4 March 1849 explains: 'All ethnicities [*Volksstämme*] are equal', and this principle is reiterated in the first section of Article 19 of the State constitution of the Rights of Citizens. In order to show how in error the reception of this slogan is in its legal form, it is sufficient to bring forward Gumpłowicz's criticism of this section of the law: 'We know well from the study of legal science that a corporation or an association is the bearer of rights which can be exercised: an ethnicity is, however, neither an association nor a corporation, nor a "moral" person in the sense of judicial science'. – 'Lacking ... the necessary prerequisite of all law, that is, the clear and precise concept of the subject who should be the bearer of rights, we cannot make a concept from such an indefinable ethnicity to enable one to exercise the existing right'. – 'We may try as we will, the March constitution of 1849 gives us in Par. 5 a riddle, without giving to us the key. We do not know what the legislator had in mind with "ethnicity" [*Volksstamm*]? Neither do we possess an authentic explanation of how many ethnicities there are in Austria'. (While

the existence and scope of the crown lands were constitutionally established), 'finally, in what way can an ethnic be the bearer of rights?'

The only possible exposition then which remains for considering the 'equality of the ethnicities' is the *negative*, whereby we conceive the determination of the laws so that the belonging to an ethnicity in no way diminishes the person's political rights in the wake of such a choice. This manner of exposition may appear then as an extraneous pleonasm in that it only repeats what, already without this determination, has been articulated over the 'equality of the citizen before the law'.

That is, if this determination of things that I put forth concerns the ethnicities as a whole, then it is impossible, because ethnicities are not subjects with rights; if it concerns individuals, then it is beside the point, because equality before the law is already established as a constitutional fact without this exposition.

One will object then: a general principle is never an independent principle of law, it is only a direction for regulating concrete legal conditions which first must be taken up in specific instances. But even in this purview we do not further anything with a mere statement of 'equality'. For in whatever concrete instances this issue arises, nothing is said by it but the following: as often as the order of rights of a person is recognised, a determination of the person's national adherence is not to be seen as affecting that right, rather the citizen as such is empowered by the right. This principle is a *negative*. What the content of such a right might be is never revealed by it. And thus, it is but a boundary for the legal material given to the State, of what the State may do in relation to the people, and who the people are.

To this one must say: no one in the State has a right to an office beyond the monarch himself. How then can the member of each nation be recognised in their equality, if an individual never has the right to an office? And the question of office is the most important issue of conflict. How can one think about this as a legal determination upon the basis of equality? The majesty of office is the prerogative of the Crown, and remains so despite all nationality battles. Every such legal determination remains to the wish of the Crown, and thus every filling of the offices by ministers and the will of majorities is finally dependent upon that wish. In a similar vein, there are many national points of conflict in which there can be no discussion of what point of law is involved, and thus, no equality can ensue.

And nonetheless am I addressing a legal, legislative regulation?

Another formulation brings up the question of the only international party within the house of representatives – at least the only one with the courage to recognise themselves as such, the Social Democratic Party. The clerical

and Christian Socialist parties, because of the internationality of their opponent, are at least international in this opposition. The Social Democratic Party demands the self-determination of all nations. That is a positive principle, as we will see. This leaves open, indeed avoids, any more proximate explanation of what a juristic person might be, and how the boundary between the self-determination of one's membership in the State as a whole and that of nationality should be drawn.

The most comfortable aspect is the fact that if one ignores the nationalities as being members of a particular crown land, all are legal subjects of the public and private law. But the autonomy of the crown lands is still far removed from meaning the autonomy of nationalities. What that difference is will be taken up below.

How should one regulate the nationality question, centrally or federally, by way of the crown lands or by the course of nationality, if the regulation be one of a legal, legislative kind, should one not ask first: to whom will the right apply, what is the content of that law which gives sanction, what guarantee can exist for inviolability before this law?

If politicians have the necessity of this before them, that the nation as such has a certain legal inherence to state administration, which can be guaranteed and ordered through a language law, then they think this not within the law considered as a material thing, which gives rights and duties to *the citizens of the state*, that is, to natural and juristic persons, but rather as an administrative precept, which empowers *the bureaucratic organs of the government*, conditioning the nature of *certain practices*. These then are regulations in the material sense. One has fought for this path of regulation. Has this then the formal meaning that the legislature alone has the competence to pass such regulation, or is the deeper meaning that here is not only a question of the internal organisation of the office, but also an important interest of individual citizens, indeed the entire nation, comes into consideration? Are not these latter considerations really what are at issue? If yes, then we must admit that national rights are meant, and not clothe our actions in the dress of official offices in their authority and duties. Or, are not the rights of nations guaranteed? What guarantees are there, however, for a legal, official activity, when the exact formulation of a constitutional right of citizens is lacking? Neither a court of law nor an administrative court are competent to decide in this issue (of the nationality right to office). It remains only the responsibility of the ministry. Today, everyone knows that there are no guarantees in the nationality question. One should not deceive oneself that some national right is insured if one lawfully passes a regulation.

A lasting solution is only possible through material laws, that is, through precepts which guarantee a certain content that spells out the subjective, public

rights of state citizens of a distinct nationality, that is, of a nation, not which merely indicate general rules of behaviour for the authorities involved. An exact fixing of the legal subject and the content of such a law is the inescapable juristic preliminary question.

Already with the first formal prerequisite, the establishment of *the legal subject*, we encounter different conceivable questions. One must decide among them. The conception of national membership has been an object of many scientific discussions, especially a difficult subject for the task of statistics. In this regard, the Transactions of the Petersburg International Statistical Congress in 1874, and the reported opinions of Ficker and Keleti are of moment. Three possibilities are at hand, which determine nationality: (1) ethnological characteristics; (2) the native language of the individual; and (3) the language of discourse of everyday life. The Congress decided in favour of the latter out of considerations of expediency, in the light of a statistical conception of the problem.

It is clear that none of these three characteristics suffices for the state-legal regulation of the nationality question. Before we seek a result deductively, we would like to view the matter with an analogy in order to clarify the issue.

Is there an area of the state and societal life that illustrates a kinship with the nationality struggles? This area is not so much chosen because it clarifies the concept, as allowing several conclusions to be drawn: the inter-confessional relations. After hundreds of years, in struggles similar in its phases to the nationality conflicts of today, the inter-confessional question in the modern legal state, if not completely put to rest, has nonetheless a legal compromise. Almost without mutual disturbance, many confessions have their own administration, side-by-side, within the community, the region, and country as a whole. As the content of the confessional and national life and their respective laws are wholly different, and there is a formal separation of these laws, this gives evidence – and only this point is at issue – that between confession and confession, just as between church and state, one can find in it a fruitful analogy.

How is the membership of a confession regulated? Every confession tends to see the membership of an individual to it as unchangeable. Christening, circumcision, and so forth, stamp us with indelible characteristics. As long as the confession makes its decisions within the life of the state, this is a source of continual contradiction and struggle. The state is a secular community, and it cannot be concerned with the mutually exclusive imperatives standpoints of the confessions. It lays its weight upon the right of the individual to freely express their will, but does not support in this right religious-ritualistic acts that create rights in a confessional sense. The adult chooses his confession freely

de jure, the child represented by the parent; the declaration of adherence to the cult satisfies the state. And with justice. The legal order as the common will is expressed everywhere only by the individual will. The expressed will of the person, juristically and naturally, is the soul of a legal existence. All relationships of law take the form of willed relationships. The products of law reveal material and ideational interests as willed acts of the individual. The law applies its imperatives not as pieces of property or buildings. It can only apply the will of persons. To see it otherwise is not possible. The membership to a nationality cannot be decided otherwise than the free declaration of nationality by the individual before the state authority with competence to hear it. This self-determination of the individual builds the correlate of every self-determinative law of the nation. A fall away from the chosen nation of one's adherence may be as distasteful to the ethnic national as a change in religion to the believer. The judgement of such affairs is not a subject of the laws of the state, but rather of the morality of the nation.

Whoever grasps the concept of nation correctly, that is the result of prior scientific investigation, must see what I outline here as incontestable. It is not the place here to track the nationality concept in its development over centuries. I will address that by offering a survey of the literature at the conclusion of this essay. In any case, one of the criteria of a people [*Volk*] is comprised of the language spoken by a people, which is recognised by a constitutional concept of membership to a political system with equal rights, the ethnological belonging to an ethnicity with a constitutional equality given to the characteristics that so define this group, but *a nationality* is to be determined by a spiritual and cultural community with an appreciable national literature that expresses this cultural community. What other criteria can be given for the membership of a spiritual and cultural community than the consciousness of this membership? Not 'the language of origin'. Chamisso, for example, belongs to the spiritual and cultural community of the German nation. The 'language of everyday discourse' should be just as little a consideration of one's nationality. For the Italian emigrant in London remains Italian, whether or not he uses English in his everyday discourse. How should the national consciousness be a consideration for the law other than being conceived of as an expressed intent of nationality?

Certainly, the national life manifests itself chiefly through the language community. But this is not the essential expressional form of national and ethnic-community consciousness. Should the feeling of belongingness among the Slavic nation in Austria be documented by the fact that they speak German, regardless of the extent of their common intercourse attesting to their Slavic identity? I will only add in this regard what Gumplowicz said:

Although one can document his nationality merely by the language which he uses, nevertheless the fact remains that one in regard to such evidence of nationality must differentiate between an active and a passive nationality. Only the educated classes can possess the consciousness of a common national culture whose expression they find among those cultivated in it, in the written language of the culture. The uneducated masses do not possess this consciousness, they are wholly incapable of a true consciousness of nationality, they only have an understanding for a common ethnicity or religious affiliation: the higher the true feeling of nationality which presumes a certain degree of culture is for the uneducated always foreign to them. For them language is the characteristic of local, ethnic, or confessional affiliation: not, however, the expression of a spiritual cultural community. This differentiation explains many manifestations of the public life of the nations, for example, that the national enthusiasm and its strivings everywhere come out of the educated middle-class, and that therefore the common people are at the most *only in tow*. Quite correct is what Eötvös remarked in this regard: ... 'We see that as far as those who stand at the forefront of national movements try to avoid the concept of the people regardless of their claims in their name'.

How true these observations are, especially that of 'being in tow', insofar as Eötvös changed the factual basis of this criticism. Those of the lower class of the people strive today for culture; they knock on the door of the national cultural temple. But their national question sounds quite different from what is the core of the current conflicts. The former are directed towards their own nation, and they desire from it the right of participation in the wealth of its culture. The head of the other manner of expressing nationhood is to address their demands to foreign nations. They are the enemies of other nations, mainly because the ruling groups of their nation are seldom in the mood to open the temple doors of culture to them. With the entry of the proletariat into Austrian politics, the national question is transformed from one of power to one of culture.

What meaning should the explanation of nationality then have in the light of the above considerations? ... Every ethnicity has an inviolable right for the preservation and cultivation of its nationality and language. Rights, moreover inviolable ones, as indicated above, can only be mentioned in relation to a subject of rights. If these rights are violated, only a subject of rights can object. A principle of right that cannot then be complained of, activated, is not a principle of right, but rather a pious wish. If there is to be a right of nationality, it is necessary that the aforementioned explanation of the membership to a nation be established as a legal personal status of the individual, as are

Catholicism, being a Senior, Fatherhood, etc., which are established subjective public laws whose essential content is, in short:

1. The membership in the nation, that is, the authorisation to participate in its cultural products, and the duty to carry its responsibilities, is a claim to the right and the duty to one's own nation. The bourgeois parties see the national question only as a relation between the state and the nation, just as the relationship of nation to nation. Their object of conflict in the forefront is that of a passive right to office. It is just this point that is the least interesting to the masses. On the other hand, the Czech worker, who is disenfranchised by law from any claim or right to review outside of the lands of the crown of Wenceslaus – and there are more than a few of these in Austria – needs to demand as the highest importance that Czech educational associations be established and for his nation to be granted the inestimable protection of the law. But this is also the case for the German officer stationed in a Galician city, where it is important for him in relation to his nation, whose responsibilities he carries, to demand that his children be given instruction in German schools. There are also rights in relation to one's own nation!
2. There must be a legitimising of the right to raise a complaint against individual national differences and foreign nationalities as corporations in the case of one's consideration of national rights, in relation to national persecution and the damage to the individual property in those rights due to national motives. The German who is plundered by the Czech, or the Czech by the German, must have the right of a compensatory claim against the foreign nationality, in cases where a single individual is not to be established, just as an Austrian is not without protection in Austria, or an Englishman in Austria can gain satisfaction diplomatically.
3. There must be a legitimising of the preservation of one's national rights against the state in the case of extension of the state's sphere of authority into the nationality's understood sphere of established rights.

Through the aforementioned points the content of national rights were merely indicated. Here it was only possible to develop schematically the subjective relations that might ensue. But this much is clear, that one must establish the subject of rights with juristic characteristics if one wishes to regulate the relations of rights in nationality questions in a legal manner in all matters of the conflict over nationality rights. It is thus that quality of status, this subjective public right of the individual, which is unavoidable for a juristic prerequisite for a legal solution to the problem. Whether one should employ the aforemen-

tioned explanation for existing membership, or one's own manner of national identification in school matriculation, is chiefly a question of expediency.

The chief problem is the organisation of an ethnicity as a juristic person. One cannot solve the nationality question if one avoids this decisive issue, instead substituting the crown lands as the topic instead of the nation, as has been done for fifty years. Or one could prove to begin with that from the autonomy of the crown lands, a peace between the nations could securely follow. As long as the proof is not brought forward, a greater or lesser decentralisation of the state and provincial administration should not become the site for the language question. It is self-evident that both questions are in extremely close relation to each other. But for a theoretical perspective the two must not be interchanged at a certain point as objects of investigation. If the nationalities are not mere squabbling parties, not political ruffians, but rather important, even peaceful, factors of law, then one must want them to be like all creations of legal life, born as legal persons, and not tolerate that the crown lands be laid as bastards on the scale. It would be quite different if the nationalities determined certain crown lands to be what they are, merely territorial districts and nothing further, where they live, where they call home.

There are fatalists – and their number in Austria today is frighteningly large – who maintain that any attempt to forestall the almost certain disintegration of the Empire is useless. They overestimate the number of those who participate without measure in the nationality questions, because they are led astray by the electoral system and its results, as well as the loudness of the daily cries concerning the issues, and do not see how they can break this hawser. Then, again, it is to be feared that the crisis will be neglected in the genuine Austrian manner. But today it should no longer be an issue of one or two languages on the street sign and similar quarrels. It should also not be an issue of the prospects to office of those who are members of the German, Czech, or Polish higher and middle classes; rather it should be an issue concerning the organisation and reconstruction of Austria in consequence of its complete disorganisation. An Austria is to be created where all nationalities govern and administrate themselves, each taking care of their own affairs, and yet all together in a commonwealth. And if there is a law of organic development in which the common organism provides for each special function a particular organ, then the people as a unified state is that organic whole in its material and social interests, and the nations are the cultural and spiritual communities that serve the special functions as particular organs. Do we not live in the time of the differentiation of law according to social and cultural interest groups? From out of the body of the bourgeois book of laws have we not cut out the rights of commerce and exchange, mining rights, rights of the sea, workers' rights, the

rights of industry? Agriculture calls for its own rights. Everywhere there is the development of certain groups and group law. And for the being of our state, are not the most important groups the nationalities, who in terms of laws are the transcendent children of nature, who are fitted out in the civilian garb of constitutional law?

Therefore, be gone the forms without motivating force, and in their place the organised nations!

Alone – isn't this just a phrase as all others? Are we not just misrepresenting the nationality principle? Isn't what is essential to this principle the development of national states? Hasn't the history of the nineteenth century irrefutably shown that the tendency of the development of national states has been the strongest developmental factor? Is there a form for the organisation of nationalities other than the separate state? This brings us to the relationship between state and nation.

It is not our intention to examine the many differing definitions of the state here. It suffices to give its most essential characteristics: the state is a sovereign corporate area. Necessary conceptual requisites are: (1) a population; (2) the organisation of the same, so that they do not remain a mere aggregate of individuals, but rather, instead of simply individual goals, a common goal is established, whose organs contribute to the development of a *collective will* and the organs that can call forth its realisation. This group will is not concealed behind individual wills of those who belong to the state, but is also not a *general will*; otherwise, it would not need a forceful imposition against any resistance. It is the expression of the will of the *present ruling interest group*; (3) this collective will is sovereign; (4) exclusive rule of this sovereign corporation over an area.

The nation, however, is a cultural community. What elements are covered by the concepts of state and nation? Chiefly, the first element. The nation is a community of individuals. But it is not a *societas*; rather a communion. For the individual element is not a collective will; the commonality lies, at least first and conceptually, not in the realm of the will, but rather in thought and feeling, as well as in the expressions of *thought and feeling*: it is in the national literature that this unity is incorporated. It concerns quite another side of the human being. There where the will remains out of consideration, there is no ruling sovereign will, rather only dominating directions of thought and feeling. Only from these are national differences generated. National consciousness has no necessary relationship to any specific area of life.

Where then do we place the nationality principle, which Mancini, Napoleon III, and others have formulated, which is given a special existence by the state as a national community, that is afforded a national collective will, sovereignty, and command of an area?

It is explained from the existence of the state and the nation. The state lives through the law: its life exists in the development of the collective will, which subjects the individual under its legal imperative. But the translation of the collective into the individual, and the individual into the collective will, does not occur automatically as a force of nature; rather it is the medium of persons: in order to be effective, the collective will must take on the expression of language, this in itself is applied through the powers of human understanding, that is, through the understanding of the necessity and efficacy of norms. The fruitlessness of a resistance to them is a motive for the will of the individual, and represents here all the others, which out of the common thinking and feeling life results in the shared motives. And the relative strength of all these motives is decisive for the decision to act. First, in this circuitous way, the state and legal order regulate and determine personal behaviour. Whether or not a legal norm is effective does not emerge from this alone, but rather from the whole of all facts of knowledge and feeling.

The primitive state of the Middle Ages had few tasks, moreover, it did not stand in an immediate relation to the entirety of the people, but rather only to the patrimonial aristocracy, a small, shrinking part of the whole people. It had but little, with few people, to realise an agreement over. Today the *factual relationships* of persons have become enormously complicated. The most competent national economist can hardly see all of the economic relationships. And all these factual relationships are regulated by the state, which makes them into *legal relationships*. There is a specific designation for each of them. The legal *terminology* alone is a system that can hardly be mastered. In this form, the state command is met by every individual. It demands a high mental and cultural niveau if it is to be integrated into a national culture. It demands an advanced national life. On the other hand, it can only affect the individual through its national cultural means of communication. In order to live in a state, the ethnicity with its undeveloped idiom of nation must be informed through its national literature or enter into such a nation. The state, in order to affect a nation, must avail itself of the national cultural means of communication.

The simplest conclusion from this is: state and nation must coincide with one another, and then the machinery of state must overcome any small resistances between them.

The nation on its side is a community of thinking and feeling life, that is, a purely internal phenomenon. The thinking and feeling occurs together through expression and communication, through the national language, these thoughts and feelings occurring in us not without cause. They are the reflexes of external events, especially those of human activity. In nearly all relationships these are

regulated today by the state, legally determined. National sentiments are above all influenced by the organisation of the state. The more independent the order of the state is from national sentiment, the more endangered is national life, and therefore the more hindered it is in its development.

The simplest conclusion from this is: nation and state must coincide with one another, then the nation has the least obstruction to its development.

These two conclusions help build the nationality principle, and they are undoubtedly correct.

How is it then that in reality the state and the nation never completely coincide? Because it is clear that the state has other tasks than guaranteeing the best possible national culture. Such tasks are so much more important to the state that the above frictions and resistances to development are tolerated in order to achieve other goals. The state's order of laws is, as stated above, an expression of the will of every ruling interest group. These interests are chiefly of a material nature, and are common to the ruling classes of all nations. As all material things, they exist in space and are realisable within a definite territory. Therefore, the state is unthinkable without an exclusive domination of territory. The state's development of territory is dominated by the spheres of material interest of the ruling groups of the state. The state and the area of the state are inseparable, the nations, however, intermingle within the area in which they follow their material interests; the struggle for existence swirls around them. The nation conceptually is not an incorporated area.

From this follows: the arguments of the nationality principle go too far, because they are an attempt to vindicate the rights of the state by dint of the nation, while, in fact, the highest authority of the area and of the culture, in itself, lies outside the sphere of national life. Where the nationalities in an area are divided clearly from one another, the machinery of the state is much simpler because the highest authority can be exercised by the same organism. Where differing, small nations are thrown together, whose area alone is neither sufficiently demarcated nor great enough to encompass them, in order to offer the ruling groups a sufficient material basis, the original relation between state and nation must be re-established, and a system of differentiated organs be created for the separate societal functions.

In this sense, the state and the nation are opposites of the same kind as the state and the society in general. The state is a *legal command of territory*, the society a *factual association of persons*. This is a contradiction that has always played a meaningful role in the developmental history of human society. The community of ancient times was one of a blood relationship of personal association. The necessity of the sojourn, the nomadic life, disallowed any fixed

relation to one area. These groups could not have a state, as they had no fixed abode. The great oriental monarchies, the Roman Imperial lands, were the first great territorial realms of authority, the first states in the modern sense, only with this difference, that the ruling interest groups were initially a nation, not an economic class. Those who were conquered were slaves or peregrine *dedicii*, and thus found a lower place within the law, or they might be taken up as citizens of the state. In place of the Roman Empire, the German, much like the Arabian, people's states emerged, based upon ethnicity. In these states, for the first time, there was manifested the situation where the conquered ethnicities maintained their law and language, just as the victors; two legally divided peoples lived within a unified area. In this, nonetheless, only one ethnicity is politically empowered. The Carolingian Empire unified at its inception many ethnicities without removing, repressing, or limiting their national law, language or characteristic life to one definitely bordered area. One economic class ruled, the large landowner, not the ethnicity as a whole; the Imperial provinces maintained their national law, even when they lived under Bavarians or Frieslanders, as did the Franks, Alemanns, or the Chamavi under the Romans. Before a judge ruled in a conflict of law, he asked: 'Quo jure vivis?' ('By what law do you live?'). Then the parties gave their national explanation. Now the judge knew by which law he had to judge. This was the so-called *Personality Principle*. Under this rule within the Carolingian Empire, ten nations lived together not only with differing national languages, but also with differing laws.

In place of this, the modern state erects *the territorial principle*: if you live in my area, you are under my rule, my laws, my language! It is the expression of domination, not of equality: the rule of the inhabitants over the emigrants, by those of property who wish to maintain it over those without property who must follow whatever is called for, at least that of the majority over the minority, or, in some cases, the settled minority over the majority. From this arises the battles over territories by the national states, and out of that the area politics of the nationalities within the state. Therefore we see the Young Czechs who want the constitutional right of territory possessed by the crown of Wenceslaus, because it would insure their rule over minorities, we see the Young Germans who want the independence of the former German lands, excluding Galicia and Dalmatia, thereby Young German constitutional law, because the majority of the Germans will be insured. The territorial principle can never arrive at compromise or equality; it can only bring war and repression with it, as its very essence is this domination.

The nation as a whole wins nothing by this domination: in consequence of the internal moves of persons and internal economic contacts between wide-

-ranging areas of the populace, no nation can be limited to any narrowly-drawn area. All national elements who have left their own homelands – be it another country, or, in Austria's case, one's own native 'homeland' within the state – are thus foreigners, and without rights. Consequently, those who argue for the constitution must admit that a Czech in Vienna has no right to exercise his nationality. The territorial principle involves the heedless sacrifice of the individual, the relentless domination of foreign minorities in favour of the long-settled property-owning classes. It fuses national thinking with patrimonial ideas, and thus it is in many ways anti-national.

In the intercourse between sovereign states, in the laws of the people there are, to be sure, certain protections against the territorial principle. The Englishman has the diplomatic protection of his fatherland; he may use English writing on the door of his shop in Prague, he may speak English there on the streets, as it pleases him. He is despite that a foreigner. The German-Austrian in Prague is, however, without rights, for he is on Czech territory. He may not speak German, may not have a German sign on his shop, otherwise he is prey to the threat of maltreatment or even robbery. To whom should he complain? The Czech ethnicity? This is, however, not a juristic person! It is noteworthy that this nation, the whole of Austria, has held its breath for the last three decades over this issue, there is no legal life for the national, only a metaphysical, transcendental image. That is naturally also the conceptual reality for the German in relation to the Czech, the Pole in relation to the Ruthenian, and so forth. In a word: every Austrian nationality is more protected in a foreign country than within its own, where he can be a foreigner more here in his own land than abroad, because the internal state life offers no remedy against the territorial principle, because no one of a nation is protected, because no one can protect them other than through repression, through revenge. That is a condition of a coming or actual civil war.

From that arises the necessity to constitute nationalities, to fit them out with rights and responsibilities, and to affirm: that everyone who belongs to a nation enjoys in theory all parts of the realm – to be explained more fully below – enjoys the protection of his nation and carries its burdens and responsibilities. In short: the Personality Principle, not the Territorial Principle, is to be the basis of regulation, the nations are not to be constituted as corporate areas, rather as personal associations, not as states, rather as peoples, not according to the legendary constitutional laws, rather by living laws of the people. Naturally, no people can exist without a territory; it cannot be independent of the place in which the divisions of the people can internally constitute themselves. If the principle of personality is the constitutive rule whereby the division of nationalities occurs, whereby the individual is

conceived, the territorial principle will still have a meaningful role as an organisational principle.

If one will assert from the outset the impossibility of this conception, however, one must keep the following in view: first, the personality principle raises not only the formal issue of language, but also the entire body of laws for public and private life – in a scope it appears today to be not practicable – yet in the life of the Franks, in their Empire, it ruled, and made possible the mutual life of many nationalities. Secondly, this system of laws will be valid for all foreigners, the so-called Franks in the Orient, and not only in matters of language, but also in criminal and private law. And for the majority, neither the legal order of the Carolus Magni nor that of the conditions of Oriental law will be commanded of them in particulars. Thirdly, this principle is already with us, and in all highly-civilised lands in the full purity of its validity, in our institutional developments that hold sway with almost unshakeable power over the minds of the people, with a living power that no one will dispute, *that is, in the religious societies*.

In one and the same community are two, often three, confessions represented, which constitute – or at least should constitute – a publically legal corporation, the cult community, having their own authoritative leadership, their own powers, having institute for instruction and social welfare, and administering their offices and business within the state themselves, conferring authority to circles of influence (the ability to take in members), as well as to situate offices territorially, the parsonage areas, deaconates, dioceses, etc. Many, such as the Catholic, reach over the globe in their authority, but in personal, not territorial, unions. Here one may find the formula for the problem: Give to the Emperor that which is the Emperor's (the state), and to God what is God's! Following this, one can see, for example, in Lemberg, three archbishops residing – one Catholic, one of the Protestant Union Church, and one of another Protestant expression – without any of them or their membership getting into each other's hair. Certainly, that was not always the case. At that time when the motto applied 'cuius regio, illius religio', a purely territorial concept (today one would say 'cuis region, illius lingua') confessional hatred covered the land. From centuries-long wars one has finally learnt that it will not work for the church to take on state functions, or for the state to take on church functions. Immediately, with this lesson, as the highest state authorities took over territorial areas and left the cult authority to itself; when that occurred, conceptually that meant: a personal association of believers, just as the nation is a personal association of those who think alike and express themselves alike.

By this understanding, the territorial principle is not turned upon itself and declared invalid, quite the contrary. It is still the formula for constituting the

national state: the national state means, as recognised in the above argument, the organisation of the state which enables the least abrasive internal obstruction, which by nature is the necessary ideal of every nation, or at least, those divisions of a nation which correspond to an active nationality. Here is a conceivable manner of a solution to the national question.

But this is not a formula for a solution to the Austrian nationality question within the framework of what has been historically given, for an economic and social unity necessary for the Austrian state. For the national territorial state does not here eliminate nationality conflicts, but rather creates and intensifies them: it does not help them to resolve their differences on the path of law, but rather decides them through the path of power; it makes possible the expansion of the conflict, indeed war, risking also loss and its own decline. The quiet, secure enjoyment of national rights, the conflict-free development of a multi-linguistic, unified, constitutional state, it can never guarantee. What it is now, a territorial-based state, cannot solve the Austrian problem, it can only lead to the dissolution of Austria. The example of Hungary teaches us that no legal association of the people can hinder a final separation.

No matter how rigorously the conceptual division can and must be carried out, such as in the Hungarian situation, the facts themselves do not stand in an irreconcilable opposition: a compromise of both principle parties must be arrived at in the face of the possible armistice between the Germans and the Czechs. This will be as long lasting and favourable the nearer it adheres to the personality principle. It will be impossible on a territorial basis.

Austria does not tolerate territorial rights of the state, none for the Czechs in the lands of Wenceslaus, and none for the German in the former German provinces of Austria, it also tolerates no state party, and no imposed state language. Just as confessional discord would burn anew as soon as one confession played the role of a state religion, so too would any state language be a perennial source of quarrel. Just as nations are constituted and organised now to exclude national majorities under law, repression of others by these majorities, as well as national consecrations into the way of these majorities through control of schooling, so too the Slavic people, where once compelled by the Germans into ways of common life historically and economically that favoured the German, are compelled to find mutual understanding only through the German language. The German language was employed everywhere people had to understand one another. One should not make a law that compels mutuality. This will occur without compulsion, by necessity.

The internal divisions of nationality must follow the population size of a place: the co-nationals of a local or regional diocese constitute *a national community*, which then is a private and public corporation with procedural

and assessment laws, and has its own powers of authority. A geographically and culturally related number of communities constitute *a national district* [*Kreis*], which all have the same corporate laws. The totality of districts constitutes a nation. The nation is also the legal subject of public and private law.

The administrative carrying out of this organisation is neither difficult nor costly: one must only fulfill a mandatory declaration of one nationality, a duty of all adult citizens to be made before the appropriate political authority of first instance, the entering of one's declaration in a document of national matriculation, the establishment of the communities and districts by national representatives, the determination of the vote in the three representative bodies (community, district, and national assemblies), and then their constituting. And now we would have the nationalities as such: each one represented by its own, according to its own internal development and its factual power: *everyone a majority in one area, and a minority in another*, not having thereby to sacrifice their unity of nationhood; each not able to repress minorities because the minority would answer the persecution with its own entire nation, and therefore all nations would be prepared for compromise with each other: every nationality would be engaged in an internal consolidation, a closer association among the economically different, opposing classes, demanding their own schools, considering what was their national literature and their national art: every woman belonging to this effort, every woman her own means of articulation. Who now would doubt that the national struggle towards others would be exhausted, rather now becoming internal and in greater depth?

Nothing can realise its own specific effects if it does not have its full authority. If one would solve the nationality question, then listen to the *nations*! Make them free of political constellations, from the necessity of the deceptive business of politics, from feudal and clerical influences, one should call on them as they are, so that they do not have to come forward in the masquerade of gilded masks, frightening one another. The living have rights and will protect their rights.

If one does not choose this form of solution, there is only the other. There is only this dilemma: the Personality- or the Territorial Principle. One must decide one way or the other. I believe the problem would be clearer if one worked out the possibilities from each opposing point-of-view. The question is not: centralisation or autonomy. One can solve the national question in terms of the personal association with the tightest centralisation or with the most wide-ranging autonomy. There can be a centralisation of legislation, and the administration can be decentralised. It is even possible to unify individual necessary legislation and administrative requirements, allowing other measures to be taken care of

within the regional lands. How one should divide things is to be determined by the nature of the state goals and the means of state. Even in these points one can never achieve perfection as long as one conflates the centralisation question with the nationality question.

Principles are seldom carried out purely in practice. When one is able to bring one consideration into a regulation, one must often make certain concessions towards the second. But every combination of these two has the consequence of the sacrifice of the minority, and the consequential effect that must be considered of the disruption of the process. The building of a community of persons can only be accomplished through the considerations of person, not through a division of geographical character. There remain unsatisfied segments of the people; there remain points of conflict. The fire is localised, but not put out. The pure territorial principle is – aside from the question as to whether it can be realised in Austria – the most inhuman and ineffective solution. It subjugates the many levels of foreign nationalities to favour or disfavour, and compels them to battle. It is the system of ceaseless brawling, the eternal conflict over who possesses what.

That the constituting of nations is difficult is a given. Yet the difficulty lies in the peculiar manner of our state organisation. Does one believe that a solution would be easy? The rules for the realisation are not a utopian effort.

The Czech and the German constitutional programmes – as I briefly characterise the German radical programme – aside from the fact they cannot solve the national question, rather only declare it as permanent, are the worst kind of Utopia, since they are Utopias of the past, which will always remain unrealisable.

The greatest Utopia, however, is the hope of the Germans for the 'Empire'. What role should our weak industries play in the German empire, since, despite the tariff, they are hardly comparable to the German. What would our intelligentsia, our bureaucracy, which in the battle over the putative, minority-rights of the ethnicities create such difficulties, mean to the Germans? Instead of a Habsburg land in the foreground, we would have become the hinterland for the Hohenzollerns. And has one forgotten about the Bohemian politics of the Prussians since 1866? The fate of northern Bohemia would be put into question. There remains still the idea of Czech lands, the Bo-Russian lands, and so forth. What was possible in 1848 is today no more. One thinks of the freedom and the internal movement in modern intercourse, on the huge tasks of the economic administration of a country. In feudal times, it was possible to administer a separated area and regional lands with even the strangest configurations as unified territories, and small states were conceivable. Will one compound the dualistic misery in its details into infinity?

One cannot take apart the land and put it back together at will. The territory is an immovable, dead factor. It is easier to bring together living individuals in the light of the more developed means of social intercourse for a solution. We have associations and parties, which stretch across the lands of the realm. Economic and cultural interests unify the inhabitants with each other from the most widely separated districts and regions. The individual has become more independent from his geographical situation: the patrimonial division yields to the social, the geographical basis of association to the spiritual. Of all the possibilities, the personal association is the least utopian.

If the initial question of the subject of rights is solved, then the content of the right can be addressed, that is, the national rights of this rights-subject; then, national assemblies can be created whose authority articulates what agendas are taken up by the state, and what is transferred to them as areas of competence in which they can legislate and administer practically: then, it can be explained in which proportion the state administration is national, and which must be international, with regard to the nationalities.

How then from the endless series of societal and state tasks are we to find, in an exhaustive manner, those that touch upon national interests? What should be considered as a national interest and elevated through legal guarantee to a 'national right' of a division of the people and the people as a whole? What can serve us in this question as a heuristic principle?

Politically considered, the nationality struggle of the ethnicities is for an authoritative influence in the state. The goal of the struggle is the *factual* power of the national parties over the legislation of the state and its administration. There is no reason in this actuality then to treat the national struggles other than as constitutional within the activity of these parties. The factual power of a party lies beyond the area of law. As power is never without the one who exercises it, the struggle between the parties arises from this. In the constitutional state, it follows that through principles and practical proposals, the adherents for a position are won for a majority over the opposition. If the parties are national, these means of battle are excluded. By that, the struggle is not eliminated; rather it is made more bitter. One must find naturally and necessarily other means than what has occurred in the Austrian Parliament: yet if we eschew these, the *ultima ratio* that remains besides the party wars are the streets.

If one will continue these wars *usque ad finem* 'to the bitter end', then it suffices to allow the national parties to maintain national rights by this political path, then a judicial regulation is not necessary. If one wishes to do this, they cannot have any other goal than the state guarantee of the unrestricted enjoyment of determinative exercise of power, which is limited in relation to the influence of state power for the other parties.

Factual power must become legal. The political problem then becomes juristic. The factual influence upon state power must become a legal participation by the highest authorities of the state. The jurist solves this within the well-recognised schema of authority. Let us examine the facts of the matter with regard to how much we allow the state to participate in the matter of the nation; in doing that, we must give an exhaustive, juristically clear overview of the rights of nationalities. We will transform the political programme into juristic categories, just as any political party programme, preparing the possible coming-to-power of the party, so that there are principles of law to be taken up in juristic clothing; if not capable of that now, the determination is there to be applied. We desire this kind of debate over the state and the nation. And this is the crux of the problem. I cannot conceive any other juristic conception of this.

In Austria, the state authorities are divided between the empire as a whole and the provincial lands. Let us suppose that this division remains in place, only a part of the sovereignty rights be given to the nations, thus, one might have the following areas of competence: the state as a whole, the territorial and the national legislation; the state administration, the territorial and the national self-administration. In a more detailed execution:

1. The legislation by the state as a whole: a central parliament with universal authority, nonetheless limited through the demands of a qualified majority that can extend in a determined, finite manner a certain competency. A two chamber system: the second chamber that comes from a general election of the people, the first chamber from the representatives of the nationalities and the territories – a state-wide administration: the ministerial system having obligatory economic advisory councils.

The Austrian upper house, the first chamber, is the most visible sign of the unified state on this side of the Leitha. In accord with its rules, we summon to it the represented realms of the kings and the provincial lands. The interests that constitute the state as well as other associated factors must be authorised here, more so than anywhere else. Then, the same power that overcame the problem of the many small states in Germany must conquer the problem of the multi-language state – that is, universal suffrage. Here the entirety of the state, the people as a political-social concept, not the nationalities, must have the last word. Here should be the ground for the struggle over economic and social interests. Here all the nations are together and more powerful in that unity than all purely national sentiments. This body unifies all the Austrian ethnicities, which are economically dependent upon each other.

2. Territorial legislation: one chamber, the national registration of the territories is through the voting rolls. The national communities, as they relate to the districts [*Kreise*] are election districts. The Personality Principle *automatically solves the question of minority representation and the separated voting curia*.

In my view, these institutional suggestions are merely the means to realise the Personality Principle. They grasp the people in terms of their opinions and interests, not by territorial election districts. The representative is no longer a feudal lord with his *patrimonium*, together with his *glebae adscriptus*, but rather one who is separated from such a basis of soil, with his own dynamic interests.

Proportional election, representation of minorities accordingly, and a curial vote are in national matters incompletely realisable forms of thought, because they seek to realise the national interests merely through the election and order of business of the representative body. They therefore can insure the nations a legal influence only through legislation, not through the administration (in our provincial legislatures it is different in such matters), and this insurance is in itself limited.

For a right is only complete when those for whom it is intended and exists can consciously take it up and exercise it, and when the person's invulnerability in its exercise is guaranteed by the law. The above three means of protection – i.e. through the elective processes to the respective legislative assemblies – are formal protections, but do not give material rights to the individual, they do not give fixed legal guarantees to members of the nation; their validity, insofar as legislation is concerned, is in the will of those elected or those who do the electing, and the legal protection in elective orders and the orders of business in the assemblies is the most renowned uncertainty in the world.

To be sure, these legislative accomplishments, as immediate announcements of what is the law, are of the highest value. Their meaning will nonetheless become clearer when one sees the implications of their fundamental rationale. Then we will be preserved from the error that the formal act of a language law is the solution to the question of nationalities.

Territorial Self-Administration: collegial administration through the restricted, proportionally elected provincial land assembly.

- 3 *National Legislation*: the national assembly elected upon the basis of declared nationality, the national communities in their relation to the districts [*Kreise*] are electoral districts. – *National self-administration*: collegial

administration through a restricted national assembly: executing organs of the national district and community assemblies.

In single language areas, a broad cession by state and national agendas to the territorial self-administrative bodies, in mixed-language areas, on the other hand, cession by the state and territorial agendas to the *national* self-administrational bodies as a transferred area of competence. And, for praxis, this is the most important point. In this way, one can avoid unnecessary overlays of authoritative bodies. The entire new organisation represented in *one language* areas is but an increase of the self-administrative authority. In mixed-language areas it means a completely new creation: as individual cities of a province had two communities, one Christian and the other Jewish, so *in mixed-language* areas both nationalities have their own communities, which as national communities take care of all the agendas transferred to their competence by the state and territorial authorities as their own area of activity. The business of the *political* community, the *political* district, are distributed, in part, to these national communities, in respect of the business normally conducted by the district assembly, and, in part, through the unified college of both nationalities, under the oversight of the state functionaries.

According to a system so organised by these principles, the most wide-ranging administration can be executed, so that the state in most of its functions is represented to the citizen in his own language, so that even in mixed-language areas every person can remain a national in his everyday transactions. To be sure, this possible system is unusual when compared to the existing practice, that is, in one branch of government to have two offices that perform the same function, where the dual competencies are organised by the nationality. Still, in this, we are not able to let ourselves loose in constitutional law from the patrimonial perspective that a government office is an area whose members – unfortunately for the bureaucrats – are people. Within these offices of the branch concerned, all business that concerns the social and constitutional issues of the people, as well as those cases in which both nations stand over against each other as affected parties, are given to the unified college, so it is not easy then to see why such a basis of the division of competencies cannot be so executed. Yes, such a transfer of authority from the state to the national administrative bodies can only be completed step-by-step, and such a programme is in the distant future. But the cadres can be formed as soon as the entire administration of the people is taken up in this manner, and that is the most pressing task before us.

When we have these three great circles of competency – that of Austria as a state in its legislative and administrative competencies, the territorial bodies

of law and administration, and the national bodies of law and administration – they will be as channels in which the stream of social and national life flow, yet there will remain one question, the most important and most difficult: what concrete affairs are of the state as a whole, which are territorial, and which are national? Which constitute the content of these circles of competency? The infinitely great number of state agendas to examine one by one, and in accord with their efficacy for concrete economic and cultural needs for this or that organ to take up, is only possible for the statesman, politician, or representative of these economic and cultural interests. It is the task of such a one to govern the state, not those who are philosophers in the way of Plato. The jurist is also not a politician in this needed vein. His task is that given a political postulate to cast it in a legal form so that a political slogan that appeals to the emotion can be de-clothed and translated into the naked relations of willing subjects.

Nevertheless, I will try to find the general criteria that differentiate affairs of the entire state from those affairs that relate mostly to the national matters, and take up several significant national questions by making them capable of being examined with *legal* regulation. In that, the theoretician can only follow the aforementioned methodology. All practical-political efforts strived towards a legal establishment of their ideal goal. One can only contribute to the understanding and clarity of daily politics when one leads political postulates to the corresponding categories of constitutional law.

Those common interests among individuals whose realisation is the goal of the state, must correspond to distinct state legal authority:

1. The interest of the commonwealth as a unity must also be represented as a unity, and recognised as such. Corresponding to these interests is *the representative authority, the authority of the representative assembly* [*Repräsentativhoheit*]. This state function is for internal and external matters. It is obvious that the nations have this interest of unity, and that in the framework of the state as a totality, in the representative assembly, each nationality must address the other, as well as its own members.

Here one sees already that the most advantageous method to make possible for us this need directly is what the nationalities have instinctively followed in the existing national assembly, although the political parties are more or less clear about their intentions. The Polish Club, the Czechs, the Southern Slavs, etc. seek to build a unified party in the Upper House [*Reichsrathes*], the Germans call, on the other hand, for a community of all citizens: the nationalities wish to be represented as a unity in all nationality concerns, while in the economic contradictions, which are more powerful than the nationality matters, they are

divided. Therefore, the most developed, the strongest nationality always has the weakest national representation because within it the economic classes are the most differentiated. Therefore, the political party of the nation can never replace what it lacks: the representative authority. The latest destiny of the Germans proves this clearly. In the common German representation, the Clerical Party and the Christian Social Party had to enter with separate, strongly articulated positions, or their separate votes would have destroyed their majority – and with that themselves. A measure against the Bohemian-Moravian Germans would from the beginning seem directed against the entire German nation. One should have considered that carefully. A party, which has distinct economic interests, defending them with courage, can only see national matters obliquely [*durch die Finger*]. So it is with politicians of the middle-classes or politicians of the proletariat. For all these reasons, a political party does not constitute a sufficient replacement for a national representative authority.

2. The interests of the commonwealth can marshal the physical force of each person for the powerful execution of the will of the state, in relation to both domestic and foreign affairs. The *military authority* is its prerogative. The nation as a cultural community would need such means as a necessary helping medium only if their cultural demands were unconstitutionally denied. In that sense the religious associations suffice themselves with the right to *brachium saeculare*, the exercise of secular force against the threat of the state.
3. The interests of the commonwealth are that their members live with one another in peace. This corresponds to the authority of justice. To take this away from the state is presently an aspiration of the nationalities.
4. There is an interest of the commonwealth that certain of the dangers to the well-being of the community be warded off by their authority (police authority) and the welfare of the individual (Welfare policing, Cultural authorities). The first can be realised solely by the state, but the latter only with the concurrence of the state and the nation. The division of these spheres of interest is given according to the nature of the state and the nature of the nationality: the first provides the material, the latter the spiritual culture. The nations require schools, art, and literature. However, since the educational development of the nationalities have material culture as a prerequisite, the state must guarantee the nations an educational minimum for all stages of their educational institutions, also guaranteeing the minimum of the necessary means for the power of less developed nations; finally, the state leaves the schooling completely to the nations, whose concern it is to make their own adjustments to the confessions that may have their own demands.

5. The interests of the commonwealth in the consequence of the above four primary interests demand material means to relate to and realise them. The financial authority is the proper authority in this respect. The nations need access to this authority. How many conflicts are occasioned today because no nation is the master of its own means. If the Bohemian provincial state assembly subvenes a Czech theater, a Czech school, the Germans raise a cry: 'Out of our sack of taxes our enemies feed!' Every nationality at times sees itself at a disadvantage. Build each a national theatre and school, as many as you will – the more, the better – but everyone should pay for themselves. Just here can the division based upon the Personality Principle make the greatest contribution.

For the realisation of the above five interests, the commonwealth needs means of power and the ultimate authority, which can provide the means for those ends. These means of power are:

1. The territorial authority able to authorise judgements for the commonwealth in the specific settled area. This is the least essential element to the concept of nationality. The nationality does not need this authority for its development – as indicated above; it remains fully in the competence of the state. But for the internal state and national organisation, the fact that an area is settled chiefly by a certain nationality is of the highest importance. National rights are to be completely applied in those areas where historically and factually the nations are primarily situated; their representation in the legislative and administrative bodies by proportion of the numbers of their population. The Czechs may consider all the lands of the Wenceslaus crown as their home, and enjoy complete rights there, but even beyond those lands they are not without power or rights: the Germans are in the former German federal lands at home (for according to the Personality Principle, one area can be the home of *two* ethnicities), but in Galizia and Dalmatia they are guests, not foreigners or enemies. In this point, among the constituted nations an understanding is possible and necessary: for every nationality has other nationalities in their dominant area, and has their own in the areas dominated by other nationalities. They must recognise the rights of others in order to have rights themselves among others. If the German nation as a whole considers the right of the Czechs to have a Czech school in Vienna, rather than merely the Viennese City Council, it will then be able to consider the necessary trade-off needed for a German school to be established in Prague, which could not be accomplished merely by the Prague Germans, in their diminishing strength.

2. The highest authority of decision-making in essential matters concerning the national communal areas is the state. Whether the nation in its exercise of the financial authority may exercise the final authority depends upon whether they are authorised to participate directly or indirectly in such a decision.
3. The authority of the Personality Principle over the individuals belongs to the national community. Finally, in the last instance, this is the authority of the state in its means of such exercise. With its power, the state can allow or forbid individuals in any matter, controlling their participation or even arresting them. This authority must be maintained by the state for final justice and system of laws.

Even for the nationalities this is the most important, indeed the only, final protection of their interests. They need the state in all their national matters. *De jure*, however, the highest authority for matters of nationality is the Personality Principle.

Through that the state can only command the individual in his or her language so that he or she can understand whether or not this order should be obeyed. From this one derives the conclusive principle: the authority of the Personality is within all national matters that of the nation, but in all other matters *de jure* of the state. *The exercise of all matters of state regarding its national populations, however, is transferred under these legal conditions from the state to the nation*: the national self-administrative bodies collect the direct taxes, administer the recruitment needed for public concerns, and so forth. The nations make public the proclamation of all the laws of the state and the rules and announcements of state public offices; they protect the rights of all nationalities in their competence. The Czech nation in Vienna and the German nation in Prague jointly exercise this competence for their co-nationals with the aid of translators. In short, the state-supported personality will in all cases be the principle by which the appropriate national bodies exercise the competences transferred to them by the state: the individual person, as well, has the legally protected right to bring actions with the help of his nation, even where they must interact with the state authorities of another nationality. What a rich, fecund internal effectiveness for the nationalities!

4. The authority of the bureau is the right to entrust individuals with the representation of the common interests.

The nationality question, as our analysis has evidenced, contains the core issues of the language conflicts in Austria. Yet in our land these natural relations

in their broad significance are not clearly taken up. We are shy in looking directly at the facts as they are, instead we construct a system of a broken prism, which projects a distorted image of what matters on to the wall, which we then take as the reality; guided by this distorted image, we take a brush in order to paint this image so as to communicate with others, thereby generating a message that conveys only that distortion. The great social issues of the time govern the facts so strongly that they are 'broken up' in their perception; one only sees to the left a small 'red' striping. The interests of industry, which generate the greatest concern for our people as here they earn their living, appears upon the spectrum of light cast by this distorted prism as a pale blue mist of a shadowy character. The honorable shopkeepers and such people, the general stores, and boutiques with their weak flames of understanding create the great effects of light across the spectrum: a single great Jewish nose. All is otherwise dark: the reflection of 5,000 large landowners of the monarchy and their spiritual advisors. This spectrum is mirrored by our public opinion. If one is enraged by the colour nuances, one takes a blue pencil and crosses out the party opinion that offends one – oh, now it is better!

One has put the blame upon others for our political conditions with imperative mandates that really have no legal basis. The facts raised are comparable in their questionability. But what one now prosecutes is just what one has willed: the representative clamours for his mandate and the interests of the narrow body of the electorate that he represents, even though this may drive the state to tatters. These will be the fruits of his representation of interests: thus he has willed what he receives!

There is no representative anywhere in the world that does not represent an interest. But the representative of a general electoral district, who will represent its dominant interests, must nevertheless not be blind to its other interests, those of the election district's minorities. For just as he may place the individual interests of a certain group of the populace higher than the whole, the opposing minority, similarly, will obstruct the majority. In its internal affairs, the ruling interests must always seek compromises with others: the advantage of egotism must give way in all these affairs – barring an effective use of deception upon all the people – to the direction of the common interest. How, however, can a representative achieve this when all he represents is his single, narrow interest? For he stands and falls with this interest, there is no compromise, for he sees only a battle for victory or defeat! Is not our parliamentary history for the past two decades nothing other than an uninterrupted rooting out of all those who do not see the representation of the people as exclusively in the service of extreme and exclusive special interests, which are mercilessly torn out so that only unmediated and irreconcilable oppositions remain?

Thus has a system of contradictions been constructed that burst asunder the whole! You have so willed – now, you reap that will.

Our electoral system chooses only the few material and spiritual interests from the great number available, fixing it for once and for all, placing everything into immediate conflict. Even if during this parliamentary process Austrian industry has completely transformed itself, what concern is that for the Parliament? The Austrian Parliament in its representation is almost wholly agricultural; even in Vienna, its representation is largely an agricultural representation. But this is a question that must be taken up later. Here we must only affirm the fact that the only dimension of the nationalities that is represented with any effectiveness is that which will never find any agreement among them, as it is one that poses their material interests against one another, disallowing these representatives to find a civic conscience that would address the interests of the people as a whole. (Look at the case of Steinwender).¹ For him, the national question was but one-sided, the battle over offices. He could sacrifice everything else if this was secured for his representation. The constitution meant nothing to him other than his give and take in these matters of office. In this regard he was Hecuba.

The only possibility of overcoming this crisis is to give all interests the influence that is natural to them, creating a *true* representation of interests in which one is eliminating the representation of interests. The greatest part of the people are not materially interested in positions within the state administration. The conflict can only be decided by this disinterested majority, otherwise the issue can only end with victory, defeat, or the exhaustion of both sides. In the latter case, there is no guarantee that it does not arise once more.

It is possible in this period of exhaustion on both sides that those not involved might come to power. Yet this is but a small hope.

In spite of that, we continue with a discussion of the most difficult point, the regulation of the office question. One can formulate it in the following manner: every nationality will be governed by its own members; it detests foreign control. This is certainly allowable. How will this problem be solved in a juristic and effective form?

1 [One of the leaders of the middle-class radicals, Otto Steinwender (1847–1921), the founder of the German People's Party, asserted the principle that in a multinational state, the parliamentary system could only work as part of an impartial government, an executive administration above party (and nationality), operating with changing parliamentary majorities. Steinwender promoted the filling of state offices with those who were competent, but the background of this belief was the German liberal command of competence because of their number of University graduates. His national partiality led him to the one-sided interest that disrupted the very impartial governance he once spoke for – Eds.].

As said above, the authority of office is a prerogative of the crown, which it exercises through its ministers. The ministerial responsibility is not guaranteed beyond party membership, however. Quite the contrary: ministers are dependent upon parliamentary majorities. With their accord, the ministers can do what is needed. The authority of office claimed by the nationalities is given with the accord of the crown. This has not been attempted. One flies the flag of democracy in this country only in order to enlist voters. If one succeeds in getting the voters, they are put into the party sack and traded for concessions, not principles. Instead of rights – one takes gifts. The most authorised and beneficial demands are here the most necessary to look to in the way things are, as that which is required is not openly struggled for, but rather is sought behind one's back, as it were, with unjust, baneful means. Thus, one is never happy with one's successes. For, as Job, one day one must say: the master has so given, the master has so taken, praised be the master!

One does not say straight out: every nation has its own right to occupy its part of the offices, every national within their territory may govern; rather, what one demands is the one or two language office. But by that nothing is won for the nationality. A lasting German friendly government can fill all posts with Germans who also speak Czech, a lasting Czech friendly government with German-speaking Czechs. The dual language requirement can thus operate for both sides as an effective organ of foreign control (for one nationality or the other).

Now, the dual language is at least a subjective quality that is juristically conceivable, and thus can be codified. That is an advantage. But in the face of another nationality in power, there is no national protection by it, thus it is not the most favourable vehicle. What could be set in its place?

Let us think of all state posts so fixed as the somewhat older chambers of the realm stated in their rules: As many councillors as there are, there must be so many Catholics, as well as so many from the Helvetic and the Augsburg Confessions. The Confession, then, was more rooted than the nationality. One cannot belong to two Confessions, yet he still may not know to what nationality he belongs, which is the case with the Swiss – one whose father is French, and whose mother is German, and educated as both French and German. For in such an instance, one is governed by two circles of culture, and yet is unified within them. Even if the nationality issue is determined as I propose in its public-judicial character, the individual can abjure one nationality and take up another, placing his nationality in question. What are convictions? Before the sun of ministerial favour, convictions melt like butter, as one has frequently seen. Favour shifts with the ministries, and these with the majorities. How should the rightful influence of each nationality then be constitutionally established for the right to office?

Here, as well, there is nothing to be said other than instead of general phrases, concrete legal postulates must be framed: nationalities will have the authority of office. But not alone; only in a union with the crown. This occurs as fact today only in association with the feudal aristocracy. Their prerogative has not diminished, even when the nationalities assume the offices made available to them. In the older German empire, the Catholic and the Protestant stations of the realm were nominated and presented their candidates to the supreme court and the councils of state, then the Emperor chose those most favourable to him, investing them. And just so it occurs today in the offices of the Church. Here as well, the authority office is divided between state and church. In a more secretive manner, it occurred shortly before with us: political parties nominated behind the scenes officials for high office in the judicial system and administration, ministers were chosen, and the crown appointed them. One did not win in Austria, rather one acted, and that became political morality.

There is no other method for an enduring peace in this issue than that of guaranteeing that every codification that regulates the question of office is to be found in the creation of national advisory councils whose relation to the district councils of state establish the proportional investment of offices, be that in the form of an election, whereby the resulting national self-administrative bodies are invested with state functions, or in the form of a plural administration of nationalities, upon the basis determined by the crown or the ministry.

And just as a return to reason always reveals to us a slew of unanticipated advantages, so it is here: if every nation has its due number of places with their national representatives guaranteed, then it does not harm them if these elements might, in their deliberations and judgements that have to do with the interests of the whole, let us say in the instances of other nationalities than the German, deploy the use of German in their state deliberations and judgements. For the *crème* of the nationality will not be harmed in their own national identity by the use of a language not their own. Then, the use of German as a state language will not be for the repression of nationalities, and an undue extension of German influence!

Every nation will have the possibility to use its own means for furthering the educational institutions and establishing its own universities; to the nation it will be natural to apply its own measures in the development of its schools, its higher education, and the corresponding offices, limiting Utopian aspirations, as it will be responsible for their establishment financially. If a nation produces more intelligentsia than they can provide for – and this will occur quite quickly – then they must prepare their graduates with at least two languages, taught in the schools, in order to open to them greater areas of opportunity. The Germans must do this, as well as the other nations. Under such conditions, the

learning of two languages is neither a burden, because it means a method of furthering oneself, nor a danger of being controlled by another nationality or the weakening of one's own. That is good on the elementary level as well as in higher education. There is no better means for the mutual understanding of the nationalities, and the elimination of opposition, than playing thus with open cards.

From this suggested regulation, one sees: the language of office in party discussion (the language of office to be used) is that of nationality in the overwhelming number of cases. If this is not done, as we have shown above, there must be mediation between a party and the other nationality, which enables the latter to have their language used. Otherwise, the internal language of the office arises from the nationality of the person recommended to the office. Where the office requires a mixture of languages, the dual language requirement is a demand for the position. If such areas are meaningfully limited, this would in itself prove advantageous, and would lose its aspect of danger to nationalities.

The language of correspondence between offices of differing nationalities is to be German.

So, we have now dealt with the last, and most important, question of state authority, that of the authority of public office. Before us now lies the problem of developing the schema for the basic laws whose content will be the spheres of national competence which enable the self-determination of nations without eliminating the sovereignty of the state. A final language law would be a detail in the development of this schema. What remains are only a few words that must be added in relation to schooling and the justice system.

The nationality communities must determine the school requirements. The nationality determines the schools. In areas where the nationality is too sparse to have their own schools established, they will be incorporated into the local district, but they will also maintain a proportional representation in the local school council, where their nationality rules for school matriculation, according to their own electorate, will apply. They will have a teacher from other areas of the country to cultivate their language. For this purpose, school rooms and sufficient time of instruction will be provided. Where the numbers of their nationality are insufficient for adequate representation, unable to provide any pedagogical presence, they will be insured that other functions of their nationality are protected, chiefly their rights to function as a nationality.

Now, we come to the issue of the justice system. If anywhere, here lies the patrimonial point-of-view as a hindrance to its development. The Roman praetor travelled from place to place, holding his judicial sessions, as does the English justice of the peace. With us, however, Mohammed does not go to the

mountain, rather the mountain goes to Mohammed. A wealth of witnesses travel for days to the seat of justice in order to stand before an individual judge for question and answer. The judge has his *Officium residendi*, just as the church *Beneficiat*. The new judicial organisational law will not follow this practice, in that it will extend the amount of judicial days for cases [*Institut der Amtstage*], and recognise travelling functionaries who are utilised throughout the Upper Austrian legal branches, where judicial business is heaviest. Could not such an institution be utilised for the national minorities, so that where only a one language court is available, the travelling judge in another language could use that court, in a revolving cycle, to hold sessions in the minority language or in dual languages? For those for whom this means of process is still impractical, the situation is satisfied if the nationality community, within its powers as an organisation for protecting its members through the nationality law, provides a representation for the legal process in its language, taking up the costs of such representation.

Thus, we have presented the tasks to be taken up by the theoreticians whereby the jurisprudential issues are resolved. The theoreticians can achieve no more than outlined here: he must generate the constitutional principles from the overview of issues presented that can be a possible solution. He must generate those principles that are judicially conceivable as effective. He can do no more than this.

Surveying the results of our investigation, we become conscious of the difficulty of the Austrian question. Certainly, the scope of what we seek is not actually possible, as we have depicted the path. But the electoral system, which is the basis of this overall system to regulate the nationalities publically and privately, can be the means by which the seemingly irreconcilable differences that now exist are resolved. This will be the cup that holds the bitter truth that must be drunk. Until that is done, the necessary scientific knowledge, as well as its practical application, is nothing but fantasy, Utopia. Yet this overview as it is has an inestimable value for the present. For it gives us a measure to judge our own Party programme, to guide what we seek and determine the value of what is accomplished. It is a picture of the Austrian state *as it can be*. If we can see a clear goal, then we can make the first steps towards it. The sure goal is the first and most important requirement for a steady, strong politics. We have lacked this, and these lines were intended to give the only usable means, informed as they are by a scientific grasp of the problem. Whether I have utilised the right means should be judged by those qualified for the task ahead. Your judgement of this *first* attempt should not be too hard.



Renner's continuing concern with law approaches pure theory in his 1904, *The Institutions of the Private Law and Their Social Function*, an interest evidenced by his re-editing and augmentation of it in 1929. Yet this is not a purely theoretical interest. Renner's pragmatic mind addresses the law in terms of its 'voice', how it translates the ordinarily willed actions among persons into its codified language. How does the imperative 'will' of social norms become the abstract 'natural law' (as he puts it) of the indicative voice that seems beyond time in its dicta? People and ways of interacting, ways of norming culture and society, are always Renner's primary concern. As a Marxist, as an Austrian Social Democrat, he looks at this seemingly timeless indicative code – whether it be civil, criminal, or administrative law – as the imperatives of authorities of a time. To use a contemporary concept, he desires 'transparency' so that the nature of the willed imperative is exposed as it emanates from cultural interests, deconstructing that indicative voice of the impersonal, timeless, authority of nature itself.



Karl Renner 1929 [1904], 'Legal Institutions and Economic Structure', in *The Institutions of Private Law and Their Social Functions* [*Die Rechtsinstitute des Privatrechts und Ihre Soziale Funktion*], Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, pp. 49–71

Section I: The Problem

1 The Norms

The conduct of law in our time appears in immense masses of legal texts, in the individual laws and regulations, in the authorisations of authorities and judgements of the courts, and in contracts and other willed acts of private persons. That which should be law is set down in print and writing, coming forth from the hazy, merely subjective existence of the consciousness of the individual into the objective world. The writing and the print in this way make objective this kind of conscious fact, making it permanent by removing it from that infinite changeability of mind that is the essence of individuality. The law appears as something fixed, established, made to be true, as law.

If we first consider the linguistic form of this determination, we find in law books a plethora of forms of expression. In today's books of law, the indicative is the governing case, whether it is in the form of an assertion ('the family situation is established by a marriage contract') (Par. 44, Austrian Civil Code) or definition ('As a right ... ownership is the legal power to dispose at will of the substance and fruits of an object, and to exclude all others from it') (Par. 354,

Austrian Civil Code), or a conditional sentence ('Whoever intentionally kills a man will be ... by reason of murder punished by death') (Par. 211, German Criminal Code). The principle of law so articulated bears the form of a rule, like the scientific rule 'if the temperature goes down, the mercury in the thermometer falls'. Natural laws and rules of law can thus be seen as formally analogous, where one refers to things of nature, the other to that order of the relationships among persons, and in which both suggest higher, supra-personal powers at work. The rule of law (and beside it the moral law) stand, in the former, on one side of the cosmos, and the latter – the natural scientific, on the other side of the cosmos – that is the counter-posed realms of reason and nature; both laws are seen traditionally as the products super-human or Godly power.²

If one examines these legal norms more closely, they transform the indicative into form of an imperative: the aforementioned Par. 211 of the German Criminal Code says to the individual: 'You shall not kill, or you yourself will suffer death!' The biblical imperative 'Stone him! Crucify him!' are rewritten into rules. And that Par. 354 of the Austrian Civil Code says to the owner: 'You may dispose of your things as you will in their substance and uses', and directs his comrades in the law at the same time with the command 'No one of you shall disturb the property owner in his will or limit it!' Every norm in the indicative form is like a fetish, related to the sway of natural law, in that it appears as super-individual, more than human, indeed takes on a Godly character, winning immediately the guise of nature, even when that is not its self-evident appearance, when, however, it is resolved into the imperative, directed to the individual, calling to him: You should and you should not! You may, you can

2 Kant 1922 [1785], p. 297: 'A world of rational beings (*mundus intelligibilis*) is a realm of ends'. 'A realm of ends is only possible by analogy with the realm of nature, and that only by maxims, that is, self-imposed rules, and these only according to the laws of externally necessary effective causes'. The realm of nature and the realm of reason stand opposite one another, the human as a natural being and at the same time a rational being stands in both realms simultaneously, 'in one case, in so far as he belongs to the world of the senses, under natural laws [*Heteronomie*], in the second case, belonging to an intelligible world, under laws which are independent from nature, not empirical, rather merely grounded in reason [*Autonomie*]'. This entire manner of conception of the world of law as one 'in general, a natural order similar to the lawfulness of actions' rests with Kant upon a historical, quite narrow abstraction derived from a society based solely upon the competition and contract that connects private property owners. Therefore, Kant's definition of law: 'Law is the sum-total of conditions under which the arbitrary will of one can be brought into unity with the arbitrary will of another in a general law of freedom'. According to this law, society is split into atoms, the atoms which by a 'natural law' together form in this analogy, the law of society – this philosophical dogma is obviously the ideological superstructure of simple commodity production.

...! The analogy with natural law loses with each of its points of comparison, nature knows no ruling Total- or None rule of individual wills.

The ancient people who put down their norms in stone and bronze, on papyrus and parchment, spoke all their laws in the direct imperative: thus the law book of Hammurabi, the ten commandments of Moses, the twelve tablets of Rome.³

The elements of the order of law are these imperatives, which are directed at the individual and command obedience. They turn upon the will – limiting or expanding, breaking or intensifying – according to one's personal will (autonomy), or are directed against one's will in such a manner (heteronomy). This relation of will for the law is fundamental; it is in no way secret, metaphysical, ghostly or Godly. A robber who stops one travelling in a forest with the alternative imperative 'your money or your life' seeks, as far as the psychic and physical process is concerned, to influence the will of the stranger (to impose), just as does the law with its prepared compulsion to fulfill, using the means of punitive threat and its fulfillment. Heteronomous will imposes itself upon autonomous will through enticement and threat, through convincing and intimidation, through deceit, through psychic method (hypnosis, and so forth), and through physical compulsion. These phenomena are a daily reality.

The secretive difference lies in the fact that in our time all laws of the state are in the name of the entirety of state citizens in their legal appearance, that is, not the will of one individual to another, but rather the general will of all individual wills is imposed. Where does this 'general will' come from (which

3 It was characteristic of the ancients that they were far more educated in their language to the imperative than we are, that they had far more forms of this – not only the active, but the passive – than the indicative. This is seen especially in the Greek. These people had economies based upon the ancient family, slave states under the ruling families (the 'despots'), and thus constructed these societies under the immediate, personal command and its obedience, using the imperative far more than we, who transform it into an impersonal 'rule'. 'The factory door will be opened between 5:45 and 6:00am' – this is an assertion which is spoken without any reference to a subject, none is authorised, it is as if a prophecy is made, as meaningless as the assertion of Par. 211 of the German Criminal Code: 'Who kills will be punished with death' – factually this punishment is in part a murder in itself. As with every criminal law, an imperative lies at its base, just as this rule by the factory door: 'Porter, you shall open at the earliest at 5:45 and close at the stroke of 6:00 everyday! Worker, you shall enter daily for work at the stroke of 6:00!' The norm as a rule enables the commanding and obeying persons to disappear, the imperatives put them into view. Therefore, the ancient laws speak in imperatives, a wonderful, graphic power of expression, the new laws love the obscure manner of expression, from what is one's duty to obey, the person and his duty must often first be interpreted.

quite evidently is not the will of all or the *volonté générale*, and that is one of the basic problems of legal science)?

We cannot address this in depth in this text. We will take as a given this end in the laws of the state without further examination, that is, the state determines the law, and that this law is the general will of its people which the individual must face and follow. We will not investigate further whether the state in this regard is real, is an actual unity, a person, and whether this unity of the state somehow is a real unity in society, which the state encompasses in its borders.⁴ It is enough to know that the order of the laws as a unified will of individual wills of the citizens is an actuality that operates as a unity. But we recognise that it is one of the most important tasks of legal science to explain how from the chaos of conflicting wills a unified general will arises, although such an explanation at this time is not our job.

There is another part of legal science that exists even earlier, that part which I have termed jurisprudence or the articulation of law [*Rechtskunde*] and would like to demarcate as a part of legal science, one with its own tasks and methodology. Jurisprudence need not examine where the 'general will' comes from, what constitutes its essence, how it becomes or passes away; it finds its principles of law in the sum of the determinations of law, analyses them, orders them according to their internal nature, and brings them into a system. Legal science cannot examine and comprehend the chaotic mass of norms, represent them, or apply or teach these norms, without being able to organise them into groupings. The norms are grouped by juristic categories, indeed that is the character which makes the norms. They are ordered according to private law and public law, the first concerning laws of property, of obligations, of family relationships, and of succession, always in these matters the relationships of individuals to one another. A loan, for example, is for jurisprudence always a relationship of wills between two persons, the creditor and the debtor, and concerns the reception and repayment of an object; whether the creditor exploits the debtor economically (as is the rule) or the debtor the creditor (which happens less frequently), whether the loan is a matter of honour or concerns a business-related giving of credit, jurisprudence always has only the task of determining the principles of law which are involved and applying them to that case. With that the task of jurisprudence is exhausted. What effects this type of loan, as a mass phenomena, has upon the economy, upon individual classes or the society as a whole, as regards the social effects of the

4 For this discussion, see Marx 1903, p. 718: 'Society considered as an individual subject, that is, its ... false, speculative aspect'.

norm involved beyond the juristic meaning, is the business of economists and sociologists; as interesting as this might be to a jurist, that is beyond the judicial system, just as the economic use of tobacco lies beyond the botanist.

2 The Institutions of the Law and Their Component Norms

The juristic system thus judges every norm in a way that differs from how political economy judges a norm; it asks whether subjective rights are involved, whether these are absolute or relative in nature, whether they are personal or in the thing, and so forth. In the classification of rights, what is decisive is their juridical nature, their life process is their being acquired, their prosecution against third parties, and the loss of these rights: the normal, undisturbed exercise of the rights is no longer the matter of jurisprudence; the right in this practical sense develops its value in life itself.

Whether the owner of the land cultivates tobacco or grain, or leaves it fallow, in every case is within the exercise of his right; how this right is exercised is of no concern to jurisprudence and its agents. No contract, no process, no articulation of judgement has anything to do with the normal, undisturbed exercise of the right. But it is just this area that is of economic and social interest. Acquisition, disturbance and protection, extinguishing of the right – what is normal in cases for the jurist – is for the economist at most a pathological phenomenon, an abnormality, which is to be considered as a dependent variable. One and the same right of property that jurisprudence is not able to decide, in its economic activity, as well as socially, will have quite different effects, and the economist will be compelled to develop categories of a different kind to explain them; he will speak of parcels, farming plot, and latifundia possessions, and the effects of each upon the population density, upon working conditions, upon export and import, and so forth. The possession of the parcel, the farmstead, the large agricultural enterprise, are economic constructions. For the economic development of the farmstead, as a normal component, belongs the reserved rights of the parents – but juristically this is a matter of a different legal institute. The institutes of the law do not wholly overlap with economic constructions.

Jurisprudence conceives of the norm complexes according to formal juristic characteristics, unifying them by a legal institution; they are completely correct in putting aside economic and social effects as far as legal institutes are concerned, for it is merely following its own appropriate methodology. National economists, on the other hand, take up human events as unified economic determinations in their economic construction, for example, the construction of a farmstead, even when, as a matter of exception, this is not worked by the owner himself, but is instead leased and thus is technically, in part, under the auspice of another institute of the law. In practical life, one will often have an

instance where one and the same name is given without differentiation to an institute of the law in one case, or to an economic development in another, and thereby create confusion.

There are quite a number of economists, many of them well known, who demand that a jurist further the intermingling of economic and legal methods, using them in their own craft.

The law of property to the 'civil lawyer', that is, the 'roman legal' concept of absolute property, connoting absolute authority, awakens disfavour⁵ for the economist. Just as for the bourgeois economist everything is seen as 'value' – a glass of water in the desert, the baritone of the opera, and the favours of a prostitute – so all is 'property' in this sense: debts, copyright, patent rights, and so forth, are property by dint of their 'conditions', and thus rights should be determined in their definition by this relative conception of property.⁶ By indicating how the middle-age conception of 'property' is used by the lawyer who cleaves to 'Roman Law', the economist feels he has shown the 'one-sidedness of the contemporary private conception of law', and how foolish it is to want to ground today's private law as legislation has made it.

Our jurisprudence commits even more such one-sided determinations: it understands a civil, a criminal, and an administrative law of property – jurisprudence, even the legislator divides the institute of the law into three parts. The civil right of property is, moreover, only a phantom without a civil process, which is its most important complement in public law. The theory of law has good methodological and practical grounds for this division. Should there be, then, in the civil concept of property administrative-legal limits and connections to the owner, taxes on land, and so forth, that are included within its compass? In fact, Adolf Wagner desires that the private law definition 'on account of the eventuality of legal limits to the rights of use by the owner or some duty to act in a certain way' be included within it. This meaning is in the eyes of every jurist a monstrosity, for he knows that every subjective right that is given is thereby objective, by the law, and that it has no existence but for the law, and that this same law may impose particular penalties upon the owner and encumber all things within an area of the state. Should

5 See Wagner 1892, pp. 185 ff., and Par. 126 ff.

6 See Wagner 1892, p. 268: 'What property is should be designated as the totality of subjective rights of the individual which can be assessed having a certain monetary value'. Julius Ofner in his 'law of things' [*Sachenrecht*] calls this entirety by the happy expression 'Suum' of the individual, which is set apart from the narrower concept of property. See also Kant 1922 [1797], p. 31.

the professor of law repeat then in each definition of a principle of constitutional and legal theory *expressis verbis*?

How then, in a country like Germany, the constitution itself takes up these principles (as does the Weimar constitution in Art. 153): 'Property creates a duty! Its use should be for the common good!' Aside from that, for such a programme principle in the constitution is not an imperative for the citizen, but rather for the legislator, containing the duty to consult a norm for his legislation, and for the citizen merely exhorting him to respect this idea – is the material right of property affected by the subjective duties of the owner as citizen?⁷

Or will our private property become social property in such a formulation of the concept? What can be proven other than that the owner is not sovereign, but rather is always a subject of the state? Property is absolutely in the sphere of private law as well as in the sphere of private economics, and therefore it is just this absolute quality that is the relevant characteristic for the economists. If this is confused, the private, capitalist economic order then swims in an indeterminable chaos of 'on the one side' and 'on the other side', which serves the defenders of private economics in their statements of principles, to be guidelines that are meant to instruct businessmen and those who study the subject.

Nothing makes the path to knowledge more difficult than a syncretism of methods. Receiving an institute of the law as such means to take it up as a complex of norms, individuating it through the unity realised by a construction of its norms. Quite different, however, are its effects on the actualities of life, which lie beyond the norms. Our studies will make this evident in a wealth of instances. Here a few examples will suffice. The legal form of the contract serves an infinite series of economic and extra-economic ends, marriage as well as prostitution, loans especially serve the 'charitable economy', just as usury. On the other hand, similar economic ends can be realised through differing institutes of the law, such as a joint ownership of production, which can be carried out either by a loan agreement, or by a loan through the payment *in natura* of a part of the product. The institute of the termed giving over the product among those who are living replaces the testamentary contract that economically binds descendents. From this discrepancy between a legal institute and its extra-legal effects, a clue is given for the reason that so many

7 This rejection of the mixing of methods does not contest the fact that between private property and certain public institutions there is a functional connectedness: this rejection is to be studied separately, not misunderstood as a collective definition of the matter!

laws are superfluous or ineffective. Thus, even where the law permits the unrestricted partition of real property, the transmission of rural property by strict entail is maintained, wherever practicable, by testament, although there is no compulsion by law. Out of such differences, there is a continual division of the legal norm and the real social effects, which will explain, as we will see, the actual development of the law.

We will see that from this uneven development of the institutions of law and the economic directions involved, from the extra-legal changes in the social functions of the law, behind these changes was a compulsion which transformed the laws themselves with regard to their norms – this will be seen as the historical development of law in its consequential emergence and disappearance. This process of the rising and falling of the order of the laws can never be clearly recognised so long as the institutes of the law and their economic direction are allowed to flow within the fog of ethical-psychological phrases. One must be warned, therefore, that the institutes of law as a products of jurisprudence are matters of form, whereas in their economic function the content, the material is the issue, a fact made clear by Stammler's research.⁸ The true content of the institutes of law are the norms that they construct; there is no other content. For the economist, the juristic determination of the economic direction is the usual contract between parcel-farmers, not merely the 'form'. The juristic determination of the concept of the exercise of law reiterates its material content. At a minimum, it says nothing beyond its applicable general category of form and matter whereby one could differentiate clearly and certainly the institute of the law and its functional use.

What is true is that the institute of law must be judged simultaneously as both a condition of norms and according to its social function, which is a war on two fronts, just as everything within this bourgeois world.⁹ Juristically, the laws are put into paragraphs, printed upon appropriate paper or written, more or less stylised well as principles, norms or objective imperatives; they have only an abstract existence beside real, willing persons of flesh and blood, comparable to the difference between the real, fixed as well as moving materials of the railroads and their paper stock certificates, or the difference between real gold bars and the paper banknotes that represent this value. The same society,

8 Stammler 1906.

9 The purely legal approach, which does not consider the social function, can be considered in terms of our ordinary means of expression as a formal law without hampering our understanding, if we do not further specify it with the precision of Stammler's distinctions. In our sense, every law and genuine act of jurisprudence is formal; our reference is not to the whole 'science of the law'.

which transposes the waged work of the miner economically into its effects on the stock market, transposes it juristically into paragraphs of a legal page or a contract. We will still see that this comparison does not rest upon a mystical verbal paradox, rather upon actualities. Just as the fetish of commodities can be set beside their natural use value, so the fetish of the law can be set beside the actual relationships between persons.

Juristically, or if one will, formal-juristically, every institute of the law is a norm-complex, a sum of imperatives. Thus, property, whose highest imperative states: 'No one shall take away the rights of disposal of the thing which is A's, no one shall disturb in any way A's possession, and so forth'. Overall, wherever the same content of norms lies before him, the jurist sees this institute of property the same as every other jurist, whether what is at issue is a piece of earth, a hunting hound, a loaf of bread, or an economically worthless family picture. The task of jurisprudence is completed and exhausted in the taking up of the materiality of norms, through technical comprehension, systematic grasp, logical formulation, and its practical application. This is necessarily a historical exercise in its terminology, and its arsenal of concepts; it is necessarily empirical, as the *Corpus juris civilis*, the *Sachsenspiegel*, or the German Civil Code.

But the institutes of the law regulate the actual relationships of living persons, and successive generations, in their continually changing circumstances, and an institute of the law, like the law itself, is only one side of the subject matter it governs. If persons and things are steadily changing, can the institutions of the law remain stagnant and fixed? It appears that is the case! For 'law must remain law'. For centuries the law was seen as divine, as unchanging and immutable as God himself, and the mere conception that humans could presume to undertake changing the law seemed outrageous! Indeed, the very person who came into the world in order to change the human order believed it necessary to say: 'I have not come to do away with the law, only to fulfill it'. All change in the law has occurred over thousands of years in a form that one understands as being that of finally stating the ancient law correctly! It is an achievement that in the past several centuries a general conviction has pervaded that humans themselves can create the laws, that human society in itself is the creator of its laws. The theory that humans, in the form of a state parliament and in the narrow frame of its existing state boundaries, can create law, has gradually permeated thought to the degree that every child knows that the parliament is there to give one laws. But why a parliament possesses the right to generate laws, and upon what basis of constitutional law all these laws are generated, indeed, 'who has the right to create law!', has not yet been scientifically considered at any great depth, nor has it been sufficiently discussed in its

practical implications. Parliament exercises the right in the name of the general public, that is, the society; they are, as one says, only an organ, a means of expression, for the society itself. How does this society, however, construct its new law? Here, in this point, the norm no longer exists – as it still does for jurisprudence. In the making of a new law, its inception, its content, and its conceptual formulation is the end of a process which lies outside the making of the law itself, that is, in the becoming of law in its societal, functional beginnings. This field of becoming is the counterpart of the theory we have presented which has its object as the social function of the legal institutions. This theory points out that the norm and the legal institution is only the completed inception of what has preceded it, nothing more. The legal institute lies in the middle between the process of becoming law and the social function of the law. And both these fields supplement the mediate field of legal analysis so that it becomes the entire area of legal science.

And this more complete field of legal science, which as a whole is the triad of the aforementioned branches – the institutes of the law, the social functions of the law, and legal analysis – is an empirical, not a speculative science, but the object of its empiricism is not a *Corpus juris*, a charter, that which lies empirically as a positive legal text. If one conceives the empirical object in the sense of jurisprudence, then one can justly compare it to another motto of Kant: 'A merely empirical point of law is (as the wooden head in the *Phaedrus* fable) a head which may be beautiful, but it is a shame that it has no brain'.¹⁰ Where jurisprudence begins and ends, before it and under it, lies the social science of laws which puts it into a context with all those non-legal aspects of our lives, and acts as the integrating wheels in the complete mechanism of societal occurrence.

3 The Economic and Social Functions of the Institutions of Law

The object of our investigation is thus a problem neither of legal analysis nor of jurisprudence, which refers to the institutions of the law, fields that are dealt with elsewhere. Nor is this object a problem of the creation of the law in itself, which raises questions of how the normative components become law, how the norm develops from the economy, what the economic causes are for legal norms; this is a field not yet developed scientifically, but it is not our concern here. We are engaged in how the economic and social reality of norms, once they exist and are recognised, and under the presumption of being unchanged, are to be investigated.

¹⁰ Kant 1797, 'Einleitung in die Rechtslehre', B.

One who wanders into socialist literature immediately recognises that we have taken up the mutual relations between economics and law as an object of study. This relation has been traditionally conceived by the Marxist school so that the economic relations are the 'substructure' of juristic conceptions that form the 'superstructure'. The terms substructure and superstructure are imagistic expressions, taken from architecture, and serve for depicting the contextual relationships, not as a conceptual description. According to the well-known statement by Marx, beside the legal, all other moral and cultural, all *ideological* relations belong to the superstructure, so that beyond the legal, this expression of speech, covers many other areas of fact whose structures are quite different from the juristic, and must be described differently.¹¹ Obviously, the superstructure relationship of the 'philosophy of an epoch' to the 'economy' of this epoch will depend upon quite different concepts from those of the legal norm, exercise of the law, and so forth. One must therefore give up the notion of defining, in some general way, Marx's concept of the superstructural relation, and address each societal area separately, in accordance with its specific nature of relations – as Marx offered simply a useful, but general analogue. We will take this approach in our investigation of the law.

We can see already in light of the discussion thus far that there is not here a simple relation of cause and effect between the substructure of the economic norms and the superstructure of the law. There are three fields of law to examine in deriving such a relation: the first field is that of the creation of the law, and it is in this field that an understanding of how the economy functions as a cause of the law is the most opaque, indeed, still unexamined; in fact, one cannot find one process of this creation of law that affords an abstraction that can clarify the relation. For it is not at all clear here that one can apply the primitive schema of 'cause-effect', and just as unclear how the Stammler formula of 'regulating form and regulating material' might apply. The second field, that of jurisprudence, can hardly begin to be studied with the concepts of cause and effect, since it is there quite apparent that it is concerned

11 The foreword to Marx's *Critique of a Political Economy* states: 'The entirety of the relations of production comprise the economic structure of society, its real basis, upon which the juristic and political structures arise'. – Engels's foreword to Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire* states: 'The law whereby all historical battles are pursued, whether within political, religious, philosophical, or other ideological areas, are in actuality only more or less a clear expression of the struggles between societal classes, and their existence, and with that the collision of these classes, are conditioned by the developmental phases of their economic situation, by the kind and manner of their production and the exchange of commodities pursuant to that' (Engels 1885).

with motive, means, and end as a teleological, not a causal, explanation. If one wants to examine the superstructure of the law within the third field, that is, the economic and social effects of the norms, exclusively in the operation of the substructure of the economy upon these, one could immediately be led *ab absurdum* through the facts.

It is a platitude to say that laws can influence the economy sufficiently to change it, and can therefore be considered as causes of economic results, which Marx himself did not deny: 'The influence of the laws in maintaining the relationships of distribution and thereby their effects upon production must be specifically determined.'¹² Laws are created precisely in the intention that they have economic effects, and they have them as a rule. One sees then that social life is not so simple that it can be cracked between the two jaws of 'cause and effect', and laid forth in its kernel. Marx never came to determine 'the influence of the laws (as above)', even as he was quite taken up with a scientific study of the laws; yet he did see the problem clearly. That explains his methodological hint, which is given in the following passage: 'The really difficult point to be discussed here is, however, how the relationships of production as relations of law enter into disparate development. An instance is the Roman civil law in its relations to modern production'.¹³ We will follow this hint in our organisation of the problem: (1) Existing and continuing law – changed economic conditions; (2) Changed economic conditions – new norms, new law. Of these problems we will treat only the first in this study.

Let us take a concrete order of law with its concrete economic base at a determined point in time. All economic arrangements are at the same time institutes of the law, all economic transactions are at the same time either in themselves transactions of the law, for example, buying and selling, or merely the exercise of subjective rights, for example, the farming of several acres, or factually extra-legal activities, which nonetheless transpire under concrete legal assumptions, as the work of a spinner at his machine. Legal transactions and economic transactions, as one sees, are not completely the same. The consumption of food is physiological, economic, and a process of the will, at the same time, but they are not a process of will in the sense of a process of law. Yet they are nonetheless all fulfilled under legal prerequisites.

The circulation of commodities proceeds in capitalist society in the form of the legal transactions of 'buying and selling', and its derivatives, in the form of the law of obligations. Production, however, is not in itself a legal transaction:

¹² Marx 1903, p. 744.

¹³ Marx 1903, p. 799.

with the farmer there is simply the exercise of his rights of property, in a capitalist factory, there is the exercise by the owner of the right of property in the factory itself and its machinery, and the fulfillment by the worker of the contractual understanding of performing the work, so that it is in part a set of legal transactions, but insofar as the work itself is concerned it is not a legal transaction. The economic category is in itself combined with several legal categories, and thus each of the categories involved is somewhat different from the other, even as they are combined in a single process. It is difficult to separate one legal process from the point-of-view of the science of economics because one economic process is served by several determinable institutes of the law, and thus I call this the economic function of these institutes of the law.

Every economic process that I have theoretically isolated in this way is only, as a thought, a part of the whole process of societal production and reproduction. Seen in this connection to the whole, the economic becomes the social function of the laws.

No one before or since has depicted the economy in each of its points, in each small detail of its processes, as consciously and thoroughly in their functions in relation to the institutes of law as Marx in his chief work *Das Kapital*. There is no account of an economic system, as we will see, that reveals so fully the connection between the economy and law as that of Marx – neither predecessors nor those who came after have seen the problem so clearly or valued it in its proper proportion!

If one considers a certain societal order as it exists at a definite point in time, one can only speak of it from the mutual dependence existing between the operation of the legal norms and the economic processes, both appear as the same thing in the economic arrangements, first seen from the point-of-view of the subjective development will, as willed relations, and from another perspective as an external, technical-natural process. We term the external, technical-natural process the substrate of the norm.¹⁴ This is quite comprehensible – in studying a stone at rest, one does not attend the laws of free fall, and just as little can we learn the art of cooking from the cook pricked by Sleeping Beauty's spindle. What we experience in its state of rest are the economic arrangements and the institutes of the law, the substrate and the norms, which are not the same, but rather two, indissoluble from one another, integrated sides of the matter. This side-by-side situation must be kept before our eyes and described.

14 On the concept of the substrate more will be discussed below in Chapters II and III.

But this considering constitutes only the mutual determinations; there is no further insight into the nature of these facts, the causal aspect of them. We must study the process in its historical consequences, the transition from the so-described societal order to the next order, in a step-by-step attending. First in this movement, in the historical sequence of economic and legal systems can the lawfulness of the events reveal itself. If I now choose two successive epochs randomly, the results I obtain for these transitory points in time of lawfulness are consequent, but not universally valid in relation to other epochal relationships. Regarding the question: what function does the law play in such changes? I cannot arrive at one definitive answer, unless I studied inductively all societal orders in their sequential history, from the most primitive to the highest civilisation. I gain in this way a general abstraction of societal orders and at the same time of the general functions of the law that were at play.

This process does not contradict the insight that every individual developmental stage has its own quite specific character and lawfulness. Marx often points to the existence and the justification of these general overarching abstractions: 'All epochs have certain characteristics in common in their productivity, determinable characteristics. Productivity in general is an abstraction, but a comprehensible abstraction, insofar as it actually enables us to see the in-common, fixing it and therefore sparing us the repetitive task of determining these in-common characteristics ... [A] unity is discernible in this exercise, that of the subject, which is humanity, and the object, which is nature – the same throughout all epochs'.¹⁵ Yet, nevertheless, Marx quite often speaks disparagingly of these general determinations of economies, in order to intensify resistance to the use of them. His rationale for this resistance is, first, to address the manner of many economists to regard the categories of the capitalist order as eternal, in essence canonising them. Secondly, the work Marx set for himself was to investigate individual epochs and describe them: then, however, 'what was in fact development for that epoch was the differentiator between the mere general characteristic and what was specifically in-common'. If Marx had sought instead the contrary assumption, that is, to show only the particular, raising it to a concrete statistic, he would have offered a description that one might see in an academic seminar, and the developmental laws of society would have remained hidden. He sought, rather, with each stage of his investigation, the specific historical form in its individual manifestation of the general, setting it beside the previous individual forms and finding thereby the connections of their development.

15 Marx 1903, p. 712.

The following may serve as an example: 'Surplus labor is a general societal manifestation, as soon as the productivity of human work rises above the immediate needs of life, but it is evidenced differently in the feudal period than in the capitalist – in the former as villeinage, in the latter as surplus value'.¹⁶

In this investigation, we cannot do without a general overview of the functions of the institutions of law: every historically conditioned function of the law has its place in the whole of society, and in the study of that one first sees clearly its function in the entire functional scheme, enabling us to orient our understanding. How else should a concrete individual function be seen other than through a reflective consideration of it in its relation to general scheme of its period? 'The concrete is concrete, because it is the interconnectedness of many determinations, that is the unity of the manifold. In thought it appears, thereby, as the product of an integrating process, its result'.

Section II: The Division and Connection of the Functions

The prerequisite for every order of society is the sociated [*vergesellschaftete*] person, that is, the person at that stage where language as a tool (Franklin's tool-making animal!) is already developed in the tribe, and secondly, when the tribe has become conscious of its own collective order. We term such a comprehensive whole an organisation. The word expresses the consciousness of the working together, and raises it above the concept of an organism.

Animal society is bound together by physiological-biological law, the law of nature. The manner in which the person of the tribe becomes conscious of the form of the natural law that binds him, that makes the tribe collective, what must be the case according to natural law, is then consciously done, and can be expressed as maxims of cooperation in accordance with natural law. In this way the oldest family systems manifested their accordance with the natural laws of natural selection and inheritance.¹⁷ How the application is consciously governed, how the natural law is given its form of societal norm, becoming principle, how the societal law rises steadily beyond natural law in its form and effects, how it finally develops its own development with improving division of labour, taking on diverse forms that are even antagonistic to each other, describing these processes is the problematic of other fields of study. Enough – the statutes as the formulation of causal necessities in a conscious metastasised form, in teleological form, in imperatives, which are applied to the individuals in the name of the whole, determining their behaviour as certainly as instinct

¹⁶ Marx 1959, *Das Kapital*, Volume I, p. 476.

¹⁷ Cf. Engels 1900.

and inherited characteristics had done before this consciousness, these statutes, then, constitute the organisation of society, forming the societal order.

If every societal order is the way of maintaining natural law, then every economic institution, and every institute of the law, is a function of this way of maintenance – the way of maintenance is nothing other than the Marx-Engels conception of production and reproduction of material life in its tendency to always take on more advanced stages,¹⁸ that is, the production and reproduction of certain types of person as well as their conditions of existence.¹⁹ All institutions of the law have these functions in their organisation, which cohere the whole, the functions as a kind of maintenance.

1 The Organisational Functions

The most important, most clearly demarcated stages of this process of reproduction can be seen in the contemporary economic order. ‘The bourgeois societal order is the most developed and varied historical organisation of production. The categories that express its conditions, offer an understanding of its divisions, and give thereby insight into the divisions and the conditions of production of all derived societal forms’.²⁰

If we consider the process of the kinds of production statistically, as mere production, in its coexistent relationships of a time, let us say a generation, then it appears to us in a double aspect: as a physiological-technical life process, as, for example, a beehive, and secondly, since it is at the same time a conscious process for the individual and the community, as a form of changing relationships of the will.²¹

18 ‘No matter what societal form of the production process, it must continually or periodically go through new stages. Just as little a society can cease to consume, so little can it cease to produce. Seen in its context, every societal process of production is therefore, simultaneously, a reproduction process’ (Marx 1959, p. 528). – ‘One finds reproduction not only in the most different economic societal forms, but, although in differing degrees, reproduction upon an advanced stage of development’ (Marx 1959, p. 561). – ‘According to the historical-materialist conception the final, determining instance in history is: the production and reproduction of immediate life’ (Engels 1900, p. viii).

19 ‘On the one hand creation of food and nourishment ... on the other side, the creation of persons themselves, the propagation of the species’ (Engels 1900, p. viii).

20 Marx 1903, p. 776.

21 See, as well as in other places, the following: ‘These rule-based relations, whether of law or not, are relations of willing, in which the economic relation is mirrored. The content of these rule-based, willed relationships are given through economic relations’ (Marx 1959, p. 50). In our way of expressing this: the economic relation is the substrate of the relation of law.

Upon whatever developmental stage people relate to one another, society must always subjugate the individual will to its general will, the society must possess some way of authorising the activity of the individual.²² Every society is a community of work and has, as such, its order of work; this is the legal subjugation of the individual will under the general will.²³

The general will is not one of a metaphysical existence, it is not a commanding voice from above – although humans believed that for three thousand years – it comes to the world as an individual will that has the force to compel, like that of exchange value within society in its incarnation of money. Where the whole commands – and it is a whole that commands in every society – there it commands through individuals as the organ of its power. There is no society without an order of power.²⁴

If one does not see a society of individuals, which has a hierarchy with its higher and lower divisions, then it is ordered legally as one of all on the same level, but that is only possible through order.

There is no equality other than society; it is not to be found in some supposed unsociable situation, it is a creation of society and the law.²⁵

Institutes of the law, which concern work, power, and coexistence have organisational functions, since they integrate the individual into the whole.

In all ancient orders of law, the direct integration of the individual will into the general will, into the order of power, and of work, is evident.²⁶ Master and

22 Directly or indirectly – through a direct compulsion or indirectly through the needed power of other institutions – as the capitalist society does through the lack of property of waged labour.

23 Only the capitalist economic order awakes the sophistical illusion that there is no necessary order for its work, as if work was the choice of autonomous, free will – the industrialist knows better, he creates the order of work within the factory, placing it upon the wall of the working site, so that everyone sees it – which has not been appreciated by the bourgeois professors of law. The order of law within the factory has become a concept, however, in legal science in its nature as law over the twenty-five years since this book was first published.

24 The anarchist cannot think of freedom without eliminating order, above all the order of force. Anarchistic freedom, which is to be differentiated from political, is the negation of society itself: 'Human rights of freedom are not based upon the connection between person and person, rather more upon the separation of each person from every other person. It is the right of this separation, the right of the restricted, the limited individual' (Marx 1902a, p. 418).

25 Those who teach natural law have called this state of equality *status naturalis*, although it is contrary to human nature.

26 The material division of power among individuals (the order of power), the material division of the necessary work of society among those qualified for it (the order of work), then

slave, lord of the manor and serf are characteristic of the past order of labour in their highly personal, direct hierarchical order of super- and sub. 'However one may judge the mask of character whereby the person took his place, the societal relationships of the person in their labour appear in each instance their own personal ones, and were not' – as in the capitalist society – 'disguised in the societal relationships of things'. The bourgeois society has managed to create the illusion that working is not a societal duty, but rather a private matter, and that it needs no order of labour. It is one of the contributions of Marx to have shown that the freedom of property and the labour contract, the general coexistence of individual wills, is actually an order of wills, compelled, for example, by the factories whose internal conditions were of extra-legal nature, or at least, counted as extra-legal in practice. First, in the past quarter-century the imperative, which the manager of the factory shouts into the ears of the workers, who are at their raging machines, has become a sphere of rights in which the bourgeois right, unarticulated publically in the past, was now known in its nature of law: everyday the living imperative 'the creation of law' and so judged! How clear, in contrast, was the 'immediate master-menial relationship' of pre-capitalist times!²⁷

If we conceive of the kinds of processes of the maintenance of society in their temporal sequence as a reproduction process throughout the changing generations, one sees then a formal continuation of activity where for each member who holds the power and who works, when the scepter or the tool falls from his grasp, a new member succeeds in his place, a substitution, or a succeeding variety. Every system of laws has its order of succession or order of calling, its institutes of the law with their successive functions. Thus, the bourgeois society has its inheritance laws.

the personal selection and appointment of the individual for both tasks (the order of calling) is in most of the societal constitutions that we know, as *publici juris*. The organised society as general will achieves these things by direct measures, and through its relationships of calling, its super- and sub-ordering, its co-equal ordering, and their succession appear as their own personal relations, and are thereby not disguised as relationships among the material things of society – as Marx has so well characterised the situation. Feudal tenure and succession, for example, were at the height of the feudal period entirely *publici juris*, indeed, in this time almost every contradiction between public and private law disappeared, almost all institutes were of public law (canon law above all). Only the wholly unavoidable regulations of a public legal nature, in the beginning stages of the capitalist economy, as complementary institutions of public law were added to the private law.

27 Marx 1959, p. 46.

There is the demand not only of a juristic continuation, but also the corporeal propagation, rearing, education, and mental development of the maturing generations. This was the first social interest, the oldest area in which the effective activity of the normal creation of society took place. The order of the *gentes* is the oldest complete legal system. By the institutions of the law, which protected the populating function, humanity developed itself from the tribe into a society.

2 The Economic Functions in a Narrower Sense

Society thus organised is a whole of integrated individual wills, directing their thousands of arms to nature. 'Work is chiefly a process between the human and nature, a process, in which each person controls and regulates his exchange with nature through his own activity. He himself comes forward as a natural power in relation to nature.'²⁸ The sociated person [*vergesellschaftete*] relates to nature not as a natural individual, that is, accordant to his nature, but rather societally, that is, society as a whole has the right of determination over each piece of earth it occupies, as well as the material that is removed and assimilated of that occupied area. An ordered society can never relinquish its power to dispose of the products which are indispensable for its own self-preservation, but it can do nothing else than place these goods in the hands of the educated individuals, as trusted hands, who use them in its name. Whatever societal order exists, the processes of production must remain undisturbed and continue without interruption, thus there must be a regulating of the order of society that authorises the disposal of all occupations and the assimilation of products as rights of the person over these things. Every economic phase has its order of goods and services, just as it has its order of labour. Institutes of the law which regulate this order of goods and services, subject the world of matter in its parts and parcels to the will of every individual – the whole is only there person by person – giving it to the keeping of individuals, so that they can dispose of the things which they have, possess, or detain. Even the property of community, in itself, is in the hands of individuals, as are the regimental flags in the hands of the flag-bearers. We find in the language of law no better name here than that of detention, the German legal expression for it which is 'Gewere', unfortunately becoming obsolete. 'Having' [*habere*] in the sense of detention is a general and necessary form of law in every societal order, and serves the bourgeois world as a legal ground for 'property' (in the sense of 'one's own' for that time and its condition). But the pos-

28 Marx 1959, p. 140.

session, or detention, as we have seen, is only recognised as private property in the transitional stages of world epochs. To the institutes of the law, which divide the goods and services in this manner, we give a detentional function.²⁹ What serves as possession, in the sense of detention, is for the legal order an allocating or assignation, thus this function can be justly named one that is assignable.

The regulation of labour and goods, as the regulation of the power to authorise the disposal of workers and the means of production, give to the manner of the processes of maintenance its legal determinations. In its technical flow, one can differentiate three stages of this process – production, distribution, and consumption – and so the institutes of the law have three differing functions – the productive, the distributive, and that of consumption. We choose these foreign terms because of our own lack of such short, clear specialised terms in German.

Every member of society must have a share, no matter how small, of its annual products, without consideration of whether one is active in its production or not; one receives this part, his consumption funds, only by means of the institutes of the law. This consumptive function is fulfilled today, for example, with the property of life-tenure, i.e. *usufruct*, or by farm-land reserved by parents for their use, and more recently worker's insurance and its subsidiaries, and where all these institutes of the law are denied, the poor law.

The distribution is carried out today in the form of the circulation of commodities, which in its legal form is sale and purchase. In the Middle Ages, it was quite different, in its legal form similar to the robot (compelled labour) and tithe.

The productive function is fulfilled today, along with numerous other institutions of the law, overwhelmingly by property and wage contract, in the Middle Ages by serfdom and villeinage, in ancient times by slavery.

All three of these discussed functions have detention in common; all three are separately considered elements of the order of goods and services. In the course of our inquiry we will find that from these general functions special and partial functions can be differentiated. For the moment this is a sufficient overview.

29 One must not forget that detention as the language of the law is merely the possession without any other legal qualification. We use the term as denoting possession on behalf of society, but again without regard to other juristic qualifications.

3 The Concept of the Social Function

Our above schema of the functions of the institutions of the law has presented: several comprehensive abstractions, which are justified as abstractions – production, consumption, and the societal order in general. It is self-evident that at every developmental stage a concrete societal production, distribution, and consumption occurs in a particular form, and it is carried out by this particular economic organisation, that is, with specific technical processes and the attendant legal institutes. Now we give shorter descriptions to these particular forms in their material changes without continual repetition.

It is self-evident that these functions interrelate in their activity: the assignation of a piece of land in a Roman colony to an ex-legionary is also a universal succession into the position of the native owner who was either killed, thrown into prison, or sold as a slave. The transfer of a farm from father to son among the living, or as a succession of inheritance, serves as the calling of a successor for the departed cultivator and at the same time its preservation for the populace, thus it is both a successive and populating function; since the successor is at the same time the master of his menials and maids, it also works in an organisational manner. If we comprehend as a unity all the individual effects of an institute of the law within a society, all the individual partial functions are fused into one social function.

An institute of the law is a norm complex. If this remains a constant within the change of the economic order, nonetheless, its function will have changed, expanded, narrowed, or completely disappeared; this is the way changes in function occur. We can compare the entire realm of rights to the vestals who kept the continual fire going within the hearths of their community until it disappeared, in that the respective norms did not change, but meanwhile the invention and general application of instruments of fire had replaced the vestal's economic function. For then we can justifiably say that the economic transformation – the invention was an extra-legal act – robbed the institute of the law of its social function in that it brought its diminishment and finally its elimination.

We can see this conversely when an institute of the law keeps the same function, that is, experiencing no change in its economic meaning, but the normative meaning of the law has changed, imperatives may have been added, taken away, or become somehow different without what was ordered itself changing. This is neither unthinkable nor without precedent in history: thus the bill of exchange has kept all its economic functions, but has stripped prison as a penalty for the debtor. The institute of the death penalty has remained the same in its function, although the norm has been qualified, disallowing mutilation of the body, quartering, and so forth.

We find then a twofold possibility in the development of law: a change in norms or a change in function. And now legal science must investigate: in what way do both occur, how conditioned is one by the other, what lawfulness can we find in the development of both?

However much the functions of the institutes of law may change, a function can never remain unfulfilled for long without society itself being dissolved. For each function that falls away, another institute of the law must enter, there is no vacuum in the order of the laws. We will see that institutes of the law can be represented within certain limits.³⁰ As a rule, however, new institutes of the law are necessary. Where do they come from? In what way do they offer a substitute?

The fact that the entirety of the institutes of the law in an epoch must all fulfill general functions, that is, the law is a whole determined in its parts by the needs of the society, I call the organic character of the order of the laws. Every institute of the law stands within that whole, closer or further in its connections to all other laws, and this connection lies not in its existence as a norm, but rather in its function.

The organic nature of the order of the laws includes within it the fact that all institutes of private law with all their connections stand at the same time in connection with the public laws; without this they cannot be effective and without considering this connection to the public law, they themselves cannot be comprehended. Thus, property is not an effective concept without a civil process, and this is not possible without a body of laws that regulate the court system; property itself is never a fully private matter in that public law limits it with restrictions and burdens, as in taxing it. Every institute of the private law has its complementary public arrangement, which will be taken up in our discussion accordingly. In the governing conception of the capitalist historical epoch, the complementary institutions of the state are merely there to serve the free operation of these private institutes, in no way to do away with them or to turn them from their intentional goals. And because of that, we can and must describe the capitalist economic practices without touching upon the institutions of the state. They come into the foreground for the first time only where the development of law goes beyond the capitalist system.

In spite of this organic character of the entire order of the law, in spite of the connections of all individual institutes of the private law, history shows us the incessant change within them all, an unceasing change in the norms and

30 The material right to a water source (*servitus aquaehaustus*) can be replaced by the obligatory duty of the owner to allow others to draw from that water source, and so forth.

functions of the institutions of the law. We must obtain a clear picture of the magnitude and breadth of the transformations which have played out beyond the law and its commands, wholly or in part below the collective consciousness of society, we must undertake a journey through the economy in order to make visible the law, coming to know the boundaries of its power, sharpening our eye for the problem of the changes in the norms.

Moreover, we will obtain an insight into the legal system of our time. As yet, the foundational institute is that of property, we must turn to that above all. In doing so, we must attend primarily to the operational means of contemporary property in order to comprehend the changes it has gone through in the past, and by doing that we are preparing for the knowledge of our future development.



As indicated in our overview of Renner's theoretical perspective above, Renner was a pragmatist in his daily interests, his theories of nationality and the law stemming from how these issues impacted on the everyday life of those around him. Most certainly, this penchant for the actualities of daily praxis made him popular among Austrians – as the many phases of his long public political career evidenced. Renner likened the daily praxis of a political leader to 'the work of building coral reef'. The work of political leaders is constant and endless; societies are being maintained, restructured, and bequeathed in their norms. The concluding two essays translated here were written immediately prior to the greatest challenges to such pragmatic gradualism. Fascism was about to surface strongly in Austrian public life. Here, in the sunshine of the possible, indeed impending, success of the Austrian Social Democratic vision of a new sociation of society, Renner wrote of economic democracy and the mediating links that would generate a socialist set of norms that guided cooperation. Renner addresses the function of consumer cooperatives. Renner had established a credit bank for these small enterprises before World War I, and reconstituted it on a larger scale in 1923 to support the large-scale purchases of the consumer cooperatives.



Karl Renner 1926, 'Economic Democracy: The Programme of Economic Self-Help Among the Working Classes', *Der Kampf*, 19(October): 428–35.³¹

The greatest cultural-historical phenomenon of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century is the rise of the working classes. Especially evident of this is the *political emancipation* of the proletariat, the conquest of equal political authority, and the realisation by each nationality of a proportional equality within the state. This conquest was attained by political parties that were directly formed by the proletariat themselves or in a mediated manner by the influence of universal suffrage, but above all, through International Social Democracy.

These political battles must be differentiated from the efforts of the working class that strive upon an *economic* and social ground to realise the goals of self-

31 [This was the introductory lecture for a course on 'Economic Democracy' offered by Dr. Renner at the University of Vienna under the auspices of the 'International University courses' in September 1926].

liberation, without counting upon *the means of the state*, that is, on the means of legislation and administration. Political parties continually strive to conquer or at least influence state power – that is their rationale for existence – which is the power in the realm, the state, the land, and the community that enables them to actualise the goals of the party. They seek social development *with the help of the state*. Their goals are universal, and in the case of economic goals, they seek to transform the economy with the means of the state. Such efforts will not be our intention in this discussion: we will speak of efforts beyond the help of the state in realising economic goals, and speak of legislation only insofar as it removes obstructions to these efforts or secures these efforts by law. One can so state the opposite intentions through two traditional slogans – *that of state help, and that of self-help* – which have their historical expressions fifty years ago and earlier in the conflict between Lasalle and Schultze-Delitsch. Yet these slogans should not go without further testing, being taken up without change.

For the efforts of our time have created another word of recognition: one speaks of *industrial* or *economic* democracy. This expression was introduced by the Webbs, if I do not err, and it corresponds to British ways of thought. Democracy or the power of the people means the state of laws in which the populace itself has the public power, and exercises it through its organs, which themselves – chiefly by election – are constituted. Democracy is self-governance or governance in accord with the will of the governed. This state of law has been or is being achieved in most states that are called upon to make history.³² This view is in direct opposition to the current *understanding of an economy*. Currently one thinks of economy solely in the sense of capitalist enterprises. The owner hires the worker on the basis of a freely chosen contract, but once hired, the worker is at the service of every command and under the working conditions of the employer. In economic matters *autocracy* is the rule, not democracy. This is especially the case in regard to the definition of economic work. Political democracy is governance not only according to the will of the people, *but in their service and in behalf of their interests*. Capitalist enterprises stand publically in the service of the possessors of capital – whether this is a private person or a private society – the worker is dealt with by the wage and has no part in profits. *Democracy, on the other hand, demands a service to the community, enterprises that are not based upon private service, that is, service to a cause separate from the people as a whole.*

32 [One can see in this sentence the acceptance of Otto Bauer's distinction between 'historical nations' and 'those without history'].

Justification of the capitalist economic form is as follows: autocracy is allowed in that without the necessary *authority of leadership*, no business could be established; the private service of the worker for the benefit of the owner is justified because otherwise any economic savings – whether one calls them surplus value, profits, or some other term – could not be counted on, the *accumulation* or savings guaranteed in the form of new capital that alone assures economic and cultural progress.

The contradiction between political democracy and economic autocracy within one and the same society cries for a solution: one way has been the model of fascism, which ends political democracy and erects a regime of autocracy or dictatorship, conceiving of the entire history of political change from the English Revolution of 1649 until the Russian Revolution of 1917 as a giant error of the human spirit. The other form of solution to this contradiction is to carry democracy into the economic realm. This enables a twofold path:

1. The bearer of political democracy is the realm, the state, the provinces and communities, who by employing the democratic path of legislation can end the private possessions of capitalistic enterprises and give their leadership to the people and their choices of representation: this will be *state and municipal socialism*. Authority of the people, and the leadership of enterprise by them, is assured in this manner. We speak in this case of a *socialisation of the state*. (Provinces and communities are only parts of the state). The work then stands simply in public service.
2. Then, there is and can be *the economic life that develops from itself, beyond the state's institutions and own forms of activity, which nonetheless exclude autocracy or private operations in its organisations*. We refer to such endeavours and forms of enterprise, as opposed to state socialism, by the traditional term self-help socialism, or *the free, purely societal-based socialism*. We call it 'free' because it arises autonomously from the economic activities of the populace without intervention by the state, operating through purely economic means. The 'societal' appellation refers to the traditional distinction between the state and society, which is operative in this possibility. The development of economic democracy is *societal socialisation in contrast to political socialisation*.

In the phases of Russian economic politics since 1917, one can see these counter-posed positions clearly. Before we take them up in discussion, we must track an example of their play of interactions in the past.

In the conflict between Lassalle and Schultze, for the first time in all clarity one saw side-by-side the differing concepts of, on the one hand, a social-

democratic state and economic conception, and on the other, a liberal state and economic conception. The liberal conception denied the role of the state to be involved in economic matters, or, at the most, encouraging and influencing the pursuit of economic life by the people. Interventions by the state from this perspective must not disturb the normal course of business. *Economy is the realm of the private, of the individual!* This conception is, insofar as economic life is concerned, individualistic, anti-social, indeed inimical to the state; according to this view, the economy is non-political, politics is non-economic ('economically disinterested'), or it should be. The state has merely the task of developing the same rights for all those engaged in economic affairs and to protect them in this economic life. This view was mocked by Lassalle as the 'night-watchman state!' The individual as an economic subject has nothing to expect from the state; he is quite on his own, responsible for himself, and therefore required to help himself; state help is rejected, economic 'self-help' is the cure-all for the individual as well as for the whole of the people. The less the individual is concerned with politics, the better it is for him!

Lassalle passionately rejected the denial of politics as the medium for the emancipation of the working class. On the contrary, his immediate goal was to form a political party for the working class in order to conquer the state. Thus, he sought the universal, equal, direct and secret vote as the chief slogan in the battle before him, coolly rejecting the unionisation and the creation of cooperatives as powerless attempts to destroy the iron law of wages, unless the state intervened with its help (production associations financed by state credit). The Lassallean demand is an *ad hoc political socialisation programme* – every revolution has one. Contrary to the solely personally responsible, self-helping individual, Lassalle called for associations, namely *the state as 'a large association of workers'*, which in the spirit of community and with the means of economic life was ordered anew from the ground up. The state-supported productive associations were only one among many new forms in Lassalle's plan. In this sense, state help and self-help after the death of Lassalle remained slogans of the fight for one or two decades.

Neither the liberal conception of individual self-help, nor the Lassallean introduction of the socialist movement solely as a political programme, was to remain as then stated. Schultze-Delitzsch proposed a *cooperative association* that would extend through the entire society, composed of the petit bourgeois and the farmers, but even among the workforce. And the Hirsch-Dunker union association was established outside of the socialist movement upon a liberal foundation. On the other hand, right after Lassalle's death the German union movement began among socialists – even without a party affiliation – as well as a cooperative movement. As is often the case, these were pragmatic develop-

ments of class independent of an ideological stamp, even in part in contradiction to any ideological identifications, and in part without any ideological leadership. The difference between socialist unions and cooperatives, on the one hand, and the liberal, on the other, did not lie at this point in the juxtaposition of self-help and state-help: the one did reject, and the other furthered state-help in theory, *both nonetheless had no hope that either could actually be fully instituted*. The opposition took on another form: the liberal direction pursued a point-of-view of helping the individual: the Schultzean cooperative, and the Hirsch-Dunker union association, would make the worker into a *small capitalist*, mediating and easing his climb into the bourgeoisie; the socialists declared such an aim unrealisable, and instead placed weight upon the spiritual, material, and moral elevation *of the entire working class*. Both movements used the same means, although in different spirits. When the opposition of self-help and state-help was applied, it was only in a different sense than previously: those who wanted state-help could not count on it practically because of the enmity of the bourgeois state, and thus were reliant upon self-help, but in the sense of *the self-help of an entire class*, not that of the individual for himself, rather the working class opposed to the bourgeois classes *as an economic movement* (beyond economic politics), that is, *the working class against the economy of the capitalist classes, in contradiction to the latter and in competition with it, in the form of an economic movement whose means was the class war*. The self-helper fought the same battle with the perspective not of one class fighting against the other, but of the individual citizen in competition with other individual citizens, not so as to sharpen the opposition, but to bridge it and to raise the working class into a bourgeois existence.

There is no doubt left today that this economic movement of working class has spread in the last two generations over the entire world, improving extraordinarily the material conditions and achieving respect. The societal position of the worker today, in comparison to what it was in the time of Marx and Lassalle, has completely changed, and these changes are universal human progress in itself of immeasurable scope.

Parallel to these changes has been the winning of universal suffrage by the working class, which has affected the entire social world, together with the introduction of the Republic as the dominant form of state throughout the world, giving to the working class its new import and growing power. The question can be raised as to whether the working class has more to thank for its new position – that of its political struggle or its economic movements, its political successes or its economic accomplishments. Without doubt, the political successes have organised the masses, filling them with will power and self-consciousness, and this concentrated readiness to act served the eco-

conomic movements. On the other hand, the economic organisational work has immensely increased the ability to resist and the real power of this class, building thereby the prerequisites for successful political struggle. The question can only be answered by discerning what aspect were dominant in a particular country at certain times, but both were always operative, *their reciprocity explaining the advance of the proletariat*.

Nevertheless, we see from country to country, as well as in one country from historical phase to historical phase, a clear change in the spiritual orientation of the working class itself. Thus, the English workforce, from the disintegration of Chartism in 1848 until the turn of the twentieth century, was dependent mainly upon economic self-help, and only with the foundation of the Labour Party in 1903 did it begin to orient itself with a political emphasis. Depending upon the fate of a particular country, at one time '*economism*', then '*politicism*' is at the forefront. The predominance of the one or the other needs some commentary here. The German working class has been, since the death of Lassalle until the most recent period, oriented toward politicism, only now gradually providing room for economic ideas. Within the economic direction we see a similar inconsistency, where the leading mental orientation prefers unions as the sole answer (syndicalism), but then the cooperatives (cooperativism).

The conflict between state-help and self-help, as we have indicated, ceased to occupy the thought of the masses of the proletariat as long as they were without influence in the state. In the last 25 years, however, the bourgeois classes themselves have decided in favour of state-help in these matters, engendering for us the greatest success. The liberal negation of economic practices providing an economic regulation of the state has been sacrificed by the bourgeoisie, and state-help in an unexpected breadth and depth has been the goal of their economic demands. One of the means exercised, indeed the most important, has been the politics of the tariff, which has inaugurated a stormy progress in capitalistic development. And the Lassallean productive associations have come with state-help in many differing forms. The widely developed *subvention*, the laws protecting the middle-class, the state-run transportation systems, the other preferential systems of taxation are some of the forms in which the intervention of the state 'further the economy'. We can see this exemplified by the Prussian railroad system, a form in which the state 'is a driving economic force'. Politics as an economic means was in no way merely a discovery of the socialist proletariat; rather a kind of *state capitalism* (driven by the state) developed, and *capitalism with the blessing of the state* (the defence industry, and so forth) blossomed, unimaginable in the liberal past.

Still more: the political assault of the working class compelled the rulers of all countries, half against their will, to place state laws and state administration

in the service of the economic interests of the proletariat in order to save their souls from the propaganda of socialism. The ordering of working conditions, which was a victory for the unions, was taken up even by the Bismarck state, and taken further by *the laws protecting workers*. The insurance against illness, accident, unemployment, and old age that had been realised by individual unions and help associations were taken over by the state's *social insurance*. Where this occurred, the unions were not made superfluous because these functions were taken from them, but they were now more limited in their functional battles with management, and took on a more focused economic set of considerations in their struggles. And just like the English trade unions, they became even more 'dangerous' in these economic demands.

The state regulations that offered social insurance created a particular ideology, that of *state socialism*, and the mythology of the *social monarchy*. This so-called state socialism made union with state capitalism in order to expand the old liberal idea of the state under law [*Rechtsstaat*] to realise the 'economic state', which influenced all classes of the society, uniting them towards a higher national goal, putting them into service in their respective functions within this 'national economy'. The 'national economy' was understood as a function, in itself, of the 'world economy', which gave it its enlarged meaning. The economic state thus from its own essence became *imperialist*.

These developments drove the working class to a change in their conceptions, to the view that the economy of the state was decided by those in the state who possessed the power, that every economic striving must above all be political. In their struggle against the state, they rejected state capitalism, as well as the unasked for trusteeship of the state socialism, and were left by the absence of their own political power to the activity of the unions and the cooperatives for influencing the economy. But the World War and revolution have politicised most recently the working class and the proletariat. In Russia, the proletariat has not had the freedom that our proletariat has had to gradually build up the unions and cooperatives, which provided a basis for the politicisation; rather, their political movement took on a romantic form of conspiracy exclusively, a wholly *one-sided* political development. *The conquest of public power and a dictatorship of the proletariat seem to be the sole means, the all-healing solution! Political power for them is the Archimedean point from which the economy must first be transformed.* With them the economic development of unions and cooperatives beyond the state, a freely developed socialisation, wholly harmless to others, is almost a meaningless exercise. Politics is everything, economy nothing, insofar as the struggle for liberation is concerned. To be sure, once the dictatorship is realised, it will concern itself with the economy, socialising it through the *deus ex machina* of public power, where they can take their

example from the wartime efforts of increased state capitalism and state socialism. *The new economy will be created through non-economic means, through political power.* The fascinating effect of the Russian example has had adequate time to pull the workforce of the world into its path. The opposition between self-help and state-help has been transformed, however. One can no longer speak of state-help as a weakness – as any appeal to the state had been seen previously; self-help, however, was now countenanced by all, in the sense of ‘the exercise of one’s own power’. What is still in question is formulated as *socialisation through state power through politics*, that is, by the means of dictatorial legislation and administration, and on the other side, socialisation through one’s own power, non-politically, through freely developed economic organisations upon the path of economic democracy. Unions and cooperatives that were initially conceived from a liberal direction as the means for the improvement of the individual’s status, were later used by socialists as the means of class struggle, and are now thought of as the means of a *conscious socialisation from the bottom up*, socialisation through society itself, beyond the mechanisms of the state – an idea that first became clear among the guild socialists. *Thereby, the slogan of the class struggle as a negation of the existent was transformed into a slogan that referred to the positive creation of a new economic order.* The opposition between the political and economism becomes clarified in a new way from this perspective.

The experience of the post-revolutionary period has made this opposition in perspective a marked actuality. On the one hand, Russian communism has concluded in a state socialism that is difficult to differentiate from state capitalism, and gives evidence of the limits to what a state can employ in realising socialism. I am not diminishing the value of the state in this movement towards socialism, *but the limits of its effectiveness in a true socialisation show themselves clearly; they can be felt in their limitations.* On the other hand, the socialisation attempted by socialist parties outside of Russia have not achieved any thorough success. Socialisation through the state, unless one commands the state in an enduring manner, is not conceivable. The political movement of the working class *thus encounters a limitation of idea: politics as a means to be exercised by this class will not reach its goal!* Even though it is unavoidable, and even if it produces results, alone it cannot achieve the goal of socialism. Political means stands within the middle of a crisis.

There are union adherents (syndicalists) who eschew politics and opine that the radically conceived and practically applied unionisation struggle will take down capitalism, and establish socialism, which is its goal – but this is an error that can be demonstrated and surmounted. There are cooperative adherents who lay weight upon neither the political nor the union struggles,

who see the peaceful development and spread of cooperatives throughout the world, especially in areas of production, as generating in this movement itself a powerful revolution towards world peace, bringing world socialism. That is also an illusion. *Yet both of these directions, which can be termed economism, have a certain element of truth!* Both are *means of socialisation* from the bottom up through self-help, beyond the state, even if not independent from it and its legislation. Both are in their means *free organisation*, means that are of a *purely economic nature*, means for transformation of the economy from within, not extra-economic means, and thereby such that *they contribute to the preparation of a new economy out of the very womb of the old.*

What should the working class of a nation begin to do, given that they have not had sufficient developmental maturity politically, and given their exclusion from real political authority? Wait and prepare! Yes – but what do they begin to do, that is, *with their own economic powers*? Should they not use these? Couldn't they pursue an economic path of their own in the face of the limits, the difficulties, given to them by the ruling capitalism? Couldn't they achieve economic effects even when this is pursued beyond state legislation and administration? Thus, this question emerges out of the very activity of the working class! Such an economic programme would necessarily be twofold: an economic-political programme that presents the state with *a summation of their demands*, and which becomes *an integral part of the programme of a political party*: this will be realised as soon as their party comes to power! In the meantime, every worker stands within the immediacy of his economic life, seizing it in both arms, taking his daily bread from it, thus participating directly in the production and consumption of the economy as it is. Does the workers movement have no programme for its own economy of class that helps the individual workers in the midst of these daily economic processes, no advice for his behaviour, no goal for his economic activity that supports his self-help or his own power in what he does as a member of the working class? If yes, there is – a no is unthinkable – what is the content of such a programme, what is its scope, what successes can it achieve? These are the questions we have presented for an answer.

A no, as we have asserted, is unthinkable, above all because: the contradiction between democracy in the life of the state and autocracy in private enterprise, the contradiction between service of the community and service to the private individual penetrates perpetually into the soul of every worker: as a citizen of the state he decides over the weightiest problems, as an elected representative he administers the most important interests of the entire people – in his work-site, however, should he not be permitted to speak of rights, rather than not being allowed to be understood? He could administer a great muni-

cipality, be part of a ministry, if only he won the consent of his fellow citizens; in the much smaller private enterprise, however, he is a mere tool of a will that is foreign to him. As a free citizen in the state, should he work for interests foreign to him, should he stand always in private employment within the economy, helping the private owner accumulate wealth that is not part of the community itself, but is instead the gain solely of a private person? This contradiction is felt by all who strive for economic democracy, by all born into this system that has such striving. Yet the post-war period teaches such a person, especially in light of the Russian Revolution, *that without the preparatory school of self-help nothing can be achieved, even on the day of victory when one commands the economy!* And so it is more than probable that, in the coming years, after a decade of exclusively political activity, *the working class may be again oriented to economism*. And in this light we will see the answer to our previous questions, answers that have great practical meaning.

The economic system as a whole has two positions for the worker:

In *the processes of production*, he has an important role as an independent worker for wages. He performs work and receives a wage. Economic democracy must also penetrate working conditions, in the ordering of the worksite, and must also direct itself against autocracy in the conduct of management, it must regulate the scale of wages and the means of compensation in order to secure the private interests of the worker who stands in the service of the private owner. The struggle for this goal is to be accomplished in the *market of workers themselves*, and one then recognises immediately that the organisation of these tasks belong above all to *the unions*.

The worker with the wage he has earned then stands within the consumer's market as a buyer of the goods necessary for everyday life, that is, *in the circulation process*: in the role of *consumer*. As a consumer, he buys freely within the market of consumption; he is – legally under normal conditions – under no autocracy, but is rather a free citizen, who has the same rights as the capitalist producer. If he understands his power as a buyer properly he can organise himself within a class effort, and thus influence, to some extent, the market of goods, and thereby the production of what is necessary for everyday needs. One can see that this is the business above all of the cooperatives.

One recognises at the same time that these two dimensions operate under wholly different premises. A union representative fights for the worker as a subordinate of autocratic power, albeit against this power; this battle does not take place on the ground of private law. A cooperative representative has his activity upon the ground of private law, as an economic subject on the ground of the economy, as a free citizen beside other free citizens. The organisation that he creates to realise his goals will be an organisation within the scope of

private law, the worker will be not solely an individual, but rather *as a member of this organisation he is at once an owner*. As an owner amidst other owners, he is in a battle, but this battle is a competitive one. The worker, who is at the same time an owner, appears to have conquered the class struggle and the autocracy of the capitalist economic order – at least within the sphere of this organisation. This apparent phenomenon was the reason why Karl Marx addressed the issue of cooperative enterprise in his inaugural address in the middle of the past century: in his speech he brought the practical advice that production without a capitalist owner, production beyond the value to the private individual, that is, in the interests of the community, is possible! It is only through such cooperation that a new, a different manner of economy can arise, no matter how much its methods are linked to the older economy.

Both institutions – cooperatives as much as unions – are operative in the bourgeois world in a way that goes beyond themselves: the one creating many helping organisations (self-production sites, insuring associations, banks), the other through workers councils and workers chambers developing the superstructure of public law. One now can ask further: To what degree can the new be developed within the womb of the old means of economic practice? The answer to this question illustrates to what degree today economic democracy stands alongside economic autocracy, how the sphere of one grows constantly at the expense of the other, *and how far the realm of economic freedom today has developed within the compelling realm, the womb of capitalism.*

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Karl Renner 1926, 'Economic Democracy', *Der Kampf*,
19(December): 525–35

The Cooperatives

1. The thought most dearly held by the workforce is what path can lead directly to the association of working conditions and wages in a manner that enables one to have the profits of one's own labour. Two ideals must be realised with one blow: first, the self-governing workshop whose workers are entirely owners of the means of production; and secondly, the right that the full profit of one's work be insured through the unification of the products to be sold and the derived profits thereof to be distributed to those who produced them. That is the oldest idea of economic democracy. One sought it at first in one's own land, and then in the virgin lands overseas in Utopian communities, but in both places fruitlessly. Robert Owen, the spiritual father of the cooperative, wasted the passionate energy of his best years in this attempt. His vision encompassed not only the cooperative of work, but also the entire corporeal and spiritual life of a people, that is, a colony in which the task of education and public administration were included. Such a Utopia occupied the efforts of many of the proletariat in the first half of the nineteenth century.

A. With the attempt to realise this ideal, practice soon taught that an integration of all these tasks was not possible. The cooperative soon limited itself to the economic processes without spiritual side goals, giving its attention increasingly to the means of production itself:

1. The experiences which the working class made in the means of production are quickly told. The *productive cooperative* of workers turned initially to the utopian ideal of such cooperative equality, this thought commanded the interest of workers in England and France throughout the middle of the last century, although it found differing forms under differing conditions.
 - a. The *productive cooperatives* generate the required capital through the participation of the enterprise's workers who take care of the leadership and discipline through elected functionaries, and divide the profits among the members, whether through equal shares or by the amount of investment or by the work hours of service rendered. It would appear that in this way the right to a full compensation for the profits of work is to be realised, yet in the capitalist business cycle the enterprise rarely receives the surplus value it generates for itself, and even in the best instances that is an illusion.

As long as the branch of production is dominated by manual labour, it is not ruled out, albeit not often, that the amount of profit reaches only to cover the costs of the operative expenses and the management – even then loan capital must be borrowed, the empowered members giving themselves higher amounts of compensatory capital, making the enterprise more of their own exclusive domain, while the enterprise must hire additional help and part-time workers who are not cooperative members. And if the enterprise then flourishes, it is transformed by the above processes into a capitalistic business. As a rule there is a lack of capital, and in consequence indebtedness ensues, or in the wake of a lack of discipline and internal conflict, it fails. Only few cooperative associations survive. The principles by which the cooperatives function show themselves to be inapplicable for a modern capitalist enterprise with great capital needs. With advancing capitalism such enterprises as the cooperative, even when they succeed, are meaningless in relation to the whole economy.

- b. These difficulties seem to occur in the form of a cooperative where the workforce from the outset do not contribute their capital or participate then in the sharing of profits, and thus are limited in preventing the autocracy of the ownership. This limitation has been realised successfully, however, in the so-called *workers cooperative*. A well-organised association of workers makes a contract with the owner (product owner, farm owner) where, in lieu of an agreed compensation, he takes over the means of production in its entirety. The cooperative performs the work under the direction of elected representatives and shares the profits.
- c. In recent times similar attempts have been made, even within highly developed capitalist enterprises: a part of the enterprise is given over completely to the workers, allowing them to share the profits as they desire. Even in commercial enterprises, for example, department stores, such efforts have been made. It is not out of the question that in a limited scope these experiments will become permanent.
- d. If such enterprises aim to replace enterprise autocracy with self-direction in the operations, without actually changing the exploitation and profits in general, then the second half of the nineteenth century, especially in England, has brought such inverted forms into being, that is, enabling the workers to share in the profits, but without bringing them into an actual administration of the busi-

ness. There are also many instances in which this 'division of profits' occurs in enterprises governed by stockholders where workers can participate through stock ownership (industrial co-partnership), an approach that is seen as the 'coming' solution to the social question. But they remain, with some exceptions (Zeiss industries) without success in their application, and are then quite meaningless, as well, in light of the existing economy.

The *direct* sociation [*Vergesellschaftung*] or 'socialisation' of the working process within the path of the cooperative seems unreachable; one gradually recognises that this task requires a wholly different form of organisation, using other methods and principles, namely, *the unions*. The more the unions waged their battle with success in the last half of the nineteenth century, the more any attempt to realise socialistic goals through the *cooperatives* was diminished. The conception at the beginning of the workers movement was that only one form of association could effectively achieve its goals in one stroke, but gradually, out of experience, differing forms arose which took up differing aspects of the struggle, and then, step-by-step progress in the praxis of the movement lead to a sharp division organisationally between the *union* and the *cooperative* associations in their tasks and methods.

2. This division emanated in the experience that the cooperative path, insofar as the production processes were concerned, had nothing to offer, while on the other hand, surprisingly, the cooperative efforts, with regard to capital investment instead of simply work, and the circulation of goods instead of simply production, achieved success. In the first decade of this century in England, the home of the cooperative movement, one saw a bewildering plethora of cooperative establishment of all kinds (the historians of the movement call it the epoch of enthusiastic experimentation), a time in which the failures were corrected by the path indicated by the individual successes. All theories, even those of Owens, had been proven false, but the pragmatic experiments gradually found effective praxis.

A. Capital and circulation – that which seemed to be the preserve of capitalists and a forbidden terrain for workers – was the successful path for the cooperative. Yet the worker could not remain on such a path by himself, the weapon he had forged would be used by quite soon by many capitalists, so that for a long while the cooperatives were, above all, bourgeois, and not a proletarian organisation.

B. In order to achieve an understanding of the essence of the cooperative, one must begin with the process of the circulation of capital. Thus, we must describe the bourgeois cooperative.

The capitalist producer, the industrialist, who employs workers in the production of goods, creating surplus value, is not in the most favourable position in being able to realise the full surplus value from what he has had produced, as we have indicated, for he must pass on the goods to commercial outlets for their sale, and share the profits with them.

But the industrial and the commercial profits do not exhaust the surplus value, as a rule. More often than not, both must borrow capital, and thus a portion of their profits goes to loan capitalists as interest, and they are left with what is termed the owner's profit margin [*Unternehmergewinn*]. Finally, the landed proprietor who has a monopoly on the piece of property he possesses enters the process of dividing the profits and takes those gains from the surplus value, given his monopoly of the business site, considering it rent for the site itself.

The capitalist class divides the created surplus value among themselves in accordance with the laws of circulation, and this division of the booty is fulfilled most often within intense struggles, but always in the form of competitive struggle. In itself, this battle is not that of class warfare, yet in the intensity of it, where certain levels of the ownership that are exclusively in either the industrial, the commercial, in capital lending, or in the role of the owner of the sites are in fierce competition with one another, this battle can take on the form of class struggle (leaseholders against owners, farmers against lenders, industrialists versus bank capital, and so forth). But it can also be the case where the industrialist is simultaneously the owner of the sites, stockholder of the bank, owner of debt, and so forth.

In this battle over more booty one may see a certain group of owners within the cooperative set against another group within it, not allowing the latter to share in the surplus value, or at a minimum, giving themselves a larger share. This process is of less interest to the proletariat as they do not consider that the facts of surplus value and exploitation can be alleviated. Nonetheless, this fact within the cooperative praxis is meaningful, giving us a clearer understanding of the present essence of the cooperative.

- a. Producers unify themselves so that they may become their own sellers, and the share of the surplus value which will flow to them as commercial profit: productive cooperatives, of course, must be differentiated from these associations of producers.

The circulation of goods transpires in the form where one hand takes what the other hand gives to it, stores it, further refines it or keeps it for a short time in order to give it to another hand further for sale. Every cooperative orients itself either against the hand that gives it its raw material or goods, or against those to whom it further sells it on to, seeking to extract the surplus value for itself.

If the producers unify themselves in order to acquire their own raw materials and auxiliary goods, excluding the usual providers, they have constructed a *purchasing cooperative* [*Bezugs-genossenschaft*] with the function of buying in common. If they associate themselves in order to sell the products in common, they have established a sales cooperative [*Absatz-genossenschaft*] whose function is to sell. One and the same cooperative of producers can unite both functions, but most often this is not done successfully. For the law and the advantage of specialisation are apparent in such cases, enabling their specific dominance through the differentiated forms of organisation they offer.

However, one producer can join with another in the transfer of the productive process. Thus, the producer who generates a partial product can sell his wares to the producer who finishes the goods for further creation. In such a case, the one producer can intend to take a greater share of the surplus value than his cohort.

Often the one hand and the other meet in a competitive struggle with unequal weapons: the stronger party can win a greater percentage of the profits because of his advantage within the situation, leaving the other with little profit to share. In such cases, the minor partner who has no other option will join with others like him, forming a cooperative for mutual aid, and then this cooperative will establish its own process of either buying that which is required for their production needs or selling the finished products.

Production cooperatives such as this are called *manufacturing cooperatives* [*Werk-genossenschaften*]. Thus a cabinet maker can form a cooperative wood-working association where from the raw material that comes from the saw-mill, through its being worked upon with the machines that plane, it is passed on to the manual worker who constructs the article, which then the craftsman can take up for its polished completion, making it ready for market, in this process much like that of the weaver who has established a cooperative arrangement with bleaching, colouring, and so forth.

The *greater capital* required for this is not suitable for the form of the cooperative. The *cartel* is more appropriate for the joining of such hands, where external hands are excluded by the means of a *combining*; this process by its very nature is autocratic and dictatorial, and limits itself to the private law practices of a given country. Cooperatives are the means of operating for *small or medium-sized private enterprises*, where large numbers of such establishments must organise in order to achieve a legal form of status – namely, the cooperative. On the other hand, since they are numerous and have divergent interests, such combinations are rarely achieved. If they nonetheless are able to form the cooperative, it can mature into the economic consequences and damaging aspects of the cartel.

- b. Merchant cooperatives [*Händlergenossenschaften*] are developed to combat those who provide the producer with the raw materials or goods and those who sell them. One can generally describe such an operation: from the numerous producers who join to become buyers in gross of the necessary materials for production, who sell them to those who buy in gross amount, the buyers in gross amount who sell them afterwards to the specialists of certain goods, who in turn sell them to the consumers. The sequence of hands is then that of the producer – buyer in gross amount – the subsequent buyer in gross of the products – the specialist in certain goods – and the consumer. In certain cases, a transitional stage takes another direction – above all when an agent is in control of this sequence, in certain cases, a transitional stage is omitted, and, in certain cases, the products take another path completely, especially when they cross the boundaries of a state or are imported. Nonetheless, the above schematic has a general validity.

Infrequently a merchant will form a cooperative to manufacture something himself, excluding the producer; when that occurs, in such instances as in crating or packing, we have a manufacturing cooperative of merchants. Quite often such groups are not formed as a cooperative, but rather as a cartel, in order to force certain levels of pricing from the producer of the goods to be sold, thus curtailing their profits. More often the buyers in gross of products to be sold form cooperatives so that they may become greater in this vein; most recently, cooperatives among specialist buyers have been formed so that their purchasing ability is magnified. These associations take the form more of a chain [*Ring*] of establishments

or a cartel than that of a cooperative so that they can exert more pressure upon the consumer with regard to price.

- c. There has been a spread of cooperatives who are producers as well as being in the commercial aspects of production – in that way they can maintain more hold on profits, and escape, to some degree, the need of lending capital with its interest charges, thus not being limited to the profit of enterprise (which is the term that denotes the remainder after interest and other external costs of selling). These are the so-called *credit cooperatives* [*Kreditgenossenschaften*].

Every manufacturing and commercial enterprise has needs for capital at certain times, and has at its disposal sums of money at other times. Lent capital has differing rates of interest, and any enterprise will need to pay for these needed or saved monies with some banking establishment. If an association of enterprises combines into a credit cooperative, then when one is flush with money and the other needs it, these transactions can avoid the charges of interest that will come from a bank or other lending facility. If in spite of that there is still more money needed by one within the cooperative, and the cooperative must seek the monies elsewhere, it can be given at a lower rate to the cooperative association. In such cases, the cost of interest will be borne by the entire organisation, and exorbitant rates will have been avoided.

Such cooperatives have been organised with differing forms, as savings and loan establishments for salespersons and manual workers in accordance with the methods of Schulze-Delitzsch, as well as lending vehicles for small and medium-sized farms [*Raffeienskassen*], the methods developed for these specific needs.

- d. More difficult is the struggle with the cost of rent for property, and in this dimension, the cooperative that is reliant only upon itself has achieved no success. The continual rise of house rents work against the efforts of building and dwelling cooperatives. They cannot ward off such raises, but they can stabilise them. If a cooperative is able to acquire terrain for building, which they gradually develop, the price of the ground once it has been built upon will be much higher than the acquisition price paid for the ground; in such a case, the members of the cooperative will be able to pay the original price for their separate construction needs. Similarly, the inhabitant of the small house and garden, or allotment, or the farmer, can form such cooperatives so that the large sections of land acquired can be parceled out in the form of leased domiciles or acreage. In all these

instances there remains the issue of the ground rent, but this will be distributed by the single, original acquirer and divided among the other members of the cooperative. Experience has taught that such cooperatives only thrive when they cooperate with public bodies (the state, the regional authority, the community) acquiring public funds for settlement [*öffentliche Siedlungsfonds*]. Then, they are more within the domain of municipal socialism than a self-help association.

- e. Our analysis shows that the cooperative forms we have discussed have not avoided the issue of surplus value; indeed they have not once altered its importance. In that sense, they do not operate in the manner of socialism as they do not eliminate the expropriation of the proletariat, nor, as a rule, do they ameliorate it significantly. Yet they do engage in *the division of the surplus value quite effectively*. They take a major portion of the surplus value that otherwise would go to a private capitalist, distributing it equally among its many members; indeed, some cooperatives, for example, certain credit unions, have a termination for the indebtedness of interest among its members as a common practice. The portions of the surplus value will be either distributed democratically or compensated for democratically – a fact that is socially meaningful. We come to learn of conditions in which these facts have gained considerable weight. For the time being, as we see, the cooperative is only a functional instrument for the capitalist: it does not socialise surplus value, but it does change its societal function. This change we term *the solidification of surplus value* [*Solidarisierung des Mehrwertes*]. The cooperative creates a way of operating that is interesting in its legal form. It no longer stands under the autocracy of a capitalist; rather it is governed by a community that has a *democratic constitution* and is democratically self-governed, although it exercises an autocracy over those within its domain. The so-called ‘societies’ of merchants and stockholders are, by their nature, still not democratic, although they appear so in the purely juristic perspective. These cooperatives do not have a closed membership; they allow free entry and exit among large groups of people, who are given immediate co-administration and immediate enjoyment of all aspects of the enterprise. We have then, at least in terms of *the form*, an entire constitution and administration that is, in this respect, a socialised operation, although *the economic content* is oriented to surplus value, even if it is solidified. The cooperative can be seen

then as a transitional form from capitalism to socialism *historically*.

In any case, it is halfway towards a democratic economic direction.

c. Cooperative thought is most certainly a product of the social movement of the working class and its forefathers were the pioneers of Rochdale, the silk-weavers of Lyon, in short, proletarian and socialist circles. But everywhere, with the exception of England, *the cooperative began in the bourgeois middle-classes, its successes placing the cooperatives of the worker in its shadows*. The proletariat in this realm must find its own field to conquer.

As we have discussed above, the proletariat were the first to dream of a universal cooperative of one's entire life, and has always come back to experiments of this kind for specialised goals. It is to be appreciated then that from these beginnings, a form hardly noticed, even by Robert Owen, that is useful for the proletariat, indeed the victor among all proletarian-friendly cooperatives, one that has evolved over time, is the cooperative general store, the consumer association!

Since its inception, theoretical analysis has easily shown why that must have been the case and will be so in the future. As we have shown, the worker is central to the economy at two points to which he is bound: in production, he stands in a determined position in the work-site as a producer of goods of different kinds, imparting surplus value to them, pumping this value into the stream of the economy. In circulation he stands in a determined position of the market of goods, buying goods and thereby establishing their value. The connecting link to both positions is his salary. He buys with the strength of his work (A) with the wages of money (G), and buys with the money of these wages (G) the differing goods (w). His economic activity can be described in two phases: A to G, and G to w.

In the goods market, he traffics only with the specialists, in the production process only with those who immediately produce. But neither the producer in one place, nor the specialist in another, neither separately or together, present to him the full power of the capitalist. They stand against him as the advance guard in the trenches of capital: only behind these lines are the great masses of the armies, the generals, and the reserves. *Economically they do not directly affect him.*

Thus it must transpire and cannot be otherwise, as the working class has only developed two organisations for its immediate struggle with capitalism – the unions for the productive struggle, and the cooperatives for the consumer struggle; and if the cooperatives will have any success, they must deal with the specialists for the everyday needs of the working families.

1. The consumer association is the beginning of a cooperative association that is practicable for all families of a certain place who need to establish a common price for their everyday needs of food, clothing, and so forth; it is good for nothing else. There are many conditions that promise a favourable realisation of this goal.

First, a great deal of capital is not needed. Only a store need be rented, many of the goods needed for the store are already in circulation. Except for that, what is required are utensils, daily foodstuffs (bread, milk), which are changed weekly or monthly. Insofar as sales are concerned, the needs of the store are minimal. In the beginnings the most important element, capital, is not a problem; the membership will grow, and the portion contributed by each person will be small. The progress of the store affords a gradual growth of capital, and its increase in business facilitates the sharing of dividends. Because of these peculiar conditions, the consumer association store can avoid the aggravation met by productive cooperatives in sharing surplus value. Because of the regularity of the needs of the worker's household, the needs of the cooperative are easily planned, and the provisions can be changed or renewed with certainty; the risks are at a minimum. The equality of the membership leaves little room for one-sidedness of interest or any special privileges, a situation hardly imaginable in a commercial society. In any case, the constitution that was created in 1844 by the pioneers of Rochdale, so democratic, which constructed an economy and a statute-regulated praxis of experienced adults, was so intelligent that hardly more need be added to it: almost all associations that have constructed themselves according to the principles of Rochdale have thrived, and all that have ignored its thought have failed in some way. In twenty years, this form spread throughout England and Scotland.

- a. Let us analyse this direction now: what such a union needs to operate is capital and remains capital, but the capital for the individual who partakes in the union is so small that in his hands the functions of capital cannot develop. Even when the member is taxed for his participation in the cooperative, the amount for the individual member is meaningless in terms of 'capital', and represents only a surtax on him as a consumer. *But the accumulation of all the monies of the members is capital*; it functions as capital among capitalists of the bourgeois market, that is, outside the union, but not within it. According to the needs of the union, it is social capital, that is, belonging to an undetermined mass of people who are members, so that no individual within has a claim other than a right to co-

determine things in a general assembly, at least in that moment, until he steps outside of the union, dissolving his membership.

What is decisive is not the relations of capital between the member and the cooperative (as might be the case within society), rather *cooperative trust*, that is, the passion of the relationship, *the purchasing among the membership, a personal act of choice*.

This member purchasing brings savings to the cooperative, and the dividends are then shared with membership in accordance with the gains of that activity. Nonetheless, the yearly savings would be better not divided up; rather the growth in capital should be used for the expansion of the business. *One must care for the necessary accumulation of capital in every economy* – production cooperatives often fail in that they spend more than they bring in. Automatic material growth is thereby established even if the number of members of the cooperative does not increase. *The member who leaves has no more claim upon the reserves*. The cooperative develops despite members who leave a *supra-individual* fund, that is, a *social wealth*. *Here the capitalist is definitely socialised, from the bottom upwards, under the authority of a continuing democratic administration*.

The economic function of the consumer store is quite modest: *it eliminates specialist commerce*. Since it sells its goods at a daily price within the same circumstances as confronts the specialist, it realises a small business profit or the same portion of surplus value as would the specialist. But in contradistinction to all other forms of the cooperative, its surplus value does not go to a capitalist, but rather to the workforce in its organised entirety. The cooperative can distribute the dividends – they will go to the individual worker in the proportion in accord with his purchases, not in accord with his business participation, thus allowing in this pay out an additional investment in the consumer union itself. The entire body can decide, however, to lay aside these profits as social capital in a reserve fund. In any case, the created surplus value returns to the workforce who produce goods in the community through the detour, if you will, of circulation. The consumer is the final ‘hand’ in the process, which pays in the price of its purchases the value and surplus value, and here, in an unexpected way, receives back a feature that is not an aspect of any other cooperative. This portion of the surplus value, although created through capitalist practices, and circulating through capitalist laws, finally *is undoubtedly socialised*.

This feature is wholly singular to this type of cooperative. In any other instance, the surplus value is in accordance with capitalist procedures divided among capitalists whose business relations accompany the sequence of steps from production to the consumer. Here the surplus value falls out of his charmed circle of practices, it falls to the consumer who in his address of these goods is *not* a capitalist, but as a member of the consumer union managed by workers, is thereby a worker. In this case, he returns to the class that has created him. Thus, consumer unions as social entities are to be judged differently from any other kind of cooperative.

Yet how small, how inauspicious is this portion of the surplus value! The specialist's profit is, more often than not, only a modest part of the profit, interest, and business earnings, rent, and everything else that is 'present' in the goods sold. Secondly, the worker who creates the goods and is enriched with the surplus value is not necessarily the same who has created the goods!

This second objection is immediately relevant when the group of producing workers belong to another consumer union, and are ensured the same advantage. In accord with the generally shared equality of all worker households, seen individual by individual, the achieved sum of surplus value is the same. In all events, the individual household is of lesser importance than the overall social effect.

- b. The experiment of the consumer union, as interesting as it is theoretically, remains meaningless in relation to the larger economic picture, as long as it remains simply a store: until the year 1866, this model remained simply that, and we need not be amazed that Ferdinand Lassalle, who was no longer alive in this year, had never seen the full value of the consumer cooperative movement, and in this very year Karl Marx, who had just finished the first volume of his manuscript *Das Kapital*, saw in the productive cooperatives a larger meaning than that of the consumer unions.

We theoreticians must take notice of how the consumer union quietly and unobtrusively developed for three-quarters of a century, without any theoretical support, simply through trial and error, finding the correct path and eschewing that which did not afford results, indeed, pursuing the natural scientific method.

It took twenty more years – after 1866 – for the weavers, locksmiths, and lathe-workers, and such craftsman, to push through the idea that the consumer unions could develop into a higher form of co-

operative, which could replace the army of agents of the buyers in bulk and the buyers themselves, and buy and sell in bulk directly by those who did the production! In 1866 the Scottish, and in 1868 the English bulk purchasing societies were established, both with this economic function, enabling them to take the profit of such large business transactions, as well as all profits in between in the course of the necessary transactions that were part of the circulation cycle, turning these profits into reserves of social capital or as dividends to be given back to the members. The surplus value saved for the working class was now considerable; the accumulated social wealth was soon very considerable.

- c. But the initial years brought many dangerous fiascos – again one had to carefully move step-by-step forward with trial and error. Many experiments failed, for example, the purchase of mining industries, while others succeeded. The praxis itself taught that the next significant step must be attention to production, but only that area of production *which had already been recognised as an organised necessity*. In the eighties, self-directed production began to develop strongly, one enterprise after another was opened, but none with certainty of their success. Strengthened associations and powerfully capitalised purchasing associations created the now famous self-production facilities in which industrial profits could be accumulated and socialised: in such production sites, the worker interfaced with the other worker directly as co-owners, with no capitalist now standing between them: the entirety of the surplus value flowed back to the worker as a consumer, being reintegrated into the entire workforce as social capital.
- d. To be sure, we still have two sections of surplus value in this schema that were not included in this social capital – the ground rent and the interests upon loans. We know from our previous discussion that the ground rent was taken up in the existing cooperative praxis only modestly, and that here was the actual sphere in which authoritative state and municipal socialism had its best access. Here the social praxis of our own decade throws a harsh light upon the basic problem: we learn that one cannot ordain by decree the dissolution of the entirety of surplus value with in one stroke, or as we said in our younger day ‘have it annulled’ [*abgeschafft*’ werden kann]; rather there must be another social organ that generates a special path, some positive means of whereby surplus value (profits, rents, interest) *can be redirected* to the workforce! The Viennese rental pro-

tection, for example, makes the entire population of Vienna as a direct user of the city ground rent, accomplishing this through its own laws, administrative vehicles, offices and officials – it nonetheless preserves this wealth, and all other institutions that generate surplus value remain, leaving it to other forms of organisation which are not part of municipal socialism to realise in some way for the benefit of the population. Through socialisation one finds instinctively and intuitively *the first light* – theory may follow with sharper understanding. *For every partial form of exploitation one finds a partial institution to correct it. They do not eliminate anything; rather they organise it.* Rent is a partial form which is channeled directly back to the population, transferred in part by the tax on construction of domiciles and embodied in the living spaces themselves, where the house rentals are generally kept low.

All examples that we have put forth reform our thinking: we learn to think in dogmas, postulates, and decrees, and *learn* to discover and develop special institutions for our special needs. I have once named that *thinking institutionally* and stand by this thought: in the epoch of the realisation of our planning, concrete institutional thinking is called for.

- e. Insofar as the interest on loans is concerned, the bourgeois-farmer credit cooperatives have shown the way in which interest is mutualised or made a solidarity. The consumer cooperative economy has in its manner shown the way as well. Every consumer association is at the same time *a savings association* that enables the saved money to meet the needs of the association, and enable it to wander into the banking divisions of the large purchasing societies (England, Germany) or into specialised cooperative banks (France). The workforce of the United States, which until now had not developed any meaningful consumer movement, has created in the last few years *an independent* savings and credit organisation in the form of credit-unions, and in the large union banks which in its scope of business enterprise do not give ground to our own large banks. The young cooperative bank in Moscow promises in a short time to surpass even these models.

The birth of these credit organisations offers proof that the wage salary reserves and other sources of money of the working classes, although divided up into innumerable small amounts, together make up such an immense sum that the essential part of the money capital of a nation is so constituted, and reach all needs of opera-

tional credit for the cooperative enterprises. If the collection of all these funds is made available for the working class, then *this class itself becomes its own lending capitalist*, the interest returning back to the class itself, and when through the differentiation between interest indebtedness and interest paid occurs, the gain is to this class, thus becoming social capital. *Loan interest loses completely its character of exploitation.*

II. The cooperative institutions, which emanate originally from the creations of social praxis of the proletariat, work directly on the expropriative character of surplus value, in that they are the creation of an entire class, not of a private individual; thus, the working class reappropriates surplus value, either in the form of a *redirection* to the individual (where the dividend is an example), or in the creation of *social capital* that belongs undispersed to the class. This is accomplished by the organisation of wholes, which from the lowest levels of the store up through a national unity of organisations that are democratically organised; from the bottom up this effort derives its impulse, and can be seen as the machinery of a progressing socialisation of the grass-roots, *continually growing, continually on the march to generate economic democracy*. Within the products it creates by its own self-directed production with its own cooperative capital, there is no trace of surplus value anymore that does not flow back to the working class in its entirety: *and in that sense the exploitation of one class by another is totally eliminated!*

Let us look now more closely at the structure of this social organisation with the example of an interesting corollary phenomenon:

- a. The household of the individual worker has always been the most neglected and poorest thing of the world, but it is not a thing of the whole community, bound by the arteries of all the households of one's class comrades: as the individual cell is nourished by the networks of blood and nerves, so the cells of the households are taken care of in all their needs through the organisation of them. Quite strangely – *it is actually a community of material life that is developed*, looking very different from the dreams of Robert Owen, not that of closed home-colonies universally the same in its living community structure. Here not everything is socialised; on the contrary, the final consumer act is individual, and the person asserts himself in a private circle of everyday life. As the Holy Book says: 'It is not good that the individual is alone', nonetheless the custom has remained in its conceptions: *a certain private sphere is asserted by every individual, and many of the actions of life remain better as intimacy, as a*

private experience, as one can recognise in sexual activity and consumption. The ideal of an absolute community of existence, which was a desire of the older communists, are, for our prerequisites of socialist thought, exaggerated and intolerable. To a certain extent and in particular cases, community household may be necessary and even desired, but the praxis of the working class itself has held on to the individual household, and is its strongest customary need; in practice, there has been no effort at all to change this. Where the war has created such communities, in peace they have disappeared. Beyond this given of individual life, socialisation has emerged from the bottom upwards, developing democratic economic and administrative forms whose practical result today allows a theoretical conclusion: these organisations can fundamentally lead finally towards a wide sphere of production and circulation – which we cannot here further describe because of the constraints of this essay – ending the exploitation of one class over another, of capital's control of surplus value, indeed socialising the material life of the masses, and so doing in a democratic manner, without compulsion.

And strangely, this development is completing itself wholly on the ground of the capitalist world itself, wholly without a class war, simply through the means of the bourgeois economy itself! The whole secret seems to lie in the fact that in capitalism's effort to organise its economy, this process begins of itself to move *in the opposite direction* to what capitalism would want: this phenomenon occurs because while for the capitalist the sequence begins with capital and production for a market, the consumer cooperative system stems from the consumer who organises himself with others to provide for their needs, collecting their capital, but as its possessor it is not capital, rather merely contributions to the consumer, and remaining so, covering its needs, and stimulating the possibility of its own production to cover these needs. The difference between the two intentions – that of the capitalist and their system, and the cooperative consumers who participate in the system in their own manner – must not be belittled: for is not this difference in paths constituted by elements of the same path! Another difference is how in this manner the consumer cooperative avoids the anarchy of capitalist non-planful production, also avoiding its unnecessary expenses, for its planning does not embrace the capitalist's systematic allowance for economic crises, as it need not buy or produce for market speculation; rather its activity is based upon what is needed continually. This is an absolute antithesis of the capitalist system. Then, if all cooperatives in part have such socialising tendencies, nonetheless, one can say that they stand upon the ground of the capitalist system

of economics, and finally one can add: *the consumer cooperative economic system is its own singular kind that is fundamentally different from the capitalist economic system.*

- b. But it would be mistaken to mean that this transpires *without struggle*. Every consumer association, every bulk purchasing society, stands centrally within the bourgeois competitive wars. Competitive warfare is its essence, and something different from class war. The pioneers of Rochdale begun with the war cry: Cooperation, not competition! And from this slogan 'Cooperation', the Romance languages borrowed from the English the term 'cooperative'. It is true that the consumer cooperative economy excludes within itself every form of competition, but it is just as true that it is in competition in all other markets of the capitalist economy, and this competition is, as a rule, fierce. Moreover, the pioneers did not imagine with the opening of their stores that they were beginning a class war! There pass decades of quiet, successful work until in England a real class war develops, which they were at the forefront of, and yet, at the same time, they have theoretically denied this because of their tradition; but despite such disclaimers, they were not spared that.

I have explained in the preceding section how the competitive war functions when one has large social groups on both sides, and how that can then take on the form of a class war. Thus, when the farmers are exploited by middlemen and lenders, they seek to form cooperatives in order to have a common struggle protecting themselves. In that moment when the workforce turns as a mass to consumer associations, *the petit-bourgeois alone* begin a mad class war against the consumer association; in that moment, however, when the workforce understands the consumer association as a strong means of organising their class, as well as a way towards the socialised society, seeking to preserve and maintain it, *the entire capitalist world* makes this petit-bourgeois *struggle its own*. Then the consumer association becomes a mere competitive object, painful and against the will of those who direct them, but for some who lead them a conscious tool of the class war. This developmental stage is unavoidable. The peculiar fact that a means of battle can be harmless for a long time, and first in a later phase of the class war becomes pertinent for it, confuses many and thus opens the character of class struggle genuinely possessed by the consumer movement to challenge.

- c. But the 'means of competition' or 'the means of class struggle' – these two designations – are only pertinent for the two beginning phases of their becoming, both of which can be called 'negative'. At a certain stage of higher development, when the social meaning of the cooperative organ-

isations are visible, the real positive value reveals itself *as a democratic means of socialisation, as the lever of a new conscious creation of society, as a part of socialism in the present. In this third phase in which we stand today*, and – again, to our surprise – the future dreams of the pioneers of Rochdale become actual problems, after fifty years of being contained within the narrow confines of petit-bourgeois thinking where there was a denial of any other ideal than dividend distribution.

The socialising function of the consumer cooperative has also been recognised by the Russian Bolsheviks who after their victory empowered the cooperative organisations, integrating them into their system, transforming them into ‘consumer communes’ from above. But that was a murdering of their soul. For their soul is economic democracy; it is the freely ordered system that emerges from the bottom up. It is self-help and personal responsibility, a free economy determined by individual themselves. But within these intentions one can see the fundamental programme of socialism. If our chosen conception is that of the old Utopians, our plan then cannot be that of a top-down, compelled community. Can such an idea really be that of our forefathers? Such a plan is neither permissible, given our tradition, nor effective. We have seen in this movement over eighty years of an actual organic development towards socialism, which has been based upon the freedom of the individual, respecting the sphere of individual life that emanates from that freedom, in which from bottom to top a commanding and decree-making compulsion is not needed, indeed a movement in which all surplus value returns to the worker. If we bless this development, instead of misrepresenting it, we will liberate this movement from all legal and administrative boundaries that stand in its way, helping it in the face of contemporary needs, lending the help of the state, enabling it to combine freedom and socialism, socialism without compulsion! The Russian authorities have liberated the cooperatives, as we said, giving them back their social capital, and in that they have been justified. They would be doubly right if they increased the self-help through state aid – the Russian cooperatives have shown, indeed, a grand growth. This experiment of consumer communes and their failure has given us immense knowledge towards the battle, the struggle, of inquiring socialism.

Friedrich Adler

As a Machian in his epistemology, Friedrich Adler saw that every immediate perception was focused, and delimited, by a conception that could be more or less conscious in the person's mind. Such concepts came from established theories, which underlay not only scientific understanding, but also ordinary perceptions of the everyday. The two essays below show the Marxist understanding of this truth. Adler shows how Marxist dialectical materialism is based upon the appreciation of the ever-changing organisations of thoughts in their historical, antithetical character to each other, and yet their syntheses (i.e. integration) over time. The first article carefully presents an understanding of the dialectic, not as a metaphysical rigour of laws that undergird nature or human nature in themselves, but as the manner in which human judgement addresses any issue of natural or societal existence in a problem-solving manner. All human social knowledge moves from one conception to another to address the omissions and anomalies of understanding, so that human society is one of 'development' based upon the knowledge that countervailing theories have enabled.

Mach articulated an approach to human knowing that was embedded in the thought of Marx, namely, that what is known and acted upon is a conscious expression of will, and that nature and humankind in its order and products are the productive outcome of directions of intentional focus, not some external, unchangeable lawful development embodied by one particular system of knowing of a time. Theories can be superseded because of their limitations, but all theory that has arisen from the conceptual guidance of empirical experience leaves lasting value, even as new concepts that generate new theories from empirical experience augment this past knowledge in some manner.

The second article addresses 'everyperson' and the role of theory that is possible in his or her life. With a simple language, Adler uses examples from everyday life to show the pervasiveness of theories of experience that emerge from personal experience, and which are inherited, subtly guiding personal experience. The intention of the article is to enable the reader to see the function of Marxist reorientation to the conceptual bases of everyday life in a bourgeois world, placing historical reality within *the pure acts of will of people* as determined by unreflective 'concepts', or those forged with a new conceptual address of experience, so that instead of the 'trees' seen by dint of everyday orientation, the actual 'forest' of one's society is recognised.



Friedrich Adler 1906–7, ‘Friedrich Engels and Natural Science’, *Die Neue Zeit*, XXIV: 620–38

1 *Experience and Development*

Among the great socialists, only Engels has concerned himself intensively with natural science. Although the discoveries to which Marx and he connect their name belong completely to the social sciences, and although he dedicated himself to an innumerable amount of social problems in both theory and praxis, he also succeeded in bringing clarity and insight to an area of the natural sciences pertinent to his socialist concerns. The worldview that stems from the historical-materialist conception made it possible for him to form a conception of natural science that was far advanced from the norm of his day. His presentations of his conception belong even today – and they are almost thirty years old – to the best and most explanatory of what can be read concerning the natural sciences.¹

Engels speaks with great modesty about this part of his life’s work. He asserts, moreover, that it ‘was only natural’ that he ‘travelled with rather great difficulty in the area of the theoretical natural sciences’,² and that in the parts of his book which took this up, ‘a great awkwardness was evident in the presentation’.³ The high demands that Engels placed on himself in this self-criticism will first be clear when one considers the thoroughness of his study. He has offered the following in this regard: ‘one must have knowledge of mathematics and natural science in order to address nature from a dialectical and materialist perspective. Marx was an astute mathematician, but we could only pursue the natural sciences in spurts, sporadically. Therefore, when I returned to business, and moved to London, I was able to devote time completely to a mathematical and scientific “molting”, as Liebig calls it, applying the best of my eight years there in this pursuit’.

As Engels came to terms with the natural sciences in this period, the foundational development of his mental life was completed. In their youth, Marx and Engels were adherents to the philosophy of idealism, particularly that of Hegel. The great revolution of their understanding was that of *accommodating the idealistic thought to experience*, which was actualised in the facts of political economy. They called their newly achieved standpoint *materialism*. This is quite easily comprehensible inasmuch as materialism at that time was asso-

1 Engels 1901, and Engels 1903.

2 Engels 1901, p. xv.

3 Engels 1901, p. xiv.

ciated with *all* knowledge of experience, and so was closest to hand as they moved from the 'idea' to experience. Today, it is necessary to stress that it was *only the experience* that could be acceptable to materialism. This is derived from Engels's expositions in his magnificent Feuerbach book, which states clearly: 'The separation from Hegelian philosophy was accomplished by Marx with the return to the materialist standpoint. That is, one decided to take up the real world – nature and history – as it offers itself to everyone without a preconceived idealism, exposing oneself to its merciless presence; one sacrificed oneself to its merciless actuality, knowing it in its real contexts, where no facts could be dismissed with fantastical schemes. *There is no other meaning to materialism other than this perspective*'.

Yet Marx and Engels did not merely take up experience as a basis for their thought, they made another decisive step in which their greatest contribution lay; they recognised that with all experience there is a determination of *experiential processes*, that all science is *developmental-historical*, or as they put it, has a *dialectical* character.

The dialectic enables one to resolve, as Engels said, 'all final, absolute truths, and the corresponding human conditions that underlie these. In its purview, there is nothing final, absolute, holy; the dialectic proves that there is past that precedes and is part of all things, and that nothing exists other than the uninterrupted process of becoming and passing away, that everything advances without end from the lowest to the highest phenomena, and that what is seen is only a mirror of what transpires in our own consciousness'.

In the mental development of Marx and Engels, Hegel's dialectical conception was integrated, but in a way that led to a quite different perspective. Engels said, to be sure: 'Marx and I were the only adherents of the German idealist philosophy who consciously saved the dialectic in its materialist conception of nature and history'.⁴ What is important is the extent of the conscious transformation of the Hegelian tradition by Marx and Engels. One can see this in the following thoughts: 'But this dialectical method was unusable in its Hegelian form';⁵ the dialectical law 'which was first developed in a comprehensive manner by Hegel, but in a mystical form, was taken out of the shell of this mystical form and brought in its simplicity and universality clearly to our own efforts'.⁶ Engels says quite clearly: 'It was not for me to construe the processes of nature by dialectical laws, rather to discover these within nature, develop-

4 Engels 1901, p. xiv.

5 Engels 1903, p. 37.

6 Engels 1901, p. xv.

ing their presence'.⁷ This would then 'turn the Hegelian dialectic upon its head, or better, take it from its standing upon its head, and placing it properly on its feet'.⁸ Engels further articulated his conception without ambiguity in the following sentence: '*The dialectic is ... nothing more than the science of the universal movements and developmental laws of nature, of human society, and of thought*'.⁹

We can therefore state that the terms 'materialism' and 'dialectic' with Marx and Engels correspond fully with the concepts of modern scientific 'experience' and 'development'.

The fact that Marx and Engels were able to bring experience and development into sharp clarity in their foundational principles for our own understanding makes their surprising success comprehensible. But it is not only that they achieved *complete* clarity of principle, they were also the first to arrive at this insight. The Marx-Engels conception of the history of human society was *the first of the great discoveries* on the plane of experiential developmental history. It was a decade later that the second great step forward in this concept of developmental history occurred with Darwin in the area of organic life, and then again, another decade later, the third meaningful advance from a developmental historical perspective occurred with the beginnings of Mach's work explaining the developmental history of the physical sciences in its dating. The principle explanation of Marx and Engels, that of the developmental-historical, was quickly and easily translated in its meaning to other areas, even though its full import has still not been adopted by many disciplines. While Darwin's theory has been integrated into the development-historical views of cosmogony and geology, one can see the ideational ancestry of such areas as embryology and ancient history even more clearly in Engels. He was limited in his criticism of the physical sciences of his time. Yet this succinct criticism, as we will indicate, was in the spirit of the natural science of our day. A thorough dialectical presentation of the natural sciences, however, was impossible for him, as Darwin's work, comparatively, took an entire lifetime. In physics, for example, Mach's work took his entire life of thought. When Engels took up his investigations, the chief works of Mach had not yet appeared,¹⁰ and Mach's views, although fully developed by then, had only appeared in journal articles known only to the specialists in his field, so that Engels could only have come across them by chance.

7 Engels 1901, p. xvi.

8 Engels 1903, p. 38.

9 Engels 1901, p. 144.

10 The first of these was the 1883 work, *Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung historisch-kritisch dargestellt*.

Engels had to restrict himself, then, to criticism only, even as he knew of his self-limitation. To show the concept of development in all areas was, as Engels once said concerning Hegel's work, 'a task beyond any one individual'.¹¹ And regarding the task of finding these laws in nature, then formulating them, Engels wrote in the foreword to the second edition of *Anti-Dühring* (1885):

To attempt this as a contextual whole and in each special discipline is a giant undertaking. Not only is the whole of the natural sciences almost immeasurable in such an interpretative challenge, in this area, especially, a huge revolution is taking place which one can hardly grasp in its midst, even if one's free time was open fully for it. Since the death of Karl Marx, my time has been demanded for more important duties, and thus my work on the natural sciences must be interrupted. I must limit myself in this present work to only certain insights, and anticipate that perhaps later I can offer a more complete exposition of these results, perhaps in association with the highly significant posthumous writings by Marx on mathematical theory. And again, perhaps the advances in theoretical natural science will make my own work superfluous. For the revolution which is being wrested out of the extant theoretical natural sciences is occurring necessarily, compelled by the mass of purely empirical discoveries, and even the empiricist who strives against the dialectical understanding is compelled more and more to recognise the dialectical processes of nature.

2 *Anti-Metaphysics*

Just as the modern sciences had, Engels turned against metaphysics, which both he and Marx realised in their thought as they separated themselves from idealism. This aspect is shown in this exposition from his work on Dühring:

The dissection of nature into its differing elements, the dividing of the differing natural processes and natural objects into determinate classes, the investigation of the internality of organic bodies in their varied anatomical forms, have been the bases of the giant advances of the last four hundred years into our knowledge of nature. But, it has left us accustomed to seeing nature only as isolated phenomena, not furthering our understanding of nature and natural processes as a whole; thus, we do not see nature in its movement, rather as a stagnant condition that never

11 Engels 1901, p. 9.

changes in its essence, rather only as a fixed entity, not in its living presence, rather only in its dead condition. And, this stationary understanding is carried over to philosophy – which can be seen in what occurred with Bacon and Locke – a particularly narrow-minded approach of the last century, a metaphysical position. For the metaphysician things and their images in thought are concepts, individualised, one after the other, none influencing each other, fixed, stationary, an object given once and for all for our inquiry. This person thinks in a contradictory manner: his words are yes, yes, or no, no, and what he expounds is negativity. For him, a thing either exists or it doesn't: a thing cannot be itself and part of something other at the same time. Positive and negative definitively exclude each other; cause and effect stand equally in a motionless opposition to each other. This way of thinking appears, at first, plausible to us because it reflects a commonsense character. But, healthy commonsense alone, even as it is a sociable partner within the four walls of one's home, experiences wonderful adventures as soon as it ventures out in the world of actual inquiry; and, even those metaphysical points-of-view which seem authorised in certain areas, seemingly necessary in our thought, sooner or later confront barriers which prove these views to be narrow-minded, one-sided, and abstract, not functional for resolving certain contradictions because they see things in an isolated manner, not contextually, not enabling one to see the emergence and dissolution of the particular thing among other things, seeing thus only the trees, not the forest.¹²

Engels recognised that the older metaphysical method of inquiry 'which preferred an investigation into the thing as a given, a fixed existence, considering any deviation from this focus as the entertaining of non-substantial phenomena ... did have in its time an immense historical justification. The things had to be investigated in themselves before the processes of which they were part were investigated'.¹³ This developmental process can be tracked in the natural sciences as well:

The older metaphysics which took things as finished entities arose from a natural science that investigated things as completed states of life or death. But, as these investigations expanded, a decisive advance was

¹² Engels 1901, pp. 6–7.

¹³ Engels 1903, p. 40.

made possible so that entities were studied systematically so that nature became something of constant change, and that tolled the end of the traditional philosophical area of metaphysics. And in fact, if natural science in the previous century was overwhelmingly that of a science of *collection*, a science of finished things, our century is essentially that of an *ordering* science, a science of processes, a science of the origins and development of things and their contexts, which integrate the natural processes into a large whole. Physiology, the science which investigates the processes in plants and animal organisms, embryology, which examines the development of the single organism from its germ through its maturity, geology, which tracks the gradual development of the earth's surface, they are all children of our century.¹⁴

In this line of thought, which is concerned with that part of natural science that treats organic life, Engels establishes the separation between the older metaphysics and the progress of the developmental-historical way of thinking fully completed.

It is different with *the physical sciences*.¹⁵ 'Since ... the natural scientist', says Engels, 'only counts, until he learns to think dialectically, he will explain any of his discoveries through a manner of thought that must be *confused without boundary*, reflecting the state-of-affairs in the theoretical natural sciences, where the model that is taught by the teacher to his students, and the writer to his audience, brings only confusion'.¹⁶ Engels hoped that shortly the 'metaphysically schooled thinking of the natural scientist' would become clear, and that the investigation of nature must 'by dint of its subject be liberated by English empiricism from its inherited, constricted method of thought'.¹⁷

In any case natural science has so developed that it can no longer escape a dialectical purview. It will make its advance in thought easier if it keeps in mind that the results which are then connected into a systematic whole are merely then a concept, and that the art of operating conceptually is not in-born, nor is it given naturally in the everyday consciousness, rather

14 Ibid.

15 Under physical sciences we understand the so-called exact natural sciences: physics, chemistry, mathematics, astronomy; Engels ordinarily simply refers to these as the theoretical natural sciences.

16 Engels 1901, p. 8.

17 Engels 1901, p. xix.

demands effective thinking, a kind of thinking that has a long, experiential history, no more nor less than the entire history of experientially-based inquiry into nature.¹⁸

The dialectical grasp of the physical sciences can only succeed upon the bases of *the dialectical comprehension* of human knowing. On the other hand, the results of the dialectical grasp of understanding cannot come to its full import until it is used effectively in a specific physical area. This explains the exceptional situation that the dialectical mode of comprehension has been discovered many times, but in the battle of opinions has never succeeded because the discoverers in one area were not known, and thus supported, by the discoverers in other areas.

With great pride we can say that in this area, it was a socialist, a German worker, who was *the first* to come to complete clarity. In 1869, the tanner Joseph Dietzgen published his work, *Das Wesen der menschlichen Kopfarbeit, von einem Handarbeiter* [*The Essence of Human Mental Activity, by a Manual Worker*], in which the dialectical conception of knowing was developed with such masterful clarity, and with such a polished form, that even today in this area where a manifold increase in contributions exists, it affords a rich and rewarding study to all who turn to it. Yet at this time the book had little success. Who could have known then that this simple worker from his standpoint in the world had produced a work that towered over the existing efforts in the philosophy of guilds; who could have realised that in this man, who surpassed those in academic stations, yet without having such a position, that a thought was evidenced which was more than dilettantism! But it was not only his position as a proletarian that hindered his acceptance. Because of the limitations in epistemology itself, as has been pointed out, there was nothing possible from his direction. Epistemological theory at that time was practised only by philosophers. But as in all other areas, so it was in epistemology: bringing up the philosophy of the dialectic was bringing down any hearing. For if one brought in experiential developmental history to an area of study, immediately one brought an end to the narrowly constricted metaphysic: philosophy. The instance of Richard Avenarius shows that to be the case. His brilliant mind enabled him to become a professor of philosophy while still quite young; all the prerequisites for a popular success in the eyes of science were there. But then he published his epoch-making work, and it was pushed aside, left in silence. That is because in him one saw the powerful, epistemological dialectical-materialist

18 Ibid.

knowledge, which could not then, and still cannot, penetrate into the thought of his 'colleagues'.

Only within a natural scientific plane of knowledge could success be found with this methodology. For the natural scientist does not have this metaphysical constriction of thought as part of his profession; rather his contribution exists only as long as someone else finds a better solution. Without a positive contribution in the physical sciences, metaphysical critiques are not sufficient, which can be seen in the little effect that Stallos's criticisms of the mechanical materialism have seen among researchers in that field.¹⁹ First with the positive contributions of Ernst Mach, who then addressed the physical sciences from a developmental-historical purview, could theoretical success from this perspective occur. Insofar as clarity is achieved in the particular area investigated by a natural scientist, he is then capable of seeing the relevance of an experientially-based developmental history in other areas of science: the purely epistemological work of Avenarius, of Cornelius, and so forth, come then to be appreciated. One must, however, be overcome with appreciation for Joseph Dietzgen when one realises how he, indeed, was the first before all these others. Today, when epistemology has leveled the field for all natural scientists, the class barriers must also fall, permitting due recognition of this first pioneer. Whoever takes up the anti-metaphysical viewpoint in his field – whether his first teacher was Marx and Engels or Darwin or Dietzgen or Mach – he can then quite easily see the justice of the experientially based developmental-historical purview in other areas. Yet this is not always the case. One sees, for example, with Häckel and his students, whose extraordinary contributions in organic biology have not hindered them from spouting the most platitudinous metaphysics in reference to the physical sciences as well as social sciences. In physics, developmental thinking is completely foreign to them, and in the social sciences they believe that they can apply the principles of evolutionary organic biology without any mediation of human cognition.

The great meaning of pure epistemological clarity for the elucidation of natural scientific questions is characterised by Engels as follows: 'One can reach [the dialectical conception of nature] by the compilation of natural scientific facts which compel such recognition; one can get there more easily if one brings to the dialectical character of these facts the consciousness of the laws of dialectical thought'.²⁰

19 J.B. Stallo 1901, *Die Begriffe und Theorien der modernen Physik* [*The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics*]. [The first edition appeared in English in 1880].

20 Engels 1901, p. xix. Insofar as an attempt to find in Engels's discussion a mystique is a failure

The idealistic youthful phase of Engels's thinking made purely epistemological problems self-evident to him. What he says in that regard is therefore above all a criticism of other epistemologies. But aside from these critiques, and his great contributions, which can be explained by his epistemological standpoint, what stands out is his own unqualified recognition of Dietzgen's rejection of the Kantian 'thing-in-itself'.²¹ For one thoroughly versed in the dialectical conception, the Kantian 'thing-in-itself' must be a deterrent from the onset. No matter how this is artificially clothed in its modern usage, nothing has changed: it is a metaphysical thing, and the attempt to reduce a fact to its basis in the examination of any process is a complete failure. The reduction that stems from our contemporary epistemological perspective, however, leaves possible only modest claims in regard to findings, and one can surely suppose that Kant's concept of his 'thing-in-itself', which was so grandiose, would not be recognised by him today. Kantians, however, feel better when the 'thing-in-itself' is recognised, no matter how surpassed Kant's thought has become, and embarrass themselves with 'lamentations' concerning that which no longer astounds them, obstructing any way forward in a fruitful development of argument.

3 *Materialism and Dialectic in Epistemology*

'With Hegel ... those within nature and history are in a dialectical development, that is within a causal context which contains all the criss-crossing movements and momentary regressions that lead to the advance from the lowest to the highest, but in itself a poor imitation of eternity, of which one has no clue, but in any event is independent from every thinking person, the self-movement

to recognise that his 'transformation of quantity into quality' and 'the negation of the negation' of the Hegelian dialectic rely upon a historical-developmental perspective. He says that the negation of the negation is 'an extremely general, and therefore an extremely broad and significant developmental law of nature, of history, and of thought ... When I say of all these processes that they are the negation of the negation, I am lumping them all under the law of movement, not attending to how this might occur in each special area' (Engels 1901, p. 144). This example, in which Engels points to the law of the negation of the negation, is how from the law of mathematics all fields are to be comprehended. Its presence in all fields can be shortened from a linguistic description to algebraic denotation. Algebra becomes a means of description. Engels's use of such description, insofar as the negation of the negation is 'a -a and +a²', so that for this state-of-affairs to arise, something must be directly the converse (Engels 1901, p. 139). Through such a formulation of the negation of the negation, that is, depicted algebraically, one must conceive of it through a *dialectical algebra*; there is no dialectic in algebra itself.

21 Engels 1903, p. 39.

of a concept. This ideological confession must be eliminated. We conceive concepts as materialist products of our mind, as images of real things, instead of real things as images of this or that phase of the absolute concept'.²² The foundational transformation of Hegel's conceptions was a giant step for Engels. It was *the concept of experience*, above all, which was the gain from all his involvement in the areas in which he developed a positive knowledge, in which he saw the developmental processes; he saw a real world of objects in contradistinction to Hegel's idea. On the other hand, it appears that he never gave a completely clear account of *what experience really was*. In a dialectical conception of physics, clarity in this question is unconditionally necessary. Dietzgen was completely successful in this direction, and Marx in 1844 seemed to have thought it through completely. He said in his *Notes on Feuerbach*, which, unfortunately, were not fully amplified:

[T]he main lack in all previous materialist thought – including that of Feuerbach – is that the object, reality, sensuousness, only has been grasped in the form of the object or the intuition; not, however, in terms of human sensuous activity, praxis, not subjectively. In this mistaken approach, activity is set in opposition to materialism, a position that emerges from idealism – but in an abstract manner, since idealism does not know the natural, the actual, sensuous activity. Feuerbach wants the sensuous, the real object as opposed to that which is in thought, but he comprehends human activity not in its actuality as objective action.

The actuality that is sketched in these notes is given below.

All earlier philosophy has always separated the natural context in which the human is to be found from its purview. Yet the person is always in a context, the experience of the ego and the contextual experience *belong inextricably together* in every event, subject and object are only to be seen in relation to one another. Philosophy divides this relation, it separates the 'I' from its environ. When this occurs, there is then opportunity for the most unlikely theories. On the one hand, dualistic theories emerge in which the 'I' is conceived of as something 'inner', a 'soul', and so forth, while on the other hand, there are ill-conceived monistic theories – mechanical materialism and energetics – which constitute the 'I' from a substance, describing it as an object. The simple actuality of experience remains in the dark. Philosophy separates the 'handkerchief, that is red' from the 'sensation in me of red'. Naturally, however, what we experi-

22 Engels 1903, p. 38.

ence is 'red', which can just as little be known without a handkerchief as without the person himself. The sensation is the real experience; to be sure, not the sensation in the sense of a philosophical theory, which is inserted into the person; it is the sensation that is manifested in the report of the natural experience that belongs immediately with the ego and the environ. The conception of this simple fact needs to be reconstructed in that it is so distorted by our philosophical norms. One comes closest to this recognition in the masterful exposition of Avenarius, who examined the issue with an ineluctable, compelling logic.²³

With the return to experience, a new beginning point for understanding physics was accomplished; all that remains to be shown is that all knowledge of humans, all science, is dialectical-historical, to be conceived as an developmental-historical process. The worldview of every individual person is first and foremost derived from experiential givens (sensed, lived experience: sensations, feelings) and in consequence of these the integration of memories of such events (one's thoughts). The worldview of every single individual is generated by development. It becomes more general the older one becomes, yet richer: memories enlarge one's view of the world, infusing a greater scope of experiential understanding. Yet there are limits that damage understanding in this process: one forgets whole contexts of experience. Once one has arrived at this worldview, it becomes definitive, provides a final meaning. When one says that one has died, this really means that his worldview has ceased to exist, that it has disappeared beyond recovery.

The individual has only his own worldview to be concerned with, only it can be lived by him as it is. That other people have their own worldviews generated by their sensuous experience and memory is recognised by the individual, but only as a hypothesis. Yes, the person can make use of this hypothesis, which seems so apparent to him that it does not become a question in itself. One only experiences his fellowman as he does the other objects of his environment – in a character of 'sameness'. He sees the movements of his fellowman as he sees the movement of the stars; he hears his fellowman speak just as he hears the roll of thunder. And others know as little of his own movements and thought, of his worldview, as they know anything substantial of the sun or the clouds. Yet he presumes that they do, and he presumes it with

23 His first taking up of the issue was in the short article, 'Bermerkungen zur Begriff des Gegenstandes der Psychologie' ['Observations on the Concept of the Object in Psychology'], which appeared in the *Viertelsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, Volumes 18 and 19 (unfortunately, there is no special monograph of this article). Then followed his *Der menschliche Weltbegriff*, which is now in a second edition.

the highest degree of probability, because the movements and the expressions of his fellowmen in their aggregate reality are so extraordinarily similar to his movements and expressions. Since he experiences himself as such an aggregate of movement and utterance (knowing himself as an object), composed of sensations and memories, so he supposes the same aggregate of movement and expression that he perceives constitutes his fellowmen. But since this is merely a hypothesis, we can see how much our views of what is perceived concerning the experience of our fellowmen changes, especially when we learn to see them with new eyes, as belonging to another class or nationality. In such cases we often come to deny the other human sensitivity; we say, he is a monster, and then, only with a few fellow humans do we determine there to be a mutuality of experience. As the rogue thinks, so he judges others to think, says the proverb. How often the rogue is wrong! But this is not the only significant fact to be found in this proverb. Today, we think of the sun, the clouds, and all other such bodies as 'lifeless', yet in our earliest developmental phases as a species we perceived them and remembered them as animate presences! Achieving clarity in relation to our hypothesis concerning the worldview of our fellowmen is not at the forefront of our considerations, but just as in the above instance, making it so can better inform us of how things are. Every individual is concerned solely with his own worldview when he sees his fellowman *as a mere object*, just as any object whatsoever. To understand *one's fellowman as a subject*, as one who has a worldview, must, to be sure, remain a hypothesis. But this hypothesis is founded not solely in our practical experience, but in science.

Through lived experiences [*Erlebnisse*], which we do not merely 'experience' [*Erfahrung*] in a general sense, but rather surmise from our actual contacts with our fellowmen in our immediate environment, we gradually develop a community of signs which people give to experiences in order to designate their meaning. Above all, we have a *linguistic community*. This community, made possible by the means of communication, is not limited to what is actually experienced in-common, but as far as is possible through a common language. These signs, constituted by persons, can be associated with permanent changes in the environment, made apparent by carvings or writings. These signs contribute to the language community. And from all the changes in the community that are marked by these signs, we single out books as those that offer the science of what has occurred. From this science the person develops his worldview, thus his dependence upon the linguistic community to which he belongs; what he remembers is conditioned by these signs, they shape his earlier experiences as he brings them into his present. From the science derived from the signs of a linguistic community, one derives a worldview.

Just as the worldview of the individual has its developmental history, so too does science. It develops from small beginnings, enlarging its scope, while existing parts of it disappear (or are replaced). We find here that there are signs, which stemmed from earlier individuals who once lived but with whom we no longer have a language community. We see, as it were, a stone with carved letters, but none of our fellowmen have any memory of this experience of the carving itself, or whom we should recall that made that carving.

Science, just like the worldview of an individual, is a transient process, a process which encompasses a limited area of experience. *Only insofar* as this process is concerned can we make statements that have meaning. 'If one follows ... in his inquiry this point-of-view [the dialectic], there ceases to be a demand of a final solution or eternal truths', said Engels.²⁴ All assertions concerning eternal being, over an eternal, indestructible substance, are completely meaningless. Or, as Engels said: '*Being is ... completely an open question of boundaries, where our horizon ends*'.²⁵ Just as little as the assertion of an eternal being of a material substance has meaning, so too the assertion over an eternal idea, an eternally valid thought, an absolute thinking, has no meaning. Only the process we have described of the emergence and disappearance of worldviews offers historically bounded ideas and thoughts. Or, as Engels has expressed it, human thought '*exists only as the thinking of the individual among many hundreds of millions of past, present, and future individuals*'.²⁶

The question of the relationship between thinking and being, which in philosophy leads to its most vexed intricacies, is reduced for us to this simple statement: *Memory follows the experience* (of sensing and feeling).

When, at the beginning of this chapter's citation, Engels writes of concepts as the 'images of real things',²⁷ and in another place, of the 'mirror image' of reality that speak within the minds of men,²⁸ misunderstandings are still not excluded. The person can think *only* over what has been his early experience. Besides *his* experience, there is the experience of *other* persons, but his thought *can only relate to his* experiences. He thinks of 'the objective world' only insofar as it belongs to his 'subjective world', as it has been his experience. The 'mirror image' in the mind of the man is not the mirroring of something that he has had nothing to do with, but rather is the mirroring (remembering) of *his* earlier sensations.

24 Engels 1903, p. 39.

25 Engels 1901, p. 31.

26 Engels 1901, p. 79.

27 Engels 1903, p. 38.

28 Engels 1901, p. 8.

The person can see the world process only from *his personal standpoint*. This simple understanding is distorted by the idealistic philosophy, which propounds that the entire world process is only 'a conception within the person'. *Mechanical* materialism, on the other hand, cannot grasp the historical nature of this understanding, and seeks a substance that has 'always' been there; it seeks a complete metaphysical expression of it, which lies outside our realm of experience.

We can only make statements about 'the past' in a limited way. Through memories our experiences of what has been are given to us, within these recollections one sees the temporal context of the process within which our own worldview comes to expression. *We remember the past, but we experience only the present*. An experience of the past can in itself only be a *contemporary* experience. Such a contemporary experience can, however, dissolve *the memory* of an earlier experience, which belonged to the consequential moments of the process. We then construct the hypothesis that the contemporary experience is a consequence of the process emanating from these earlier experiences. This series of experiences were *not* my experience, the hypothesis concludes with the affirmation of the possibility that 'someone' has had these experiences. Let us take an example. I see at the moment a fallen tree with ten rings in its cross-section. An entire history of the tree emerges before me: I say that the ten rings are a sign that it stood and grew for ten years. Actually, I only know these ten rings, which I experience at this moment, and recall my earlier experiences of the statements of fellowmen over yearly rings. Our knowledge of the past limits itself, on the one hand, to the areas of science in which written experiences of our fellowmen have been set down, and intuit, on the other hand, hypothetical, analogical conclusions from these experienced processes. Theories about volcanic activity at the beginnings of the earth are reliant upon contemporary experiences of volcanic activity. We can only think about these past processes, insofar as we refer to 'someone' who thought about them. Usually, we are content with this thought model which appears to us, in which we participate, which is not possible as a thought for one who does not possess it, and order it within a past where there is no actual justification for assuming that this model is in accord with what actually occurred. If we will become clear over this matter, then we must suppose a 'someone' who had this experience. All statements about the knowledge of something presuppose a knower.

4 *Mechanical Materialism and the Foundational Concepts of Physics*

Engels sees the mechanical materialism of the eighteenth century as a completely *metaphysical* perspective, against which he proposes the principle of experiential, developmental history:

The insight into the complete wrongheadedness of the German idealism that has existed until now leads necessarily to materialism, but – and this must be emphasised – not to a mere metaphysical, exclusively mechanical materialism of the eighteenth century. Opposed to this naïve revolutionary, simplistic discarding of all earlier history, modern materialism sees in history a *developmental process* of humanity, whose *laws of movement* are its task to discover. Opposed to the French thought of the eighteenth century, which is like that of Hegel, with its view of a narrow succession of moving, but constantly consistent wholes, eternally the same bodies of nature, as Newton has it as well, and unchanging kinds of organic existence, as Linné taught, there is, rather, a new advance in the natural sciences where nature has its history in time.²⁹

‘The conception of nature of the French materialists [was unsupportable] with dialectics and the newer sciences’.³⁰ He affirmed by this clearly the antithesis whereby mechanical materialism stood opposed not only to the idea of development, but also to experience.

‘With each epoch-making discovery, materialism as a scientific purview must change its form’.³¹ All these changes that bring experiential knowledge are experienced gradually through the infusion of developmental thinking, an understanding that, as we have seen, Engels accepted. The residue of mechanical materialism could not be fully challenged by him. He affirmed, to be sure, the ‘boundless confusion’, which governed the physical sciences, he also designated clearly the seat of the confusion inasmuch as he spoke of the ‘shallow, vulgar form in which the materialism of the eighteenth century continues to exist in the minds of physicians and investigators of nature in the fifties of our century, formulated as doctrine in the ideas of Büchner, Vogt, and Moleschott’;³² yet Engels could not completely escape the sway of mechanical materialism at that time. Yes, he saw the epistemological error of it, which provided an opening for his critique, but in the physical sciences themselves he could not provide an adequate rebuttal. While Engels could not participate in the absurd views of Büchner, Vogt, and Moleschott, which derived all sensations and memories from the movement of atoms and was a fruitless task, he still could not adequately challenge these views, for example, in physics, by the manner of their conceptualisation, which synthesised the sensations in particular ways –

29 Engels 1901, p. 10.

30 Engels 1901, p. 12.

31 Engels 1903, p. 19.

32 Engels 1903, p. 18.

this path of criticism was not yet known to Engels. Dietzgen was undoubtedly more advanced in his address of the principles of physics. This was because the superior amount of detailed facts of physics that Engels possessed were insufficient for the more general arguments offered by Dietzgen. The developmental history of explanation in physics was first given in its particulars, as I have pointed out, by Mach, whom Engels did not yet know. To be sure, the direction of the solution which would rely upon the developmental-historical view had been shown clearly by Engels insofar as he had emphasised the fact that science relied upon the memory of experience 'since the results which synthesised experience were concepts'.³³ This kind of mechanical materialism – and by that we mean the consequences only of the views we have just explained – which stemmed from the classical period until the eighteenth century, had experienced a new birth, remaining in the understanding of a great many natural scientists even today. It exists in the hypothesis that a 'stuff' – a material – which in its smallest parts – the atoms – are throughout the same and unchanging, of eternity; and these atoms are the seat of a constant attractive force and possess a speed reliant upon their differing sizes and direction, transferring this speed to other such phenomena, so that the sum of the potential and kinetic energy remains constant. According to this hypothesis, all changes in the bodily world can be derived *from these movements of atoms*, and all science, therefore, is finally *the mechanics of these atoms*. The mechanics of these unchangeable bodies can be represented by mathematical equations; so, for example, astronomy can describe quite simply – as it has been able to do so for quite some time – the simple movements of the heavenly bodies. The final consequence of mechanical materialism was, therefore, the thought expressed by Laplace, that it must be theoretically possible to represent every process in the world with mathematical formulas, with a giant system of differential equations, enabling one to track each atom in the universe from a precise place, describing its size and direction, as well as speed, thereby determining precisely its trajectory at every moment. From the creation of such a formula, it follows that one can determine the constellations of atoms, and determine their speed and acceleration. Once this has been accomplished, the past as well as the future can be determined. From this standpoint, all questions in all the sciences can be answered. Yet how infinitely distant are we from the creation of such a formula – aside from the principled unsuitability of such a formulaic approach as a goal for serving science; one can best illustrate that distance by showing that today it is not yet possible to predict the weather a day ahead with any

33 Engels 1901, p. xix.

certainty. In order to know that, we must only take up the movements of the relatively stationary waters of our earth and atmosphere. Even in this special area, one has not been able to develop even a rough equation system for such prediction!

Mechanical materialism received a new supportive standpoint in the middle of the nineteenth century with the kinetic theory of gas. This rests upon the hypothesis that heat exists in a certain manner of movement of molecules and atoms. In a certain circumscribed area, mathematical formulas can be created which satisfy the facts with this hypothesis. This was above all in the relationship of the so-called ideal gas, while an application upon liquids or solid bodies, in spite of the complicated additional hypotheses, had little or no success. The entire kinetic hypothesis rested essentially upon its connection to the following two points-of-view. First, if one heated a gas in a closed vessel, the pressure on the walls was directly proportional to the temperature (Gay-Lussaches law). Secondly, imagine (one can easily see the reasons why in fact such an observation could not occur) one has within a closed vessel a number of completely elastic pellets, which move with a constant velocity in all directions. The pellets will collide with one another and the walls of the vessel, and therefore transmit their velocity by the laws of elastic impact to each other, exerting a pressure on the walls of the vessel. This pressure, according to its laws, will be proportional to the square of the average speed of the pellets. The kinetic hypothesis says then: a gas is a system of such elastic pellets, and the temperature is the square of the average speed of this system. The kinetic gas theory undeniably represents a powerful sum of mental work, and even when the goal to which it points is flawed, nonetheless its results, which it has gathered in its research, are of lasting value, above all Maxwell's law over the distribution of speeds. The kinetic gas theory is seen in the behaviour of light as nothing other than the characteristics of a system of elastic pellets. As such it will remain of lasting value. That every body in existence can be represented by such a system is, on the other hand, a hypothesis without foundation, whose adherents now, finally, appear to be melting away.

Naturally, the kinetic gas theory is valued as a momentous success of mechanical materialism. For the first time, mechanics has succeeded, beyond its traditional sense, in realising a mechanics of atoms, that is, the practice of mechanics in an area previously foreign to it – the mechanics of heat. This explains why mechanics once more gained an immense influence, and also the tenacity with which it continued to exist 'in the minds of the natural scientists and physicians', and, unfortunately, continues to exist.

What is particularly an epistemological problem that can be stated concerning mechanical materialism can be summarised in short from our above dis-

cussion. Above all, mechanical materialism is metaphysical in that it sees itself as *a final solution* that offers *an eternal truth*. It postulates an *eternal being* from which processes emanate, but it does not recognise its own process, its coming into being and passing away – as a point of view, its history in time.

Mechanical materialism does not arise out of experience. In order to show this, we must consider the physical sciences more closely.

Mach sought with conscious clarity to gain access to the developmental history of physics. In the foreword to the first edition of his *Analyse der Empfindungen*,³⁴ Mach stressed his ‘deep conviction that with the whole of the sciences and physics in particular, the next great understandings would be upon the bases of biology, which one would see in the analyses of sense data’. Although he said with an earnest modesty: ‘Certainly, I have only progressed a short way in this direction’, he had nonetheless established the foundations for an anti-metaphysical conception of physics.

Mach recognised in sensations simple elements (as he termed them), avoiding any philosophical misconceptions regarding ‘being’. Mechanical materialism had to be derived from such immediate sensations, because any other point of departure was an impossibility. The psychological path to these beginnings commenced with contact, which could be established by a certain degree of volume (*Volumina*). Once this was determined, one could assert (aside from later inquiries into the sensations involved) that: this volume ‘contains’ material, which is the ‘cause’ of our sensation, which *affects* our senses, which is the carrier of attributes which continue to exist *regardless of the experiential relation between the ‘ego’ and the ‘environ’*. The material has its ‘spatial site’, its ‘strivings’, ‘willings’, ‘tendencies’. To eliminate these metaphysical conceptions one must show only that the volume arises from the relation to the sensation of contact, and any other relation encompassed with the term ‘material’ is to be derived solely from this sensed contact. We will demonstrate this in greater detail. The older metaphysical definition, which stems from Newton, refers to the ‘quantity of material’. It is according to this way of representing a thing whereby the volume is sought and its size determined. Mach has eliminated this metaphysical conception in that he recognised the goal that Engels also saw, namely ‘that the results which natural sciences create are but concepts’.³⁵ He demonstrated how the sensations were translated into generalised concepts.

34 Mach 1903 [1885], p. vii.

35 Engels 1901, p. xix.

His definition of mass³⁶ is so illuminating that physicists who previously could not see the developmental historical truth of his arguments had to accept them.³⁷ Mach found that the relations of acceleration experienced by the body was the single fact which had to be considered in the concept of mass. All motions that we observe involving two bodies involve opposing accelerations simultaneously.³⁸ The size of the acceleration for two bodies is always mutually dependent, which remains a constant for the two.

A body is a complex of sensations. An apple, for example, we know as a form from our sensations of contact and perception, we see it as red, we sense a certain smell, a certain warmth, it tastes sweet to us. But none of these characteristics remains part of the body of the apple itself as it spoils and decays. With each change the body becomes different, yet we speak of the same body, when we maintain our interest in regard to it. So, we say quite often, it is the *same body*, even when the volume, the form, the temperature, the electrical potential, the magnetic bearing, the chemical constitution, the colour, the brightness, the acoustical vibrations, have changed. When we affirm by means of the sensations of contact that on the same closed surface there are now two volumes, we say: the body has separated; or, in the contrary instance, it has come together. With the division or the bringing together, the accelerative relation is changed with regard to the volumes in which they participate. And in the manner that the setting together of a body from what had been two, the size of the accelerative relation emerges with a summation of what had been the constant relation between each of the separate bodies. In relation then to each of the bodies, we have an entire series of numerical quantities, which characterise the accelerative relationship between bodies, and for each division that arises within an existing body, a new such series must emerge.

36 Mach 1901, pp. 125–286, is of the highest importance for anyone who will have insight into the meaning of mechanics. The definition of mass, in particular, is elucidated in the following places: pp. 226–32, 263–9, 276–92.

37 For example, the leader of the older school, Boltzmann, in *Vorlesungen über die Prinzipie der Mechanik*, Volume One (Boltzmann 1897, pp. 18–22).

38 Acceleration is the change of speed of a body in a second. When, for example, a body falls from a tower, in the first second it travels five metres, in the second 15 metres, in the third 25 metres, and so forth, so that its acceleration comprises 70 metres. – With closer observation one can see not only its acceleration towards the earth, but also the earth against its body. This latter acceleration is because the relative greater mass of the earth, in this particular instance, is almost invisibly small. On the other hand, the acceleration of the earth in relation to other heavenly bodies, for example, the moon, is capable of precise measure.

We can realise a much more economic depiction of these relationships if we express the accelerative relationship as the quotient of two sizes, which we achieve in the following manner: we multiply all accelerative relationships in which a body participates with the same number m_a , and maintain a series of numbers m_b , m_c ... we note for the bodies a, b, c ... the numbers m_a , m_b , m_c ... The experience allows us then to note the *other* accelerative relations on which b, c participate by the values m_b , m_c . Through this process there is the simplification by which we need not denote for each body each series of accelerative relations that arises in which it participates; rather for every body there is only *one number*. From these numbers we can easily derive the accelerative relation in each instance. *This number we call the mass*. We note that these numbers are the means by which we give the name to a body. For certain purposes (the tracking of the manifestations of motion), this is the most suitable, for the bodies then directly have the names m_a , m_b ... and so forth. We have then directly in the name of the body the accelerative relation in which it appears. Thus, we have generated a naming system of masses with the most economical expression of their spatial existence, a system of bodies.

One sees how in these considerations the mystery of the mass 'which is within the body' disappears. We have not discovered the mass as a thing, rather only as a law of represented accelerations we have directly perceived.

In a quite similar manner as we have determined 'mass', we take up other concepts of physics. We call these as a group 'capacities', of which our approach to mass is an instance, and all these in their constancies we call as a whole the 'material'.

Mechanical materialism postulates a substance in the sense of a 'stuff' – the material – whose differing characteristics should be given through its differing manners of movement. Mach, on the other hand, we thank for the recognition that natural law should be consulted, rather than metaphysical conceptions of substance. He comprehends the concept of substance in the following passage: 'In mass one sees the conditions of an appearance, which can give the impression of substantiality. One knows the relations between the conditions and the conditioned, the comparisons, which govern greater or smaller areas, as what is the actual existing, the substantial, as that whose determination enables a stable image of existence [*stabiles Weltbild*]:'³⁹ In that the substance is demonstrated as a natural law, it is clear that it can only be affirmed within the developmental process which science addresses. There is no eternal being to the mass, it is not a metaphysical uncreated being or indestructible in this essence;

39 Mach 1900, p. 431.

rather it is only a determined constant of an accelerative relation measured by humans. Statements concerning the accelerative relations of bodies that are not perceived by persons have no meaning, for the bodies that are not perceived by humans are not representable.

Mechanical materialism makes the significant error that all reality must be sensuously available as a touching contact. Such sensations are certainly of foundational meaning for our orientation, but they are not our only experiences. Seeing, hearing, smelling, and tasting are as immediately given as touch. We therefore need no explanation of one of these kinds of sensing sensation by dint of another, for the immediacy of any type of sensation is its own 'explanation'. This error of mechanical materialism occurs in other areas it takes up as well, without really regarding what it has done, simply ascribing its approach to natural science. Tonal artists see themselves led astray when they attempt to describe all experience in tones, and when this meets such absurdity in literature it is laughable, for example, in the attempt to describe experiences and atmospheres through colour, smell, or tastes. These errors are really no different from what occurs with mechanical materialism.

Mechanical materialism 'explains' warmth as the movement of small voluminous parts (molecules and atoms). When we make clear to ourselves that the sensation of warmth is immediately given, it seems to us that an explanation of the one by another referent is useless. 'The essence of warmth exists practically in the sum of its manifestations, theoretically in its concept, and scientifically in the analysis of this concept. *To analyse the concept of warmth means, generally, to discover the manifestations of warmth*', says Dietzgen⁴⁰ with admirable sharpness, and he designates by that understanding the programme that is later taken up by Mach.⁴¹ That the manifestations of warmth are the manifestations of movement, as mechanical materialism asserts, has therefore no meaning with regard to that which we actually know: the sensations of warmth are always different from movement as they are given to us. On the other hand, it could be that all manifestations can only occur at the same time as the mechanical. If this were the case, this would be a colossal simplification (economising) as a possibility for scientific description; a deeper insight in principle, however, would not be given. There can be no simplification in the direction of mechanical materialism's stress on movement, however. On the contrary. Physics, in its attempt to realise a deeper insight through mechanical materialism has complicated its search unnecessarily with hypotheses

40 Dietzgen 1907, p. 78.

41 Mach 1900.

whose derivations lead nowhere. Phenomenological physics, as Mach shows us, not only has no contradictions, and epistemologically has no grounds for being contested, but its meanings are also simpler (more accordant to thought economy) than the mechanical approach.

We cannot go into the phenomenological approach to physics here, as that requires a special study for guiding inquiry. We only wish to indicate the boundaries that must circumscribe scientific inquiry, those same boundaries that Engels discovered in his conceptual breakthrough. In the chapter where he discusses the positive physical developments of nature, he is still under the compulsion of mechanical materialism, so rife yet, in his time.⁴² He did not see beyond the limits of understanding generated by mechanical materialism, even though we now can see in his work *the foundational principles* that would have enabled him to do so.

One understands by the 'historical materialism' of the Marx-Engels perspective mainly the history of humans. We can see now that *in no other area, as well*, can there be any other way to comprehend materialism than *the historical*. In all areas of science, dialectical-historical materialism, or, as we can call it today, the experiential-developmental history of what is at issue, is a method which has realised a victorious breakthrough because of the fundamental perspective of our shipwright, our champion.



42 Engels 1901, pp. 49–56.

Friedrich Adler 1919, 'Why Do We Need Theories?' (originally in *Der Kampf*, March, 1909), in *The Renewal of the International* [*Die Erneuerung der Internationale*], Vienna: Wienvolksbuchhandlung, pp. 193–203

I

There are two means of production in possession of the bourgeois society: the productive means of *life* and the productive means of *death*. The productive means of life rest in the machines, in the clothing materials, food, in short, all of that which is needed for life; the productive means of death are the weapons, the arms and cannon, by which people are wounded and killed. The possession of weaponry and machines are the monopoly of the bourgeois society; they establish their authority by these.

The working class possesses nothing other than their working skills from which the bourgeois must avail themselves in order to put the means of production in motion, and by that the death-dealing machines as well as those that facilitate life. Upon this actuality we establish the goal and the means of the struggle of the worker. This goal is that *the entirety* of societal possessions, above all the means of production, the machines, the weaponry, belong equally to all, who must oversee them in order to see that they fulfill their proper function.

Until the final conquest of the means of production for all, ridding themselves of the proscription given to them by the capitalist class who now make use of the means of production for their own ends, boundaries must be constantly drawn to curb their arbitrariness. The proportion in which the machinery is used as an instrument for exploitation must be limited, and it must be made clear to the bourgeoisie that weapons are not to be played with, that they must be given limits in their application, particularly in their use against the worker. *And that has, indeed, succeeded.* In lieu of the decree, the regulation of working conditions by the infamous 'master in one's own house', the worker's contract, first in factories, then in entire branches of industry in the cities, finally in the nation as a whole, the daily hours of work, the level of wages, and so forth, have been established. In lieu of the regulation we have now the contract, to be sure, for the time being only a contract between the workers as a unity, the capitalists, and those others involved in contractual decisions, while we strive in the meantime to establish the situation where all individuals who are so engaged work together as equals by dint of their functions.

But we have more to realise as well with regard to the life of the individuals, more than a mere contract: the laws of the state themselves. At first, these too were regulations that benefitted those in authority, where the workers had

nothing whatsoever to say concerning them. But even in this lack of say, in this state of injustice, the worker increasingly moves to end this situation, transforming the decrees of a certain class into a contract that engaged all citizens. No longer the privileged class, but a majority of citizens had the *decisive* influence. But this situation was not yet the most favourable possible, because the minority who felt themselves excluded, who did not get the concessions they felt their numbers deserved, who felt overpowered, did not see themselves as protected by law any longer, and sought to obstruct all functions of the society.

Just so the workers were at one time in the factories of the state, *without rights*, but gradually won through working regulations influence in the order of the state. The arbitrariness of the individual capitalist, as well as the capitalist-controlled government, was more and more limited by the organised working class. *What means do they have to make their commands obeyed?* Finally, they can only rely upon *property*, that which they actually own and with which they can do as they please: *the life of the individual, and in particular the skill that each possesses*.

The first means of power of the worker is thus not to employ their skill, that is, to strike, that is, to put the means of production out of service. And that applies not only to production as the means of life, but also as the means of death: stilling the activity of the machines, that activity which we know in daily life, the rejection of weaponry where in the decisive instances their use is necessary.

In the socialist sense, the worker must exercise this power in relation to the individual machine, which, after all, belongs to the proletariat – through the work of organisation by which *these means of production becomes the power of the working class*. Insofar as other types of the productivity are concerned, socialist work can only go so far, as the owners have taken away many rights. The work by machinery in our work cooperatives is *socialist* work, and, finally, it can also be seen as the means of production of death, that is, the weaponry, since ‘the course of the world depends upon fire power’.

The workforce and finally life itself are the resources on which we finally must rely. In the conferences over a worker contract, as well in the conferences which one calls parliament, in which contracts with much wider scopes are dealt with, all depends upon what our representatives, our delegates, our deputies can arrive at with each other, which in turn depends upon what power stands behind the workforce, representing their numbers and a willingness to sacrifice for their ends, so that the authorities know that they are ready to set forth their work and eventually their very lives in the trenches of their struggle. The working class may not harbour the belief that their contracts can be realised in the bureaus and parliament, that their representatives are their

most important means, doing everything they can for them; rather, it is just the opposite: everything depends upon how much their representatives can rely upon the word of those who provide the contracts. The greater mass of workers need not move into *visible* action; they must only *be prepared for war*. Only the smallest segment of the contracted should be determined to actually fight; but the degree of preparedness for struggle is determined by *what is involved in the contract itself*. In parliament our contracts are never taken up, and yet every decision, every law that comes into being, have just so many concessions to the working class as that which corresponds to their actual power in the moment.

To put it succinctly, when that is the means of struggle that can be waged by the proletariat, the question forces itself upon us: why does one even speak about theories? And sometimes one says: *do we need theories anyway?*

In order to become clear about this question, we must first answer another question: *What are theories?* Are these really so foreign to ordinary life, as people say who have never addressed this question seriously? Or are they not more *a natural product* that emerge continually in all our life activities?

II

A theory is the greatest overview possible, an organised system of principles, or, as one says, of laws, natural laws, or even better: scientific laws.

When we want to know what a theory is, we should first investigate what principles as laws can contribute to the development of the theory.

By that means we must beforehand avoid a misunderstanding. One has often the impractical penchant to characterise two different things with the same name. We have used the word 'law', and spoken of the laws of the state, saying that these regulations have contributed to the democratising of contracts between the citizens. The law of science is, as we will explain, not a regulation of a contract, but *a principle*.

'A child who has been burned is afraid of fire'. This old saying says to us quite clearly how a scientific law arises. The child touches the oven and feels pain. If he has this *experience* often, finally it comes to him that there is *a relationship* between his feeling of pain and the touching of the oven. He forms the law: 'When I touch the oven, it hurts'. This principle arises in his consciousness every time he looks at an oven, and governs how he relates to it: he avoids unpleasant appliances attentively.

Such principles exist in great number: 'By touching the oven I have hurt myself'. The law and the theory are above all *a description of an experience, which occurred to one in the past*. The use of such a thoughtful determination exists above all in that it *saves us the need to experience this again*. We can use the experiences of the past in future instances. The child burns himself once,

then no longer; for when he comes close to the oven, his thought intervenes; the brain works as a limiting device in what he will do. Through theories an *economy* occurs, that is, a saving is realised. Theory is thus *a description* and fulfills an economic function.

The child needs not to be burned by the oven, however, in order to learn this theory. The *experience* can only be had *by an individual*; the theory, on the other hand, *can be transmitted* to one by others. This occurs with *instruction*; the goal of such instruction is to preserve the person from the experience by the transfer of knowledge by other persons. The child who is told by his mother: 'do not touch the oven, it will hurt, other children have tried it', can live an entire life without burning his fingers. Yet sparing one's experiences by theories goes further than merely an oral communication in a lecture. It can spare entire generations of certain experiences by being preserved in libraries, which are available for later generations. Only through such economy are we able to orient ourselves in the world, and accomplish something in the world. For what *the individual person actually experiences oneself* is but a small facet of the world, and is ordinarily only known in the most primitive manner where one is exposed to a manifold of dangers. Think for a moment of what we could have created for ourselves without books and newspapers; think of what could have been done without the systematic lessons communicated to us, and then we see what is left over; what we have experienced solely by ourselves would be too little to even use. If we had not had the transmission of thought by others through theory, we would sink into the realm of the animal; moreover, we would have never risen above that realm.

An individual can only have few experiences by himself; he is dependent upon the other humans, and that is just as true for everyday life as it is for the complicated work of science. The only belief possible comes into play, and that is, one must recognise science, and entertain that belief which the great thinker Josef Dietzgen formulated: '*We must believe in the knowledge of other individuals*'. That is the only belief we must maintain, without which no work, no success would be possible. But we must nonetheless *not believe blindly*, not always believe. The descriptions we get from another *may not be accurate*. They can be mistaken; there can also be *a lack of intellectual acumen*. Such false information can also be given intentionally, where there is *a lack of integrity* in the communicator. If we believe to be on the ground of such questionable circumstances, then we must test the situation ourselves, have the experience ourselves in order to determine the facts, finding out if what has been said can be corroborated. But on the whole, we operate in the world with a large dose of good will towards what has been said, but not excluding the need for more work on determining the state of things.

Advances in knowledge and progress in technology are only possible when we proceed economically with experience in order to understand things, when we use the experience of others. But this assumes the formulations of this experience, *for experience which has not been formulated, which has not become theory, is lost, that is, an experience that can never be used again.* The formulation of experience can take many forms. If a child who is burned by the oven wants to characterise that experience, giving the full range of special circumstances, then the actuality of being burnt by the oven could generate thick books for reading. *There must be an economy of expression within the formulation of experience.* The characterising aspects must be brought forward and rendered in short sentences. In all sciences, the complex manifold of appearances has to be ordered with oversight in mind, and in easily understood and applicable principles. The *second* task of theory exists in providing *our memory and thought the greatest possible economy in its formulations.*

III

How can theory – this greatest cogency of description of the earlier experiences of humankind – help us in *our future*?

Nature is immensely manifold, but it does offer repetition. A process once observed returns – at least in certain of its characteristics. If this were not the case, all theory, all science, would be superfluous; but there is no life, as we understand, where this is the case. Through the repetition of the same instances, past experience as it has been formulated in appropriate theories is useful. We see a part of what appears to us as the beginnings of a process. Our theories say to us what possibilities, insofar as what appears, may occur subsequently in these appearances. That means: the theories tell us which cases are before us, when a certain complex of appearances is given. If we did not have a theory, *then all possibilities would be open.* Recall what discomfort, what mistrust we experienced when we first stepped before a strange machine, for example, an automobile. We possessed no experience; all possibilities were open. One was even afraid to touch it, one did not know which touch would bring it into motion, or which would blow it up. The more experiences we collect, the more we develop theories, the more certain we are, *and the fewer possibilities can confront us.* We can therefore say with Ernst Mach: *'Theories (and included in that are laws) are limitations of our expectations in later instances'.*

Do theories give us absolute certainty? Do we know through theory what *necessarily* must occur? In no way. We only know what *most probably* will occur. And the more cases of experience that substantiate our theory, the more often the process is repeated, the more probable it is that the theory will hold.

In theory we observe *how certain appearances are dependent upon others*. Theory says to us: until now, these appearances were always dependent upon these others. Yet suddenly one can see that other appearances come forward seemingly accidentally in place of what had been a constant. This result is wholly other than the theory had supposed. Let us take a simple example. The child who proposed the theory: 'If I touch the oven, it hurts', comes across the oven once more and experiences no pain. He sees that theory does not hold for every instance. Then, he precipitously says: 'The theory has made a fool of me: I do not need theories any longer!' When, however, he is a bright child, he will say: 'This theory was not sufficiently perfected; I must augment the theory; I must see in which circumstances it is always the same, and what circumstances I have not adequately attended which may have intervened'. And after some investigation he finds: it is not touching the oven in general, but rather touching it *when it is hot*, which generates the pain. When the theory was created, it was winter; in the meantime, it became summer. The more complete theory is more exact, accommodating a greater number of experiences.

What occurs is not necessarily what the theory premises. It only is probable, and only within the range of probability of the circumstances that are determinative for that theory. Yet although the theory is not a recipe, in spite of the fact that we cannot say anything by it with complete certainty, nonetheless we rely upon it. We go into that site in the morning where we work because we have established through prior experiences that it is a reliable supposition that we can exercise our usual activity there. Perhaps our theory is false; some circumstance has arisen that had never occurred there before, for example, the house burnt to the ground. But in spirit of this risk we will embark in this direction, which means that we rely upon our theory. For because of unknown and unknowable possibilities, not to go towards our workplace, eschewing theory, would be an impracticality.

Theory must be handled in an accordant manner to live a practical existence; what we do must be more probable than other options, and in determining that, theory plays the decisive role.

IV

The animal follows his will automatically and reacts directly to the stimulus that occasions that will or wish. The butterfly sees the lamp; he has the wish to come nearer to it, and flies into the fire. The child in his beginnings reacts like an animal: first gradually he learns to use *some tool* that protects him from danger: theory. The adult person curbs his will above all, reacting first with his mind, testing what confronts him with an instrument – theory – insofar as what might occur if he were to follow his will. If he finds that he will run into a wall

if he follows the impulsion of his will, then he seeks to master this wish; if his theory shows him that his will is the avenue to a higher development, then he gladly allows his will free reign.

Theories are instruments which each person needs. In this sense, *all* people are theoreticians; the only question is whether they are a good or a bad theoretician. The older woman who asserts that Friday is an unlucky day is also an adherent of a theory, and, to be sure, a theory that is based upon *experiences*. The first fact that this theory is based upon is the crucifixion of Christ, and since then, other misfortunes that have occurred on Fridays. Someone broke a glass, another put the wrong shoe on the wrong foot, and so on. Therefore, the older woman – and, naturally, this applies to men as well who think in this same manner – does not travel on Fridays, and engages in no complicated events on this day whatsoever. Why would we say to this woman who has experienced so many unpleasant things on a Friday, who has developed a theory about them, that she is wrong? Because her experience is not broad enough for such a claim. She has only paid attention to Fridays, and not taken into account how many glasses were shattered ‘accidentally’ on other days, a view that premises that any day of the week can indicate the same type of occasions she limits to Fridays.

Since we are *all* theoreticians, it matters whether we are a good one or a bad one, since it is not only science to which we refer, rather the broader question of *our orientation to life*. This gives rise to *the bitter struggle over theory*. It is through bad theory that the repressed in our society accept the protection, the umbrella of the church, as well as the rod of learning of the class-based state; through *good* theory the way towards freedom and knowledge is created, allowing us to see that things must not always be the same, that it can be otherwise if we will it to be. *Our entire propaganda exists in making bad theoreticians into good ones.*

We have stated that we *all* must be theoreticians in the sense that we must always *apply* theories. Everyone carries into his experience an element of testing, so that he can improve the theory that carried him there. We have to be theoreticians *in a narrower sense* as well, that is, being able to generate theory through *the formulation* of the facts in the most economic manner, logically ordering our principles. This is the case with every creation of a tool: there must be an application and thus a proving of the tool to see if it is useful, and on the other hand, to see if one is indeed capable of developing the tool. The tool-maker need not be skilled in using the tool himself. He can make a very good hammer and yet not be able to nail anything himself. So it is with the creation of theory, for some are better at the application of it than others, they engage in praxis with theory, and these persons are called *practitioners*

because of that. In the differences that often emerge between the theoreticians and the practical individuals, the term 'theoretician' is often seen as an insult. This view can be simply stated: 'he is just a theoretician!', which is to say that he is not good practically. And the converse. We need both good theoreticians and good practitioners, those who develop good theories so that they can be applied. That one can be both a good theoretician and a good practitioner seldom occurs. But this is not really necessary; neither is directly related to the other. The practitioner must simply use the theory given to him by the theoretician correctly, and the theoreticians must understand what theories are serviceable for the practitioner; then the appropriate work is understood, and can be divided accordingly.

A tool can be too complicated to be serviceable. In ordinary retail sales in a market, an apothecary's scale is not needed, for this degree of exactitude is not necessary for ordinary life, it is superfluous to what is effective – that is, it is in the highest degree *not economic*. Thus, a tool offered by a theoretician can be *too good*. Thus, we employ theories of varying degrees of exactitude for our needs. For simple tasks, we use theories that employ the ordinary language of the everyday to achieve *an approximation* of what must be done. However, if fine points are to be dealt with, difficult decisions to be made, then we must employ finer, more complicated theories; here the language of science enters and finally a mathematical language.

V

Now, by way of illustration, let us take up a theory *that concerns human society*. Above all, of interest to us are the great revolutions in society, *that is, the historical development of society*. We might say that the original material in this, which the theories will take up, is the willful strivings and willed actions of humanity. At first glance, we see a chaotic combination of wills that cross over each other, a seemingly inextricable knot of willing humans in their strivings and behaviour. For a long time in human thought, no law could be determined that gave order to these differing wills. One was satisfied by stating that the individual should follow his personal will, writing about exceptional individuals who followed their personal wills as the key role in history. It was Karl Marx who first showed how *the will of the masses of humanity themselves was directed*; it is to him that we are indebted for *the initial insight* into the willing of humanity. In the principle: *'History of all society heretofore is the history of the class struggle'*, as he formulated in his essential understanding. Thus, with one blow, a light was shone on the expressions of willing of all humanity. *Not all expressions of will were encompassed by this principle, but all of those that entailed the development of society were*. It was shown that

in the confusing mixture of elements of willing, larger groups of wills that had the same intent could be demonstrated, and with that, for the first time, a key to an understanding of the foundations of these manifestations was achieved. Class struggle, which then was quite clear as a manifestation, had often occurred more visibly, thus in ancient Rome, in the Peasant War, in the great revolution of 1789, in the July struggle of 1830; but never had one come to a clear consciousness about the grounds of even these events. It was the *class instinct, the class interest that was at work*, and thanks to Marx we can now understand this *as class consciousness*. And this theory of the class struggle has done us a great service. As long as the class struggle was waged without consciousness, and conducted without a theory, merely as a reflex insofar as its form is concerned, those preachers of quietude and order, those writers paid by capitalists, offered the glib but accepted 'truths' of peace and harmony between capital and work, and these were accepted because they pointed out, with the false theory, that resisting this order created only disharmony, wounding all involved. Against all these false theories, against all the seductions of peace, Marx enabled us to realise a goal-oriented struggle, one that was a planned, deliberated exercise of our will.

Those people who could not or would not understand Marx have often asserted that he has *forgotten* the will of persons in his theories. The entire time Marx spoke of the revolutionising of society, of the organisation of the workers, in short, *of the pure acts of will of people*. That the man whose theory of the willing acts of persons in generating society has 'forgotten' the will could only be asserted by people who have never been penetrated by the spirit of Marx, who can only see the trees, not the forest.

But Marx went even further into the theory of the will of human beings. He has seen that in every time in the minds of individuals there are ideas, wishes for the improvement of the world, ideals are striven for, and the will is there to realise these ideals. And he asked himself: what was the deciding factor that destroyed certain ideas and wishes until the time came when the will could establish them in reality? He saw that within the great stationary stream of societal life, the revolution emerges first when the relationships of production change. *The precondition of any societal revolution is always the relationships of production*. Thus, before the great French Revolution of 1789 in place of small hand labour in manufacturing there was an organisation of work on a large scale; with that the structure of the classes changed; the bourgeoisie seized this new organisation of productivity as their own; the stationary condition of society became labile; the lines of war were drawn. Then came the war; the will of the repressed manifested itself: the revolution was victorious. *Thus Marx gave for the first time his theory of revolution*. It did not emerge because

of a cabal of villains, as those who supported the state asserted, nor does it emerge because finally there were truly good men, as the idealists claimed or as naïve liberal historians relate; rather the revolution only emerges when the productive relations have changed, when, as in Marx's theory of revolution, certain preconditions are fulfilled, then the will to revolution can be victorious, then the wishes, the ideas, the will, which has always been there, can be successful in practice.

And this theory is immediately significant, for it shows us *which revolution is possible today*. The reactionaries also want a revolution, a revolution towards what was, to the good, old times, which were, at least for them, much better. Marx has taught us that all their strivings will be fruitless; they can cost us time; they can obstruct us – but finally they are only ramming their heads against the wall. In the beginning, the workers were just as naïve, and believed that a revolution could return things to what once had been. The history of the Silesian weavers in the 1840s, when machines first began to impact upon their own work, saw workers in the factories as those who stole their bread, that is, the children who worked in the factories day and night were seen as sucking their blood; this understanding was shared in all countries. Always the first thought was: down with these machines! And indeed they were destroyed by those who saw them in this way. But this theory was false. New and greater monstrosities arose, but the fight against them was without pointless. Marx demonstrated that it was not the machines that drank the blood of the worker, but rather the capitalists, the owners of the machines, who withheld part of their wages. Marx put forward the theory of *surplus value*, which the capitalist kept, instead of giving it to the worker who produced it. And in this exposition, Marx not only offered a theory of the revolution, but the theory of the revolution in which we still live, *the theory of the proletarian revolution*. Not to go backwards, not to rid oneself of the machines, but rather to see the machines as the property of everyone, building a new society in which exploitation is eliminated.

In his theory of revolution, Marx is also often misunderstood. He sees certain preconditions in the productive relations to any revolution, certain directions of will among the masses must be evident, certain willed actions must have occurred. Many of his interpreters believe that Marx is stating that *productive relations automatically generate a new society*. That would be as insane as claiming that the air creates the person, even though it is correct to say that the air is a precondition of their existence; and it is just as much nonsense to assert that the productive relations create a new society, even as it is correct that the precondition for that society which humans will create anew.

Theory can never replace the will, but likewise the will can never replace theory. *The will without theory is blind; theory without the will is lame.* Theory shows us which elements of the will are there, which ideas, which wishes can be fulfilled, which will can be actualised. We do not want to be blind, we do want to run into walls: we want our will to be actualised; we want to win! We need theories so that in the class consciousness of the workers their live will can overturn the existing society so that victory can be achieved!

More than sixty years ago, Marx wrote this principle in the *Communist Manifesto*: 'The proletariat have nothing to lose but their chains; they have the world to win!' The first part of this principle no longer corresponds wholly to the facts. In the past sixty years, the proletariat have become something else. The disrespected, defenceless worker of the 1840s, with no rights, no longer exists. *By their own power* they have arisen, built organisations, won rights: they stand centrally in events, around them all happenings occur. Yet not only do they still have *chains* today, they also stand to lose the fruit of their work in their organisations as well as their respect. Every step they take can eventuate not only in a victory, but could also mean a loss. Therefore, they must be more mindful than even before; therefore, *theory as an instrument of the class war is increasingly important.* If it is true that the proletariat have more to lose than their chains – a world remains for them still to win.

Otto Neurath

The two writings included for Neurath develop his logical empiricist method, which he developed over his career as a sociological thinker, a thinker who considered himself more squarely Marxist than those whose theoretical focus stemmed from either Kant or phenomenology. Neurath emphasised that Marx was interested in praxis, in changing the world, and not in epistemologically-based interpretations. Neurath believed that the language of science must be radically simplified, so that it could be comprehended by any adult, especially those of the proletarian class for whom the educated socialists spoke.

Thus, Neurath gave attention to what he called ‘common parlance’, a descriptive and explanatory language that afforded a readily comprehended intersubjective understanding. This focus upon the readily understood need not be non-scientific. Empirical descriptions of person, place, and thing could lead to valid laws in the natural and social sciences. If there was to be a cooperative, democratic society, specialists must be able to demonstrate their findings to the laypersons with a language that was sufficiently empirical to be transparent for every interested eye. The logic of this empiricism was to be a guide for propositions that could be easily tested, for propositions that could lead to effects, which created the systematic ways of life that Karl Marx had propounded in his view of a democratic socialism.



Otto Neurath 1931, ‘Sociology as Physicalism’ [Soziologie im Physikalismus], *Erkenntnis*, 2(1): 533–42.¹

1 *Physicalism Free of Metaphysics*

The ‘so-called’ ‘Vienna Circle of the scientific world conception [Weltauffassung]’ seeks to create in their connection to Mach, Poincaré, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and others a metaphysically free atmosphere in order to further scientific work in every area with logical analysis. It would be less open to misunderstanding to speak of a ‘Vienna Circle of Physicalism’, because ‘world’ is a term that the scientific language lacks, and *world conception* [Weltauffassung] is often misinterpreted as *worldview* [Weltanschauung]. All the representatives of this Circle are united in holding that beyond the sciences there is no ‘philo-

¹ [Neurath 1981, pp. 533–62].

sophy' as a discipline that provides *special principles*; all propositions based upon sensed inquiry are contained by *the sciences*.

The sciences will be conducted as they have been separately, even as they are now considered a *unified science*. Their unity is of a logical character, heretofore not stressed in this dimension. Unified science is the result of comprehensive *collective work*, which has its model in how the structures of the separate sciences of chemistry, geology, biology, or even mathematics and logic operate.

Unified science will be conducted as the separate sciences were formerly, and therefore, the 'thinker without a school' will be no more important than he was in the former separate sciences. The individual can no more through individual moments of insight achieve here as much or as little as hitherto in any one science. Each proposed innovation must be so formulated that one can expect its general acknowledgement. Through the cooperation of the many, its full impact becomes apparent. If it is wrong or meaningless, that is, metaphysical, then of course it falls outside the sphere of unified science. Unified science, beside which here is no 'philosophy', no 'metaphysics', is not the work of individuals, but of a generation.

Some representatives of the 'Vienna Circle', who, like all other representatives of this group, declare explicitly that one cannot speak of special 'philosophical truths', nevertheless still occasionally use the term 'philosophy'. They want this term to signify 'philosophising' as the 'activity of clarifying concepts'. This concession to the traditional linguistic usage, while understandable, easily gives rise to misunderstandings. In this exposition the term will not be used. No new worldview is contrasted with an old one, nor is some old worldview replaced by a clarification of concepts. Rather now a 'science *without a worldview*' *confronts* all worldviews. For the Vienna Circle, the traditional structure of metaphysics and other related formations consists of meaningless statements except for scientific statements that are found among them 'accidentally'. The objection to the term 'philosophising' is not only terminological; one cannot separate the 'clarification of concepts' from the 'pursuit of science' to which it belongs. Both are inseparably bound up together.

The works of unified science are closely intertwined: if one thinks about the consequences of new astronomical observations, or if one investigates which chemical laws can be applied to certain digestive processes, or if one examines to what extent the concepts of different branches of science can already be connected with each other as unified science demands their interconnection.

To be sure, different kinds of laws can be distinguished from each other: for example, chemical, biological, or sociological laws; however, it *cannot be said of prediction of a concrete individual process that it depends upon only one definite kind of law*. Whether, for example, a forest will burn down at a certain

location on earth depends as much on the weather as on whether or not human intervention takes place. This intervention, however, can only be predicted if one knows the laws of human behaviour. *That is, under certain circumstances, it must be possible to connect all kinds of laws with each other.* Therefore all laws, whether chemical, climatological or sociological, must be conceived of as *parts of a system, namely, as unified science.*

To establish unified science (Kurt Lewin has point out that the expression was used by Franz Oppenheimer, though in a somewhat different manner), a *unified language* with a *unified syntax* is needed. From the deficiencies of syntax at the time of its articulation one can know the prevailing attitude in the individual directions of science of that generation.

Wittgenstein and other representatives of a scientific world-conception, who rendered a great service in their repression of metaphysics with the exclusion of meaningless statements, are of the opinion that each individual, in order to achieve science, first needs meaningless word sequences for 'elucidation' (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 6.54):

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it).

This statement seems to suggest that one had to repeatedly undergo some sort of purification from meaningless, i.e. metaphysical, statements. One has repeatedly had to use that ladder and then throw it away. Only with the help of clarifications consisting of word sequences that are later recognised as meaningless could one reach a unified language. These clarifications, which may well be characterised as metaphysical, are not isolated occurrences in Wittgenstein's writings; there we find further expressions that resemble less the rungs of a ladder than a quietly formulated metaphysical side-doctrine. The end of the *Tractatus* – 'What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence' – is the least misleading in its wording; it sounds as if there were 'a something' of which one cannot speak. We should say: if one really wants to abstain fully from a metaphysical mood, 'we must pass over in silence', but not 'about something'.

We do not need a metaphysical ladder of clarifications. On this point we cannot follow Wittgenstein, whose great significance for logic does not thereby diminish in merit. We thank him, among other things, for the contrast between 'tautologies' and 'statements of events'. Logic and mathematics show us which linguistic transformations are possible *without adding to meaning*, regardless of how we formulate the facts.

Logic and mathematics do not need any further observation statements for their elaboration. Logical and mathematical errors can be removed within their own sphere. It is no contradiction to this that experiential statements can bring corrections. Let us suppose that a captain strikes a reef with his ship. All the rules of calculation may have been correctly applied, the reef can be found in the geographical maps. In this way we could discover a mistake in the logarithmic tables, which was the cause of the accident; however, it can also be found without such experiences.

In Wittgenstein's 'clarifications', which have occasionally been characterised as 'mythological preliminary remarks', an attempt seems to be made in a pre-linguistic stage, so to speak, to make investigations of pre-linguistic conditions. These attempts have to be rejected not only because they are meaningless, but also because they are not necessary as preliminary for unified science. It is certainly possible to speak about one part of language with the help of another part; it is, however, not possible to make pronouncements about language as a whole from a 'not yet linguistic' standpoint, as Wittgenstein and some individual representatives of the Vienna Circle seek to do. A part of these attempts may, after suitable transformation, find a place within the spheres of science; while another part would have to be dropped.

It is also impossible to confront language as a whole with 'experiences' or the 'world' or with something 'given'. Every statement of the kind: 'The possibility of science is based upon the order of the world', is therefore meaningless. Such statements cannot be saved by counting them among the 'clarifications' for which a less rigorous standpoint is assumed. Such an attempt is hardly different from metaphysics in the accepted sense. The possibility of science becomes apparent in science itself. We enlarge its domain by augmenting the *mass of statements*, by comparing new statements with statements taken over from the past, thus creating a consistent system of unified science that can be used for successful *predictions*. As makers of statements, we cannot, so to speak, take up a position outside the making of statements and then be prosecutor, defendant and judge at the same time.

This standpoint is that science remains within the domain of its statements. That statements are the beginning and end of science is sometimes admitted by metaphysics, with the addition, however, that besides science there is a domain that contains something like quasi-statements. In contradistinction to the frequent interlocking of science and metaphysics, this separation of science and metaphysics – though without eliminating metaphysics – is carried out by Reininger (1931). His standpoint is akin to that of the Vienna Circle which takes up a similar viewpoint, as well as behaviourism insofar as it is considered a science.

Unified science formulates statements, changes them, makes predictions; however, it cannot itself anticipate its future condition. Alongside the present system of statements there is no further '*true system of statements*'. To speak of such, even as a conceptual boundary, does not make any sense. *We can only establish that we operate today with the spatio-temporal system suitable for physics*, and that we obtain successful predictions in this way. This system of statements is that of unified science – that is the standpoint that we can call *physicalism*.² If this term should be adopted, it might be advisable to speak of 'physicalist' when we take up a spatio-temporal description in the sense of contemporary physics, for example, employing a behaviourist description. The term 'physical' would then be reserved for the 'statements of physics in the narrow sense', those of mechanics, electrodynamics, etc.

The unified science of physicalism, which is characteristic of a definite historical period, avoids all meaningless sentences, and proceeds from statement to statement, which are combined in a consistent system as tools for successful predictions, that is, for life.

2 *Unified Language of Physicalism*

Unified science contains all scientific *laws*; these can be connected without exception. Laws are not statements; they are directions for obtaining *predictions* from observation statements (Schlick).

Unified science expresses everything in the unified language that is common to the blind and the sighted, the deaf and those who hear, it is 'intersensual' and 'intersubjective'. It connects the statements of a man talking to himself today with his statements of yesterday; the statements he makes with his ears closed, with those he makes with his ears open. In language, nothing but order is essential, and that is already represented by the signs of Morse code. 'Intersubjective' and 'intersensual' language in general depends on *order* ('next to', 'between', etc.), that is, on what can be expressed by sign sequences in logic and mathematics. All predictions are formulated in this language.

The unified language of unified science, which by and large can be derived from everyday language by certain alterations, is the language of physics. Here with regard to the *uniformity* of the physicalist language, what the language of physics might be in a certain period is all the same, whether it explicitly uses a four-dimensional continuum in its more precise expressions, whether it utilises a spatio-temporal order in which the position of all occurrences is always *exactly* defined, or whether the basic elements are coupled positions

2 Neurath 1931, p. 2.

and velocities for which *precision is limited in principle*; what matters is that the concepts of unified science always share the fate of the fundamental concepts of physics, wherever use is made of utmost precision as well as where nothing but a rough description is attempted. With this common fate the standpoint of physicalism becomes apparent. But all predictions, by whose confirmation we estimate science, can always finally be based on observation statements, on statements in which perceiving persons and stimulus-producing things occur.

The claim that the complicated relationships that can be recognised are less clear if they lack the greater precision of the language of modern physics when they introduce hypothetical electron paths, probably originates in certain old habits of mind.³

We meet the unified language of physicalism wherever we make a scientific prediction on the basis of laws. If someone says that he will hear a certain sound at the same time that he sees a certain colour, or the other way around, or when he speaks of the 'red spot' which under certain circumstances will appear by the 'blue spot', he is already moving within the sphere of physicalism. He himself as a perceiving subject is a physical entity, he must localise the perception, for example, in the central nervous system, and he must formulate everything he says about spots as statements about these processes in the central nervous system or at some other place. Only in that way can he make predictions and come to an understanding with others, and with himself at another point in time. Each definition of time is already a physical formulation.

Science tries to transform everyday statements. They are given to us as 'bundles' consisting of physicalist and pre-physicalist components. We replace them by the 'unifications' of physicalist language. If one says, for example, 'The screeching saw is cutting the blue wooden cube', then 'cube' is an obviously 'intersensual' and 'intersubjective' concept that can be used equally for the blind and the deaf. If a man soliloquises and makes predictions that he can check himself, then he can compare what he as a seeing person said about the cube with what he reports in the dark using his sense of touch.

How to incorporate the word 'blue' into the unified language is at first doubtful, however. One can use it in the sense of the number of oscillations of electromagnetic waves. But one can also use it in the sense of a 'field statement' as follows: If a sighted man (defined in a certain way) enters the area of this cube as an experimental test body, then he behaves in a certain physicalistically describable way; he says, for example, I see 'blue'. While for the case of 'blue'

3 See Frank 1931, pp. 183–96.

it may be doubtful what people mean by it in everyday language, 'screeching' will be meant predominantly as a 'field statement', i.e. the hearing subject will always be taken into consideration together with it; however, closer examination shows that 'cube', 'blue' and 'screeching' are of one sort.

Let us try to explain the above statement according to our analysis along the lines of physicalism, and to reproduce it in another way so that it may serve for predictions:

'Here is a blue cube'. (This wording, like the following, can be replaced by a physical formula in which place is defined by coordinates).

'Here is a screeching saw'. (The screeching would at first enter the formulation only as vibrations of saw and air; this can be expressed in physical formulas).

'Here is a perceiving man'. (Perhaps a 'field statement' could be added to indicate that under certain conditions the perceiving man enters into relation with the physical blue and the physical screeching).

The perceiving can be subdivided, for example, into:

'Nervous changes take place here'.

'Brain changes take place in the sphere of perception, perhaps also in the sphere of speech'. (It does not matter for our consideration whether these spheres can be localised or whether they must be described structurally. Whether changes in the area of speech – 'speech thought' of the behaviourists – is connected with changes in the larynx or in its innervation, may also be left aside).

Perhaps some additions are needed in order to fully extract the physicalist sense of this simple statement, for example, clock data, place coordinates, but the main thing at any rate is that we have to consider only statements with physical concepts.

It would be a mistake to believe that the physicalist rendering of everyday affairs must be complicated because very complicated physical formulas are needed – some of which are not yet at hand – for the *calculation* of certain correlations. The physicalist everyday language comes from prevailing everyday language; only certain parts are dropped, others are correlated in a different manner, and certainly additions are made. From the start, the perceiving subject will be more closely linked with the perception statement and the object determination than was done before. The distinguishing of certain groups of statements, for example, the perception statements, will be made differently than they were before.

Children are able to learn the physicalist everyday language. They can advance to the strict symbolic language of science, and they can learn to make predictions of all kinds successfully, without ever having to resort to 'clarifica-

tions' that function solely as a meaningless introduction. The fixed purpose is a clean manner of speech in which the highly confusing term that imputes 'sense deception' does not occur. Though at some later time the physicalist language may be learned as the general language of communication, at present our task is still to free the 'bundles' of our language from metaphysical trappings and to define everything that occurs in them physicalistically. When the metaphysical tie has gone, many things may lie before us as an unconnected heap. The further use of such residue will not be precisely fruitful, and a new construction will be unavoidable.

Frequently we can go on using existing '*bundles*' after their reinterpretation. But this should be done with caution, because people who are prepared to adapt such language often take comfort from the fact that so much can be expressed 'in principle'. It is more than questionable whether it is expedient to go on using words like 'instinct', 'motive', 'memory', 'world', etc., and to adopt a quite unusual interpretation for them that is easily forgotten if we go on using these words to keep the peace. In many cases a new shaping of language is certainly superfluous, indeed dangerous. As long as we express ourselves only 'approximately', we have to beware of wanting to be all too subtle at the same time.

As the views of this paper are above all close to those expressed by Carnap, it might be stressed that the special '*phenomenal language*', from which Carnap tries to derive the physical one, is discarded here. The exclusion of 'phenomenal language' in its present form, which does not seem to be even suitable for predictions, will probably necessitate a number of alterations in its *constitutive system*. Together with this, the 'methodological solipsism' (Carnap, Driesch) will probably also disappear; it can probably be understood as a weakened residue of idealist metaphysics from which Carnap in particular always tries to keep clear. The thesis of 'methodological solipsism' – even as Carnap would probably admit – cannot be formulated scientifically; it cannot even be used any longer to give an idea of a certain attitude in contrast to another attitude, because there is only one physicalism. In it, everything that can be formulated scientifically is contained.

The 'ego', the 'thinking personality', can be separated as little as anything else from the 'experienced', or from 'experiencing', or the 'thinking'. The statements of physicalism rest on statements, and they are connected with seeing, hearing, touching and other 'sensations' (as physical occurrences), but also with 'organic sensations' that are mostly only roughly discerned. We can, of course, close our eyes, but we cannot switch off processes of muscle enervation, digestion, blood circulation. What we try to separate as 'ego' is included in the language of physicalism. These are processes about which we are not informed through

the usual 'external' senses. All 'personality coefficients' that discriminate one individual from another are of a physicalist nature!

Though we cannot confront the 'ego' with the 'world', nor with 'thinking', we can still differentiate within physicalism between statements concerning the 'physicalistically described cube' and statements concerning the 'physicalistically described person', and then we can, under certain circumstances, extract 'observation statements' and thereby create a substitute for 'phenomenal language'; but careful investigation will probably show that the moiety of *observation statements are part of the mass of physical statements*.

A distinction will certainly be made between protocol statements (that turn up as physical formations) made by an astronomer, or a chronicler, and the statements that have a precisely defined place within a physical system, though obviously there are some overlapping transitions. But no special 'phenomenal language' confronts the 'physicalist' one. *From the very beginning, each of our statements can be physicalist – in this respect what is said here differs from everything that has been said by the 'Vienna Circle'*, which otherwise stresses again and again the significance of *predictions* and their confirmation. Unified language is the language of predictions, which are the centre of physicalism.

In a certain sense the view advocated here starts from a given state of everyday language, which in the beginning is essentially physicalist and only gradually becomes intermixed with metaphysics. Here is a point of contact with the 'natural concept of the world' of Avenarius. The language of physicalism is nothing new, as it were; it is the language familiar to certain 'naïve' children and peoples.

Science is at times discussed as a system of statements. *Statements are compared with statements*, not with 'experiences', nor with a 'world', nor with anything else. All these meaningless *duplications* belong to a more or less refined metaphysics and are therefore to be rejected. Each new statement is confronted with the totality of existing statements that have already been harmonised with each other. *A statement is called correct if it can be confronted with this totality*. What cannot be incorporated is rejected as incorrect. Instead of rejecting the new statement, one can alter the whole existing system of statements until the new statement can be incorporated; in general, however, this decision is taken with hesitation. *Within* unified science there are important tasks of transformation. The definition of 'correct' and 'incorrect' as proposed here abandons the definition that is usually accepted in the Vienna Circle and recurs to 'meaning' and 'verification'. In the present presentation one always remains in the sphere of speech-thinking. Systems of statements are transformed. However, generalising statements, as well as statements by which certain relations are developed, can be compared with the totality of protocol statements.

In the framework of unified science, then, there are all sorts of classifications of statements. For example, it can be decided whether certain statements are 'statements of reality', 'hallucination statements', or 'lies', according to the degree to which the statements can be used to draw conclusions regarding physical events beyond the movements of the mouth. There is a 'lie' if a conclusion can be drawn that there was a stimulation in the speech centre, but not a corresponding occurrence in the perception centre; however, these are essential in the case of hallucinations. If we can conclude that there were not only stimulations in the perception centres but also events outside the body of a clearly definable kind, then we have a 'reality statement'; in this case, for example, we can use the statement, 'a cat is sitting in this room' spoken by someone, as a physicalist statement. A statement is always compared with another statement or with the system of statements, and not with a 'reality'. Such an endeavour would be metaphysics, would be meaningless. However, 'the' reality is not replaced by 'the' system of physicalism, but by groups of such systems, of which actual practice uses one.

From all this it becomes clear that within a consistent physicalism there can be no 'theory of knowledge', at least not in the traditional form. It could only consist of defence actions against metaphysics, i.e. unmasking meaningless terms. Some problems of the theory of knowledge will perhaps be transformable into empirical questions so that they can find a place within unified science.

This cannot be analysed further here, nor can the question of how all 'statements' can be incorporated into physicalism as physicalist formations. 'Two statements are equivalent' could perhaps be expressed physicalistically in the following way. We expose a man to a system of commands that are connected with all sorts of statements. For example: 'If A behaves in such and such a way, do this'. We can now fix certain conditions and then observe that the *addition of a specific statement* causes the same change of response as that of another statement. We will then say the first statement is *equivalent* to the second. By the addition of tautologies, the stimulus of the system of commands remains *unchanged*.

All this could be developed experimentally with the help of a 'thinking machine', as suggested by Jevons. Syntax could be expressed by means of the construction of the machine, and through its use logical mistakes would be automatically avoided. The machine would not be able to write the sentence: 'two times red is hard'.

The arguments of this paper link up best with a basic *behaviourist* attitude. We speak not of 'thinking', but straight away of 'speech-thinking', that is, of *statements as physical events*. Whether a perception statement concerning

something past (e.g. 'I heard a melody a while ago') can be traced back to a past speech-thought, or whether past stimuli bring about a response in 'speech-thinking' only at this time, is fundamentally without significance here. All too often the discussion proceeds as if, through the refutation of any individual claims made by behaviourists, the principle were somehow affected that only *physicalist statements* have a meaning, that is, can become part of unified science.

With statements we begin, with statements we end everything. There are no 'clarifications' that would not be physicalist statements. If 'clarifications' are understood as calls for a certain attentive focus, then like whistles or caresses they cannot be logically analysed. All science is about the physicalist language, *unified language*: no 'phenomenal language' beside the 'physical language'; no 'methodical solipsism' beside another possible standpoint; no 'philosophy'; no 'theory of knowledge'; no 'new worldview' beside other worldviews; *only unified science* with its laws and predictions.



Otto Neurath 1932–3, 'Protocol Statements' ['Protokollsätze'],
Erkenntnis, 3: 91–9

In the interest of scientific work, more and more formulations in the unified language of unified science are becoming increasingly precise. No term of unified science, however, is free from imprecision, since all terms are based on terms that are essential for *protocol statements*, whose imprecision must be immediately obvious to everyone.

The fiction of an ideal language composed of pure atomic statements is as metaphysical as the fiction of Laplace's 'spirit'. Scientific language, with its ever-growing systematic symbol formations, cannot be regarded as an approximation to such an ideal language. The statement, 'Otto observes an angry man', is less precise than the statement, 'Otto observes a thermometer registering 24 degrees'; but 'Otto' itself is in many respect an imprecise term; the statement, 'Otto observes', can be replaced by the statement, 'The man whose carefully taken photo is No. 16 in the file, observes'; but the term 'photo No. 16 in the file' has not yet been replaced by a system of mathematical formulas that takes the place of 'Otto', 'angry Otto', 'kind Otto', etc.

What is first given us is our historical ordinary language with a plenitude of imprecise, unanalysed terms ['*Ballungen*'].

We start by purifying this ordinary language of metaphysical elements and thus arrive at the physicalist ordinary language. A list of forbidden words can serve us well in doing this.

In addition, there is the physicalist language of advanced science that we can design to be free of metaphysics from the very start. It is in our power to accomplish this within only some of the special sciences, indeed only in parts of these sciences.

If we want to embrace the entire unified science of our age, we must combine terms of ordinary and advanced scientific languages, since in practice the terms of both languages overlap. There are certain terms that are used only in ordinary language, while others occur only in scientific language, and finally there are terms that appear in both. In a scientific treatise that touches upon the whole range of unified science, therefore, only a 'jargon' that contains terms of both languages will do.

We expect that it will be possible to replace each word of the physicalist ordinary language by terms of scientific language – just as it is also possible to formulate the terms of scientific language with the help of terms of ordinary language. We are not very used to the latter and sometimes do not find it easy. Einstein can somehow be expressed by means of Bantu language, but not Heidegger, unless one first introduces misuses into the Bantu language, which have been adapted to those of the German. A physicist should, in principle, be

able to satisfy the thinker of wit's demand that: 'It must be possible to make the main features of any strictly scientific theory plain to a hackney-coach-driver in his own language'.

Highly scientific and ordinary languages are in harmony today especially in the field of calculation with figures. But even the expression 'two times two is four' – a tautology – is linked to protocol statements in the system of radical physicalism. Tautologies are defined by statements that record what effect tautologies have if they are inserted as additional stimuli by certain commands under distinct conditions: 'Otto says to Karl: go outside when the flag waves *and* two times two is four'. The effect of the command is not affected by the addition of the tautology.

Even on the basis of the strictest scientific principle, in unified science, we can only use a 'universal jargon'. Since there is as yet no agreement as to what it should be like, each scholar who turns to these problems must use a universal jargon for which he largely must create some new terms.

There is no way to finally establish pure protocol statements as starting points of the sciences. There is no *tabula rasa*. We are like sailors who have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being able to put it into dry-dock and reconstruct it from the best parts. Only metaphysics can disappear without a trace. Imprecise 'verbal constellations' [*Ballungen*] are somehow always part of the ship. If imprecision is diminished at one place, it may well reappear at another place to a stronger degree.

We will teach children from the onset of their education the universal jargon – purged of metaphysics – as the language of unified science, which has been historically provided. Each child can thus be 'trained' to start with a simplified universal jargon and gradually advance to the universal jargon of adults. It makes no sense in our discussion to segregate this children's language as a special language. Otherwise one would have to distinguish all sorts of universal jargons. The child does not learn a 'primitive' universal jargon from which the grown-up's universal jargon derives; the child learns a 'poorer' universal jargon, which is gradually enriched. The term 'ball of iron' is also used in adults' language; while here it is defined by a sentence in which words like 'radius' and 'pi' occur, in the definition for children, words like 'nine-pens', 'gift from uncle Rudi', etc., occur.

But 'uncle Rudi' is not absent from the language of strict science either, if the physical ball is defined by protocol statements in which 'uncle Rudi' appears as an 'observer' who 'perceives a ball'.

Carnap, however, speaks of a '*primitive*' protocol language.⁴ His remarks on the '*primitive*' protocol language, on the protocol statements that 'require no

4 Carnap 1934, pp. 42 ff., 76 ff.

verification', are only marginal to his significant anti-metaphysical expositions where the basic idea is not touched by the misgivings brought forward here. Carnap speaks of a 'first language', also called 'language of experience' or 'phenomenalist language'. Here he stresses that 'the question of a more precise characterisation of this language cannot yet be answered at the present state of inquiry'.

These remarks might induce younger people to search for this protocol language, and this easily leads to metaphysical detours. Although metaphysics essentially cannot be defeated by arguments, it is important for the sake of the vacillators to press for physicalism in its most radical version.

Leaving tautologies aside, unified science consists of factual statements. These are either (a) protocol statements, or (b) non-protocol statements.

Protocol statements are factual statements of the same linguistic form as other factual statements, but a personal name always occurs, often several times, within them in a definite connection with other terms. A complete protocol statement, for example, might be worded like this: 'Otto's protocol at 3:17 o'clock: [Otto speech-thinking at 3:16 o'clock was: (at 3:15 o'clock there was a table in the room perceived by Otto)]'. This factual statement is so constructed that, after 'deletion of the brackets', further factual statements appear, which, however, are not protocol statements: 'Otto's speech-thinking was at 3:16 o'clock: (at 3:15 o'clock there was a table in the room perceived by Otto)', and further: 'At 3:15 o'clock there was a table in the room perceived by Otto'.

From the start, each of the terms occurring in these statements can be replaced, to a certain degree, by a group of terms of the highly scientific language. Instead of 'Otto' a system of physicalist definitions can be introduced; this system of physicalist definitions can be further defined by the 'place' of the name 'Otto' in a group formed of the names 'Karl', 'Heinrich', etc. All words used in the protocol statement above either are words of the universal jargon or can easily be replaced by words of the universal jargon from the outset.

It is *essential* for a complete protocol statement that the name of a person occurs in it. 'Now joy' or 'now red circle' or 'a red cube is lying on the table' are not complete protocol statements.⁵ Even as expressions within the innermost brackets they are not acceptable. According to our version it should at least be said – in rough correspondence with children's language – 'Otto now joy', 'Otto sees a red circle now', 'Otto sees a red cube lying on the table now'. That is, for the protocol statement to be complete, the expression within the innermost bracket is a statement that again features a personal name and a term that

5 See Carnap 1934, pp. 46–7.

belongs to the sphere of perception terms. The extent to which ordinary terms or highly scientific terms are used is of no essential importance, since linguistic usages within the universal jargon are highly flexible.

The expression after the first bracket, 'speech-thinking' recommends itself; this becomes apparent if one wants to form different groups of sentences, for example, sentences with 'reality terms', with 'hallucination terms', with 'dream terms', and especially if, moreover, one wants to segregate 'untruth'. One could say, for example: 'Though Otto's "speech-thinking" as: In the room there was only a bird perceived by Otto, he wrote down, as a joke: In the room there was only a table perceived by Otto'. This is important, especially for the discussions in the next section, in which we reject Carnap's claim that protocol statements are statements that 'need no verification'.

The process of change in the sciences is like this: statements that were used at a certain period drop out at a later period and are often replaced by other statements. Sometimes the wording remains, but the definitions are changed. *Each law and each physicalist statement of unified science, or one of the factual sciences, is subject to such change. The same is true for each protocol statement.*

In unified science we try to create a *consistent system* of protocol statements (including laws). When a new statement is presented to us, we compare it with the system at hand and check whether or not the new statement is in contradiction with the system. If the new statement is in contradiction with the system, we can discard this statement as unusable ('false'), for example, the statement: 'In Africa lions sing only in major chords'; however, one can also 'accept' the statement and change the system accordingly so that it remains consistent if this statement is added. The statement may then be called 'true'.

The fate of being discarded may befall even a protocol statement. There is no 'noli me tangere' for any statement, though Carnap claims it for protocol statements. An especially drastic example: Let us assume that we know a scholar called Kalon who can write with both hands simultaneously, and that he writes with his left hand: 'Kalon's protocol at 3 hours, 17 minutes: [Kalon's speech-thinking was at 3 hours, 16 minutes 30 seconds: (At 3 hours, 16 minutes, there was *only* a table in the room perceived by Kalon)]', and with his right hand: 'Kalon's protocol at 3 hours, 17 minutes [Kalon's speech-thinking was at 3 hours, 16 minutes, 30 seconds: (At 3 hours, 16 minutes there was *only* a bird in the room perceived by Kalon)]'. What can either he or we do with these two protocol statements? We can, of course, make statements of the following kind: Certain marks are on paper, sometimes shaped like this, sometimes shaped like that. With reference to these marks on paper the word 'verification' used by Carnap can, however, find no application. 'Verification' can only be used with reference to 'statements', that is, with reference to rows of signs that can be used in

the context of a test as to how one reacts to that reference [*Reaktionsprüfung*], and can be systematically replaced by other signs. 'Synonymous statements' are to be defined as stimuli which when tested for response evoke comparable responses. Strings of 'ink blobs on paper' and strings of 'air perturbations', which can be considered equal under certain circumstances, are called statements.

Two conflicting protocol statements cannot be used in the system of unified science. Though we cannot say which of the two statements is to be excluded, or whether both are to be excluded, we can be sure that both cannot be 'verified' together, that is, it is not the case that both statements can be incorporated into the system.

If, in such a case, a protocol statement has to be given up, why not also when contradictions appear among protocol statements developed over a long argument, on the one hand, and a system of protocol statements and non-protocol statements (laws, etc.), on the other hand? According to Carnap, we could only be forced to change non-protocol statements and laws. *In our view, the cancelling of protocol statements is a possibility as well.* It is part of the definition of a statement that it requires verification and therefore can be cancelled.

Carnap's claim that protocol statements 'need no verification', however it may be understood, can easily be related to traditional philosophy's belief in 'immediate experience'. For these there were of course certain 'ultimate elements' out of which the 'world picture' was composed. According to this traditional philosophy, these 'atomic experiences' were obviously above any criticism and required no verification.

Carnap tries to introduce a kind of 'atomic protocol' by demanding that 'a strict differentiation be made between the making of a protocol and the processing of the statement in the scientific procedure'. According to him, this will be achieved by 'not adopting any statements gained indirectly with this process into the protocol'.⁶ The formulation of a complete protocol statement given above shows that insofar as personal names occur in protocol statements, 'processing' must *always* have taken place. In scientific protocols it may be useful to phrase the expression within the innermost brackets as simply as possible, for example: 'At 3 o'clock Otto was seeing red', and a further protocol: 'At 3 o'clock Otto was hearing c sharp', etc.; but such a protocol is not 'primitive' in Carnap's sense, because one cannot get around the 'Otto' and the 'perceiving'.

6 Carnap 1932, p. 437. [This passage is given in Max Black's translation as follows: "A 'primitive' protocol will be understood to exclude all statements obtained indirectly by induction or otherwise and postulates therefore a sharp (theoretical) distinction between the raw material of scientific investigation and its organization" (Carnap 1934, p. 43)].

Within the universal jargon there are no statements that could be characterised as 'more primitive', all are factual statements of equal primitiveness; in all factual statements words occur like 'men', 'acts of perception' and other words of little primitiveness, at least under the presuppositions from which they are derived. *That is to say, there are neither 'primitive protocol statements' nor any statements that 'do not require verification'.*

The universal jargon, in the sense explained above, is the same for the child and for the adult. It is the same for a Robinson Crusoe as for a human society.

If Robinson wants to join what is in his protocol of yesterday with what is in his protocol of today, that is, if he wants to make use of a language at all, he must make use of the 'intersubjective' language. The Robinson of yesterday and the Robinson of today stand in precisely the same relation in which Robinson stands to Friday. Let us assume a man who 'has lost his memory' and 'his eyesight', and at the same time learns to read and write anew. His own notes of earlier times, which he can read with the help of special apparatus, will for him be those of 'another' person as much as the notes of any contemporary. This remains true even if afterwards he becomes aware of the continuity of fate and writes his own biography.

In other words, *every language as such* is 'intersubjective'; it must be possible to incorporate the protocols of one moment into the protocols of the next moment, just as the protocols of *A* can be incorporated into the protocols of *B*. *Therefore it does not make sense to speak of monologising [private] languages*, as Carnap does, nor of different protocol languages that are later related to each other. The protocol languages of the Robinson of yesterday and of today are as close or distant as those of Robinson and Friday. If, under certain circumstances, one calls Robinson's protocol language of yesterday and today *the same language*, and *under the same conditions*, one can call Robinson's and Friday's the same language.

Also in Carnap's writings we encounter the emphasis on the 'I' familiar to us from idealist philosophy. In the universal jargon, one cannot speak meaningfully of one's 'own' ['*eigienen*'] protocol, nor of 'now' and 'here'. In physicalist language, personal names are replaced by coordinates and coefficients of physical states. One can only distinguish an 'Otto-protocol' from a 'Karl-protocol', but in the universal jargon, not one's 'own protocol' from 'another's protocol'. The whole problematic connected with one's 'own mind' and 'other minds' does not arise.

The 'methodological' solipsism and 'methodological' positivism⁷ do not become more usable by the addition of the word 'methodological'.

7 Carnap 1932, p. 461.

If, for example, I had said earlier: 'Today, 27 July, I am busy with protocols of my own and of others', it would more be more correct to say: 'Otto Neurath's protocol at 10am, July 27, 1932: [Otto Neurath's speech-thinking at 9 hours, 55 minutes was: (Otto Neurath occupied himself between 9 hours, 40 minutes and 9 hours, 54 minutes with a protocol by Neurath and with a protocol by Kalon both of which contained the following two sentences ...)]'. Although Otto Neurath words the protocol concerning the application of the protocols, he incorporates his own protocol into the system of unified science in the same way as that of Kalon. It may very well happen that Neurath deletes one of Neurath's protocol statements and adopts one of Kalon's in its place. That a man clings more obstinately to his own protocol statements than to those of another, in general, is a historical fact – without any fundamental significance for our discussion. Carnap's contention: 'Each individual can only use his own protocol as a basis' cannot be accepted, for his argument is *not* conclusive: s_1 can certainly utilise s_2 's protocol, and this utilisation becomes especially simple through the incorporation of both protocol languages into the physical language. Still, it is made indirectly: s_1 has to describe in his protocol that he sees a piece of writing of such and such a shape.⁸ But Neurath has to give the same description of Neurath's protocol as of Kalon's protocol. He describes how he sees the Neurath-protocol as well as how he sees the Kalon-protocol.

In further developments the protocol statements of all men will be treated alike. Fundamentally, it makes no difference at all whether Kalon works with Kalon's or with Neurath's protocols, or whether Neurath occupies himself with Neurath's or with Kalon's protocols. In order to make this quite clear, one could think of a scientific rectification machine into which protocol statements are thrown. The 'laws' and other 'factual statements', including 'protocol statements', which have their effect through the arrangement of the wheels of the machine, rectify the stock of protocol statements thrown in and make a bell ring when a 'contradiction' appears. Now either the protocol statement has to be replaced by another or the machine has to be reconstructed. *Who* reconstructs the machine, *whose* protocol statements are thrown in, is of no consequence at all; everybody can test his 'own' as well as 'other' protocol statements.

To sum up:

Unified science uses a universal jargon in which terms of the physicalist ordinary language also must occur.

8 Ibid.

Children are to be trained in the use of universal jargon. Apart from it we do not use any especially separable 'primitive' protocol statements, not 'protocol languages of different persons'.

Within unified science we have no use for the terms 'methodological solipsism' or 'methodological positivism'.

It is impossible to start from finally secured, pure protocol statements. Protocol statements are factual statements like other factual statements, in which personal names or names of groups of persons appear in a certain connection with other terms that are also otherwise used by the universal jargon.

The work of the Vienna Circle is concentrating more and more on the task of presenting unified science (sociology as well as chemistry, biology as well as mechanics, psychology – preferably called behaviouristic – as well as optics) in a unified language, and of creating the often neglected 'cross-connections' between the individual sciences so that it is possible to relate the terms of each science to the terms of every other science without effort. The word 'man', which is connected with 'making statements', is to be defined in the same way as the word 'man' that occurs in statements containing words like 'economic order', 'production', etc.

The Vienna Circle has received powerful stimuli from different sides. The achievements of Mach, Poincaré, and Duhem were utilised, as well as the contributions of Frege, Schröder, Russell, and others. Wittgenstein had an uncommonly stimulating effect both insofar as what was accepted from him and what was rejected. His first attempt to use philosophy as a necessary *ladder of clarification*, however, can be regarded as having failed. What matters in all scientific work is to establish harmony between the statements of unified science: protocol statements and non-protocol statements. For this purpose, a 'logical syntax' is needed, which is the main issue of Carnap's work; Carnap has created the first preparations for this in his 1928 book *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*.

The discussion begun here – Carnap will certainly find all sorts of things to correct and supplement in these corrections – serves, as do so many other efforts of ours, to reinforce the broad common basis of work done by us, the physicalists. Such marginal debates will play an ever-decreasing role. The rapid progress of the work of the Vienna Circle shows that the *planned collective work* devoted to the construction of unified science is in continuous development. We physicalists will succeed in this construction the more quickly and thoroughly, the less time we have to devote to the elimination of old errors and the more we can occupy ourselves with the formulation of scientific correlations. For this purpose we have to learn above all to make use of the *physicalist language*; this is what Carnap advocates in his article.

Rudolf Hilferding

The two essays translated as offerings in comprehending Hilferding's theoretical bent of mind, and his key contributions to Marxist theory and the Social Democratic movement are, first, the Preface to his *Finance Capital* published in 1909, and secondly, an article written in the midst of the war in 1915.

The Preface to *Finance Capital* enables us to see Hilferding's conceptual care and rigour in defining economic processes. His conceptual distinctions in revealing the development of the capitalist economy from industrial to finance capitalism established, for his generation, the lenses for examining the objective economic praxis of those who controlled the economy of his time. The science of prediction of capitalist developments was thereby prepared to comprehend the economic forces in play with a rigour not yet even approached by the normative bourgeois economic theories.

The article in *Der Kampf* of 1915 examines the social psychology of capitalist subjection that was promulgated by the social imperialist propaganda, generated even by the German and Austrian German Social Democratic Parties. Hilferding uses the explicit term 'social psychology', only recently made a public expression by William McDougall in his 1909 publication *Introduction to Social Psychology*. The nominalist penchant of Hilferding's thought incorporated this term into a Marxist examination of the effects of praxis within the capitalist world, and thereby makes clear how words and pedagogy can reorient Marxists towards the principled ground for their objective choices of action.



Rudolf Hilferding 1968, 'Preface', *Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Development of Capitalism* [*Das Finanzkapital: eine Studie über die jüngste Entwicklung des Kapitalismus*], Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, pp. 17–21

In the following pages the attempt shall be made to arrive at a scientific understanding of the economic characteristics of the latest capitalist development. That means bringing these characteristics within the theoretical system of classical political national economy, which begins with William Petty and finds its supreme expression in Marx. The most characteristic features of 'modern' capitalism are those processes of concentration which, on the one hand, 'eliminate free competition' through the organisation of cartels and trusts, and on

the other, increase bank and industrial capital into an ever more intimate relationship. Through this relationship capital takes on the form of finance capital, its most mature and most abstract expression.

The mysterious aura that always surrounds the position of capital becomes more inscrutable than ever in this case. The distinctive movement of finance capital, which seems to be independent although in reality it is a reflection of the diverse forms in which this movement fulfills itself; the dissociation and relative independence of this movement from that of industrial and commercial capital – these are all processes which it becomes more urgent to analyse the more rapidly finance grows, and the greater the influence it exercises on the current phase of capitalism. No understanding of present-day economic tendencies, and thus no address of scientific economics or politics, is possible without knowledge of the laws and functioning of finance capital.

The theoretical analysis of these processes must take up the question of the interconnection of all these phenomena, and thus lead to an analysis of bank capital and its relation to the other forms of capital. One must investigate whether the juristic forms in which industrial enterprises are established have a specific economic significance; which the economic theory of the joint stock company may also inform. The relation of bank capital to industrial capital in its mature form evidences the same relationships that can be discerned in the more elementary forms of money and productive capital. Thus, there emerges the problem of the nature and function of credit, which in turn can be dealt with only after the role of money has been clarified. This task was all the more important because, since the formulation of the Marxian theory of money, many important problems have emerged, particularly in the monetary systems of Holland, Austria, and India, which monetary theory up to now has apparently been incapable of solving. It was this situation which led Knapp,¹ acute though he was in his appreciation of the problems raised by modern monetary experience, to attempt to set aside any kind of economic explanation, and replace it by a juristic terminology which can indeed provide no explanation, and thus no scientific understanding, but may at least offer the possibility of a neutral and unprejudiced description. A more incisive treatment of the problem of money was necessary because only with empirical evidence can we provide a valid theory of value, which is fundamental to any system of economics. Furthermore, only a valid analysis of money enables us to understand the role of credit and thereby the elementary forms of the relations between bank and industrial capital.

1 See Knapp 1921 [1895].

The plan of this study took shape out of these very necessities. The analysis of money is followed by an investigation of credit. Connected to this are the theory of the joint stock company and the analysis of bank capital in its relation to industrial capital. This leads in turn to an examination of the stock exchange in its role as a 'capital market'. The commodity market, however, embracing as it does the activities of both money capital and commercial capital, requires a separate treatment. The progress of industrial concentration has been accompanied by an increasing coalescence between bank and industrial capital. This makes it imperative to undertake a study of the processes of concentration and the direction of their development, and particularly their culmination in cartels and trusts. The expectations harboured for the 'regulation of production', and thus for the continuance of the capitalist system, to which the growth of monopolies has given rise, and to which some people attribute great significance in connection with the problem of the trade cycle, require an analysis of crises and their causes. With this, the theoretical part of the work is completed. Yet, since the developments studied at this theoretical level also exert a powerful influence on the class structure of society, it seems desirable to conclude our study by tracing their principal influences on the policies of the major classes of bourgeois society.

Marxism has often been attacked for failing to advance economic theory, and there is some objective justification for this complaint. Nevertheless, this failure is very easily explicable. National economic theory, by dint of its infinite complexity, is among the most difficult of scientific enterprises. The Marxist finds himself in a peculiar situation; excluded from the universities, which afford the time required for scientific research, he is obliged to defer his scientific work to those leisure hours that his political struggles may spare him. To require of the active combatants in their societal struggle that their labours contribute to scientific progress as rapidly as those whose contributions are made in the quietude of study would be quite unjust if it did not indicate a respect for their own contributions.

My treatment of economic policy merits perhaps a brief word of explanation, if not justification, given the depth of methodological controversy of recent times. It has been claimed that the study of policy is normative, and determined in the final analysis by valuations; and that inasmuch as such value judgements do not belong to the realm of science, the study of policy questions lies outside the domain of scientific investigation. Naturally, it is impossible here to enter fully into the epistemological controversies about the relation of the normative disciplines to the explanatory sciences, of teleology to causality, and I omit such a discussion all the more readily since Max Adler has thoroughly investigated the problem of causality in the social sciences in the first

volume of the *Marx-Studien*.² Here it is enough to say that so far as Marxism is concerned, the sole aim of any inquiry – even into matters of policy – is the discovery of causal relationships. To know the laws of commodity-producing society is to be able, at the same time, to reveal the causal factors that determine the willed decisions of the various classes of this society. According to the Marxist conception, the explanation of how such class decisions are determined is the task of a scientific, i.e. a causal, analysis of policy. The practice of Marxism, as well as its theory, is free from value judgements.

It is therefore false to suppose, as is widely done *intra et extra muros*, that Marxism is simply identical with socialism. In logical terms, Marxism – considered only as a scientific system, aside from its historical effects – is only a theory of the laws of motion of society. The Marxist conception of history formulates these laws in general terms, and Marxist economics then applies them to the period of commodity production. The socialist outcome is a result of tendencies, which operate in the commodity producing society. But acceptance of the validity of Marxism, which includes the recognition of the necessity of socialism, is neither a matter of value judgement, nor a guide to practical action. For it is one thing to acknowledge a necessity, and quite another thing to work for that necessity. It is quite possible for someone who is convinced that socialism will triumph in the end to join the fight against it. However, the insight into the laws of motion, which Marxism gives, assures a continuing overview to those who accept it, and among the opponents of socialism the most dangerous are certainly those who partake most of the fruits of its knowledge.

The identification of Marxism with socialism is easy to understand. The maintenance of class rule depends upon the condition that its victims believe in its necessity. Awareness of its transitory character itself becomes a cause of its overthrow. Hence the steadfast refusal of the ruling class to acknowledge the contribution of Marxism. Furthermore, the complexity of the Marxist system requires a difficult course of study, which will be undertaken only by those who are not convinced in advance that it will be fruitless or damaging. Thus Marxism, although it is logically an objective, value-free science, has necessarily become, in its historical context, the property of the spokesmen of that class to which its scientific conclusions promise victory. Only in this sense is it the science of the proletariat, in contradistinction to bourgeois economics, while at the same time it adheres faithfully to the requirements of every science in its insistence upon the objective and universal validity of its findings.

2 See Max Adler 1904.

The present work was ready in its main outlines four years ago, but extraneous circumstances have repeatedly delayed its completion. However, I must permit myself the comment that the chapters dealing with monetary problems were finished before the appearance of Knapp's work, which compelled me to make only minor changes and to add some critical remarks. These chapters are also most likely to present difficulties, for in monetary matters, unfortunately, not only pleasure but also theoretical understanding is soon exhausted, as Fullarton was well aware when he lamented:

The truth is that this is a subject on which there can never be any efficient or immediate appeal to the public at large. It is a subject on which the progress of opinion has been and always must be exceedingly slow.³

Things have not gotten better since then. I hasten to assure the impatient reader, therefore, that once the preliminary discussion has been mastered, the rest of the study should not generate complaints about difficulties of comprehension.

Rudolf Hilferding

Berlin-Friedenau, Christmas 1909

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3 Fullarton 1845, p. 5.

Rudolf Hilferding 1915, 'The Work Community of the Classes?', *Der Kampf*, 8(10): 321–9

If someone is of the opinion that the war has dissolved the old contradictions between the opportunism and radicalism within the workers movement, the facts have long been there to instruct him otherwise. The reality is just the opposite. Just in the last years before the war there was evidence that these contradictory movements, which appeared in differing forms within the workers movements of all countries, was diminishing. The war has changed this situation completely. Certainly, not in the direction of a growing mildness so far as the differences perceived in the social contradictions of society are concerned – any illusions to this effect will be markedly dissipated at the conclusion of the war. No, what has occurred is an unexpected victory for the opportunists. Everywhere there is a dictatorship of the right-wing within the party. Yet this should have been expected, as before the war the politics that guided party tactics were towards reform and accommodation within the capitalist society, an acceptance of the powers-that-be, not towards a revolutionary movement whose goal was the renewal of society. One who denies this contradiction in socialist tactics as it existed before the war, and asserts that such tactics during the present war are simply a transitory episode which will be transcended as the war is ended and tactics 'return to normal', either deceives himself or fails to recognise the pre-existing depth of the division between opportunism and radicalism in the past. The attitude towards the war is rather a decision of world-historical importance in the light of the effects of such a decision. The attitude towards the war is the touchstone of the spiritual resistance of the social democratic movement in its convictions as it addresses the hegemonic ideology of capitalism. The attitude towards the war reflects the role of independence that the working class will assume, a presupposition of its political and social emancipation. In this light, the opportunistic ideology is a danger for the future of the workers movement, because of the tendencies of capitalist development that reinforce those elements of the movement, which will hinder the realisation of socialism.

I

The social development of capitalism has, in its essential forms, taken the path foreseen by the genius of the *Communist Manifesto*, who knew of the 'necessary development' that 'Capital' would undergo. But the social-psychological effects of this development on the comportment of the working class were not seen as clearly by him, in that the subjective aspects of communal thought could not be foreseen in its depth and detail, given the objective changes that while

predicted, still lay in the future community life. Marx saw the revolutionary tendencies of capitalism, but that is all; he was still of his own time in gauging the social psychology around him. What he underestimated (yet even we are blind to these aspects of communal life, although we live within them) was the accommodative tendencies to be seen in the struggle of the working class, and the social democratic and union movements in their interface with the capitalist society. To be sure, there has been a moral and material uplifting of the 'vegetating' working class from the depths of misery in which they found themselves in Marx's time, an elevation of the worker from a 'speaking tool' to that of a person, an advance to which capitalism in its processes has itself contributed, offering existence in its fullest sense for the working classes for the first time. Capitalism in its processes has enabled the workers to become strong mentally and physically; indeed it has made them ready for the struggle against their system more self-conscious than any hitherto repressed class of society, and yet at the same time, by dint of this elevation, it has watered down the revolutionary fervour of that workforce. The worst aspects of their existence, the death of their children and they themselves from hunger and neglect, have been overcome because of the processes of capitalism, which have inevitably empowered them. The political and union battles whose ground was obtained through capitalist development in its processes have made impoverishment an impossibility, yet making the workers movement thereby doubt the need for revolution, even while these masses are kept in an uncultivated subjection. To say it paradoxically: the counter-revolutionary effects of the workers movement have weakened the revolutionary tendencies of capitalism.

The newest phase of high capitalist development creates from its processes still other conservative tendencies. The rapid development of world capitalism since the middle of the 1890s has shortened periods of depression, and tempered unemployment. The developed capitalist countries – Germany and the United States – had no reserve workforce in the traditional sense, rather they needed a continual infusion of foreign workers in both agriculture and industry, especially in times of economic crisis. Finance capital – the control of monopolised, organised industry by a small group of large banks – had the tendency to ameliorate the anarchy of production, and contained in itself the germs of a transformation of anarchistic capitalism into an organised-capitalistic economic order. The immense growth in the power of the state, which finance capital and its politics created, moved in the same direction. In place of the victory of socialism, a society appeared that was organised, but in an authoritarian manner, not democratically, particularly in its economic form. At the head of this organised economy were the unified powers of

the capitalist monopolies in conjunction with state authorities, under which were the working masses lower on the hierarchical division as employees in the production process. Instead of the overcoming of the capitalist society by socialism, the material needs of the masses were seen by them as better realised through accommodation to the societal structure of organised capitalism.

And the events of the war – when one looks beyond the democratic-proletarian resistance to it – only strengthen these tendencies. What one now calls ‘War Socialism’ – which is only a monstrous strengthening of capitalism through the power of its organisation – causes this direction. And through the massive increase of its self-conscious power within the authority of the state, its ability to wield its financial bases (state monopolies!) only furthers these tendencies.

Thus, now we see within the leadership of the working class an ideology arise, which must contribute to the furtherance of this development. One hears this leadership preaching to the working class that their interests are congruent with the authoritative levels of society, especially with the state as a whole. The thought of any contradiction between immense power of the state as an imperialist power and the democratic transformation of internal and external politics recedes behind the hope for satisfying one’s immediate material interests through measures of social reformism. In other words: the battle for democracy itself steps back, and its realisation through socialism ceases to be an immediate, practical goal of proletarian politics. And this in a time where the foundational meaning of democracy, in contradistinction to the power politics of the ruling hegemony, should be the condition of peace between the nations – indeed, should be sought in order to maintain and rebuild the International. The solution of the one, i.e. democracy, is at the same time the solution for the other so dependent upon it, Internationalism. The issue then is whether the future will see the strengthening of organised state capitalism or democratic socialism. If one moves democracy to the rear and social politics to the foreground, expecting thereby to realise the immediate material interests of proletarian daily life – experiencing little resistance in this policy – there will be no change in the power relationships of the classes within contemporary society. And there can be no doubt then that this politics of resignation or, better said, of a false understanding of the harmony of interests will be supported by the German working class.

If this is indeed the case, then a taking up of the issues presented by these politics is the most pressing task within the party now, as these issues have been present within the workers movement since its very inception. It does

a greatest disservice to the working class to hinder or limit the discussion of such a serious, historically important conflict, especially the poisoning of the discussion by undue suspicions over motives that may be in play among the differing associations within the state.

However, it would be quite 'un-Marxist' to imagine that theoretical arguments or a simple appeal to democracy could convince the parties of our understanding. We know how bourgeois democracy and liberalism, which has pursued the satisfaction of the material interests of the bourgeoisie in Germany, has lost its own power. If we harbour hope that we will succeed in realising proletarian democracy, preserving our efforts from a similar fate as theirs, these hopes cannot be founded in our conviction of the merit of our arguments, nor in the passion of our convictions concerning the necessity of democracy – which burn hotter than ever before – rather, above all, in the insight that it will be just through the effects of the war itself (which are not apparent at the moment) that the working class will become convinced that the principal politics and tactics that we represent alone are those to be preserved, corresponding as they do to our enduring interests.

We must follow the lead of Marx himself as he held forth in the *Communist Manifesto* in regard to the momentary interests of the proletariat in relation to their necessary understanding of their long-term interests. We must represent the advance guard of the proletariat in this long-range vision. Whatever the socialist opportunists may imagine insofar as the short- or long-term viability of their positions are concerned, the working class must be guided against any accommodation to capitalism. We have no doubt that the decision of the masses will be finally for us, and thereby for democratic socialism. It would be hypocrisy not to state that our pride and our defiance remain intact despite the most repressive experiences. Our theoretical consciousness knows our true interests, that is, our awareness of the historical necessity and the world-historical mission of the working class.

II

The great significance of the contradictions that exist between the opportunists and the principle conceptions we hold of the next tasks, indeed over the very spirit of proletarian politics are immediately foremost in our mind as we read the recent, singular literary work in which ten Professors and ten Social Democrats write of 'The workforce in a new Germany'. This publication is a kind of literary herald of the future cooperation of the classes. The editor, Dr. Friedrich Thimme, Director of the Archives of the Prussian Herrenhaus, and Comrade Karl Legien, the Director of the General Commission of the German Union Movement, say in their foreword:

One states over and over in this time the wish that a unity and singleness of purpose among the entirety of the German people can result in a future peace, bringing us out of this war and its horrific events. But the doubt has been expressed as to whether such a continuing unity among the people is possible in the face of the many-sided economic and social contradictions, the differences among the classes and the parties, and above all the deep divide between the bourgeois classes and Social Democracy. Only the future will determine between doubt and hope. But nothing can be more important today than the possibility and the conditions under which a spiritual work community among the bourgeois and socialist way of thought can become clear. This knowledge is forthcoming thanks to the efforts of the present contributions.

Certainly, among those who contributed none knew of the other's solutions.

Naturally, the individual collaborators of this volume had no knowledge of each other's contributions, and are only responsible for their own article. The two editors are also independent in their own views, not being able to support or deny the views each other hold. With regard to opinions and views, the editors have given each of the authors a free hand, and have only sought in their editing to avoid a polemic against a particular party or individuals.

Now this abnegation of responsibility cannot literally be upheld throughout the text. When men whose names resonate throughout the workers movement take on a literary enterprise in a cooperative project, seeking to spread their views, they are certainly responsible for the whole, and it is only a personal lack of earnestness that has led them to abjure a public taking-of-responsibility for the publication and its obvious implications. But such a responsibility should be easy to bear as the editors have expressed great satisfaction in the result. On the whole, say Dr. Thimme and Comrade Legien in the foreword, 'despite differences in viewpoint that arise, all the authors see mutually that from such natural differences one can hope for a common, dedicated cooperation in the newly invigorated Germany of the future'.

We also strive to reach such an understanding. Germany has realised its bourgeois revolution not only in fact, as in England and France, but also in its philosophy. It is in accord with our past history that social reformism as it occurs also in England and France among the ministers of the government has begun with us among Professors who have jointly generated a book in common. That is, it is the Professors and not bourgeois politicians, however,

who diminish the actuality of the work community. Surely one understands that it would have been better that instead of Professors from their specific fields, our comrades had brought forth such a community from their politics, and such a community would be more comprehensible when not bourgeois professors, but bourgeois politicians had spoken for an in-common work community. One knew beforehand how, where, and when this might occur if instead of the Professors Heydebrand, Zedlitz, Spahn and Bassermann individually, their views were explicitly associated with Social Democracy. For the views of Professors in the area of politics have the disadvantage of bearing little weight on the difficult actualities of politics. The advantage, on the other hand, is that their standpoints are elevated above the normal day-to-day politics. 'One certainly knows', Börne has said, 'how heavenly high all German Professors stand with their views; for there in the clouds there are no police'. And even when this cynical view of Börne is no longer completely true, as the police have also risen to the same heights of the Professors in their standpoint, indeed everyone today has this height of vision, the reality of a work community in-common found by the Professors is a thing of the clouds until these Professors step into the actualities to support their views. Yet, in today's conditions, the academics are the leading spokespersons of even bourgeois politics, and therefore this writing deserves political significance.

III

What is then meant by their central point – what is this in-common shared by all bourgeois academics? What fills them with such a feeling of happiness, which the historian from the University of Berlin, Professor Meinecke, so enthusiastically articulates? It is the belief that Social Democracy, as Professor Onken expresses it, will never lose the knowledge that the power of the German worker is bound to the power of the German state. In this connection to the historical authorities of power of the state lies the satisfactions of all needs and tendencies of the broad masses in Germany, opines Onken, 'all progress of the classes in the further solution to its mutual problems in the future belong to this understanding. The idea of the state will conquer even in Social Democracy the anti-state manner of thinking and the international orientation of pure Marxism'.

What that means is best developed in the exposition of the Berlin law professor Anschütz, who most concretely puts forward the political problems.

The state as it exists in the capitalist society is above all an authoritative organisation within, and an organisation of power towards other states. The idea of democratic socialism is to transform the state into a self-administration of those to be without class of their own production with a consciousness of

their interests, regulating the entire society according to their mutual needs. The removal of class contradictions eliminates the capitalistic conflicts of interest that produce the contradictions within the society, and thus makes an organisation of power superfluous. The war, however, has heightened the existing dominating power politics, making the politics of democracy the most exigent political problem for the people of the nation.

Given that, we can see more clearly the position of the Professors in relation to this problem. Professor Anschütz writes at the beginning of his essay, 'Thoughts on the future reforms of the state':

Whoever has thoughts about the future of our internal politics in its directions and goals, with regard to German reforms of state, must begin with the inexorable understanding that the highest of all necessities of state is the means of power which our fatherland requires to preserve its independence and strength and its meaning in the world. Herein we wish to preserve a unity of thought, especially during the war, but also after the war. We do not want a 'new orientation', but rather a simple holding-fast to the great foundational principle: the fatherland above all else, with all power and means which are required to preserve it, to raise it higher. Whoever is not capable of this understanding cannot be given license by us to speak any further, for in the construction and improvement of our house advice can be taken only from those who wish to allow the house to stand, not from those who would tear it down, who would destroy it.

We speak with a decisiveness and determination: The care for the strongest of all state powers, that of the weaponed power, the army and the navy, must for now and the future stand in the centre of our internal programme for the state. We should not shy away from the slogan that anyone who thinks this way must also know that they are hated and scorned by our enemies – and we should not deceive ourselves – also by the greater part of the still neutral world, who accuse us of a disastrous militarism. Yet this belongs to the very formative factors of our state's being, a life necessity in every sense of the word. We must cleave to this steadfastly! And the word 'militarism' must be to us a word of honour (even as it is a despised word to the whole world, and not least of all to those who are more military than we are or who would like to be).

We must on land and sea remain militarily strong, indeed even stronger than any nation of like size ... The defence power of our people will in the future, by all estimation, be more strongly exercised than before the war, indeed it must be exercised to its full employment for all the available military forces and capabilities at hand for the nation. This means above

all the tireless realisation of the principles of a universal defence by arms, which until now has merely been a fact expressed on paper ... With the strengthening of our armed forces on land, our navy powers must experience a similar strengthening. The current law concerning the fleet must be changed; the experiences of the war demand a new plan for the organisation of the fleet.

This enthusiastic recognition of the dominating power politics of the present, this unreserved affirmation of the imperialist position of state power, is, for Anschütz and the other Professor, a self-evident presupposition of all other reform activities. It is characteristic for Anschütz, as well as the others, that these prerequisites for reform, never entertained before by Social Democracy, create new enemies of the realm who will not be allowed to speak in a conversation over the reconstruction of the realm, voices of the courageous ideologues of existing praxis, the brave Social Democrats who have been jurors, state officials, reserve officers, indeed professors themselves, the most outspoken of whom should be put in prison.

But we satisfy ourselves now chiefly with having established that the worker community inaugurated here in a one-sided manner will be dominated by a politics that has not been changed in its essentials. Let us look more carefully into its details of the reforms that are brought forward from this position. Herr Anschütz presents a lengthy and detailed state programme whose intentions are to strengthen the Empire, and to limit Prussian dominance:

The leadership of the Empire must be the government of the Empire. The Emperor is at its helm, governing through the ministry, the Chancellor and his state secretaries (whose responsibilities towards the legislature must be sharpened and facilitating measures taken to insure these responsibilities). The Upper house [*Bundesrat*] must become more closely associated with Parliament than its current authority as a governing body, stepping into a coordinative role with the legislature [*Reichstag*]. It can be an Upper House of the Empire whose responsibilities include oversight of the functions of the state system of justice. By these changes the Emperor will truly for the first time fulfill tasks which he presently does not fulfill: to be a monarchic executive of the realm, of the entirety of the German people. The elevation of the Imperial power is surely in the interest of the overwhelming majority of the people – especially when its authority through the ministries is brought more closely into constitutional relation to parliamentarianism. A German Imperial government, genuinely monarchical with constitutional integrity is the goal of

the future. It was the dream of our Fathers, who in the year 1848 and 1849 sought German unity and freedom for the first time, and brought forward the plan of the Frankfurt Assembly: Empire upon the basis of democracy enabled with democratic provisions.

To achieve these goals, the reform of the Prussian election laws would also be necessary. The ideal would be the expansion of the election laws of the Empire that extended to Prussia. If this was not achievable, said Professor Anschütz, then one should be satisfied with partial reforms. The first and minimal change would be the introduction of the direct and secret ballot. Then would come 'a plural or multiple determination vote (which would extend beyond the individual who held it) or in the worst case a wider, democratic set of boundaries for those who were authorised to vote'. Too heavy a representation by Social Democracy need not be feared. For: 'is not the will of the representative house in Prussian law required to have the authorisation of the upper house and the ministries of state?' And in fact, even when the plan of another Professor realises that in the upper house workers could sit, the chamber remains preserved from too great an influence by Social Democracy.

Elevation of the Emperor, transformation of the single chamber system into a two chamber system in the Empire, the right for a plurality vote in Prussia – this is everthing which can begin reasoned progress, the dreams of 1848 to be repeated in the future as the prospect to be achieved – and at the same time this becomes the foundation for the achievement of the worker community of classes. My God, what more can one expect?

Of course, the majority is taken care of. Among the cooperating Professors there are a number of Academic Socialists [*Kathedersozialisten*] who also spoke for social reform before the war. They see from the war experiences the justice, indeed a new evidence of the utility of social reform for even the goals of state power. Thus, they speak in their essays for the continuation and further development of social reform – even when one could ask for a more precise, more focused set of measures, as well as a shortening of the workday, which somehow is overlooked. They expect that the attitude of Social Democracy, namely the unions, will eliminate state authority's resistance to social politics and the free expression of the workers associations. Several of them even go a step further and see in the tendencies of state capitalism a welcome compromise between the individual bourgeois and socialist proletarian principles. They regard with trust the positive cooperation with the workforce in all areas of activity, and further, therefore, the equality of the worker in politics and administration. Jaffé even sees in the pure economic activity of the working class an instance in which there is an apparent overrating of political activity by them, a concep-

tion which is to be expected by thinkers like him, as for them the politics is the principle question, the lever by which the victory of state power is to be achieved, as the war has shown.

Fundamentally, we see here the old lesson of the social monarchy of the Hohenzollerns, which arises here in an impersonal conception, disrobed from its polemical form assumed earlier in the attacks against Social Democracy; and, so presented, one should not expect a rejection of this former policy to continue. And in consequence of this acknowledgement and acceptance of the current direction of state there opens between Social Democrats and Professors upon the ground of social reform a 'workers community in the new Germany'. And certainly, this entry of the Professors for political equality and social reform is to be welcomed, if only the influence of the leading capitalist levels of society and their political representatives were not so highly esteemed.

IV

How do things stand, however, in this book with the representatives of the Social Democratic worldview, the ten of them who were called upon to speak? It is embarrassing to address them. Ten socialists and not one word of socialism, ten democrats and no word of democracy! Or at times a word is dropped in these respects here and there, but they lack inspiration. Not that our leaders of the socialist viewpoint in this text have said anything against our programme or our party vision. The demands that we have, insofar as the state's social politics are concerned or on the policies within the nation's communities, are discussed thoroughly and knowledgeably. Political equality in the state is deliberated as something that is self-evidently understood. The discussion of the activities of Social Democracy in its cooperation with the conduct of the war is thoroughly dealt with as well, indeed it is described with great satisfaction. Comrade Noske writes:

German Social Democracy accommodates itself to the hard necessity. The assertion, however, that the Social Democratic cooperation was duplicitous, made solely to preserve political associations and newspapers that served millions and employed thousands, and to protect the unions from any disadvantage that might come from resistance to the policies of war, is totally false. Far more our actions must be understood as arising from honest conviction, from the desire to avoid any harm to German interests, and with the ceaseless dedication of our strength, the sacrifice of our blood, for the Good that ensues with preserving the people and the Fatherland from harm.

And further:

From solid conviction the greater part of the Social Democratic press has decidedly stressed the justice of the German-led struggle, as our people are compelled to do their duty. More than a million Social Democratic pages are printed daily with this message. Many thousand exemplars of this press production wound up in the trenches and the front lines. Thus our press enjoyed a special trust from its readers. We secured trust for the Fatherland, awoke understanding for the unavoidable economic hardships which were a consequence of the war, providing solace for the rising resentment and anger each day over the inflation, supporting in its stead a willingness to sacrifice for the struggle, all this the majority of our newspapers provided. Even when we made errors in our reaction to the judgements of our actions by those beyond our nation, or resisted certain inner political measures that were demanded, the Social Democratic press showed itself to be insightful supporters of all things German.

And over the position taken by the unions, Noske wrote:

The German unions have devoted themselves fully to the Fatherland, acting with understanding towards the difficult situation of the entire nation as their membership expresses its wishes and demands. As an economic organisation of struggle they have overcome tremendous obstacles given the assaults upon them by owners, the government, and other authorities, becoming great and strong in these engagements. The best rule of battle has always been to seize the most favourable opportunity and use it to their advantage. But changing conditions during the war have seen even the unions preserve the civil peace [*Burgfrieden*]. Organised labour exercises a renunciation of such tactics in the face of the exigent situation of the Fatherland, despite their own indispensable need to fight for their own advantage, even when they are in the position to do so if they chose to. The organisation gave rather an elevated effort for the Fatherland. They used their great means to ameliorate the angry stirrings of dissatisfaction among their workers, transcending their own rules and boundaries in their support of them in these difficult times. They could have acted differently, but didn't, as one can witness the counter-example in the many demands for higher wages among the unions in England during this war.

Similar discourses are found in most of the other Social Democratic contributions. The most extreme view of the work community of the classes can be found in Winnig's contribution. He writes:

The majority of the nation knows and feels that the fate of the nation and its organisational expressions is that of the state. They no longer regard the state as a super authority over them, rather they recognise the dependence of it upon the effective powers of the people as a whole, and strive more and more to make its being part of themselves. They feel themselves in an economic, political, and cultural sense a participant in the community of the state, bound to it. Their economic well-being depends upon their station within the national economy, which affords them the freedom of movement to develop themselves. Their union organisations can only influence their wages and working possibilities favourably if commercial intercourse is generally furthered throughout the state. Therefore, the mass of the workforce are interested in the fate of the national economy, and consequently on the political viability of the state; thus, they feel the need to defend the state from dangers that threaten externally, and feel themselves in solidarity with entirety of the nation.

Here the harmony of the classes is expressed in a manner that makes concessions to the dominant stance of traditional English trade unionism, but would be appropriate only if Winnig at the same time spoke of the International as the necessary prerequisite for the possibility of such a stance within proletarian class politics in every land. The International would then be the appropriate institution to insure the needed representation of individual demands, that is, political-social demands for all workers, meeting less resistance than the national proletarian associations within the pressures for class harmony. Such international relationships with the national are certainly no more different from international institutions representing agriculture or the bimetallists; if such a counterweight were present, it could be shown that the international sentiments of the proletariat and the national sentiments of the bourgeoisie were not in contradiction.

But these thoughts, which are our own view, stray from the decisive point. We have seen in the expositions of the Professors that they all end up with an enthusiastic confession of support for the dominating power politics. But even then it would not be unwarranted to expect them to represent our worldview as well, that is, an open confession of support for socialism and for democracy. For that, unfortunately, we hear not one word. Of the great new formation of the world to which we the working class are called to take up, especially as the World War has challenged us to address because of its politics, nothing is said. The only reference to the particular foundational principles of socialism, as it affects the relationships among the nations, is written by Professor Meinecke,

and that piece is a polemic against the 'pacifistic' demands of socialists that are contrary to the needed power politics among nations. One does not hear that such a stance, even within the civil peace [*Burgfrieden*], is impossible for our comrades given our beliefs. Perhaps in such a text that could not have been said. But if nothing could be said, then nothing should be said at all. Yet the very outspoken beliefs in power politics contributed by the bourgeois academics show us that our comrades could have said the contrary. In truth, if our views had been articulated, they would have been contrary to the very spirit of this book. If one wants a work community, then one should avoid championing that very issue that divides us from the bourgeoisie. The basic issue that separates the classes today is not that of social reform, nor is it the authorisations of courts or state statutes, nor is it even that of Prussian electoral reform; rather it is the position towards the power of the state: power politics and imperialism, or democracy and socialism. Insofar as our party comrades choose to ignore this as an issue, they have left the political field to the bourgeois Professors without a fight, and they are guilty when at the conclusion of the book – the bourgeoisie have the last word! – Herr Thimme announces the positive political stance of Social Democracy towards the state for future times.

To bring up what should have been said in any depth is not possible here. To show the consequences to socialism, which can be derived from the great current catastrophe that challenges democracy in all its tasks, will be evident in the realities that emerge around us. We must be content here simply to offer a warning of the danger to the very essence of our party as we have known and loved it, the warning evident in the political modesty, resignation, and doubt concerning our real tasks, which can be seen in the discourses of the Social Democrats who contributed to the book in question. And with this warning we exhaust the importance of this book. The spiritual work community can only come to be, in the book's view, on the ground of the bourgeois world, according to all the contributors, the ground of power politics, and that is not the ground of Social Democrats. There are many valid considerations otherwise throughout the book in which the social politics of the Social Democrats and the bourgeois Professors find agreement in terms of goals (albeit with differing motives), but even here the determining opinion of bourgeois society would disagree. And so, the worker community must remain but 'spiritual', because it cannot become an actuality. For the reality after the war will bear little resemblance to that of the war, even as the 'politicians of the real', 'realpolitiker', imagine it will be so.

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